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Writers of golden age crime fiction (1920 to 1945), and in particular female writers, 
have been seen by many critics as socially and politically detached. Their texts have 
been read as morality tales, theoretically rich mise en scenès, or psychic fantasies, by 
necessity emerging from an historical epoch with unique cultural and social 
concerns, but only obliquely engaging with these concerns by toying with unstable 
identities, or through playful, but doomed, private transgressions. The thesis 
overturns assumptions about the crime novel as a negation of the present moment, 
detached and escapist, by demonstrating how crime narratives responded to public 
debates which highlighted some of the most pressing legal and philosophical 
concerns of their time.  
Grounded in meticulous historical research, the thesis draws attention to 
contemporary debates between antagonistic psychological schools – giving equal 
space to debates within psychoanalysis and adaptive neuroscience – and charts how 
these debates were reflected in crime writing. Chapter two explores the contestation 
of the M’Naghten laws on criminal responsibility in light of Ronald True’s case 
(1922), followed by readings of crime narratives in which perpetrators have 
ambiguous and controversial legal status in regard to criminal responsibility. At the 
intersection of psychiatric discourse and the popular literary imagination, a critical 
and ethical perspective developed which not only conveyed a version of 
psychological discourse to a wider public, but profoundly reworked the foundations 
of the genre as the ritual unveiling of deviancy and the restoration of the rational 
institutions of society. In similar vein, chapter three explores the status of the ‘Born 
Criminal’ in law and medicine, and looks at crime writer Gladys Mitchell’s efforts to 
expose both the pitfalls of categorisation, and competing discourses’ limitations in 
adequately accounting for crime. Chapter four, whilst maintaining close medical-
legal focus, opens up the study to consider how understandings of deviant selfhood 
in modernist writing inflected crime writers’ representations of unconscious and 
epileptic killers. Finally, chapter five continues this intertextual approach by 
asserting that certain crime novels express an exhaustion with the genre’s classic 
rational and scientific heroes, and turn instead to the affective epistemologies and 
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notions of subconscious synthesis concomitantly being celebrated in modernist 
writing. Altering the position of the authoritative detective in ways that profoundly 
alter the politics of the form, the chapter and the thesis in total propose a reading of 
golden age crime fiction more responsive to cultural, psychological and legal debates 
of the era, leading to a reassessment of the form as neither escapist nor purely 




Introduction: Whodunit? Why and How. 
The aftermath of the Great War saw the decline of the short story of detection and the 
rise of the mystery novel, and with it, the rise of a new breed of crime writers. Their 
works have been known as formal English detective novels, classic crime fictions, 
whodunits, murder mysteries, clue puzzles, and the ubiquitous golden age mystery. A 
division of mass publishing previously associated with sensational heroism and 
produced by celebrated male authors such as Wilkie Collins and Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle, during the interwar years the genre came to be dominated by immensely popular, 
influential and irreverent female writers, the ‘Queens of Crime’ as they have been 
termed (see Scaggs 26; Munt 7; Shaw and Vanacker 27). Agatha Christie began to 
produce a bestseller on a near yearly basis after the publication of The Mysterious Affair 
at Styles in 1920, while between 1923 and 1939 the poet, scholar, and lay theologian 
Dorothy L. Sayers won acclaim through eleven novels and three short story collections 
featuring her charismatic aristocratic sleuth, Lord Peter Wimsey. Coincident with the 
sustained growth of a female readership supplied with books by local libraries and 
lending services at Boots the Chemists (see Symons 93), these novels frequently located 
criminal deviance in the English country house, drew attention to clues which had 
specific relevance to the home, and placed familial dysfunction at the heart of the 
mystery (see Knight, Form and Ideology in Crime Fiction 109; Munt 8; Thompson 128-
9).  
In a trend started by the hard-boiled crime writer Raymond Chandler in his 1950 
essay, “The Simple Art of Murder,” Sayers, Christie and their peers – most obviously 
Margery Allingham and Ngaio Marsh – have been condemned by some for their so-
termed feminisation of the genre and their light-hearted portrayals of domestic murders. 
Chandler has particular contempt for admirers of the golden age novel, ‘the flustered old 
ladies – of both sexes (or no sex) and almost all ages – who like their murders scented 
with magnolia blossoms and do not care to be reminded that murder is an act of infinite 
cruelty (196-7). Associating golden age tropes with pungently aging femininity and 
masculine lack, Chandler’s criticisms are reiterated in Julian Symons’ 1972 Bloody 
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Murder, in which the author asserts that golden age novels were ‘written specifically for 
maiden aunts,’ (98) and located in a ‘fairy tale’ land in which ‘murder was committed 
again and again without anybody getting hurt’ (104).  
Widely held perceptions of the golden age crime novel persist. It has been 
classed as a ‘cosy’ form (Munt 8), generic, homogeneous (see Munt 7; Shaw and 
Vanacker 10), and ideologically committed to containing deviant elements that threaten 
the bourgeois status quo (see Knight, Form and Ideology 128-9). Alison Light terms the 
clue puzzle novel ‘a literature of convalescence’
 
(65) because in the aftermath of the 
First World War, to a generation experiencing unprecedented social upheaval and the 
psychological repercussions of prolonged and catastrophically deadly conflict, the 
certainty of a resolution to a problem had therapeutic advantages. 
In recent years, feminist scholarship by Sally R. Munt, Gill Plain, Susan 
Rowland, Marian Shaw and Sabine Vanacker, has highlighted instances of gender 
transgression, deviance and heterodoxy in golden age writing. Drawing attention to 
constructions of the body as ‘uncontainable and excessive,’ (Plain 27) their studies in 
various respects address the cultural anxieties to which golden age crime fictions speak, 
and expose the personal and political tensions which underlay these otherwise 
conservative forms of popular writing. By detecting the feminist content of golden age 
narratives, bent as they are on the examination of domestic scenarios, social relations 
and structures of power within the bourgeois and aristocratic home, feminist studies 
have led the way for a revaluation of the crime novels of the interwar years. Probing 
notions of stable identity, gender roles and class positions in pursuit of a malefactor who 
is emphatically not other, but who is part of a social milieu rendered unfamiliar, the 
golden age novel has undeniable subversive potential, even if it is obligatory that the 
transgressor will eventually be captured and ejected. What this scholarship has yet to 
address are approaches to the mental state of the transgressor in crime fiction. This is a 
significant ellipsis, and addressing it will provide a fuller account of the ways in which 
golden age crime fiction responded to contemporary discourses of mental illness, and in 
turn, participated in the scientific and medical discussions of its day. So too will it 
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respond in a meaningful way to recent crime scholarship’s detection of subversive and 
critical tendencies within the form. If mental illness is seen to have been fostered by the 
environment in which the criminal has been nurtured, the bourgeois family for example, 
this provides ample opportunity to critique the social structures which make people so 
unhealthy. If mental ill health, even criminal insanity, is presented as not an acquired 
condition but something inborn, its chance occurrence in otherwise ‘normal’ 
communities presents problems with defining otherness, as the criminal is in the tricky 
position of being at once both culturally inside and biologically outside of the social 
group. The ways in which crime novels represent mental illness and work it into their 
plots are profoundly responsive to social anxieties and social prejudices, and as such a 
necessary point of enquiry precipitated by recent scholarship.  
Building upon, and extending the focus of existing research, this study will 
examine developments in psychiatric and psychological discourses of the pre-war and 
interwar years, in order to contextualise the statements golden age crime writers made 
about human psychology, the motivations of criminals, and the divisions their novels 
make between the normal and abnormal mind. Heightened sensitivity to psychological 
traits and abnormalities defines golden age writing, but no study has yet addressed the 
complexities and the specificities of madness and psychology as they were understood 
during the interwar years, and as they were reflected in crime writing. Plainly, the novels 
of Gladys Mitchell are replete with references to the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund 
Freud, while in the late golden age work of Christianna Brand, the threat of madness 
agitates the psychic landscapes of communities already unsettled by political 
uncertainty, shifting loyalties and unstable social hierarchies. More subtle, and less 
remarked upon, are adaptations to the self-consciously formulaic detective narrative 
made in response to popular perceptions of insanity, debates about criminal 
responsibility and psychiatric discourses. Also demanding enquiry is the inflection of 
crime writing by contemporary modernist writing, which influenced representations of 
selfhood in the popular form. Grounded in historical research and comparative close 
readings, this study seeks to overturn assumptions about the crime novel as a negation of 
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the present moment, detached and escapist, by demonstrating how crime narratives 
responded to public events and cultural innovations which highlighted some of the most 
pressing legal and philosophical concerns of their day. 
 
Focus of the Study  
It is convenient to talk in general about ‘golden age’ crime novels, but throughout this 
study a number of different terms for this school of fiction – including the 
aforementioned ‘clue puzzle’, ‘whodunit’ and ‘murder mystery’ – will be used. This is 
in part to avoid tedious repetition, but also to draw demarcations where possible between 
different types of novel – for example, those in which no murder occurs, which can 
hardly be called murder mysteries, or those in which the enigmatic arrangement of clues 
(the clue-puzzle) takes precedence over the psychological enigma of the killer’s identity 
(the whodunit). It will also help avoid giving the appearance of ‘homogeneity’ which 
Munt sees as defining most critical responses to writings of this period (3). In a number 
of ways, this study will extend the perimeters of the golden age, to discuss works 
authored by writers who only dipped briefly into detective writing, such as Miles 
Franklin and Georgette Heyer, and those who published during the Second World War, 
such as Christianna Brand, and to include works by male authors such as Michael Innes, 
who have not been considered in many of the most recent discussions of the genre. The 
simple reason for this is that some of the most interesting books, and most relevant to the 
argument of this thesis, were authored outside of the traditional ‘golden age’ and, just 
occasionally, by male authors. Although the years between the wars provide a neat 
demarcation, and the commencement of the Second World War a profound reason for 
literary tropes and generic expectations developed during the interwar years to become 
somewhat less than ‘golden’, certain works test these expectations. Brand and Mitchell 
produced novels during the 1940s in which the threat and realities of war are barely 
perceptible (Brand’s 1945 Green for Danger being a notable exception) and which 
evoke, in spite of the global conflict, the fracturing Edwardiana of the classic golden 
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age. According to Chandler, writing in 1950, the golden age, ‘for all practical purposes 
… is still here’ (185).  
The reasons for this are manifold: the interwar crime novel, even in its earliest 
forms, always manifested an ambivalent nostalgia for a period and form of life that had 
already become impossible, and by the 1940s this lifestyle was no more impossible, or 
less compelling. The persistence of golden age tropes beyond the onset of the Second 
World War may be criticised as an escapist strategy which comforted readers unwilling 
to confront the reality of global turmoil (writers have certainly been accused of ignoring 
the political realities of the 1930s for much the same reason). Understanding how 
representations of madness and psychology communicate meaning in these texts will 
expose how such representations constitute not only a direct engagement with 
contemporary mental health debates, but an indirect contemplation of wider social evils, 
from poverty to class prejudice, sexism to fascism. It is highly relevant that a number of 
the novels under consideration here were published immediately before and in the early 
years of the Second World War, including Gladys Mitchell’s St Peter’s Finger (1938), 
When Last I Died (1941) and Laurels are Poison (1942); Christianna’s Brand’s Heads 
You Lose (1941) and Margery Allingham’s Traitor’s Purse (1941). Psychological 
themes and modes of enquiry are striking in these texts, a trend noticed by Symons, who 
states that late golden age mystery writers ‘were inclined to ask Why rather than How 
and their Why was often concerned with the psychological make-up and social 
background of killer and killed’ (153-4). For Symons, the cause of this increased 
psychological focus lies in an exhaustion with the interwar form’s assumption that 
human motivation and human affairs were, at basis, reasonable. The golden age’s 
complacent belief in the ultimate triumph of a reasonable social order was overturned by 
the coming of war and the rise of ‘force’ and ‘irrational doctrines’ (Symons 148) on the 
Continent. Psychology is treated as a means of understanding such unreason. So too 
does it help explain crimes that are not the product of careful thought, or worked-out by 
a rational individual with a reasonable motivation, but are inspired by beliefs founded on 
desires which, to the observer, may resemble madness. During the late 1930s, many 
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authors turned their detectives to war work and espionage, (e.g. Allingham in Traitor’s 
Purse – see chapter five – and Christie in her 1941 N or M?) pitting them against fascist 
villains and fifth columnists, but even in novels in which the war is not mentioned, 
irrationality bleeds into the narrative through representations of insane motivations and 
mad reasoning (Heads You Lose, discussed in chapters 1-2, is a prime example). As my 
attention to novels which feature madness and psychology will show, the notion of 
‘reason’ was itself far from stable during the earlier years of the period, with texts like 
Dorothy L. Sayers’ Whose Body? (1923) interrogating its meaning and offering 
alternative epistemologies in its stead.  
 
Psychology and Detection  
Jon Thompson has noted that ‘it is an interesting – and little-remarked-upon – aspect of 
the formal English novel of detection that insanity nearly always figures as part of its 
atmosphere or mental landscape’ (131). Insanity is used as a metaphor for impending 
disorder, to light-heartedly mock unusual behaviour, and is suggested as a motive in 
many a false solution. Madness pervades golden age crime fiction, but the ways in 
which it was understood and accounted for are neither uniform nor disconnected from 
the medical and psychological theories that were discussed and debated during the 
period. The human cost of the First World War must be measured by its psychological 
repercussions, as well as by the devastating slaughter of the conflict itself. From the late 
1910s, war neurosis became a public concern, sparking debates about the proper care of 
the mentally ill, the origins of mental turmoil and the constitution of the mind itself. 
Post-WW1 insights into the fragility of the mind helped reignite medical and legal 
debates which had been put on hold at the outbreak of war in 1914, and which had their 
origins in nineteenth century adaptive psychology and criminal anthropology. The post-
War years were a period in which issues of mental health and criminal responsibility 
attained a prominent place in public discourse.  
From the copious references in their texts, it is apparent that crime writers were 
concerned with mental health and followed medical and legal debates in the press. Susan 
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Rowland provides biographical surveys of Margery Allingham, Agatha Christie and 
Dorothy L. Sayers in her study (1-14), in which she highlights the significance of mental 
illness and psychology in these authors’ lives. All experienced ‘moments of 
psychological trauma’ (7) as Rowland states, triggered by personal catastrophe – Sayers’ 
unplanned and out-of-marriage pregnancy (8); Christie’s dramatic disappearance in 1926 
and purported amnesia following her discovery of her husband’s affair (Rowland 2; also 
see Symons 106) – or caused by an underlying mental illness, as suffered by the manic-
depressive Allingham, who in 1955 underwent electroconvulsive therapy (Rowland 8). 
Gladys Mitchell was amongst a new generation of women with access to higher 
education; she trained in teaching and encountered psychoanalysis as part of her 
education (there are parallels here with modernist authors Willa Muir, Dorothy 
Richardson and May Sinclair, who like Mitchell used Freudian ideas to inform their 
writing). Christianna Brand worked as a nurse and a Voluntary Aid Detachment nurse 
(VAD) during the Second World War, and it is no coincidence that depictions of 
medicine and mental illness are commonplace in her novels.  
In spite of the evidence that golden age writers had many encounters with 
psychological theories and the medical treatment of mental illness, much scholarship on 
golden age crime fiction focuses upon the non-professional, perceptive and intuitive 
pseudo-psychological approaches to detection and criminal motivation in their texts. 
These approaches are frequently cited as aspects of a ‘feminised’ approach. Depending 
on the voiced or implicit ideological affiliations of the scholar, this feminisation has 
been interpreted either dismissively (see Chandler), radically (Munt 8-9) or as a ‘front 
for a simpler method’ more accessible and engaging for the reader (Knight, Crime 
Fiction 91). Is the psychology used in these texts simply the exercise of intuition, 
perception, common sense emotional awareness, or empathy? Or are more rigorous 
methodologies, more specific conditions, being represented? 
This is an issue which has divided critics. In Form and Ideology in Crime 
Fiction, Knight cites an incident in Agatha Christie’s 1923 murder mystery, The Murder 
on the Links, in which her iconic Belgian detective Hercule Poirot exposes the 
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psychological focus of his method as exercised upon the alluring killer Marthe Dubreuil. 
Poirot explains that the ‘cold and calculating’ Dubreuil’s ‘clever brain takes in the 
simplicity’ (213) of the crime and perpetrates it with ease. This account is convincing 
and reasonable, but as Knight asserts, somewhat superficial: Poirot is doing ‘no more 
than comprehending people in a general, untested way,’ and he ‘never shows any fuller 
grasp of psychological process’ (111). To an extent, Knight is quite right – Christie’s 
detective does not explicitely employ specialist psychological terminology or method in 
his investigation. Nonetheless, Christie’s texts rely upon their readership’s ‘common-
sense’ understandings and assumptions about psychology and states of mind, which in 
spite of their surface simplicity, are profoundly shaped by the cultural dissemination of 
contemporary discourses of mental health. For example, Knight does not note the 
importance of heredity in Poirot’s investigation of Dubreuil. The fact that she was the 
daughter of a notorious killer alerts Poirot to the fact that she is ‘of the same … type as 
her mother’ (The Murder on the Links 213) which makes her particularly likely to have 
committed the crime. These simple statements are as fit for interrogation as any other 
unspoken and ostensibly neutral and transparent feature of the novel’s social reality 
which disguise relations of power – the expectation of primogeniture, the legal power of 
the father and the compromised agency of women, for example. Judgements about 
individual psychology based on parentage not only form part of the conceptual milieu of 
the period as Christie is representing it, but have a decisive and instructive value.  
Why this is, and what kind of psychology is being practised when this is the 
case, opens up the possibility that intuitive psychologising is never merely a simple, 
common-sense calculation. Characters, detectives, readers, authors, do not respond to 
one another naturally, intuitively, or free from the influence of specialist methodologies 
and theories of mind. Dubreuil’s inheritance, a perverse reversal of the financial 
inheritance of her fiancé and just as crucial to the plot, alerts the reader to a mind-set and 
moral nature that is out of the ordinary in a way that is not simply intuitive, but neither is 
it straightforwardly derived from a comprehensive psychological theory. 
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 Crime fiction is a genre as concerned with the mystery of individuals as the 
mystery of the crime scene, therefore knowledge gleaned from an array of psychological 
discourses is frequently called upon to account for individual behaviour, overlapping, 
inconsistent and occasionally contradictory though this common stock of knowledge 
certainly was. Rather than bringing the reader closer to a true account, such 
psychologising often hints at the indeterminate and unknown true self of the individual 
under scrutiny. This is something addressed by Alison Light in her short but 
comprehensive account of Agatha Christie’s conservative modernism. Light states:  
her whodunits … compulsively reiterate the same question, one which has 
the character of both fascination and fear: is this person what they seem? asks 
character after character of one another. What lies behind the calm façade 
which is their outward appearance? (88) 
Character, to Light, is always ambivalent in Christie, a fact which make her mysterious 
plots possible, and which allows the mystery plot to function at the level of theme. The 
reader’s tendency is towards empathy and identification with characters, but the mystery 
novel spurns this in favour of an iteration of social unease, a game of charades played 
again and again. Light proposes that Christie’s fiction entails ‘the evacuating of notions 
of character’ (66). Painful existential anxieties such as ‘the obsession with unstable 
identities, the ultimate unknowability of others,’ which ‘torment the writers of high 
culture’ are dealt with comically, whilst maintaining the tension of ‘ambivalence upon 
which the plot depends’ (88). Light is quite right to note that, although the murderer is 
eventually revealed, and with them what lies behind the calm façade, the fictions are 
never completely reassuring. Insecurities are unresolvable, but the drive to know and the 
means through which communities drive to know are of persistent concern.  
 In From Agatha Christie to Ruth Rendell, Susan Rowland proposes a Lacanian 
reading of detective novels, interpreting the works of Christie, Marsh, Sayers and 
Allingham according to the contestation between the disruptive potential of desire, the 
transgression of social norms and the ultimate impossibility of closure in a genre which 
seeks fantastically to overcome death. While performing such a psychoanalytically-
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informed reading, Rowland asserts that contemporary psychological discourses were of 
limited relevance in the actual authorship of golden age crime novels. While Allingham 
would ‘dip into Jungian theory to portray irrational, dysfunctional families’ (92) 
Rowland asserts, she would not delve any deeper, nor use theoretical structures to 
actually inform the construction of the plot. A rejection of psychoanalysis as an 
explanation in crime fiction is central to Rowland’s thesis and, citing Sayers’ clear 
antagonism towards Freud in her novel Gaudy Night, Rowland asserts that ‘[w]hat 
golden age crime fiction does is to question the legitimacy of psychoanalysis 
functioning as a cultural authority claiming to explain all crime and deviance’ (97). 
Psychoanalysis, to Rowland, is the subject of critique in crime fiction because of its 
social implications and its controversial accounts of sexual difference. It is also a threat 
to the open-ended, indeterminate and unreassuring narratives that Rowland sees as 
constituting the transgressive potential of the female-penned whodunit. As Rowland’s 
study does not cover the works of Gladys Mitchell, it is not concerned with those novels 
of Mitchell’s which claim to use psychoanalysis as a detection method, and as a means 
of explaining crime and deviance. In other works under consideration (as, for example, 
in Michael Innes’ Death at the President’s Lodging and Christie’s The ABC Murders) 
psychoanalysis is one of a range of psychological disciplines which compete to explain 
criminality. As shall be seen, psychology in its many forms is often accepted as a 
legitimate cultural authority, but Rowland’s uncertainty about the credibility of 
psychoanalysis in crime novels does stand. Psychoanalysis is not treated as the sole 
means of understanding and accounting for character and motivation during the period: 
other psychological theories inform narratives, and it is this study’s objective to bring 
them to light and to discuss their effect on the plotting and the meaning of crime novels.   
Reading the whodunit with a mind to recognising references to psychoanalysis can 
give the false impression that the theories of Sigmund Freud, in original or mediated 
form, settled like a mist upon the interwar British readership, rendering universally 
recognisable notions like the dynamic unconscious, repression and the Oedipus 
complex. The years before 1920 saw the first appearance of Freudian ideas in a palatable 
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public form in Britain and, according to the historian J.M. Roberts, by 1919 these ideas 
had become so familiar that ‘a writer could use the phrase “Freudian complex” in a book 
about economic affairs and expect it to be understood’ (292-3). Such understandings, 
however, remained generalised and unevenly disseminated, a social phenomenon whose 
recognition Roberts sees as intrinsic to an adequate account of the history of ideas: 
we tend to write the history of ideas in terms of innovators. That is sensible, 
in that the successful innovators put into circulation ideas which, in the long 
run, change society. But at the moment of their introduction they are likely to 
be taken up only by an ‘advanced’ intellectual elite, while the popular, 
widely diffused ideas which shape the ideas of many people are still those 
noted generations before. (178) 
When many people thought about psychology during this period, both of the ‘normal’ 
individual and the criminal, their opinions might have been shaped by psychoanalysis, 
but so too might they have been influenced by ideas drawn from Social Darwinism, 
deterministic physiognomy or a resolutely mechanical neurophysiology. An account of 
competing theories of mind is given in the ‘Theories of Mind’ section of this 
introduction. The demands of space mean that this account is brief, and deals only with 
those aspects of psychological and scientific history which will be drawn on in ensuing 
discussions of texts. This account is, however, necessary, and will help to situate golden 
age crime novels in this dynamic and conflicting history, and to make sense of the 
confused and occasionally strange alliances made between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
psychologies found in crime novels. Psychoanalytic ideas do not settle like a mist, but 
conflict with, overwhelm, co-exist or intermingle with other theories of mind which 
constituted, in the terminology of Raymond Williams, the dominant ideology, prior to 
the period and throughout it. Of the other two states of ideology that Williams describes 
in Marxism and Literature – emergent and residual – psychoanalysis was, at the 
beginning of the 1920s, emergent – a novel cultural and intellectual development which 
posed an alternative to the old (see R. Williams 121-127). By the late 1920s, 
psychoanalysis had become the dominant ideology for crime writers like Mitchell and 
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Allingham, although it was barely accepted within criminology and was ambivalently 
received by their contemporaries, Christie and Sayers, who drew from ideologies of 
adaptive and neurological psychologies, respectively.  
Combined with its uneven cultural dissemination is the disclaimer that during the 
interwar years, psychoanalysis itself was less of a known quantity than is often assumed. 
A number of simplified accounts were published throughout the 1920s and 1930s in 
Britain in order to counter what the feminist author Rebecca West described as “this 
period of braying” (qtd. in Low, Psycho-Analysis 2) and what Percy T. Nunn diagnosed 
as the ‘exaggeration and misunderstanding by ill-balanced and unhealthy minds,’ of 
Freudian ideas, their ‘exploitation by charlatans,’ and the use of terminology comparable 
to the ‘jargon of astrologists’(5-6). In Gladys Mitchell’s The Mystery of a Butcher’s 
Shop (1930), one young character remarks upon the profession of Mitchell’s 
psychoanalyst-detective Mrs Bradley as a pretentious and slightly outdated fad: ‘Psycho-
analyst. I don’t know what they do, quite. I believe it’s something mad but brainy. The 
thing was all the rage two or three years ago’ (62). Taking such uncertainties and 
interpretations into consideration, this study pays careful attention to the ways in which 
psychoanalysis was represented and (mis)understood in the interwar period. 
 
Detection and the Law 
At the intersection of psychological discourse and the popular literary imagination, 
psychologically-inflected crime fiction not only conveyed a version of psychological 
discourse to a wider public, but profoundly reworked the foundations of the genre as the 
ritual unveiling of deviancy and the restoration of the rational institutions of society. As 
much can be seen in the persistent interrogation of the law and the legal categories into 
which criminals fall once exposed by the detective. The replacement of the ingenious, 
hyper-rational murderer with a multitude of psychically disturbed villains, many of 
whom were of ambiguous and controversial legal status in regard to criminal 
responsibility, is accompanied in many novels by the refashioning of the detective as a 
figure with a superior and extra-legal moral and psychological perspective. In Gladys 
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Mitchell’s psychoanalytic detective, who offers murderers the chance of redemption 
through her expert guidance, and in Christianna Brand’s portrayal of bereaved 
characters who conspire to conceal the offender from formal legal justice, can be seen 
the development of a critical ethical perspective which both exemplifies crime writers’ 
engagements with the most pressing moral issues of the time, and demonstrates their 
awareness of the ideological implications of their texts.  
Influential in this history are the true crime narratives and the sensational murder 
trials reported in gory and exacting detail in newspapers such as the Times, which was a 
reliable source of court proceedings and a tool for the dissemination of information to 
both authors and their readership. Too little attention has been paid to the co-identities 
of interwar crime writers as both authors and readers of crime narratives. Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle has been credited for his attempts to present ‘realistic’ portrayals of crime 
scenes, and for the impact his Sherlock Holmes tales had upon nascent forensic 
technology and the arts of detection as practised by the police (see Thomas 5). Writers 
of the golden age, on the contrary, have been seen as socially and politically detached 
(see Thompson 129, for example), their texts read as morality tales, theoretically rich 
mise en scènes, or psychic fantasies, by necessity emerging from a historical epoch with 
unique cultural and social concerns, but only willing to engage with these concerns by 
toying with unstable identities, playful, but doomed, transgressions or estranging affects. 
However, such unusual murder cases as that of Dr Crippen (1910), Ronald True (1922), 
Patrick Mahon (1924), and Dr Lockhart (1939) are not only mentioned in crime novels, 
but are responded to in ways that critique both public representations of killers and court 
processes. News reports which describe epileptic and unconscious killings also shaped 
crime narratives (as chapter four asserts), with novels playing upon the fears of the 
concealed nature of self and the threats of madness and deviance implicit in such 
accounts.  
In The Pursuit of Crime, Dennis Porter discusses the conservatism of golden age 
writers. A crime ‘implies the violation of a community code of conduct and demands a 
response in terms of the code,’ he asserts, therefore the impetus to discover the murderer 
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attests to an ideological investment in ‘the given order and the implied value system that 
helps sustain it’ (120-1). The desire to discover and contain the murderer, to Porter, 
anticipates the legal processes of the actual social order, making crime fiction, with its 
fascination with isolating the criminal, an implicitly conservative fiction. This is a 
common stance, and by no means inaccurate: undoubtedly, as Thompson has stated, 
Christie’s novels (and those of many of her contemporaries) are marked by their 
‘valorization of middle- and upper-middle-class society and mores, her resolute 
individualism, her nostalgia for an Edwardian type of domesticity, and her remarkable 
exclusion of social conflict’ (129; also see Symons 104). However, broadening the 
range of authors under consideration and paying considerable attention to the novels of 
Gladys Mitchell, who has been unjustly neglected, helps uncover the golden age crime 
novel as a site in which politics and social conflict are approached both implicitly and 
explicitly. Using mass narratives of true crime and the often vigorous debates they 
generated as a starting point for assessing the ways in which criminality, responsibility 
and social deviance were conceived of during the interwar years, the relationship 
between high court, legal and medical debates on these issues and popular crime 
narratives can be revealed. 
 Many critics have drawn attention to the importance of bourgeois legal structures 
– in particular laws dealing with property and inheritance – in golden crime fiction (see 
Porter 120-21; Mandel 28-9). Countless novels deal with the transference of wealth and 
its related documentation, and to this extent they are hegemonic in that they uphold 
bourgeois primogeniture and the rule of law. Crime fiction is also concerned with the 
treatment of criminals, including the legal process following arrest, what takes place at 
trial and the assessment of what crimes have actually been committed. It is well known 
that crime fiction has its origins in public digests of criminal trials published in the late 
eighteenth century Newgate Calendar (Knight’s history of this development in Crime 
Fiction, 1800-2000  is particularly thorough). Ernst Bloch has also linked the rise of 
modern, investigative crime fiction to the juridical developments taking place from the 
mid-eighteenth century. ‘Because the trial by evidence demanded that evidence be 
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sufficient for both the initial arrest warrant and the trial’ he states, ‘criminal 
investigations arose with the detective in the foreground’ (italics in original, Bloch 246-
47). Crime fiction arose at a moment when testable empirical data – footprints, alibis, 
material signs and so forth – was becoming more central to convictions than the old 
emphasis upon moral character and possible motivation. Reflecting upon the effects of 
this development in the mid-nineteenth century, in Detective Fiction and the Rise of 
Forensic Science Ronald R. Thomas charts how the literary detective rises as a figure in 
command of new technologies and adept in the use of nascent forensics. The legal 
demand for such verification described by Bloch suggests the genealogy of the tropes 
noted by Thomas, as evidence gathering derives from a legal process demanding 
corroboration, verifiable testimony and material proof. Nonetheless, the expectation of 
trial is not always present in narratives which demand such corroboration – Arthur 
Conan Doyle’s stories, for example, often do not feature an illegal offence at all. In “A 
Case of Identity” for example, a minor heiress’s stepfather approaches her in a disguise, 
inspires her love and trust, and then pretends to have been kidnapped. The stepfather’s 
intention is to preoccupy her with mourning for the imaginary, missing lover, so that she 
does not fall in love with and marry another man, which would mean losing the income 
that was being spent upon her upkeep in the family home. Although immoral, the 
stepfather’s emotional fraud and the naïve girl’s detention do not, according to Holmes, 
transgress any written laws, and the perpetrator receives the detective’s scorn, but 
nothing more.  
 Some critics have noted parallels between Conan Doyle’s moralising 
dénouements and golden age crime novels. Knight, for example, states that golden age 
novels are concerned more with ritual unveiling than successful prosecution: ‘they will 
be revealed by the detective; possibly forced to confess; but they will not be punished 
… The knowledge that explains the puzzle seems a sufficient ending to a classic 
mystery’ (Crime Fiction 88). On the contrary, golden age crime novels have a 
considerably more palpable expectation of legal intervention than this. Frequently, the 
detective conceals their solution for a large part of the novel until adequate evidence can 
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be gained, or sets a trap for the killer in order to assure that conclusive proof can be 
gathered. The issue of whether a case will be able to stand up in court is essential in 
golden age fiction, especially in those numerous novels in which outré, complex and 
highly unlikely crimes take place. Inquests are staged, innocent people are incriminated, 
arrested, and occasionally convicted on the basis of falsified evidence, as is the premise 
of Sayers’ first Harriet Vane and Peter Wimsey novel, Strong Poison (1930). The 
expectations and the demands of the legal system, and the necessity that a just resolution 
concludes the novel, are more than an afterthought: they are both a narrative and an 
ethical demand.  
Indeed, ethical critique constitutes a significant and often unremarked aspect of 
golden age crime fiction’s encounter with the law. This can be seen in Mitchell’s When 
Last I Died (1938), which confronts the psychological classification and 
institutionalisation of child offenders (discussed in chapter three), and in novels like 
Brand’s Green for Danger (1945) and Mitchell’s St Peter’s Finger (1938), which show 
up the cracks in the law’s understanding of criminal insanity (the focus of chapter two). 
In the cases covered in these novels, the law is able to offer only an incomplete, and 
therefore flawed, account of crime, which the crime novel complicates and expands 
upon. The position adopted in these texts is, then, obstinate and adverse: as Susan 
Rowland has stated, the golden age crime novel ‘crucially supplements the culturally 
authoritative texts of the law’ (17); it tells stories the law cannot, or will not tell. 
Criminality is recognised as more complex and nuanced than the unambiguous language 
of law can express. 
In Rowland’s reading, crime fiction attends to this ellipsis, becoming ‘the other 
of the powers of legal institutions to represent crime to a culture’ (Rowland’s italics, 
17). The law and the legal process is, to Rowland, structurally and culturally gendered 
as masculine, meaning that the crime narrative as other is ‘structurally gendered as 
feminine’ (16). The binary of mad and sane (which is itself not entirely severable from 
the binary of feminine/masculine) is also discernible in the operation of the golden age 
crime narrative, and is crucial to the form’s structural placement in regards to the law. 
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Rowland’s argument is situated in the context of changing roles for women in the 
interwar years, and so too did this period see a contest over the role of psychology 
within the law. Debates between the proponents of competing psychological disciplines 
meant that the law was always implicitly or publically under attack by those who 
disagreed with the form of psychology upon which it was based. The unambiguous 
language used to define criminal responsibility was attacked prior to and during the 
period by psychologists who saw it as reductive, outdated, and open to 
misinterpretation. Changes to the law, especially in response to ‘faddish’ psychological 
doctrines, were seen by many jurists as subversive. Even worse, the undecidibility of 
legal texts opened up the threatening possibility that decisions may be made not on an 
objective basis, but according to the preferences, perhaps even the unconscious wishes 
(a most threatening idea) of those invested with legal power. Crime fiction is then 
indeed a supplement to the law, not only because it is structurally feminine, but because 
it occupies a position in which insanity is not containable, in which psychological 
insights into unconscious and irrational actions are accepted as fact, and in which the 
reasonable, objective ethics of the law are deeply suspect. The novels under 
consideration in this study are, then, in spite of their genre’s classic demand for 
organising order from chaos, structurally diagnosable as mad.  
 The suspicion that the law cannot contain the irrational is central to Agatha 
Christie’s novel, And Then There Were None (1939). A masterpiece of pared-down 
horror, it concerns ten characters, all of whom have committed murder, who are tricked 
into attending a party on an island from which none will leave alive. The characters’ 
perceptions of their crimes range from indifference, a belief in having taken the moral 
high-ground, rationalisation, cold-blooded satisfaction and hysterical guilt. A nurse who 
allowed a child to die in her care, a general who sent his wife’s lover (a soldier) on a 
fatal mission, a surgeon whose drinking lead to the death of a patient, and a policeman 
who accepted a bribe to convict an innocent man, are all included in the cast. As well as 
offering a critique of the perverse possibilities of power, And Then There Were None 
exemplifies the use of the crime novel as a potent medium in which to negotiate 
18 
 
concerns over public policy and social arrangements. Members of the police, the army, 
medics, the leisured middle class and the indulgent upper classes (as well as a pair of 
working class schemers) are all responsible for crimes they committed whilst exploiting 
a position of power. But the position of power that comes under greatest scrutiny in the 
novel is that of judge, the final adjudicator of law and punishment which, until 1969, 
included the death penalty for murder. Christie’s character, Mr Justice Lawrence John 
Wargrave, is described as a hanging judge because of his predilection for advising the 
jury to pass the death penalty in murder trials, even in cases in which the guilt of the 
defendant is in doubt. Occupying yet another position of power above and beyond 
accusations of murder, the judge represents both the subjective kernel located at the 
heart of the myth of an objective law, and a particularly demonic form of delusion. As 
Rowland states, ‘the body of written laws ... are those documents supposed 
unambiguously to assign criminal status to their own otherness: that which transgresses 
or is excluded by them’ (17). In positioning the other, the mad, subjective and criminal, 
within the law itself via its emissary – the judge – and unleashing that emissary in an 
allegorical, legal microcosm – the uncanny automatic-punishment machine that is the 
novel’s inescapable island – Christie suggests that it is impossible to exclude 
transgressive elements from society through the process of the law, or to use the law to 
assign criminal status to otherness. These possibilities pervade the social body, in which 
the law is included: otherness is already within, and the division between mad and sane, 
killer and innocent, becomes less clear. 
 The conservatism of Christie has been discussed by numerous scholars, while 
transgressions of gender and bodily borders cited by Rowland, Plain, Munt, and assaults 
on class by Light, suggest ways of moving outside of the automatic dismissal of Christie 
and her contemporaries as merely invested in the perpetuation of the status quo. The 
new and more complex ways of imagining the forms that justice and the legal process 
could take, proposed explicitly in certain novels and felt implicitly in others, can also be 
seen as an constituting an ethical dimension that makes problematic accusations of 
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conservatism. This is a premise, however, that has been previously dismissed by 
scholars, for example Thompson, who states; 
the detective figure’s identification of the murderer has the ideological effect 
of extirpating the diseased agent (the murderer) and thereby confirming the 
body politic in its sense of its own collective moral and political decency. 
This is because Christie’s murderers either are actuated by moral failure 
(greed, lust, avarice, etc., sins that are the result of consciously made 
decisions), or else commit their crimes because of mental derangement. In 
any case, none of these crimes call into question the justice of the current 
social and economic arrangements characteristic of her settings. (132) 
Imagining, as Thompson tries to do, a crime fiction derived from Marxist theory, where 
crimes are explored through an analysis of the economic situation of the perpetrator and 
their particular location within a superstructure in which the exercise of consciously 
made decisions is always suspect, will not get us far with Christie’s fiction. To Christie, 
moral failure is a case of individual failure – a ‘weakness’ according to Knight (Form 
and Ideology 116) – and while sympathy is expressed in certain novels for characters 
who find themselves in awkward financial positions, they are still considered as 
autonomous agents, responsible for their crimes.  
 The exception is, of course, in cases where the killer is mentally disturbed. 
Coincident with the rise of golden age crime fiction was an exacerbation of accounts of 
selfhood which sought to wrest agency away from the thinking and perceiving subject 
and locate it in the embodied mind. This development needs to be traced, and given 
proper attention next to the other transformative ideas of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century which unseated the unitary, bourgeois self from its primacy as director 
of action and intention. Thompson looks specifically at Karl Marx and Freud’s 
deconstructive accounts of identity to suggest reasons for the explosion of divided 
identities, uncertain selves and unknowable others in golden crime fiction (130). 
According to Thompson, Marx’s account of the shaping of individual subjectivity by 
economic circumstances, along with the estranging effect of false-consciousness (which 
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exposed the historic forces that shaped one’s closest held values and desires), combined 
with Freud’s radical and unsettling account of the unconscious and the divided ego, to 
shape the crime narrative. This is due both to their general pervasiveness as intellectual 
premises, and their enormous influence upon literary modernism. As Thompson states: 
‘many of these tenets became accepted facts of experimental modernism, and it is one 
measure of their ubiquity that the questioning of identity should become a convention in 
a popular genre such as the formal English novel of detection’ (130).  
 Incidental to the rise of experimental modernism, British law and psychology 
were becoming increasingly concerned with questions of agency and self-knowledge. 
While ‘high’ literature meditated upon the instability of identity, the phenomenology of 
consciousness and the concealed deviance or multiplicity of selfhood, British law and 
medicine were both attempting to categorise and comprehend conditions which affected 
memory, consciousness and physical action. Epilepsy and automatism, while occupying 
uncertain positions in law, incited anxieties about the self and its unknown contents and 
desires which paralleled the concerns of modernist literature. Representations of these 
psychological conditions in crime fiction are shaped by press coverage of automatic 
killings (see chapter four), but so too do they engage with modernist explorations of 
selfhood, as well as critically respond to modernist fears (to be discussed in chapter 
five). Narrative and syntactical similarities in descriptions of the recording and 
perceiving consciousness and the synthesising, irrational unconscious are found in both 
seemingly opposed literary forms, calling for more focused intertextual analysis of 
crime fiction in relation to modernist writing (again, see chapter 5). The employment of 
innovative techniques and narrative modes demonstrates the spread of modernist themes 
and approaches outside of the ‘high’ literary canon in ways that test the boundaries of 
the canon itself. More importantly within the long tradition of detective writing, 
instances of irrational and intuitive detection counter crime fiction’s classic demand for 
rationalism and the conflation of power with knowledge which defines the masculine, 
scientific detective of the pre-golden age (see Thompson 45).   
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 Emotional pathologies and intellectual disabilities limit responsibility and 
autonomy, even impairing the attainment of selfhood for criminals in golden age crime 
fiction. In many novels, a problematic area is opened between the self-determined or the 
biologically determined self and between rational and constrained choice, undermining 
exactly the kind of individualism that critics like Thompson and Knight have seen as 
ideologically inseparable from the whodunit. During the interwar period, law and 
psychology were frequently in opposition over the relationship between responsibility 
and madness, and regarding the benefits of punishment or therapy. Crime fiction 
provides unique insight into this history, at the same time as it demands that things be 
otherwise in ways that contradict dominant associations of the form with containment. 
As many novels demonstrate, the capture of the criminal can mark the beginning, not the 
















Theories of Mind 
 
Golden age crime writing is pervaded by psychological debates, drawing from popular 
spiritualist pseudo-sciences, evolutionary psychology, neurology, and psychoanalysis in 
its representations of insane killers and psychologically astute detectives. 
Understandings of free will and determination – either self-determination, or 
determination by sources outside of one’s control – are central to the meaning and to the 
ideological commitments of the detective story. Repeatedly, the ethical value placed 
upon punishment at a golden age novel’s dénouement is informed by contemporary 
psychological debates, and competing psychological practitioners’ understandings of 
autonomy, responsibility, and choice. In the immediate pre-war period and leading into 
the interwar years, psychological discourses provided a crucial context for drawing out 
the meaning of interactions between the detective and the criminal, the transgressor, and 
the social group in the golden age form.  
As deviations from social norms, insanity and criminality are a feature of every 
social history, although the origin and nature of each has been accounted for in ways as 
diverse as culture itself. On the contrary, psychology has a unique historic moment of 
emergence; according to David J. Murray, the word psychology ‘was hardly known in 
the English-speaking world’ before the 1850s (120). Explorations of human 
understanding, emotion, sensation, and morality pre-date the emergence of psychology 
as a discipline in science, theology, literature, and in philosophical debates concerning 
human nature, free will and the subtleties of the relation between mind and body. During 
the nineteenth century, psychology emerged from these multiple sources as a discrete 
discipline. The age-old mind-body problem was re-articulated according to new 
understandings of nervous energy and brain localisation, while the laying of a 
groundwork for a ‘science of human nature’ (Leahey 137) took place in the move from 
rationalism to empiricism, the replacement of speculative metaphysics with introspective 
psychology, and the removal of the once-central God in many thought systems. 
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   Neurological research grounded in dissection and anatomical experimentation, 
philosophical discussion of the associative faculties of the mind, and pseudo-scientific 
practices accompanied by extravagant spiritualism all form the early nineteenth century 
context for the development of psychology. From the outset, psychology was poised 
between conflicting rational and metaphysical demands: both to justify itself as an 
empirical science of human nature, and to evoke a sense of the fantastic and religious to 
fill the spiritual vacuum left by growing secularism and, after 1859, the rise of 
evolutionary science. The immense popularity of practices like Mesmerism – established 
by Franz Anton Mesmer in France in the 1760s – which employed hypnosis as a 
therapeutic practice and exploited research into animal electricity and nerve energy to 
assert the outlandish theory of animal magnetism, ensured that psychology had both 
occult and charlatan associations from its earliest days. These associations were not 
easily shaken off, as can be seen in much golden age crime writing. Margery Allingham, 
for example, fuses psychoanalytic jargon with ritual and magic in many of her novels, 
while in Gladys Mitchell’s writing, psychological theories and magic are mutually 
supportive, best seen in Tom Brown’s Body when her psychoanalytic detective Mrs 
Bradley gets locked into a battle of arts with a practicing witch. Psychoanalysis demands 
a compelling personality to practice it, and magical properties are associated with both 
the skills and the practitioner. As well as to the contemporary flourishing of Spiritualist 
culture and the resurgence of occult societies such as the Golden Dawn, it is to an older 
history of quasi-scientific psychological researches that golden age authors often refer in 
their representations of theories of mind.  
The changing reception of phrenology throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries exemplifies the interaction of the rational and the irrational, the positivistic and 
the qualitative, in the history of psychology. The founder of the system, F.J. Gall, 
asserted in works produced between 1796 and 1819, that the brain was the physical 
organ of mental activity and nervous impulses. The brain was not homogeneous matter, 
but the moral and psychological faculties had corresponding organs each located on its 
surface, which could be investigated by examination of the shapes and contours of the 
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cranium. Although the conclusiveness of the method and the science behind the system 
were contested, phrenology became enormously popular. Specific organs were claimed 
to manage functions of mind ranging from ‘Attachment, Propensity to oppose, 
Combativeness, Propensity to injure or Destructiveness’ (Morgan 19). Studies such as 
James Brown’s 1869 Phrenology and its Application included figures demonstrating the 
difference in head shape between a philosopher and a parricide (see plate 9), the latter of 
whom exhibited a flatter skull due to paltry development of particular moral and 
intellectual faculties.  
It is demonstrations like this that give the impression that phrenology was a 
deterministic system, but it was equally common for its practitioners to assert that 
various parts of the brain could be manipulated and developed as a means of self-
improvement. As Nicholas Morgan, writing in 1871, asserted, ‘phrenology does not 
teach that particular actions can be predicted, nor does it teach that any person must 
necessarily act in a certain manner’ (8). The criminally minded could be spotted by 
features like ‘a very low and retreating brow’ which demonstrated ‘meanness and lack of 
judgement’ (Morgan 14), but there was always the hope, however small, that application 
could help develop those organs and alter both the shape of the cranium and the 
character of the individual. This was part of phrenology’s appeal. As well as being 
immediately comprehensible, it could be readily applied to a range of directive and 
disciplinary practices from education to discipline, character analysis and aptitude 
testing..   
 During the nineteenth century, more sophisticated scientific accounts of 
localisation in the functions of the brain were advanced, but nonetheless phrenology 
persisted as what Clarke and Jacyna have called a ‘trace element’ in many of the major 
intellectual, scientific and discursive traditions of Victorian society (240). It formed an 
important antecedent to both Social Darwinism and eugenics, with its combined 
emphasis upon the material manifestation of psychological and moral characteristics, 
and upon the hereditary transmission of such characteristics. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, phrenology enjoyed a minor revival in London (see Hollander), and it continued 
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to be practised with gusto in North America, where the American Phrenological Journal  
(established in 1840) continued to be published until 1911. Ideas derived from 
phrenology – both as a means of developing self-determination and, contrarily, as a 
determining science – were still active in criminological writings in the interwar years 
and in popular accounts of criminality, as shall be seen. 
 
The Brain and Nervous System  
It was phrenology that first drew significant attention to the brain as an object of study in 
the understanding of character and mental faculty. In attempts to clarify or overhaul 
Gall’s premises, physiologists developed experimental methods for analysing the brain 
and its functions, with specific attention to the cerebral hemispheres and the cerebral 
cortex, and to the nature of nerve impulses and reflexes. The major advancement from 
Gall’s system was the discovery of the centrality of the nervous system – the motor and 
sensory nerves. The view of the brain as a complex, responsive system, ‘a complex 
reflex machine,’ (Leahey 169) was, in 1870, made more precise by the disclosure that 
electronic currents could be applied to areas of the brain to stimulate movement in the 
corresponding motor nerves. Animal electricity had been established by Luigi Galvini in 
1791 (see Clarke and Jacyna 157), but the discovery of the direct relationship between 
cerebrum and specific nerves lead to geographies of the brain and body which became 
the primary paradigm of physiological psychology.  
 In this paradigm, madness was treated as a disease of bodily machinery, not a 
weakness of the will or an imbalance in an immaterial soul. The nervous system and 
brain were looked to on a microscopic level as the sites of disease. Writing in the 1870s, 
psychiatrist and pioneering asylum manager Henry Maudsley stated: 
No one now-a-days who is engaged in the treatment of mental disease doubts 
that he has to do with the disordered function of a bodily organ – of the 
brain. … Insanity is, in fact … a disorder of the supreme nerve-centres of the 
brain – the special organs of the mind – producing derangement of thought, 
feeling and action. (Responsibility in Mental Disease 15) 
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Disorders in the ‘nerve element’ (ibid. 17) were at the root of insanity: over-stimulation 
or damage to that area of the organism could bring about insanity, while repose and 
other nerve-cures had the potential to affect a cure. This paradigm of sympathetic 
physiology saw the body as a commonwealth and the brain as a switchboard passing 
messages through the nervous system like – as it is put in a 1920s introduction to 
neurology – ‘the telephone exchange of a great city. The girls and their switchboards are 
the centres, the ingoing wires are the sensory nerves, the outgoing wires are the motor 
nerves’ (Fraser-Harris 4).  
 Writing in Neurology and Modernity (2010), Laura Salisbury and Andrew Shail 
explore the neurological paradigm of embodied subjectivity, which they see as 
inseparable from the modern experience of selfhood. Tethering their analysis to Charles 
Baudelaire’s diagnosis of modernity’s influence upon the artist in The Painter of 
Modern Life (1859-60), Salisbury and Shail note that Baudelaire defines the experience 
of the modern as intensified stimulation from the external world, which corresponds in 
exhausting and invigorating ways with the interiority of a modern subject who is 
decidedly nervous. ‘[E]very sublime thought is accompanied by a more or less vigorous 
nervous impulse that reverberates in the cortex,’ Baudelaire states (qtd. 398). As 
Salisbury and Shail point out, Baudelaire describes an artist who ‘translates the 
sensations of the world into a body that vibrates and responds in sympathy with it, 
according to a model of nervous force’ (2). Describing a culture which understood 
experience as consisting of a responsive relationship between external stimulus and 
internal nervous constitution, the authors detail various ways in which nervous activity 
underpins characterisation in late-Victorian and Edwardian popular fiction. Strong 
emotion is accompanied by nervous strain, while those with stronger, better exercised 
and better ‘fed’ nerves are more likely to respond practically and reasonably to external 
events, to have energetic and optimistic natures, and to experience good physical health 
(3-5). The symbiotic relationship between the nervous system and subjectivity 
represented in modern, popular writing is undeniably persistent, and innumerable 
instances in golden age crime novels support the examples cited by Salisbury and Shail, 
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from the commonplace worry that a character’s nerves will not take the shock of the 
crime, to attempts to drive someone to death or madness through over-stimulating their 
nerves. The popularity of nerve restoration tonics for fraught nerves and other 
psychological instabilities is even satirised in Dorothy L. Sayers’ Murder Must Advertise 
(1933), in which advertisements for these cure all stimulants are exploited to 
communicate information about drop-off points to illegal drug traffickers, giving a clear 
sense of Sayers’ attitude to both the over-the-counter remedies and the intellectually 
incapacitating activities of marketing agencies. Throughout the interwar years, and in 
spite of all the sensation and fascination of psychoanalysis, the neurological view of 
emotion and consciousness as an affect or symptom of the body’s nervous machinery 
remained pervasive in mainstream thought.  
 
Darwin and Darwinisms 
Charles Darwin was not the first thinker to draw attention to generational alteration in 
species: Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s romantic-naturalistic theory of the innate drive of 
species to perfect themselves as new habits are developed and a useless organ ‘shrinks 
and wastes little by little’ (Lamarck 47) in response to changing environments was an 
important early nineteenth century antecedent; so too was Thomas Malthus’ 1798 “An 
Essay on the Principle of Population” in which population growth is linked to available 
resources (see Malthus, passim). Nonetheless, Charles Darwin’s publication of On the 
Origin of Species (1859) heralded a revolution in nineteenth-century scientific and 
intellectual thought. In it, Darwin contends that ‘numerous, slight and diversified 
variations’ (“The Descent of Man” 222) occur naturally within species. In the ‘universal 
struggle for life,’ (ibid., 108) successful variations are more likely to breed, thus passing 
on their unique features to their offspring, while less successful variations die out. The 
diversity of world environments accounted for the diversity of nature, although the 
principle upon which variation was based was a simple one: difference between species 




 The lengthy process of evolution involved not only the development of animals’ 
physiques, but their behaviour too: ‘instinctive behaviour also evolved – creatures that 
spontaneously showed certain behaviour patterns that led to successful feeding or 
breeding would survive’ (Murray 222). Innate aspects of animal behaviour were 
acquired out of multiple compounded tendencies to act in certain ways, becoming more 
complex as the species evolved. In human evolution, the case would subsequently be 
made that different races had acquired different mental and intellectual capacities, and 
different instincts. In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin asserts that differences 
‘between the highest men of the highest races and the lowest savages, are connected by 
the finest gradations. Therefore it is possible that they might pass and be developed into 
each other’ (“The Descent of Man” 214). Although his intention was to argue that 
humans shared a number of instincts and emotional states with animals rather than to 
taxonomise human species, discussions of the social instincts, the development of will in 
relation to cultural demands and the evolution of intellectual powers all paved the way 
for the psychology of adaptation. 
 
Social Darwinism 
As the historian J.M. Roberts asserts, during the late nineteenth century, ‘Darwinian – or 
misrepresentations of Darwinian – ideas were imported into social and political thinking 
with great effect’ (179). Psychology and criminology are no exception. Herbert Spencer 
was a great promoter of Social Darwinism, arguing that the principle of the survival of 
the fittest be allowed to fulfil itself in social life, and that ‘[g]overnment should leave the 
cosmic process alone, for it will perfect humanity by the selection of the fittest’ (qtd. in 
Leahey 259). The ‘weak’ should be allowed to perish for the good of the species, as ‘all 
reform was seen as tampering with nature’s laws’ (ibid.).  
As well as promoting his conservative, laissez faire program, Spencer proposed 
that learning and associations built up throughout an individual’s lifetime constituted the 
basis of instinct. This became a part of the genetic constitution of a species, and could be 
inherited as an acquired characteristic which would contribute to the teleological 
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evolution of that species or subspecies. According to Spencer, the ‘European inherits 
from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan,’ meaning that ‘civilised 
man has also a more complex or heterogeneous nervous system than the uncivilised 
man’ (Illustrations of Universal Progress  11). Ostensible intellectual inequalities 
between ethnic groups were seen as physically manifested at the cerebral level, and an 
ameliorative evolution postulated in which richness of association, complexity of the 
nervous system, and high brain mass were assumed to distinguish civilised Europeans 
from primitive races. A hierarchy was established in which ‘savage’ groups were 
claimed to be representative of the infancy of the supposedly more intellectually, 
emotionally and physically advanced, civilized Westerners. The vision of social 
evolution as a hierarchical continuum shaped anthropological tracts, scientific treatises 
and the organisation of museum exhibits, which in institutions such as the Horniman 
Museum in South London were arranged to show the transition from primitive designs 
to more civilised forms (“Centenary Gallery”).  
 As the inhibition of savage instincts was seen as a marker of civilisation and 
higher mental evolution, the loss of will concomitant with insanity seemed to place the 
insane on the same evolutionary level as so-called savages. An ulterior discourse to 
ameliorative-evolution developed in which madness and criminality were accounted for 
as negative evolution – degeneration. Links were made between insanity and mental 
defect, and the lower mental evolution of uncivilised humanity and non-European races. 
Convinced that all madness was hereditary, medical practitioners like Henry Maudsley 
transformed the mid-nineteenth century role of psychiatry from one of moral care, 
guidance and discipline to one of observation, taxonomisation and experimentation: 
‘They insisted that insanity had a physical cause that could be discovered by a 
sophisticated medical practice’ according to Elaine Showalter (Female Malady 104). As 
Maudsley states in Responsibility in Mental Disease (1874), ‘no one can elude, were he 
able to attempt it, the tyranny of his organization,’ for a defect 
will run on in the stream of family descent, sometimes appearing on the 
surface, sometimes hidden beneath it, until, on the one hand, it is either 
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neutralized by the beneficial influences of wise intermarriages, or, on the 
other hand, reaches a pathological evolution which entails the decay and 
extinction of the family. (22) 
Such catastrophes could be averted if people were cautious about heredity, paid attention 
to natural laws and to the breeding of their family. Because criminals and lunatics are 
determined and do not appear by accident, if humanity was to remain at ‘the head of 
nature,’ a person had to become ‘the conscious farmer of his destiny’ (Responsibility 24).  
 In this view, the insane were designated as evolutionary misfits, the ‘distortion of 
humanity’ (Responsibility 4). Although Maudsley criticised past societies, including 
supposedly civilised ones, for excluding the insane like ‘a diseased member that is 
unfitted for the natural functions of its kind,’ (Responsibility 5) he nonetheless saw the 
psychiatrist’s role as recognising the signs of manifest or latent insanity and weeding out 
the sufferers. Poverty was often seen as a consequence of innate insanity, in conflict with 
philanthropic or Marxist accounts which saw the misery of impoverishment or the 
alienation of labour at the root of mental distress. The optimistic, if patronising, moral 
management approach which had led to the creation of modern, Utilitarian, quasi-
domestic asylums in the mid-nineteenth century, also went into decline: 
While the moral managers had hoped that the insane poor could be cured, the 
Darwinians thought that they could only be segregated; in the long run, 
physicians hinted, their numbers could be reduced through stricter 
immigration and selective breeding. (Showalter, Female Malady 108) 
The pessimistic determinism which marked these accounts was redoubled with regards 
to criminality. Insanity was connected to crime, and both were pilloried as the markers 
and outcomes of degeneration. From the 1870s onwards, psychiatrists and criminologists 
frequently discussed criminality as a form of insanity and as such a form of inheritance, 
rather than a sin or moral failing, or in evolutionary terms, as a ‘disorder of the process 
of adjusting the self to the circumstances, and that it is primarily manifested in disorder, 
not of the mind, but of conduct’ (Mercier, Crime and Insanity 32).  
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The most notorious proponent of the classifications of moral insanity and born 
criminality, which were pervasive in psychiatric writings of the fin de siècle, was Cesar 
Lombroso. A criminal anthropologist, Lombroso asserted that physical abnormalities 
both marked and determined the criminal: ‘the antisocial tendencies of criminals are the 
result of their physical and psychic organisation, which differs essentially from that of 
normal individuals,’ (Ferrero 5). Using mug-shots and measurements of criminals, 
Lombroso claimed to have established that human character could be assessed by 
attention to facial expressions and other physical features, attitudes and gestures.  
Another turn of the century proponent of criminal positivism was Sir Francis 
Galton. Like Lombroso, Galton used portraiture to exemplify his claims, but rather than 
finding perfect examples of a criminal type, he composed composite photographs. 
Multiple images of similar types were superimposed upon one another in order to bring 
out ‘the common physiognomic denominator of all the faces’ (Blacker 46). According to 
Galton, composites allowed one to appreciate fully ‘the degradation of their 
expressions,’ and the regularity of human ‘sub-types’ including both criminals and the 
insane (ibid. 47). Obviously, these photographic researches were based on the 
assumption that character, morality and psychology were physically manifested and as 
such pre-determined. In a similar vein, Galton used statistical research to isolate and 
chart psychological, intellectual, moral and physical trends and differences in a 
population. Differences meant variation, and its study could lead to an understanding of 
evolutionary change, according to Galton. The programme Galton developed from these 
researches was named eugenics, which he defined as ‘the science which deals with all 
influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also those that develop them to the 
utmost advantages’ (“Eugenics” 1). For the most part, eugenics involved the 
‘[s]ystematic collection of facts’ (“Eugenics” 4) concerning birth rates, the conditions 
under which families thrive, the density of noteworthy individuals in a society. and 
occurrences of so-called undesirables – be they criminals or the insane – who were ill-
fitted for social life due to faulty adaptation. Galton’s recommendation was that the 
whole of the social field, both present and historical, be submitted to measurement, 
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taxonomisation and scrutiny, and the results be turned into a proactive social project to 
improve the human race. Means of tweaking the race and factoring out undesirables 
included the banning of unsuitable marriages (“Eugenics” 5), encouraging individuals to 
keep family pedigrees to make it easier to improve their stock, providing low rent houses 
for ‘promising young couples’ (Essays in Eugenics 32) and the segregation of the unfit. 
Galton claimed to be inspired by an ethical, even religious conviction that it was 
humanity’s responsibility to breed selectively, weeding out undesirable traits and 
propagating desirable ones, for the good of European races (“Eugenics” 5).  
 The appalling consequences of eugenics were realised in the genocide of Jews, 
Serbs, Slavs and Roma committed by Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1945. As well as 
ethnic and racial persecution, those suffering from mental defects or exhibiting ‘anti-
social’ behaviour were tortured and murdered in concentration camps alongside other 
‘undesirables’, who included homosexuals and ideological dissidents (see Lifton 65; 
153). The ‘cleansing’ of intellectually and physically ‘unsound’ individuals, including 
those suffering from epilepsy, schizophrenia, physical deformities, genetic conditions 
such as Down’s syndrome and mental disabilities by the Nazi regime forms a 
devastating parallel with the moves for racial hygiene through sterilisation then popular 
in a number of Western countries, including the United States. In Nazi Germany, the T4 
program, as it became known after the war, claimed moral and political justification 
throughout the 1930s, masquerading as both economically rational – reducing the costs 
of care to the state – and ethical, with the murder of deformed children being justified 
according to the perverted rhetoric of ‘euthanasia’ and ‘mercy killing’ (Lifton 48; 50). 
Objections to eugenics on ethical grounds were, unfortunately, not chief amongst 
the first responses to Galton in British psychology at the turn of the twentieth century; 
instead, the practicality of implementing eugenics was hotly debated. Maudsley, while 
sharing Galton’s interest in the role of inheritance in psychology and the freak 
occurrences of both geniuses and mental defects in normal families, doubted whether the 
subtler traits of humans could be selectively bred in the same way as the traits of 
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animals. More was at play in human character, Maudsley asserted in response to Galton, 
than could be affected by factors as yet unregistered by science:  
the corpuscles, atoms, electrons, or whatever else there may be [are] 
subjected to subtle influences of mind and body during their formations 
and combinations of which we hardly realize the importance. (“Discussion: 
By Dr Maudsley” 8) 
The criminal psychiatrist Mercier agreed with Maudsley, asserting that the passing of 
character from parent to child was completely unpredictable, making it ‘doubtful if 
moral traits are hereditary’ (“Discussion” 8). In spite of contemporary objections, 
Galton’s theories had profound implications in the early twentieth century. Its affects 
were felt in the study of disease, intelligence and the allocation of state funding in 
sociology and anthropology. In 1905, a Francis Galton Research Fellowship was 
established at the University of London, which encouraged research on the compilation 
of biographies of gifted, capable families and below average families, as well  as ‘the 
families of persons in asylums of all kinds, hospitals and prisons’ (“National Eugenics” 
440). Research was conducted on how state intervention impacted upon criminals, 
because ‘[p]ublic opinion is beginning to regard with favour the project of a prolonged 
segregation of habitual criminals for the purpose of restricting their opportunities for (1) 
continuing their depredations, and (2) producing low-class offspring’ (ibid. 441). 
Galton’s influence propagated the view that criminality, like insanity, was both innate 
and inheritable. Eugenics could explain how both could be guarded against and reduced. 
 The popularity of eugenics was even greater in North America than in Britain. 
Spencer promoted a laissez-faire policy in the United States, but many American 
psychologists took to a proactive eugenics project instead, often in excess of what 
Galton suggested: ‘Galton had no plans for the unfit, only aiming to encourage the 
multiplication of the fit. Americans took the opposite course, doing little to marry the fit, 
but trying to keep the unfit from reproducing,’ according to Leahey (259). The 
development of the Stanford-Binet Test – based on the French Binet-Simon intelligence 
quotient (I.Q.) test – by Lewis Terman in the early 1910s, and its rigorous 
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implementation in state institutions from prisons to schools and army barracks, attests to 
the desire of the USA’s psychological establishment for a reliable mechanism for 
weeding out undesirables. Through intelligence testing, it was ostensibly proven that 
there was a strong link between insanity, low intelligence and criminality. The feeble-
minded were also often associated with the criminally minded, as they innately lacked 
the necessary intelligence to recognise that crime was immoral, as well as the will to 
restrain themselves from immoral acts.  
 The influence of adaptive psychologies on golden age crime fiction has 
occasioned little discussion in scholarship. Although Ronald R. Thomas has explored 
their treatment in fin de siècle crime writing (Conan Doyle’s in particular), their 
appearance in golden age crime has been little remarked upon, and therefore will receive 
close attention in chapter three, ‘Born Criminals’. In the novels studied there, ideas 
about criminal type informed by adaptive psychologies are involved in both false and 
true solutions, demonstrating how psychological understanding penetrated to the heart of 
the mystery and shaped readers’ understandings of character types. In countless other 
novels, ideas about born criminality lurk behind social fears and prejudices.. In Dorothy 
L. Sayers Gaudy Night (1935), for example, an American eugenics enthusiast pops up at 
inopportune moments and tries to convince Sayers’ hero and heroine to sign up to a 
cause which is represented as both comical, fanatical and offensive. This side note in a 
larger work is just one example of how ideas associated with eugenics are ever-present 
in golden age crime fiction. Alison Light has argued that in Christie’s novels, the 
appearance of these ideas is more oblique and often intermingled with Freudian ideas: 
the ‘unconscious is seen in an almost Darwinian light as the repository for purely anti-
social desires of an unambiguously destructive kind, which represent traces of ‘savagery’ 
in the individual, a racial and social past which must be overcome and survived’ (104). 
As shall be seen, representations of criminals in detective fiction are informed both 
implicitly and explicitly by notions of innate dispositions, mental inheritance and the 




Adaptive Psychology and the Nervous System 
William James’ Principles of Psychology marked an important stage in the development 
of academic psychology as a discrete discipline. Published in 1890, James’ Principles 
fused introspection and the recognition of emotion as a valid object of study with 
physiological research into the brain and central nervous system. With its understanding 
of the interdependence of mind and body and its central image of the nervous system as 
a ‘great computating switch-board at a central telephone station,’ (26) Principles 
remained a respected psychological source book throughout the interwar years. In a 
break from the mind-body dualism of Cartesian thought systems, James asserted that 
mind should no longer be considered as having unique spiritual qualities, but as subject 
to the same natural laws as the body. Consciousness had its basis in physiological 
processes, meaning that with empirical exploration, the material causes of mental 
phenomenon could be isolated and understood. James was, then, primarily a 
psychologist of adaptation, but one with a much more holistic and comprehensive sense 
of how the body responds to its environment. He asserts that  
the essence of mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, “the adjustment 
of inner to outer relations.” Such a formula is vagueness incarnate; but … it 
takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them 
and on which they in turn react; … in short, it takes mind in the midst of all 
its concrete relations. (6) 
The demands of the social and natural environment, to James, provide the framework for 
human mental life. Both inner psychic life and the physical mind are formed in relation 
to external demands. However, James also asserts that the motivating forces of a 
reasoning, judging will lay behind human thought and activity. The relationship between 
the outside world and the will – the mind – should be the remit of psychology.  
 The question – what is the mind, and what is its relationship with the body? – is 
core to the Principles. James begins the work by dismissing spiritualist psychologies, in 
which the breadth of mental phenomena, including memory, desires, judgements and 
ideas, are attributed to ‘a simple entity, the personal Soul’ (1). The notion of the 
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transcendent soul, James asserts, insufficiently accounts for the mechanical properties of 
the central nervous system and the material qualities of the brain. In his development of 
an embodied psychological theory, James postulates a sympathetic nervous system and a 
psychology constitutively focused upon brain physiology and bodily processes: ‘no 
mental modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily 
change,’ (5) he states.
1
 The constitution of the hemispheres, motor-discharges which 
instigate and accompany acts, and the neural pathways created and maintained in a 
reflexive loop between brain and muscle were, according to James, the proper object of 
psychological study. Identity and character were not purely determined by inborn 
qualities, but formed throughout the individual’s lifetime in a responsive relationship 
between body and environment, as continual activity through the sensory and motor 
nerves linked impression to motion, carving deeper channels in certain parts, and 
forming ever more complex manifestations of consciousness: ‘an endless consequent 
increase in the possibilities of behaviour on the creature’s part’ (26). 
In much golden age crime fiction, the difference between unconscious and 
automatic acts is of considerable importance. In interwar legal debates over whether a 
criminal is an author of an act, or whether a guilty mind is a necessary accompaniment 
to guilt, especially in cases of insanity, James’ writings form an important point of 
reference. Of central concern is the question of choice, will and volition, which James 
approaches from a theological, moral standpoint as well as from a biological one. 
Although he asserts that movements in mind are necessarily accompanied by bodily 
activity, he does not agree that each feeling, ‘is only the correlate of some nerve-
movement whose cause lay wholly in a previous nerve-movement.’ (133). He 
distinguishes acts of mind from mere automatic and reflexive acts, because, ‘actions … 
as are done for an end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable 
expressions of Mind’ (11). James defines consciousness as ‘a selecting agency’ (139), 
asserting that making choices as to how to achieve ends makes an act a definite product 
of Mind.  
                                                 
1
 All italicisations in quotations are James’ own.  
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 One interesting component of James’ argument is his account of morality as a 
biological affect that is, to a certain degree, within the individual’s control. He asserts 
that the will becomes less freely exercisable the more the neurological effects of 
repeated actions build up. Rather than discrete acts of will, basic movements such as 
walking and jumping are comparable to higher skills like playing music, because 
learning them involves developments in the brain, nerves and muscle. Changes may 
come about as a consequence of education, or of action performed originally as an act of 
will, and they are made possible by the early plasticity of the brain and its receptivity to 
impressions. If early actions create fresh neurological pathways, and subsequent actions 
cleave deeper into those neurological pathways, character eventually becomes calcified 
as a consequence of those same pathways being inevitably followed: ‘the most complex 
habits … are, from the same point of view, nothing but concatenated discharges in the 
nerve-centres due to the presence there of systems of reflex paths’ (107). In this way, 
morality becomes habitual, as the will has carved a sluice, ‘a natural drainage channel’ 
(108) which it is simultaneously deepening, making certain thoughts and moral choices 
irresistible.  
 In a curiously visionary section, James advises his readership not to commit 
private guilty acts because ‘when a current has once traversed a path, it should traverse it 
more readily still a second time,’ (109). If bad or useless acts and tendencies are allowed 
to become habits, the consequence is a diminishing of the will, which is, after all, only 
‘an aggregate of tendencies to act’ which ‘only becomes effectively ingrained in us in 
proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur’ (125). 
Training out of habits is, to James, both a moral and a physical task, and the only means 
available to counteract the determining effects of a nurtured neural karma: 
We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every 
smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar. … Down 
among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering and 
storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing 
we ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. (127) 
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Adaptation and ethics, the body and the mind, co-exist in James’ psychology, and it is 
striking to observe how alike is his final warning here to the recording unconscious as it 
was envisaged by Sigmund Freud. 
 
Psychoanalysis 
During the latter years of the nineteenth century, Social Darwinist and physiological 
accounts in which organic matter constituted and predetermined consciousness turned 
attention away from the immaterial and the psychic towards the physical. 
Psychoanalysis won back control of the mind over the body in the recognition of 
psychosomatic action, unconscious impulses, and the interactions between the mind and 
innate instincts, particularly the sexual instinct.   
Freud’s impact upon literary, intellectual, scientific and medical thought in 1920s 
Britain can in many respects be seen as a culmination of nineteenth-century traditions. 
Leahey has suggested that many of Freud’s views on sexuality were ‘thoroughly 
Victorian’ (219): his presentation of female sexuality as ‘a deeply repressed animal 
nature to be awakened by the right seducer’ (ibid.) and his comparison between this 
buried nature and the proclivities of savage women had already been articulated in 
previous thought systems. The idea of sexual instinct or libido in Darwinian thought can 
be traced, as Leahey states, to ‘a combination of Victorian morality and physics’ (217), 
which shared metaphors of limited reserves of energy derived from thermodynamic 
physics, and the nerve stores found in physiology. Many of Freud’s theories were 
inspired by explorations of the conflicting nature of desire and the mysterious origins of 
ideas from writers as varied as William Shakespeare, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Marcel 
Proust and the Classical tragedians. Nineteenth century philosophical, spiritual and 
literary writing was familiar with unconscious ideas, in Romantic poetry and 
spiritualism, which laid the way for understanding of alternate aspects of the mind, 
integral to the self but throwing up desires and inclinations contrary to reason, social 
morality or conscious dictates. William James wrote in the 1890s of the stream of 
thought, describing consciousness as ‘a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations’ 
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(224) and, in language that owes more to the Victorian literary trope of the dual self than 
Freud’s understandings of complex and interrelated mental states, the ‘subconscious 
personage’ as an ‘interior fraction of the subject’s own natural mind’ (228). The reality 
of these ulterior and supressed states of being is nonetheless assumed in James’ scientific 
account, and formed the context for hypnotic experiments Freud was conducting in the 
1890s on sufferers of hysteria: ‘the buried feelings and thoughts proved now to exist in 
hysterical anaesthetics, in recipients of post-hypnotic suggestion, etc., themselves are 
part of secondary  personal selves’ as James wrote in 1890 (Principles 227) 
Freud’s major contribution was not, then, in proposing the existence of 
unconscious ideas, but in his hypothesis of a place in the mind called the unconscious: 
‘where ideas reside when they are not conscious and from which they can affect 
behaviour without our awareness’ (Leahey 218). As well as proposing the existence of 
the dynamic unconscious, Freud announced a theory of the mind in which the sexual 
instinct was central to the development of the Ego, and in which the process of 
repression was a major factor in psychological development and mental pathology. 
 During the late 1890s and early 1910s, the ‘lonely years,’ as Freud termed them 
(“On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” 22), psychoanalytic theories were 
treated by many as objectionable and eccentric. The establishment of the Zurich Institute 
in 1911 marked the beginning of Freud’s success on the Continent, while in Britain, 
Barbara Low and Ernest Jones were prominent amongst those who produced popular 
introductions to Freudian theory, defining how his work was received by the general 
reader. Although psychoanalysis was never recognised by the academic psychiatric 
establishment, which preferred behaviourism and psychologies of consciousness (see 
Leahey 216-7), and Freud’s insights were never brought to bear in the courts of law, 
psychoanalysis was practiced by a network of analysts (see Danto, passim), and had 
manifold influences upon thought, writing and social life in interwar Britain. 
  Prior to conducting his own research, Freud worked with female hysterics at the 
clinic of Parisian doctor Jean-Martin Charcot in 1885 and 1886 (“On the History” 9). 
Charcot was renowned for having proposed a mentally and neurologically grounded 
40 
 
explanation for hysteria: women’s uteruses were not diseased, and their bodies were not 
possessed by a ‘wayward internal will’ as many Victorian psychiatrists had assumed 
(The Female Malady 32). Freud’s major contribution to the study of hysteria was the 
contention that its physical symptoms, the ‘uncontrollable fits, contortions, paralysis, 
pain, muscular rigidity’ (L. Williams 3), and coughs, limps and ticks, were a means for 
the hysteric to indirectly communicate information about their mental suffering which 
they were otherwise unable to articulate. Something was stopping hysterics from voicing 
their complaints, and so the body was finding its own means to express the tension 
within the individual’s psyche.  
 In the research Freud conducted with Joseph Breuer in the late 1890s, the 
interview answers of female patients suggested that complaints were frequently of a 
sexual nature, and could be traced back to childhood or teenage sexual traumas. On this 
basis, Freud formulated his seduction theory, which claimed that hysterical conditions 
issued from partial memories of sexual abuse. Experimental hypnosis, automatic writing 
and speaking and dream recitation were employed by Freud as a means of recovering 
memories of trauma and allowing patients to confront their past (see Studies on Hysteria 
21-47). The ‘talking cure’ as it was developed with such patients as Anna O., in 
particular was seen as a way to ‘reclaim and control subjective territory,’ (L. Williams 
6);
 
as memories were being repelled from consciousness by a powerful force, a method 
needed to be adopted which avoided the rational selection process of the conscious mind 
and broke down conscious resistance to ideas from the depths of memory. The notion of 
repression was a ‘theoretical inference’(Freud, “On the History” 17)
 
of these 
observations, as was breakthrough: the discovery of the unconscious, the area to which 
painful memories had been banished.  
 The claim which would define early psychoanalysis in both crucial and 
problematic ways was that actual abuse need not be at the root of hysteria. Sexual 
traumas could be psychic in origin, and rather than looking to verify accusations of 
abuse, the mind and its fantasies should be investigated. Psychological conflict in later 
life need not come from instances of real trauma, but could be caused by a mishap in 
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sexual development: they could be ‘rooted in an anxious unresolved experience of 
infantile sexuality,’ as Linda Williams puts it (5). Adult patients who claimed to have 
witnessed sexual encounters between parents or to have been victims of abuse might, 
Freud asserted, actually be generating these fantasies unconsciously as screen memories, 
‘to cover up the autoerotic activity of the first years of childhood, to embellish it and 
raise it to a higher plane’ (“On the History” 18). Freud’s disregard for those vulnerable 
patients who may well have suffered abuse was the price they paid for his breakthrough 
– the recognition that ‘psychic reality requires to be taken into account alongside 
practical reality’ (“On the History” 18). Hysteria was caused by a tension – the 
inadequate discharge of an unpleasant emotion or memory – and this could be just as 
equally be a psychic event as a real one. 
 Fundamentally, Freud proposed that the sexual instinct was a universal and 
constant psychological force, finding expression in different wishful impulses towards 
both real and fantasy objects (“Repression” 146). An individual’s sexual maturation 
began with sexual attachment to oneself – infantile narcissism – moving on to 
attachment to the mother or father. At some stage, social mores and the denials of the 
parent would intervene to force the child to recognise that incestuous desires are 
inappropriate. In normal development, the individual would ultimately fix upon a proper 
sexual object (of the opposite sex), outside of the family and the self. Freud’s tale of 
incestuous fantasy, parental rejection, the repression of painful memories from the 
consciousness, and the unhealthy consequences of unsuccessful repression formed the 
basis of the Oedipus Complex. This is perhaps Freud’s most well-known and 
controversial contribution to interwar thought: it is certainly a theory with which the 
crime writers under consideration here were copiously familiar. 
 A clearer definition of the architecture of the mind developed from Freud’s 
research into the primary repression of infantile sexuality. In works authored between 
1899 and 1915,
2
 Freud developed his model of the mind as divided into the faculties of 
unconscious, pre-conscious and consciousness. During the 1920s,
 
Freud developed and 
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refined his definition of the faculties of mind as ego, super-ego and ID.
 
However, as 
golden age novels tend not to represent the finer points of Freud’s developed theory, his 
earlier terminology will be used, and only the premise of the super-ego will be discussed 
when it influences accounts of mental pathologies in crime fiction. Consciousness, then, 
is defined as the part of the mind which registers experience and which recognises itself 
as self. It is from consciousness that rational action is directed. The unconscious is where 
memory and past experiences are stored, and it is also the seat of instinct. Freud 
compares it to ‘an aboriginal population in the mind’ composed of ‘inherited mental 
formations,’ (“The Unconscious” 195) and in doing so demonstrates an affinity with 
adaptive psychologies and Social Darwinism, the like of which Light sees in Christie’s 
appropriation of Freud (see Light 104). The preconscious acts as a guard and censoring 
agent for consciousness; ideas, memories and wishful impulses must move from the 
unconscious and through the preconscious in order to be made conscious.  
According to Freud, many instinct representations, despite the restraining power 
of the preconscious, are released to consciousness harmlessly; indeed, much of the latent 
content of the unconscious is allowed to pass into consciousness. Freud credits the 
unconscious as the source of artistic creation, imagination, jokes and original ideas. 
Dreams and ‘slips’, or parallaxes, also provide compelling evidence that individuals 
have a hidden nature at odds with or unfamiliar to their conscious self-understanding 
(“The Unconscious” 167-70).
  
The preconscious can, however, resist the movement of 
memories or desires from the unconscious if this material is judged to contradict the 
governing principles of the consciousness, or of the social arbiter in the psyche, what 
Freud would come to term the super-ego. The pre-conscious, therefore, has an executive 
function in the ordering of the mind, enforcing the moral ideals and social laws of the 
super-ego and protecting consciousness from the ulterior desires of the unconscious. 
This mental ordering is represented quite straightforwardly by both Freud and writers 
like Low in diagrams which show the movement of desires, memories and experiences 
from one state of mind to the next, or being deflected from consciousness to the 
unconscious (see Freud, “The Unconscious” 174). 
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What is repelled into the unconscious – be it a memory of a real event or an 
instinct-representing desire – is repressed. Repression is, by Freud’s definition, ‘a 
process affecting ideas on the border between the system Unconscious and 
Preconscious’ (“The Unconscious” 180). Completely successful repression has no 
negative mental repercussions, as all traces of it are removed as less and less energy 
(cathexis) is attracted to it (“Repression” 150-2). Unsuccessful repression has various 
mental affects. Although consciousness may be protected from outlawed ideas in their 
complete form by the preconscious, repressed material can maintain a certain degree of 
attraction within the unconscious, drawing strength from instinct and forming 
associations with other psychic matter and memories. Although repressed ideas do not 
generally re-enter consciousness in their original form, their derivatives can, for which 
reason repression is described by Freud as an ‘after-pressure’ (“Repression” 148). This 
return could take the form of nightmares, tics or imaginary injuries, phobias, mental 
anguish or fantastical fears (as in cases of paranoia). After Freud established that 
unconscious material could be accessed without the use of the hypnosis (a method he 
had earlier promoted, see “Hypnotism” and “A Case of Successful Treatment by 
Hypnotism”), he developed methods of tricking the mind’s censor and accessing 
repressed unconscious material in attempts to heal the patient, which including 
relaxation, free-association, automatic writing and dream analysis (see “The Neuro-
psychosis of Defence” 54-5; Studies on Hysteria 111; The Interpretation of Dreams, 
passim). With the consciousness in relaxed state, in dreams or in moments of incomplete 
concentration, ideas loosely related to the repressed idea could pass censorship and be 
translated by the analyst.  
 In interwar Britain, Freud’s theories caused considerable controversy. The notion 
of the unconscious itself was repellent to some; as shall be seen in chapter two, many 
legal commentators resisted the notion of an ungovernable and unfamiliar aspect within 
the self, which threatened to undermine notions of the individual as autonomous, 
reasonable, and capable of exercising free will. As Neil Badmington suggests, ‘to read 
Freud is to witness the waning of humanism,’ because Freud’s thesis of unconscious 
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impulses undermines the Cartesian model in which ‘the critical determinants of being is 
rational, fully conscious thought’ (6). Freud’s writing can be seen as issuing from, or 
marking the termination of, an older discourse of the self and self-determination.  
Equally troublesome was the centrality of sexuality in his account of 
psychological development. Freud asserts that individuals are defined by the result of the 




between libido directed towards 
the self and directed towards external objects (“On Narcissism” 75). Healthy states of 
mind depend upon the right balance being found. In a mentally healthy individual, 
sufficient ego-cathexis ensures self-respect is maintained, and is balanced by object-
cathexis for a lover, family and for other real-world objects. For those who have 
renounced sexual life all together, for religious reasons for example, pathologies caused 
by thwarted instincts need not be the result if one achieves ‘sublimation’: that is, 
diverting ‘sexual interest from human beings entirely’ and sublimating ‘it to a 
heightened interest in the divine, in ‘without the libido having undergone an introversion 
on to ... phantasies’ (“On Narcissism” 80). Sublimation, achieving a balance between 
object and ego-cathexis, is a means to mental health.  
Writing against the complex, contrary, prudish, and inhibitory discourses of sex 
which defined nineteenth-century gender relations, social life and religious morality, the 
suggestion that people recognise and satisfy their desires was treated as highly radical 
and implicitly critical of social relations. As repression involves the stopping-up of 
libidinal energies which demand to be released, the more a society’s mores are in 
conflict with the expression of instinctual impulses, the more likely neuroses are to 
occur: ‘libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the vicissitude of pathogenic repression if 
they come into conflict with the subject’s cultural and ethical ideals’ (“On Narcissism” 
93). Veering from class, family or social ideals in order to satisfy desires might result in 
self-condemnation, while their repression could resurface as guilt for fantasy crimes or 
all-pervasive anxiety. Parents in particular are held responsible for enforcing social laws 
and impressing upon children the importance of aspiring to favoured moral ideals; they 
define the form the super-ego will take, as fear of punishment by parents accounts for 
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much of the anxiety felt at failing in their judgement (“On Narcissism” 101-2). 
 
‘Civilisation’ as it is learnt in the nursery, ‘is based on the repressions effected by former 
generations, and that each fresh generation is required to maintain this civilisation by 
effecting the same repression’ according to Freud (“On the History” 57).  
 Freud’s approach to ambivalence also constituted a radical aspect to his thought 
which was particularly attractive to crime writers, not least because their works are 
characteristically concerned with grief, or lack of it, over the death of an un/loved one. 
In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud asserts that the state of mourning for a lost loved 
one and the condition of melancholia involve overlapping and comparable unconscious 
mental processes. The libido of the mourner, which is still attached to the deceased loved 
one, revolts at first against the need to withdraw itself. In the normal mourning process, 
grief is overcome by the desire for self-preservation: to live and not go the same way as 
the lost object, the libido must withdraw from the lost object and eventually seek 
another, living, object. Melancholics experience a similar ‘profoundly painful dejection’ 
(“Mourning and Melancholia” 244) because of a thwarted libidinal attachment, but differ 
only in that they refuse to withdraw from the lost object. A jilted lover, for example, may 
refuse to withdraw their attachment to a lost lover, despite strong feelings of anger and 
resentment. The conflict between love and resentment is overcome when the cathetic 
energies are withdrawn to the ego itself ‘to establish an identification of the ego with the 
abandoned object’ (“Mourning and Melancholia” 249). Rather than admit their negative 
feelings, the melancholic treats their own ego like the lost lover, making self-accusation 
feel enjoyable, as the sufferer feels they are exacting revenge upon the lost love object in 
attacks upon their own self (“Mourning and Melancholia” 250).
  
 
 The ambivalence of these relations, the co-existence of love and hate and the 
resistance of the conscious mind to the feelings of hate directed at the lost loved object, 
is not restricted to melancholia: ambivalence is liable to complicate the process of 
mourning as well. Freud considers the obsessional states of mourning, when the mourner 
blames him or herself for the death of the loved one and feels shame at past neglect, and 
sees these reactions as revolts against feelings of resentment which are present in any 
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relationship, and the pain they cause when the loved one is lost. Indeed, ‘the loss of a 
love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make 
itself effective and come into the open’ (“Mourning and Melancholia” 251).
 
Even when 
the mourning is not obsessional, Freud contends that it is fundamentally concerned with 
individual struggles of ambivalence, where the ego is impelled ‘to give up the object by 
declaring it to be dead and offering the ego the inducement of continuing to live’ 
(“Mourning and Melancholia” 257). In this respect it is a comparable to melancholia, 
which loosens ‘the fixation of the libido to the object by disparaging it’ (“Mourning and 
Melancholia” 257). 
 
The emotional states of the bereaved are cast in a less sympathetic 
light when held to comparison with the morbid state of melancholia, and with the 
diversion from perpetual grief being the narcissistic desire to perpetuate one’s self. 
 Ambivalence is also a major theme of Freud’s social anthropological study, 
Totem and Taboo (1913). Influenced by James Frazer’s influential study of magic and 
religion in world cultures, The Golden Bough (1890), Freud shares Frazer’s iconoclastic 
and comparative approach in his explorations of diverse ‘primitive’ phenomena, 
including ancestor worship, fear of spirits, reconciliation with enemy war dead and the 
terror of the corpse, all of which he was drawn to compare with the neurotic mental 
states of Western society. For example, belief that the dead become demons intent on 
punishing the living is read by Freud as a neurotic projection originating from guilt at 
unconscious wishes for an individual’s death while they were still alive, as well as 
unconscious satisfaction at their passing (“Totem and Taboo” 102). The demonic fantasy 
acts as a form of psychic self-defence, which protects consciousness from perceiving 
ambivalent, and repressed, hostilities towards the dead.
 
While ‘primitive man possessed 
a higher degree of ambivalence than is found at present among civilised human beings’ 
(Freud’s italics, “Totem and Taboo” 111), Freud asserts that atavistic tendencies persist 
in psychological illnesses like paranoia, in which the ego’s judgement of itself against 
the ideal or super-ego is mistaken for a hostile and watchful external presence (“Totem 
and Taboo” 114). Freud’s insistence that conscious understanding is instigated by 
unconscious impulses, and that latent hostilities to loved ones could motivate even 
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socially admirable expressions of grief or excessive tenderness towards the dead, is 
applicable to primitive and Western societies alike.  
The overlapping of the supposedly distinct civilised and primitive elements 
found in Freud’s thought is highly influential in golden age crime novels. Families are 
often depicted as loci of sexual tension, ambivalence and unsociable instincts, whilst 
repression and complexes (which have an alternative history in the work of Carl Jung) 
are presented as a major way of responding to transgressive acts and accounting for the 
motivations for crime. Of course, the theories of Freud and his followers are not 
presented in a consistent way in crime novels, but however exaggerated and mediated 
public interpretations of Freud were, there is no doubt that a generalised understanding 
of his most potent contentions constituted a radical new way of interpreting human 
emotions and actions which permeates golden age crime fiction. Providing a 
considerably more profound pool of motivations from which to construct characters, 
psychological knowledge affected the kinds of clues that counted, the skills possessed by 
detectives, and the credibility of final solutions. It radically altered the premise of reason 
on which the genre was founded, undermining the archetypal ingenuity of both criminal 
and detective and upsetting the dichotomy between the normal and abnormal mind 
which had made the form so reassuring. Furthermore, insights into emotional instability 
and mental pathology complicated the pattern of reason and reassurance the formula 
provided by introducing ethical questions into the judgement of criminals, whom it was 










I. Psychological Detection 
 
The triumph of reason, it has been asserted by numerous critics, is celebrated in golden 
age crime fiction, but what in fact is ‘reasonable’? The answer to this question is by no 
means consistent, and is highly responsive to the advance of psychological ideas and 
understandings of madness in the golden age form. Many golden age crime novels, far 
from excluding madness and mental pathology, treat both as acceptable narrative 
devices, employing psychology as both a specialist and an accessible detecting method 
with its own reliable laws. Rather than upsetting the detection formula with its demands 
for reason, the incursion of insanity, the irrational, and psychology are fitted into the 
formula. They are also often turned to social critique, as once accepted as a medical fact 
rather than an instance of individual wickedness or deviance, the presence of criminal 
madness begs the question: why has this happened, and how can it be helped? 
The golden age of detection was a period of rule writing and self-reflection. The 
Detection Club, whose members included Margery Allingham, G.K. Chesterton, Agatha 
Christie, Gladys Mitchell and Dorothy L. Sayers was formed in 1928. Its members were 
responsible for putting together what Symons has called, ‘a body of criticism … which 
tried to lay down the limits within which writers of detective stories ought to operate’ 
(101). Its meetings featured mock occult rituals on initiation, during which authors 
committed themselves to obeying the rules of the genre (Mitchell, “The Golden Age”; 
Drayton 109). Ronald A. Knox, another club member, penned his “A Detective Story 
Decalogue” for mystery writers in the same year, whose demands for fair play to the 
reader ran as follows:  
 
1. The criminal must be someone mentioned in the early part of the story, but must not 
be anyone whose thoughts the reader has been allowed to follow. 
2. All supernatural or preternatural agencies are ruled out as a matter of course. 
3. Not more than one secret room or passage is allowable. 
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4. No hitherto undiscovered poisons may be used, nor any appliance which will need a 
long scientific explanation at the end. 
5. No Chinaman must figure in the story. 
6. No accident must ever help the detective, nor must he ever have an unaccountable 
intuition which proves to be right. 
7. The detective must not himself commit the crime. 
8. The detective must not light on any clues which are not instantly produced for the 
inspection of the reader. 
9. The stupid friend of the detective, the Watson, must not conceal any thoughts which 
pass through his mind; his intelligence must be slightly, but very slightly, below that 
of the average reader. 
10. Twin brothers, and doubles generally, must not appear unless we have been duly 




Authors often broke Knox’s commandments, nonetheless they respected the sentiments 
they supported, that sense of ‘fair-play’ which can be recognised at once in clue-puzzle 
novels. Clues are shared, the detective uses comprehensible reasoning rather than 
intuition or accident, and supernatural agencies are ruled out along with ‘undiscovered’ 
poisons and any other such unscientific devices. The fictional universe of detective 
fiction, though fanciful, had to be reasonable, or at least seem to be so.  
 Accounting for degrees of variation between texts, the conventional plot runs as 
follows. A crime occurs – usually a murder – the circumstances of which are mysterious. 
A detective appears or is appointed and an investigation is launched. Evidence and alibis 
are acquired and false solutions are considered and discarded. Finally, a solution is 
posed. Arrest or another form of containment – suicide, or the death of the murderer at 
the hands of a member of the cast are not uncommon – is the next step. A marriage 
between former suspects often completes the mood of resolution. 
                                                 
3
 Ronald A. Knox’s “A Detective Story Decalogue” was originally published in his introduction to Best 
Detective Stories of 1928-29.  
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When considering the demand for reason in the golden age novel, the working 
out of the solution is central to its achievement. Although many authors intentionally 
contravened Knox’s rules, if only in order to demonstrate their prowess in the form, the 
principle that solutions should not be inconsistent, deceitful, supernatural or tediously 
conventional was respected. The dénouement is the moment at which the truth is 
revealed, but it is also the process by which the novel obtains credibility and 
consistency. It is an essential moment of demystification, when the plethora of false 
solutions are rejected, and when the details of the narrative are made sense of and 
aligned. The principle of fair play, and what Munt has called (although not altogether 
unironically), the ‘detective hermeneutic of pure reason’ (10) must apply to the story that 
is told at the dénouement as much as it must apply to the individual parts which have led 
to it: there must have been a sequence of clues or telling incidents throughout the novel 
that can be referred to as evidence in support of the dénouement, running through the 
novel like an unbreakable, logical chain. An entertaining afternoon might be spent 
picking through crime novels to assess whether authors were truly so honest. Chandler 
devotes much attention in “The Simple Art of Murder” to the logical and scientific 
inaccuracies in crime novels which readers still regarded as logical and scientific (187-
9). Although they may be otherwise, what is important is that the dénouement seems 
convincing, and the most reliable means of making it so is to have the detective refer to 
the clues that have been distributed throughout the book. The fact that there is 
demonstrable, or at least credible, logic underpinning the resolution of the crime novel is 
a generic necessity. 
 Solutions should also not be impossible. Although there are many examples of 
scientific nonsense being touted as sense in the crime genre (see Chandler 187; Hodgson 
310), the world of crime fiction should obey the same physical laws as the readers’ own 
(hence Knox’s rejection of the supernatural). For example, in Chesterton’s “The 
Hammer of God” (1911), a man is gruesomely murdered by a blow to the head with a 
tiny hammer, creating a serious mystery: how could such a small tool have caused such a 
serious wound? The solution is that the hammer has been dropped from the steeple of 
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church, and that the terminal velocity achieved by the hammer at impact caused the fatal 
damage. Golden age authors frequently draw upon commonplace knowledge of this type 
to construct their plots, and often the simplest solutions make for the most mysterious 
crimes. Indeed, Knight suggests that rather than complexity, intrinsic to the classical 
form is the dramatic shift that occurs when the unsolvable, impossible riddle of the 
crime is shown to be simple, even ‘elementary’ at heart. Writing on Poe, he states: 
The aura of genius combines with the actuality of simple explanation – a 
very skilful piece of characterisation (Doyle will imitate it carefully), which 
gives the story both a surface complication and an actual simplicity; the 
audience can admire and also understand. (Crime Fiction 28)  
While detectives are frequently eccentric in their methods and obfuscatory in their 
speech, their logic is nonetheless sane and based upon reasoning that the reader can 
understand.  
 
Reason and Reassurance 
Clue-puzzle novels are guided by the principle of ‘fair play’, which entails the honest 
presentation of clues to the reader and the ostensible compliance with scientific and 
physical laws. The closure, and the sense of not having been cheated that the reader 
experiences at the dénouement is dependent upon the reasonableness of the plot. What, 
then, does the formula suggest about the demands of readers? What is the literary 
standing of a genre which demands reiterated reassurance? Amongst his many criticisms 
of the form, Chandler accuses British golden age writers of producing ‘second grade 
literature’ (192), parochial, artificial and dull, and ties all these problems specifically to 
their obsession with following their ‘arid formula’ (192). Many subsequent critics 
follow his lead, arguing that golden age writers privilege formulaic thrills over social 
comment and critique. David Grossvogel, for example accuses Christie of a dreary 
predictability of plot that guaranteed ‘formulaic certainty’ (120), while William W. 
Stowe complains that Christie’s novels are ‘imprisoned by Cartesian methodological 
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certainties’ and recommends instead the openness, ‘undecideability’ and existential 
pondering of the hardboiled form (373).   
Criticism of golden age crime fiction as inferior literature because of its formula 
have, however, been matched with accounts which find its preoccupation with form and 
structure an ideal object for the explication of theoretical positions, elevating the 
standing of the form. During the 1980s and 1990s, scholars influenced by structuralism 
and post-structuralism from Roland Barthes’ S/Z to Peter Brooks’ Reading for the Plot 
wrote extensively upon the detective formula. Susan Elizabeth Sweeney lists three 
formal elements common to all narrative – sequence, suspense and closure – and 
suggests that the self-reflexivity, artificiality and observation of formula in the detective 
story thematises a reader’s desire for closure and thereby ‘represents narrativity in its 
purest form’ (3). She claims that by: 
creating suspense about whether and how conflicts will be resolved, every 
narrative exploits a constant tension between meaning (the anticipated 
revelation of a coherent narrative pattern) and meaninglessness (the fear that 
no such pattern exists). (4) 
In its insistence upon coherence, meaning and pattern, and in its integral rejection of 
meaninglessness, detective fiction demonstrates that closure is a demand that readers 
make on all narrative: crime fiction is no worse offender than any other closed or 
complete fiction. Rather, although crime fiction performs a reassuring function, the 
artificiality of closure and reassurance functions as something of an in-joke shared by 
writer and criminal, at the expense of the over-confident detective and gullible reader 
engaged in their precarious attempts to stave off irrationality and meaninglessness.  
 A similar direction is taken by Bo Eriksson in his work on the structuring forces 
– a  term he borrows from Barthes – of detective fiction. Eriksson contends that 
detective fiction has a unique appeal for readers because of its valorisation of truth and 
its central dichotomy of irrationality – the mystery of the crime – versus reason, the 
logical solution provided by the detective. Eriksson’s pared-down, four stage detective 
formula, ‘crime, detective, investigation, and solution,’ (16) constitutes a uniquely 
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urgent structure which sparks a desire to know and a ‘sense of exploration, common to 
most intellectual activities’ (22). Seeing such a desire for knowledge as intellectual, 
Eriksson naturally disagrees with the view that detective fiction’s emphasis upon 
solution is escapist or unintellectual. Instead, he adopts a structuralist position, central to 
which is the ‘peculiar, double structure of the formal detection story, where the 
detective’s investigation corresponds to the sjuzet [and] the fabula describes the story of 
the crime that is laid bare by the detective’ (24). The fabula is the objective order of 
events or pattern, and it provides the foundation for the sjuzet, the often perplexing order 
in which clues are uncovered, suspicions raised and mysterious events take place. The 
demand that a fabula exist is therefore essential to the assumption that reason and order 
will triumph over irrationality and mystery. In ‘undecideable’ existential thrillers, the 
existence of this underlying order is not guaranteed; indeed, postmodern forays detective 
fiction such as Paul Auster’s The New York Trilogy (1985) probe just this need for a 
reassuring conclusion by denying the existence of an objective fabula absolutely.  
 Structuralist accounts propose that detective fiction installs a coherent narrative 
pattern in order to avoid or exploit the tension between meaninglessness and meaning. 
This is not quite the same thing as escapism because, although the tension is always 
resolved by the affirmation of meaning, the self-reflexiveness, formulaic structure and 
artificiality of classic detective fiction cannot entirely reassure the reader. Keeping with 
the issue of reassurance, a contextualised reading of the detective narrative has been 
given by Michael Holquist, who situates the narrative drive to closure and reassurance 
enacted in the formula in the same context that generated the most uncertain of literary 
movements, modernism. A number of critics have considered detective fiction as a 
highly modern trope: Raymond Williams locates the rise of the detective in the 
conditions of nineteenth-century urban expansion (“The Metropolis and the Emergence 
of Modernism” 88); Light suggests that Christie’s novels were a form of popular 
modernism replete with unstable identity constructions, disordered linearity and an 
interest in social masks (88); Žižek states that ‘both the modern novel and the detective 
novel are centred around the same formal problem – the impossibility of telling a story 
54 
 
in a linear, consistent way, of rendering the “realistic” continuity of events’ (48-9). In 
contrast, Holquist notes a discord between interwar crime fiction and the ‘high’ 
modernist literature that reached its apex simultaneously. To Holquist, the figure of the 
detective as a rational entity is pitted not only in a mythic battle against a world which 
seems irredeemably chaotic and insensible to reason, but also against the uncertainties of 
modernist literature itself. Writers like W.B. Yeats and T. S. Eliot rejected the nineteenth 
century’s drive for a science of origins and chronological world history – themselves 
consolations for the loss of a theological grand narrative – and turned instead to the 
archetypes of myth (sourced from the fin de siècle popularity of anthropology and 
mysticism) and to the irrational elements of the psyche revealed in the depth psychology 
of Freud. To Holquist, these turns to unreason are resisted in the detective narrative. He 
states:  
when the upper reaches of literature were dramatizing the limits of reason by 
experimenting with such irrational modes as myth and the subconscious, … 
the lower reaches of literature were dramatizing the power of reason in such 
figures as Inspector Poirot and Ellery Queen. (147) 
The dichotomy Holquist establishes between high and low literature is, however, 
misleading, as he goes on to propose that popular criminal narratives were not only 
popular with the hypothetical ‘common reader’ but with exactly those intellectuals who 
were engaging with unsettling modernist fiction. Such writers were turning ‘for relief 
and easy reassurance to the detective story, the primary genre of popular literature which 
they, during the same period, were, in fact, consuming’ (147). If it is the case that 
interwar detective fiction is reassuring because of its ‘flatness of character’ (Holquist 
147), its defence of rationalism and its guaranteed narrative closure, it is only so because 
its authors, intellectuals including Dorothy L. Sayers, C. Day Lewis and Michael Innes 
(the pen-name of the scholar J.I.M. Stewart), consciously excluded irrational elements of 




 In the work of Ronald R. Thomas, the forms of reassurance the detective story 
provides are linked less to literary uncertainties than to the forms of power bound up in 
knowledge. Based upon the work of social and intellectual historian Michel Foucault, 
Thomas explores crime fictions’ appropriation of nineteenth and twentieth-century 
technologies for fixing identity – the photograph, the fingerprint – and probing the self – 
the polygraph and Lombroso’s pseudoscience of criminal stigmata. According to 
Thomas, the figure of the detective has been linked since its inception to developments 
in forensic science. The way in which this figure employs these technologies expresses 
the text’s investment in perpetuating the status quo and containing the unruly individuals 
of the modern state. When a detective solves a crime, Thomas claims: 
At stake is not just the identification of a dead victim or an unknown 
suspect, but the demonstration of the power invested in certain forensic 
devices embodied in the figure of the literary detective. (2) 
Forensic technologies are invested with power to know and to uncover the secrets of the 
self, converting the body of the criminal into ‘a text to be read’ (Thomas 4) and fulfilling 
in print the work that Foucault sees as intrinsic to modern governmental and disciplinary 
societies – the atomisation of people into individuals to be observed, and their 
aggregation into population of like subjects amenable to organisation and governance 
(see Discipline and Punish and Security, Territory, Population, especially 42-5). In 
response to Thomas’s work, it is possible to see detective novels as reassuring because 
they often assert that contemporary forms of control by individuation (forensic science), 
and comprehension (through the discovery of general scientific laws of behaviour) 
work, and are monopolised by likeable and reliable individual figures, rather than a 
depersonalised and threatening state.  
 Of course, as Thomas outlines, these technologies are not always reliable, their 
results being open to misinterpretation and exploitation, meaning their reliability must 
be guaranteed by the detective. In crime novels, such technologies become part of a 
repertoire of detecting techniques which constitute a reasonable solution. Of course, they 
are only part of a repertoire because, as Žižek states, the reader will be ‘immensely 
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disappointed if the dénouement is brought about by a pure scientific procedure (if, for 
example, the assassin is identified simply by means of a chemical analysis of the stains 
on the corpse)’ (49). If the explanation is merely something that can be tested and 
proven scientifically, the reader will be as disappointed as if the solution is not backed 
up by reasoning. Neither the romantic clairvoyant, ‘the man possessing an irrational, 
quasisupernatural power to penetrate the mystery of another person’s mind,’ (ibid. 49) 
nor a logician, the detective employs individual reasoning, makes clever associations, 
accumulates clues and makes use of recognisable specialist knowledge, all of which 
contribute to the reader’s satisfaction with the plot.   
  
Psychology before the Golden Age 
The study of emotional states predates the golden age in the work of a number of 
influential nineteenth and early twentieth century crime writers. Edgar Allen Poe’s 
exemplary locked room mystery, The Murders in The Rue Morgue (1841) begins with a 
manifesto of detection decidedly psychological in character. Here, the analytical method 
of detection is formulated from the observational and inferring techniques used by the 
player of draughts or whist, rather than the calculating and rules-based expertise used by 
the chess player. The narrator explains how the analytical player is able to deduce from 
their opponent’s behaviour the truth they are concealing about their hand:  
He notes every variation of the face as the play progresses, gathering a fund 
of thought from the differences in the expression of certainty, of surprise, of 
triumph, or chagrin … A casual or inadvertent word; the accidental dropping 
or turning of a card, with the accompanying anxiety or carelessness in regard 
to its concealment; the counting of the tricks, with the order of their 
arrangement; embarrassment, hesitation, eagerness or trepidation – all afford 
to this apparently intuitive perception, indications of the true state of affairs. 
(5) 
In Poe’s account of the card game, the ideal reasoner uses intuitive perception, combined 
with his knowledge of the rules of the game and a degree of empathy, enabling him to 
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judge why the opponent looks either annoyed or satisfied. Human behaviour falls into 
distinct patterns, this excerpt suggests, and the ideal reasoner is able to interpret this 
behaviour. In a game of cards, however, the breadth of concealed thoughts and reactions 
is significantly reduced from that of everyday life. Later in the story, however, Poe’s 
detective Dupin is able to transpose these principles into the limitless field of interior 
monologue and private thought, clearly a realm in which predictable modes of behaviour 
are rarer. As the narrator and Dupin are wandering along the Parisian streets, the 
detective makes a comment relating to a matter the sidekick is at that moment silently 
contemplating. The matter is not something they have been discussing, neither is it 
something Dupin could have guessed he would be thinking about. At the point of 
interruption, Dupin appears to have that ‘quasisupernatural power to penetrate the 
mystery of another person’s mind’ (Žižek 49) which is purely irrational. Instead, what 
Dupin claims to have done is the opposite of irrational; he claims to have followed the 
semantic, anecdotal and emotive links which guided the meditations of his companion 
from the point at which their previous conversation stopped to the point at which he 
chose interrupt him. In doing so, Poe claims that the seemingly random movements 
individuals make from thought to thought are guided by a connective logic, even if it this 
logic is imperceptible to the person actually having those thoughts. Indeed, the thinker is 
likely to be surprised at the logic that guides their ‘unguided’ contemplation: 
There are few persons who have not, at some period of their lives, amused 
themselves in retracing the steps by which particular conclusions of their 
own minds have been attained. The occupation is full of interest; and he who 
attempts it for the first time is astonished by the apparently illimitable 
distance and incoherence between the starting-point and the goal. (9-10) 
The language and insights of Freud’s theory of the unconscious and William James’ 
notion of the stream of consciousness inform a retrospective reinterpretation of Poe. A 
prophetic apprehension of later developments in the study of psychic states is, however, 
not the only matter of interest within the excerpt, or in Poe’s detective’s methodology. 
Psychologically intuitive analytic thought by golden age novelists familiar with Freud or 
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James can be as well attributed to the method of the talking cure as to the scientific 
principle presented in Poe’s stories – that all phenomenon, whether physical or 
psychical, has a cause and an order which can ultimately be revealed. The psychological 
reasoning Poe’s detective uses seems to have less to do with claims to specialist 
knowledge of the workings of the mind than with the reassuring promise of reason itself. 
Holquist, taking a biographical stance, notes that Poe experienced states of mental 
distress and suggests that he found solace in the authoritative, reasoning mind of the 
detective, who is capable of tethering and accounting for the same sort of mysterious 
enigmas that have full rein in Poe’s Gothic writing:  
The world was a place of chaos for Poe, a vale not only of tears, but also of 
unspeakable horrors ... it is in the very depths to which he experienced, and 
was able to capture in words, the chaos of the world, that we must search 
for the key to the ordered, ultra-rational world of the detective story. (141) 
The logic of human behaviour is as much a reassuring fiction as the figure of the 
detective himself. Poe’s detective responds to the dilemma of the chaos of the world as 
well as to the problem of the chaos of the psyche. Dupin follows the same principle to 
unravel the technical details of the locked room mystery as he does to analyse the 
supposedly impenetrable mind of his accomplice. 
 Psychological speculation is found in Poe, and it features in Conan Doyle’s 
writing too. A number of Holmes stories begin as the detective watches an as yet 
unknown client advance along Baker Street, from whose gait and expression he is able 
to deduce their emotional state and the kind of complaint they are bringing to him. In “A 
Case of Identity” Holmes remarks upon a female client:  
I have seen these symptoms before … Oscillation upon the pavement always 
means an affaire de coeur. … And yet even here we may discriminate. When 
a woman has been seriously wronged by a man she no longer oscillates, and 
the usual symptom is a broken bell wire. (83) 
There is psychological sensitivity here, although it lacks the depth, spontaneity and 
individuality of Poe. What it does propose is an objective science of human emotion, 
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manifest in physical acts and nervous responses, derived from the adaptive and 
sympathetic neurology in which Conan Doyle was trained as a student of medicine at 
Edinburgh. It is true too that Doyle’s system amounts to little more than typecasting, the 
type in question being a woman.  
 Also of influence on golden age crime writers were the mysteries being written in 
North America during the first two decades of the twentieth century by authors including 
Carolyn Wells and Mary Roberts Rinehart. These writers, Knight proposes, influenced 
golden age authors in their situation of crime in an ‘emotional-rich family setting’ 
(Crime Fiction 85). Roberts Rinehart’s The Circular Staircase (1905) is indeed 
concerned with the romantic difficulties of its implicated youngsters, and both the 
centrality of a strong female detecting-figure and the involvement of family politics in 
the crime define Rinehart as an early contributor to the long golden age and forerunner 
of the interwar writers. Nonetheless, the criminal’s motivation in The Circular Staircase  
has a greater symbolic than psychological significance, making the novel read more 
convincingly as an allegory of capitalist self-destruction than an emotional study of 
particular depth.  
 In The Murders in the Rue Morgue, Dupin’s methodology is presented as a matter 
of ratiocination, of following semantic and anecdotal links which connect one’s 
ostensibly arbitrary meanderings of thought. It is clear, however, that abstract thought 
only accounts for part of Dupin’s technique; or rather, abstract thought is supported 
considerably by the reading of physical signs. Following Knight’s thesis of the ‘inner 
simplicity’ of detective fiction’s solutions, Dupin’s trick is demystified and made 
comprehensible to the audience. As Knight explains, 
he has actually watched the narrator’s glances, gestures and reactions as he 
walked through the streets, and, having followed this series of minute 
points, knows where they must have led in terms of opinions and responses. 
(Crime Fiction 27-8) 
Although Knight’s assessment of the technique is a touch too dismissive – despite its 
inner simplicity, the reader of Poe may have difficulty recreating the trick with their own 
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companions – Knight is right that the solution appears simple: but should it? Why it is 
that watching the gestures of another and deducing the contents of their thought and 
feeling appears so simple? The scope for misunderstandings and false impressions in 
interpersonal relationships is vast – indeed, interwar crime writers joyfully exploit false 
appearances and inaccurate assumptions at the stage at which the whole cast is under 
suspicion – and yet the value of close observation of suspects is emphasised time and 
again in crime novels. It is necessary to enquire further into the techniques they used and 
the knowledge of human psyche and action that justified the use of those techniques, in 
order to assess how interwoven psychological knowledge is with the golden age form.  
 
Intuition 
Detection Club members took an oath in which they promised not to use female intuition 
to solve their plots, but it is right to ask whether Agatha Christie’s detective Hercule 
Poirot actually uses anything other than intuition. Like Dupin, Poirot claims to be able to 
read suspects’ minds by observing unconscious tics, slips and body language. As he 
explains to a slow-witted policeman, ‘I would like … to converse – very often – very 
frequently, with members of the family. … In conversation, points arise! If a human 
being converses much, it is impossible for him to avoid the truth!’ (Hercule Poirot’s 
Christmas 545). His cases are still predominantly solved by attention to traditional clues 
such as found objects and inconsistencies in alibis, but the existence and relevance of 
such clues are often discovered through close attention to his suspect’s actions and 
thoughts. Poirot is not a professional psychiatrist, but uses what he calls both the ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ methods – new psychoanalytic techniques of probing the unconscious, and the 
old art of female intuition:  
Les femmes. … They invent haphazard – and by miracle they are right. Not 
that it is that really. Women observe subconsciously a thousand little details, 
without really knowing that they are doing so. Their subconscious mind adds 
all these little things together – and they call the result intuition. (The 
Murder of Roger Ackroyd 109) 
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The reference to the subconscious mind takes for granted a familiarity with Freudian 
notions, but does not imply that any specialist knowledge is necessary in order to make 
use of this faculty: even women can do it! Poirot’s generalisation is in part playfully 
evoked by Christie to amuse her largely female readership, and it can be said that for this 
readership the affinity between feminine knowledge and psychoanalysis has an 
empowering dimension. By aligning the ‘new’ sciences of the self, which, during this 
period, were predominantly practised and produced by men, with pre-existing female 
‘arts’, Christie brings her readership with her as potential equals to Poirot in the arts of 
detection. Her detective’s psychological techniques are more a matter of implied 
psychological expertise than conscientious forays into analysis.  
 
The advice of alienists, insights inspired by psychoanalysis and insinuations 
about the subconscious are often employed in Christie’s novels to explain human 
motivation. Such psychological rhetoric, according to Light, lends ‘a humanising, 
common touch to moral judgements’ (103). Light also states that Poirot’s job, ‘like the 
analyst’s, is to listen, as the reader does, to oral testimony’ (102). Although Poirot is not 
an analyst, in Christie’s novels ‘psychological explanation appears as a form of common 
sense, a kind of secular morality with new claims to certainty and continuity which help 
us to form reliable judgements about the nature of human beings’ (103). Like the 
forensic methods discussed by Thomas, psychological laws function for Christie as a 
series of ‘learnable axioms’ which can be used to ‘limit and contain disorder, making the 
world knowable, manageable, liveable in’ (103) according to Light. Indeed, Christie’s 
novels exploit the uncertainty and opaqueness of characters at the investigative stage in 
order to emphasise the reordering process that takes place at the dénouement, where it is 
proven that people do not act unpredictably, that subjectivity is not oblique, and that 
earlier confusion was the consequence of faulty and incomplete data. The essence of 
Poirot’s method is to reveal all the little details of the case, however seemingly 
irrelevant, personal or emotional in nature. When all is known, as indeed it can be, 
common sense popular psychology and such scientific terms as complexes, paranoia and 
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fixation are used to provide the reader with a comprehensible explanation for motivation 
and action.  
 It is a common feature of many novels that multiple suspects are found to have 
reasonable motives for killing the victim. Implicitly the reader comes to a crime novel 
equipped with a range of normative assumptions about what constitutes a reasonable 
motive for murder, which authors will toy with during the stage at which the whole 
group is under suspicion. Traditional reasonable motives include financial gain, revenge, 
an escape from blackmail and sexual or familial jealousies – although as Mandel 
suggests, the ‘bourgeois passion greed significantly [outdistances] all other drives’ (25). 
Of course, the reasonableness of motivation can only be determined by the killer, 
meaning motivation only becomes credible when it is seen to be the consequence of a 
particular state of mind and appropriate psychological ‘type’. The publication in English 
of Carl Jung’s Psychological Types in 1923 (in German, 1921) and his delineation of 
determining categories of personality no doubt influenced the advice given to readers by 
Christie, to attend to emotional and psychological life in order to judge the murderous 
potential of her suspects: 
I tried to decide which of them were psychologically possible criminals. 
And, in my judgement, only two persons qualified in that respect … Alfred 
Lee was a person capable of a great deal of selfless devotion. He was a 
man who had controlled and subordinated himself to the will of another for 
many years. It was always possible under these conditions for something to 
snap. (Christie’s italics, 621) 
Although the potentially murderous individual named in this extract from Hercule 
Poirot’s Christmas is not actually the killer, psychological evidence of this kind enriches 
the notion of the motive, as well as demonstrating that psychology should be seen as on 
an equal footing with more traditional witness-based and material evidence such as 
clues, alibis and opportunity. 
 
In Christie’s novels, normative possessive or reactive 
motivations such as financial gain, revenge, escape from blackmail and sexual or 
familial jealousies are not sufficient explanations for crime unless they are proved to be 
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acting upon characters who are prone, because of their psychological constitution, to be 
susceptible to them, as well as psychologically capable of actually committing murder. 
 In her 1936 novel, The ABC Murders, Christie portrays a discord between 
Poirot’s method and police work inflected with psychoanalytic understanding, and offers 
an ambivalent critique of the value of psychology in detection. Prior to the first murder, 
Poirot receives a taunting letter from the mysterious ‘ABC’ telling him to look out for a 
crime committed in Andover on the 21
st
 of the month. Subsequent to the death of a Mrs 
Asher on the foreshadowed day, a letter arrives to predict the death of a ‘B’ in Bexhill 
and (though the letter goes astray and does not warn him until too late) a ‘C’ in 
Churston. Insanity is quickly assumed to be at the root of the mystery, and The ABC 
Murders is relatively unique amongst golden age stories in featuring an eminent 
psychologist who aids the police in helping to profile and track down the killer. Poirot’s 
role is not, therefore, as psychological advisor, and he repeatedly dampens the 
enthusiasm of investigators by demanding clarity instead of their reductive or haphazard 
applications of psychological reasoning. He is not anti-psychology, instead he negotiates 
a path through the myriad ways of accounting for and describing madness offered 
throughout the novel. At times he seems to be on the side of the ‘famous alienist’ Dr 
Thompson, who looks to complexes – an ‘inferiority complex’ (482) coupled with an 
‘alphabetical complex’ (392). Poirot certainly seems to support the doctor when he 
states: ‘In my opinion the strength of his obsession is such that he must attempt to carry 
out his promise! Not to do so would be to admit failure, and that his insane egotism 
would never allow. That, I may say, is also Dr Thompson’s opinion’ (Christie’s italics, 
460-1). At this point in the novel he is attempting to ferret out the murderer from the 
group whom he is addressing, and later he will reveal that his wholesale conviction that 
the murderer suffers from ‘insane egotism’ was a tactic of co-ordinated effect, designed 
to play into the murderer’s conviction that he has succeeded in his plot to ‘Create a 




 In his objective, the murderer has been aided, not impaired, by the police and 
their enthusiastic but hazy adoption of psychological principles. The prime perpetrator 
here is the ‘younger inspector’ Crome, a figure with modern sensibilities who is 
described as ‘a very different type of officer’ and ‘the silent, superior type. Well 
educated and well read’ (394). Crome’s characterisation and his chafing interactions 
with older, more dogged inspectors, refer to the actual tensions being experienced in the 
police between graduates of the new Metropolitan Police College at Hendon (opened in 
1934) and both provincial forces and plain-clothed constables from more modest 
backgrounds who lacked the Met’s resources, and had had to gain their experience on 
the beat. Part of an interwar drive to bring better educated men into the police force, the 
establishment of the Hendon college had been in part a response to a media campaign 
spearheaded by Leslie Randall in the Daily Express, which bemoaned the lack of 
dedicated detectives and scientific and technological know-how in the police force 
(Laybourn and Taylor 85. See also C. Williams xix). What is interesting is that the 
overwhelming drive of this training policy involved forensic procedures, rather than 
psychological profiling. The purpose of the ‘agility’ scheme, as it become known, was to 
produce officers highly trained in  
the value of the microscope, methods of removing fingerprints from 
linoleum, blood analysis, the analysis of positions … and microscopical 
studies of clothing for stains and a whole range of other forensic activities. 
(Laybourn and Taylor 98) 
Lectures delivered by eminent Professors of Forensic Medicine to police forces focused 
upon these new skills, and in September 1935 constables were treated to a five-day 
forensics course at University College London, where classes included analysis of 
footwear, the thorough searching of suspects and the preserving and packing of forensic 
material (ibid., 99). In this respect, the interwar police force lagged disappointingly 
behind their literary counterparts, amongst whom fingerprinting, the finding of 
microscopic clues and analysing bloodstains had become routine.  
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 Psychology was as yet not a part of this history, but in The ABC Murders  
Inspector Crome is clearly intending to advance briskly in his police career with the aid 
of an enlightened adoption of the cutting edge mental sciences of his generation. He is 
confident and well-versed in the psychological line of reasoning:    
“I’ve had a good talk with Dr Thompson. … He’s very interested in the 
“chain” or “series” type of murder. It’s the product of a particular distorted 
type of mentality. As a layman one can’t, of course, appreciate the finer 
points as they present themselves to a medical point of view. … As a matter 
of fact – my last case – I don’t know whether you read about – the Mabel 
Homer case, the Muswell Hill schoolgirl, you know – that man Capper was 
extraordinary. Amazingly difficult to pin the crime on him – it was his third, 
too! Looked as sane as you or I. But there are various tests – verbal traps, 
you know – quite modern, of course, there was nothing of that kind in your 
day. Once you can induce a man to give himself away, you’ve got him! He 
knows that you know and his nerve goes. He starts giving himself away right 
and left.” 
“Even in my day that happened sometimes,” said Poirot. (394) 
Crome receives a fair amount of Christie’s light-hearted mockery in his petty arrogance 
and patronising regard of Poirot, but psychology plays a pivotal role in Poirot’s 
reasoning. He claims:  
It is not the facts I reflect upon – but the mind of the murderer. … I begin to 
see – not what you would like to see – the outlines of a face and form – but 
the outlines of a mind. A mind that moves and works in certain definite 
directions. (Christie’s italics, 429) 
The ‘certain definite direction’ – motive – is frequently discussed, but despite the 
psychologist’s and inspector’s best efforts, is not convincingly accounted for. All 
involved in the investigation agree that ‘there isn’t such a thing as a murderer who 
commits crimes at random’ (Christie’s italics, 413), and that ‘deadly logic is one of the 
special characteristics of acute mania … there’s always some perfectly coherent reason 
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behind it’ (392). Poirot, however, is more exacting and more complete in his 
investigations than doctor or police, and rejects their conclusions, which owe more to 
generalised, misapplied and often misunderstood psychoanalytic ideas than to the 
specific details of the case. To Poirot, the character of the innocent man they arrest does 
not quite fit the crime or the purported motive: ‘[t]here was something haphazard about 
the procedure of ABC that seemed to me to be at war with the alphabetical selection’ 
(499). Neither does the lust to kill hypothesis convince Poirot. It does  
not quite fit the facts of the case. A homicidal maniac who desires to kill 
usually desires to kill as many victims as possible. It is a recurring craving. 
The great idea of such a killer is to hide his tracks – not to advertise them. 
(Christie’s italics, 498-9) 
There are contradictions in the analyst’s psychological reasoning itself, which Crome 
and Dr Thompson are unwilling to acknowledge. Claiming to have found a science to 
account for human acts, the innovators have neglected the facts of the case, observation 
of which should be at the core of any empirical form of study, which is what detection 
is, after all.  
 A perceived tension between the moderns and the older generation runs through 
the encounter between Poirot as sceptic and Thompson/Crome as innovators, but this is 
a false dichotomy. Poirot is a modern too. As the novel begins we find him moved into 
‘the newest type of service flats’ chosen specifically for their ‘strictly geometric 
appearance and proportions,’ causing him to bemoan the fact that ‘science has not yet 
induced the hens to conform to modern tastes and lay square eggs’ (359). His modern 
lifestyle separates him from the older generation, as do his attitudes to psychology. More 
decidedly old fashioned is the blustering police Assistant Commissioner, who is equally 
frustrated by both his young officers and the Belgian detective’s interest in the criminal’s 
mind. When Poirot demands they look for a motive, the A.C. complains impatiently: 
‘But my dear fellow, the man’s crazy’ (482). While the imprecise adoption of 
psychoanalytic jargon is framed as scientifically unjustified, the superficiality of an 
older generation’s attitude to the complexities of mental life is equally unreasonable. 
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Gladys Mitchell 
While Christie dismisses psychoanalysis in favour of an admittedly vaguely articulated, 
but nonetheless creditable form of psychology, Gladys Mitchell makes psychoanalytic 
techniques and modes of interpretation central to her novels. In 1929, Mitchell, an 
enthusiastic Freudian, introduced the vociferous mystery-devouring interwar readership 
to Beatrice Adela Lestrange Bradley. A far cry from the domestically-astute detective, 
Mitchell’s irrepressible Mrs Bradley is a Home Office psychiatric consultant and an 
accredited psychoanalyst. The modest critical attention that Mitchell has received, in 
comparison with her innovation in presenting the genre’s first psychoanalytic detective, 
is quite disproportionate to her importance. She deserves considerable credit for 
introducing a mass readership to Freudian ideas in a digestible mould, at a time in which 
many readers would be as cognisant of the intricacies of the New Psychology as one of 
Mitchell’s characters, who remarks: ‘Psycho-analyst. I don’t know what they do, quite. I 
believe it’s something mad but brainy. The thing was all the rage two or three years ago’ 
(Mystery of a Butcher’s Shop 67) 
 Bradley synthesises the era’s paradigmatic savant-roles – detective and 
psychologist – and, in doing so, renders axiomatic Slavoj Žižek’s theoretical comparison 
of the literary detective with the analyst. In Žižek’s Lacanian reading, both these figures 
are invested with the omniscient power to uncover the secrets of the past, and of the self, 
and therefore function as ‘the subject supposed to know’ (57-9). In this conflation of 
privileged subject positions, Mitchell goes some way to resolving the essentialist and 
derogatory aspects of Freud’s approach to femininity. Because Bradley, a woman, has 
claimed the right to interpret, she asserts agency both through a psychoanalytic 
interpretive framework and over the psychoanalytic process. This fusion of feminism 
and analysis is wittily declared in the title of Bradley’s monograph, A Small Handbook 
of Psychoanalysis (1929), of which Munt has remarked ‘the diminutive term has to be a 
phallic joke’ (156). 
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 Mitchell frequently jokes, but never entirely at the expense of psychoanalysis, and 
although little escapes Bradley’s irreverent eye, her approach to detection through 
analysis is never wholly satirical. Bradley considers herself a psychoanalyst ‘old 
fashioned enough to consider Sigmund Freud the high priest of the mysteries of the sect’ 
(The Saltmarsh Murders 46). Crimes and explanations are considered reasonable as a 
direct consequence of their consistency with psychoanalysis, and psychologically 
credible explanations are essential to her dénouements. In the broadest sense, this attests 
to the elevation of psychological hypothesis, whether psychoanalytic or otherwise in 
character, to the level of other sciences already considered as at most, infallible, at least, 
useful, in the literary management of crime.  
 Where there are complexes, subconscious jealousies and antagonisms, Bradley 
notes them, and she enjoys impromptu analyses of suspects and uncovers repressed 
traumas as a routine investigative technique. In The Saltmarsh Murders (1932), the 
‘batty’ Mrs Gatty, who is distinguished by her tendency to define each of her fellow 
villagers as an animal (Bradley, of course, is Mrs Crocodile), who lives in a converted 
lunatic asylum and speaks in riddles and mock-heroic nonsense, is not only ‘translated’ 
and understood by Bradley, but is cured of her ‘maggot’ – her mental illness – in a 
dramatic performance at the village revue: ‘The poor woman only wanted to assert 
herself a little,’ Bradley explains (184). The later Tom Brown’s Body (1949) features the 
therapeutic hypnosis of a gloriously uninhibited but occasionally violent West African 
schoolboy, who is depicted in conventional psychoanalytic mould, and very much in 
keeping with the racism of the day (152-3). As well as these character-specific cures, 
word-association is one of Bradley’s most successful techniques. This method works to 
extract the truth from both conscious and unconscious liars, even though Freud himself 
expressed doubt that Jungian word-association techniques, generally used to probe 
unconscious complexes (see Jung, Studies in Word Association), could be used against 
criminals who were consciously lying to their interrogators:  
In psycho-analysis the patient assists with his conscious efforts to combat his 
resistance, because he expects to gain something from the investigation, 
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namely, his recovery. The criminal, on the other hand, does not work with 
you; if he did, he would be working against his whole ego. (“Psychoanalysis 
and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal Proceedings” 112) 
Although Mitchell has more faith in psychoanalytic techniques than Freud, their 
employment in her novels is consistent and contributes to the ‘complete’ explanation of 
crime. In When Last I Died (1941), statements and clues elicited from suspects through 
word association are treated as concrete facts and allowed to move the plot forward, 
even though by her 1949 novel Tom Brown’s Body a canny schoolboy mocks Bradley’s 
attempts to extract information from him in this way: ‘Binet-Simon stuff!’ he scoffs, 
‘And about forty years out of date’ (Mitchell’s italics, 100). The assumption that the 
truth necessary to impose order and linearity on the chaotic and disordered crime 
narrative is not a material object or a secret that can be elicited by bargaining, but 
submerged in the depths of an irrational unconscious, pervades her novels and 
necessitates the use of psychoanalytic techniques.  
 Mitchell, although she differs from Christie in her identification of 
psychologically possible criminals, agrees that a unique combination of circumstances 
acting upon individual psychology, environmental conditions and moral life could turn 
anyone into a murderer with a significant trigger: 
Mrs Bradley was not one of those psychologists who divide humanity into 
two groups: those capable of committing murder and those incapable of it. 
Her view was that, given time, place, opportunity and circumstances, it was 
impossible to say that any human being is incapable of such an act. (Death 
at the Opera 150) 
In the process of investigation in Death at the Opera (1934), Bradley concludes that a 
number of suspects are psychologically capable murderers, from the ‘perverse, ill-
dispositioned and thwarted’ (153) Miss Camden to the ‘hysterical’ (146) and ‘unstable’ 
(147) Hurstwood. One suspect, the art teacher Mr Smith, had a credible motive for 
revenge, but is excused because of his explosive artistic temperament: he is ‘not the type 
to brood for two or three days over a wrong. If he had been going to kill Calma Ferris 
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for damaging his work he would have snatched up the nearest object and brought it 
down on top of her head there and then’ (155).  
The actual murderer, the aged actress Mrs Berotti, escapes serious consideration 
because of her complete lack of any perceptible motivation, despite being the perfect 
psychological type and having the best opportunity: 
although temperamentally she would make an ideal murderer, possessing 
the artistic instinct, courage, a sort of divine exasperation with fools, 
resourcefulness and an actress’s self-command, it was difficult to assign to 
her any motive for the crime. A murder without motive is the act of a 
maniac, and Mrs Berotti, whatever her shortcomings of temper and 
impatience, was certainly not mad. (153) 
Despite Bradley’s reasoning, Berotti’s motive for committing the crime is close to 
madness (and comments upon the relationship with exceptional talent and madness): the 
victim is drowned shortly before she should be appearing onstage in an amateur 
production of The Mikado. Berotti, knowing that a far superior actress will step in to 
perform the part if the victim is absent, drowns her in order to see the part played by a 
true artist, rather than the incompetent victim. It is by no means a perfect or entirely 
credible plot, but it does demonstrate the kinds of changes which occur at the 
dénouement when highly eccentric individual motivations are accepted as a reasonable 
account of crime. The fact that the correct solution is so outré, not because it is the only 
physically possible solution (as in Poe’s La Rue Morgue, where only the non-human 
killer would be able to commit the crime), but because it is the only psychologically 
possible solution, means that the limits of what can be considered as reasonable 
deduction have shifted significantly. An appendix which contains Mrs Bradley’s final 
conclusions illustrates her psychologically informed ‘reasonableness’ in the case of 
Berotti: 
Motive. Mrs Berotti is an artist. Everyone insisted on it. 
She had seen Calma Ferris act very badly. 
She had seen Alceste Boyle act superlatively well.  
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She risked her neck to get the part of “Katisha” performed as she knew it could and 
ought to be performed.  
I recognise that this motive would be more easily credible if the piece had been 
grand opera or great tragedy. It seems a slight motive when the piece was comic 
opera. 
But Mrs Berotti is a very old woman. She may not see many more pieces 
performed.  
Besides The murder was a gesture. “Away with incompetents!” she said. “Let us 
have the thing done as it might be done by the angels.” (255)  
The skills required of Mrs Bradley include psychological awareness more advanced than 
the common sense empathy or intuition already in use in crime fiction. The deductive 
work in Mitchell’s Death at the Opera also depends at various instances on general 
psychological laws which are by no means the preserve of specialists. Even a young 
teacher with no psychiatric training is able to contradict an inquest’s verdict on the 
novel’s focal drowning: 
All women think about what they’ll look like when they’re dead, and there 
can’t be a woman on earth who could bear to think of looking like 
“Katisha”. Miss Ferris didn’t commit suicide. She was murdered. (66) 
In the analysis of Mrs Berotti, Mitchell’s psychoanalyst detective probes further than the 
common-sense, means-end analysis of rational action provided by the young teacher. Its 
object is not, in fact, rational action, either in the form of general human behaviour or 
the normative murderous motivations which appear time and again in crime fiction 
(jealousy, revenge, vanity, profit and so on). Instead she experiments with the 
reasonableness of motivation itself, and therefore with the moment of explanation 
provided at the dénouement. Rather than being reasonable per se, the motivation is as 
reasonable as the murderer. For this reason, the detective, who is of course in Mitchell’s 
novels a professional psychoanalyst, must be able to cope with the idiosyncrasy – even 
unreasonableness – motivation  once it is accepted that individuals are psychologically 
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complex. This is something that a general understanding of human nature simply cannot 
provide. 
 
Insanity and Homicidal Mania 
In Mitchell’s novels, anyone is capable of becoming a murderer in the right 
circumstances. In a comparable way, the highly idiosyncratic individual reasoning that 
serves as a justification for murder is capable of appearing ‘mad’ when judged by 
someone not convinced by the murderer’s logic. Light has noted how in Christie, ‘the 
true criminal is never sick and always sane’ (103), but Mitchell differs considerably in 
that in her novels characters with pronounced psychological disturbances commit 
murder. The principle that the solution to a crime narrative be reasonable, and therefore 
understandable, appears to be controverted by madness offered in place of motivation: 
the extreme mental states of the madman or woman are, by definition, marginalised to 
the extent that they seem to be by their nature excluded from the normal. However, a 
reasonable madness is permissible. Even in the eccentric reasoning of the Berotti, it is 
possible to see the kinds of shifts in reasoning which would occur in a crime narrative in 
which madness permeates the rationale for murder. Specialist, albeit comprehensible, 
knowledge becomes essential in these cases in order to make sense of a state of mind 
which to the majority of onlookers will appear senseless.  
In 1913 the former medical superintendent of the high security Broadmoor 
Hospital, Dr David Nicolson, outlined his experience of dealing with criminal lunatics: 
in some cases strange beliefs and morbid fancies show themselves in the 
previous life-history of the individual which, although in themselves 
seemingly remote, may afford some clue or explanation as to why the 
murder was committed … I am anxious to-day to impress upon you not 
merely the necessity of … leaving nothing out in our scrutiny which would 




Nicolson believed that the life-history of the criminal should be documented; minor 
incidents recorded and treated as clues which, in their entirety, compose the present state 
of mind and character of the criminal. Motivation, even insane motivation, generates a 
narrative which can be followed the psychologist.  
Nicholson’s recommendations could be read as a manual for psychological 
detection, and there is another point of overlap with the golden age novel. Nicholson 
was highly suspicious of the notion of the homicidal maniac – the figure who merely 
acts upon momentary impulse and a lust to kill. The explanation of homicidal mania in 
law claimed to provide an explanation for otherwise mysterious happenings: it 
ostensibly accounted for the actions of criminals in a number of cases in which no other 
motive or explanation could be found. Although it is frequently mentioned in 
criminological writing of the 1910s to the 1930s, it was rarely taken seriously as a 
defence.
4
 This was primarily because, with Nicholson, most psychiatrists and jurists 
continued to believe that a motive could be found for even the most outrageous crime, 
committed by the most troubled individuals.  
In keeping with contemporary medical-legal opinion, it is not appropriate for the 
golden age murderer to be like the raving lunatics of Victorian Gothic literature – no 
Bertha Mason will ever set fire to the golden age country house. When the insane appear 
in crime novels, sense is made from their madness. Frequently, in the early stages of 
countless golden age crime novels someone suggests that a homicidal maniac has 
committed the murder – a lunatic escaped from a local asylum. This is, however never 
really an option, and the person making the suggestion is generally as ignorant of the 
workings of the criminal mind as they are of the workings of the genre. It is only 
possible to observe fair play to the reader if the reader is convinced by the solution to the 
mystery: the idea of madness, and this kind of madness in particular, in itself does not 
qualify because it is the opposite of reason, both in substance and symbol. If a novel’s 
understanding of madness is not governed by observable psychological laws, Freudian 
or otherwise, then it has the tendency to appear as a deus ex machina swooping in 
                                                 
4
 Whitlock lists eight cases in which pleas of insanity regarded as irresistible impulse were rejected by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal between 1911 – 1936 (26). 
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preposterously to save a flagging story. Characters generally resort to the escaped lunatic 
solution for just this reason, in order to blame an outsider and alleviate their own 
responsibility. This device functions much the same way as the rather arch suggestion in 
many Christie novels that Communists are responsible or, as the Detection Club 
directive not to blame sinister Chinamen took into account, the assumption that 
foreigners are generally suspicious. In Hercule Poirot’s Christmas, one character 
observes, ‘[t]hen there’s that lunatic foreigner prowling about,’ (586) thus synthesising 
the two perils. 
 The notions of fair play and the rules produced by Knox, not to mention those 
produced by Aristotle, emphasise the order and integrity of a narrative in which events 
are seen as a logical working-out of forces generated by events and actions within the 
novel: a raving lunatic passing by can rarely be credited as a force generated from within 
the novel. Loyalty to Knox’s very first rule, that the criminal ‘must be someone 
mentioned in the early part of the story, but must not be anyone whose thoughts the 
reader has been allowed to follow’ also presents the ‘raving lunatic’ solution with an 
obvious difficulty: the killer should take part in the plot and be scrutinised alongside 
other suspects, therefore it would hardly be possible to make such a character appear 
sane throughout a long novel. 
 In Heads You Lose (1941), Christianna Brand explodes the reassuring promise of 
the raving lunatic solution, and instead offers an altered view of madness that has its 
own threats and reassurances. A classic country house mystery, it opens as the 
decapitation of a detestable neighbour puts all the family under suspicion and evokes 
painful memories: a year previously, a local maid had been found bound and decapitated 
in a nearby forest. As the maid’s murder had never been solved, the family and locals 
informally decided that a maniac tramp with an irrepressible lust to kill must have been 
responsible. In the same way, when the neighbour’s body is found, and is found to be 
wearing a hat owned by one of the family, they jump to the same conclusion:  
A maniac. Not a pretty thought, but at least, ridiculous though it seemed to 
say such a thing, at least a sane one. A maniac had struck again, and this 
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time had satisfied some crazy impulse by decking the body of the victim 
with the first bit of brightness and colour that came to hand. (Brand’s 
italics, 40) 
The family are satisfied with this solution, as it both acquits the inner circle of 
responsibility and tethers that responsibility to a deviant other who can be satisfactorily 
excluded. The figure of the tramp is distasteful enough to the capitalist landowner, he 
becomes capable of anything when equipped with mental illness. Brand, however, 
denies her characters such helpful othering, and the homicidal maniac is dismissed by 
the police detective Cockrill, because the murder of the maid did not conform to the type 
of murder which, psychologically, one would expect from such a character:  
[I]f he was a maniac he was a very unusual one, to say the least of it. The 
girl had been tied up and then decapitated with the scythe; most homicidal 
maniacs, whatever they may do afterwards, kill their victim with their hands 
or with anything they may happen to have in their hands – they strangle or 
bludgeon or slash or stab. The lust to kill is strong, and they don’t waste 
time on fancy stuff like tying the victim up first. (55) 
The fantastical figure of the homicidal maniac becomes less fantastical the more closely 
he or she (but mostly he) is profiled, categorised and rationalised into a psychologically 
consistent type. However, the detective’s advice concerning the maniac misleads both 
the reader and cast, who would be wrong to believe that madness will not be part of the 
novel’s solution. Instead, it is the insanity of a family member from within, not without, 
who is responsible for the killings. Brand’s plotting in Heads You Lose (which is 
discussed at greater length in chapter two) poses a clear threat to the demarcation of sane 
from insane, and of rational from irrational, which preoccupies the golden age clue-
puzzle.  
 The homicidal maniac problem suggests another way of looking at Christie’s The 
ABC Murders. As much as it is about psychology, it is a novel about madness, or more 
specifically about how madness is accounted for. Assumptions about madness are shown 
as both dangerous and invested with power, and the killer’s plot entails not only 
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technical planning but the insightful management of perceptions about states of mind to 
incriminate an innocent man and mislead investigators on what is, in reality, both a sane 
and a self-interested crime.  
 The killer of The ABC Murders concocts his elaborate scheme to murder for 
profit in the expectation that police and public will be taken in by the drama of a serial 
killing spree by a homicidal maniac, without asking too many probing psychological 
questions about motivation. The newspaper headlines are loud and predictable: ‘Latest 
… Homicidal Maniac at Churston’; ‘Work of a Homicidal Maniac’ (426) they scream. 
Rather than being homogenous and purely sensational, there are a number of ways of 
accounting for madness suggested in the novel. A man, or rather boy on the street, shares 
his opinion on the visibility of the insane with a man who, trembling nervously and 
speaking hysterically, the boy will soon decide is ‘batty’ himself. As the boy states: ‘You 
never know with lunatics. … They don’t always look barmy, you know. Often they seen 
just the same as you or me’ (426). The explanation given for this is the war – 
‘Sometimes it’s the war that unhinged them – never been right since’ (427), and indeed 
the prevalence and recognition of war neurosis by the 1930s, when The ABC Murders 
was published, was enough to make even the post-war generation conscious of its 
aftermath. Lady Clarke, the wife of the third victim, proposes that madness is a 
specifically modern condition, a reaction to the intensification of lifestyle, speed and 
urbanisation of  the interwar years, and expresses her sympathy for the killer:  
Mad, poor creature – the murderer, I mean. It’s all the noise and the speed 
nowadays – people can’t stand it. I’ve always been sorry for mad people – 
their heads must feel so queer. And then, being shut up – it must be so 
terrible. But what else can one do? If they kill people. (445) 
At points, Poirot and the Watsonian narrator Hastings express a cold horror at the 
madness of the killer: ‘A madman, mon amis, is to be taken seriously. A madman is a 
very dangerous thing’ (362) warns Poirot: ‘Madness, Hastings, is a terrible thing …’ 
(393). Ultimately, Poirot’s psychologically astute detection is used to counteract the 
faddish speculation of the investigators and professionals, and so too does he resist the 
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irrational speculations of the popular press, with their tendency to view madness in a 
fantastical and irrational light, emphasising its horror, otherness and incomprehensibility.  
 
‘Reasonable in his Unreason’ 
Raving lunatics are forbidden, but in many highly successful golden age novels mental 
conditions act either as motivating forces for criminal acts, or contribute to the range of 
possible false solutions that the detective must disprove. Mental instability put forth as a 
false solution to incriminate an innocent party is a feature of a number of novels and 
short stories, as in Christie’s “The Affair of the Pink Pearl” (1929) which depicts the 
false incrimination of an unconscious kleptomaniac. The assumption that madness lays 
behind crime also has political consequences, best explicated in Dorothy L. Sayers’ 
Gaudy Night (1935), which focuses upon crimes committed in an Oxford women’s 
college. Here, the misguided suspicion that the trouble-maker is an hysterical female 
scholar driven to distraction by intellectual labour and the scarcity of men functions as 
proof for some that women should avoid cerebral stimulation altogether. In contrast, in 
Mitchell’s novels irrational mental states do indeed contribute to the discovery of the 
true solution; the killer in When Last I Died (1938) is exposed by her superstitious 
hysteria as ‘the nervous, over-strained, weak and clinging little ... murderess’ (203); 
likewise the murderer in Georgette Heyer’s pastiche whodunit Why Shoot a Butler? 
(1933) suffers from a pathological complex which governs his means of accomplishing 
the murder, if not its motivation.  
The fact that these novels seem reasonable and were in many cases highly 
successful demonstrates that the psychological principles involved in their author’s 
plotting were comprehensible to the readership and acceptable under the generic 
principle of fair-play. Readers should feel themselves capable of solving the mystery, 
even if the novel is written in such a way that they cannot, and the fact that medical 
conditions were comprehensible demonstrates that authors assumed a level of 
knowledge about mental illness in their readership, both in terms of the types of 
behaviour that could be expected of disturbed individuals and the range of conditions it 
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was possible to suffer from. Madness as a solution does not, then, contravene the 
precedent set by Poe that the solution should be rational, because the development of 
twentieth-century psychology and the splintering of mental illness into recognisable 
types, including the neurotic, the hysteric and the hypochondriac, meant authors could 
take it for granted that madness, like material facts or the means-end rationale of 
common sense psychology, was subject to observable laws. Only adequately 
taxonomised mental conditions appear, most likely because they enable writers to refer 
to general understandings of particular conditions and suggest consistency and linearity 
in the thought-processes of a madman or woman.  
 
Who’s Mad? 
Only the existence of a widespread, popular understanding of and receptivity to 
psychological theory could account for the appearance of criminals with pathologies 
both minor and extreme, who could credibly disguise or even not notice their own 
conditions, and still function relatively ‘normally’ in everyday life. Anthropological 
tracts such as Frazer’s Golden Bough (1890) and Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1913) 
demonstrated the pathological impulses behind social behaviour and its links to 
primitive mysticism and primary sexual instincts, while formulations such as the 
Oedipus complex, the sexual foundations of neurosis and the importance of the 
unconsciousness in psychic life took on a new life beyond Freud’s original texts. Crime 
writers did not chiefly use specialist language but what in 1928, writer and lecturer Nan 
Shepherd described as the ‘ordinary educated person’s knowledge of the psychological 
vocabulary’ (qtd. in Christianson 37) 
 
in order to probe familial relations, build lifelike 
characters and create the least predictable killers. Introductions such as those penned by 
Barbara Low or A.G. Tansley were popular sources and when, in St Peter’s Finger, 
Mitchell tells us that Ferdinand Bradley ‘admired his mother’s taste in sons, and fostered 
what he called “the romantic attachment,” playing off the Freudian Oedipal complex 
against her with a delicate and admirable wit’ (236), Mitchell is not expecting her 
readers to turn to their dog-eared 1905 copy of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
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in the original German: they are likely to have got their information, general though it 
may be and possibly less than accurate, from elsewhere. 
The language of the subconscious and of Continental psychology was far more 
common in crime novels, and had fruitful consequences for the least likely suspect 
device. A development attendant on the dissemination of psychoanalytic ideas was the 
normalisation of both minor and major psychological disturbances. In 1920, A.G. 
Tansley asserted: 
It is clear beyond all possibility of doubt or cavil that the mental factors which 
produce the characteristic behaviour of the neurotic and the lunatic are at 
work in the “normal” mind and give rise to many well-known traits of 
“normal” behaviour, as well as to behaviour and conduct which we may not 
care to call ‘normal,’ but which certainly fall far short of anything for which 
the help of a physician would be sought. (15) 
As Tansley’s account suggests, overlapping notions of insanity and sanity were coming 
to be considered as more true to normal, everyday experience directly as a consequence 
of the spread of Freudian thought. Within Freud’s model of the construction of the mind, 
even those who had attained normality shared with the lunatic certain functions of mind. 
The relatively innocuous condition of hypochondria was, for example, seen as on a 
continuum with more advanced and debilitating conversion hysterias, as both involved a 
narcissistic withdrawal of libidinal energies from the outside world and their 
concentration upon internal ‘objects’, either on a ‘troubled’ organ or a fantasy object, 
respectively (Freud, “On Narcissism” 83-4). The normalisation and domestication of 
mental illness in golden age crime novels was then both a consequence of, and a 
contributory factor in, the establishment of a popular psychological vocabulary, the 
existence of which is attested by narrative formations which include madness, 
psychoanalytic skills and psychological explanations. Even the exaggerated accounts of 
Freud’s theories presented by a sceptical or sensationalising media had a part to play, not 




In this climate of widespread familiarity with Freudian ideas and what Aileen 
Christianson has termed the ‘acknowledgement of radical uncertainty’ (39) in human 
experience, during which time psychological disturbances demonstrated the insecurity of 
assumptions about the normal mind, some crime writers found scope to portray 
pathological criminals who are also familiar types to be found at the heart of the home. 
Golden age crime stories rarely feature hardened criminals, or the impoverished 
outsiders who dominate the criminological accounts of the likes of A.F. Tredgold and 
Havelock Ellis; criminals who have been raised in dire poverty and with poor education, 
suffer from epilepsy, psychological problems and alcoholism, and commit petty thefts, 
get arrested for fights or prostitution, or commit brutal and unplanned murders in states 
of drunken aggression. Writing on Christie and her presentation of class, Light asserts: 
The most innocent (the least likely) person may turn out to be the criminal, 
the obvious deviant and the degenerate are frequently red herrings: the 
criminal classes are not the ones to fear. It is within the charmed circle of 
insiders that the criminal must be sought; the cuckoo in the nest, not the 
alien from outside. (94) 
This privileged-group paranoia is not limited to Christie’s writing, and in many golden 
age novels it is accompanied by an expansion of the restrictive notion of what 
constitutes a normal mind and who is expected to have one. In Brand’s Heads You Lose, 
the grotesque figure of the homicidal tramp haunts the perimeters of the feudal 
household, but the threat comes from within. Similarly, in Georgette Heyer’s Why Shoot 
a Butler? a pathological aristocrat is implicated in the deaths of his retainers. Sayers, 
who Light convincingly depicts as often sycophantic in her portrayal of the aristocracy 
(80), fluctuates in her assignment of guilt. In Whose Body? a maniacal nerve specialist, 
undoubtedly the most unfavourably presented psychiatrist in crime fiction, commits the 
crime, contravening his social standing and knighthood, while in Gaudy Night, a 
disgruntled servant manages to make a whole college of female dons appear certifiable 
in order to avenge a past insult to her husband. Gaudy Night, though posing as an 
exception to the golden age rule that which deviants and degenerates from the lower 
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orders are rarely found to be killers, proves to be remarkably orthodox. The killer works 
as a servant, but she is the widow of a don whose fall in the world was brought about by 
one of the female scholars she is targeting, demonstrating how madness and crime are 
brought about by the very social order that they in turn threaten.   
 
Three Case Studies 
In many golden age novels, psychological understandings underpin the plot. Psychology 
is presented as a specialist, but also an accessible, means of probing the secrets of the 
mind in the search for the killer, a way of revealing the order that underlies the mystery 
of the crime scene, and of explaining the solution to the reader at the dénouement. Their 
use as a detection method conforms to fair play because the reader is convinced by their 
reasonableness: the reader, then, is supposed to have faith in, and even possess, the 
psychological knowledge necessary to solve the crime and to see this expertise as an 
acceptable basis for reasoning. For this reason, the assertion that psychological 
knowledge contributes to narrative closure and coherence in crime fiction does not 
entail a dispute with the principle of fair play. Psychologically inspired solutions are 
presented as reasonable, but this begs the question: does the inclusion of the irrational – 
madness, or the insights into the subconscious provided by depth psychology – 
complicate the pattern of reassurance that the formula ostensibly provided?  
 In representing madness, and positing diagnosis for madness as a solution to their 
mysteries, authors demonstrated, encouraged and shaped a familiarity with both old and 
new theories of the workings of  the mind among their readership. Moving beyond the 
faddishness of new doctrines and critiques of the old, these employments of psychology 
show how such ideas were admitted to the realm of the reasonable, the familiar and the 
objective. In the first novel discussed below, Michael Innes’s Death at the President’s 
Lodging (1936), insanity trumps its characters’ loyalty to the formula with its demands 
for fair play, but demonstrates how irrationality demands a renegotiation of the idea of 
fair play itself. Psychological accounts of madness pervade the text, and are elevated to 
the level of science, only they are not new Continental doctrines; instead they are rooted 
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in Social Darwinist accounts of inborn criminality. In the second novel, Bring the 
Monkey (1933), Miles Franklin retains the radical content of Freud’s thought by 
demonstrating how mental pathologies only visible to the psychoanalytic gaze are 
fostered within traditional social orders, leading to an interrogation and critique of that 
order. Finally, Gladys Mitchell’s St Peter’s Finger tests the categories of reason, 
motivation, normality, and reassurance in a plot which involves a highly unstable killer. 
 
Michael Innes, Death at the President’s Lodging  (1936) 
Innes (the pseudonym of the Oxford University professor J.I.M. Stewart) is the 
writer cited by Holquist as a paragon of the genteel interwar rejection of the 
disorderly (147). Death at the President’s Lodging offers an obstacle to the 
schismatic drawing of boundaries between reason and unreason and, in its 
flirtation with the passing lunatic solution, demonstrates how abnormal 
psychology can be compatible with both fair play and the demand that the killer 
have high social status. Set in an Oxford college, the novel is built around the 
tension between the threat of disintegration implicit in madness and the 
methodical orderliness, even artificiality, of the scholastic world. What must be 
countered is the ostensible irrationality of the crime scene, which is littered not 
just with the corpse of the college’s president, Umpleby, but with piles of macabre 
human bones (purloined from an archaeologist’s collection), eerily flickering 
candelabra and representations of skulls marked in chalk upon the walls. Whether 
these details are evidence of insanity, ‘some perfectly sane man’s idea of the 
humorously grotesque’ (57), or a plot to frame a Fellow who previously suffered a 
nervous breakdown, constitutes the psychological dilemma of the novel. The 
Dean hopes the murderer is a passing lunatic, but the detective knows the locked 
college to be physically impenetrable to anyone other than the scholars. This is 
presented as a conflict of reason, as it seems impossible to locate insanity amongst 
these intellectuals, whose lives are supposedly devoted to order, efficiency, and 
absolute purity of thought. This problem is further complicated by the insularity of 
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the scholars’ psyches: their measured natures make them adept at composing 
themselves under interrogation, leading to conflicting false impressions which 
Detective Appleby, as a psychological amateur, finds it difficult to synthesise into 
a consistent psychological profile. When Appleby proposes to a professor of 
psychology that Haveland, the Fellow who had previously suffered a nervous 
breakdown, might have committed the crime during a relapse of insanity, he is 
flatly contradicted, not because it is altogether impossible, but because it is 
inconsistent, as Haveland’s mental constitution does not tend that way: 
Science is infallible, but it is not nothing. And it will tell you with great 
authority that the bones are a damnable plant – a plant by someone ignorant 
of abnormal psychology … the circumstances of the President’s death are 
incompatible with what I believe to be Haveland’s mental constitution. 
(170-1).  
 The detective, as pure reasoner, is somewhat undermined in his role by this 
prioritising of another’s specialist knowledge, and indeed this is not the only matter in 
which he momentarily bows to the expertise of another. As if to emphasise the novel’s 
confirmation of reasonableness as a generic necessity, Appleby receives advice on 
permissible plot developments from a don who, like Innes, has another life as a 
bestselling crime novelist. This markedly self-referential device seems to promise that 
the narrative will not step outside the safely circumscribed formula of the whodunit, and 
as the convenient lunatic device is a classic red-herring, the reader is encouraged to be 
cautious about accepting it.  
 When Haveland is found to be the killer, it at first seems that the science of both 
psychology and the formula (if we imagine for a moment that it can be called a 
‘science’) are flawed. But this is not the case, and instead it is within the realms of 
detection, of ratiocination, that a mistake has occurred: it is reason that is proved to be 
an inexact science. Haveland did not murder Umpleby and scatter the bones, but he did 
murder Umpleby. It is the reasoning of each scholar that temporarily obscures this fact: 
one scholar hears the voice of another outside his window luring Umpleby to his death. 
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He concludes that this man is the killer and, shocked that he might get away with it, 
moves the body in an attempt to incriminate him. The scholar under suspicion realises 
what has happened but suspects a different scholar, and so in an attempt to frame him 
adds an incongruous detail to the crime scene, and so this goes on, with all four suspects 
secretly adding a different detail to the crime scene. Each scholar’s reasoning is 
methodical, but because they have based it on flawed knowledge, their involvement in 
the quadruple bluff has obscured the guilt of the real killer. Because they have each 
interfered with the crime scene in order to create a false impression, it becomes so 
overdetermined by contradictory evidence that it obscures what it was intended to 
illuminate.  
 
Rational thinkers can be bad detectives, and so produce false solutions, and it is 
left to Detective Appleby to unravel the knot unwittingly tied by the scholars. In this he 
is aided by the compatible sciences of psychology and the formula which, as long as 
they are interpreted correctly, are infallible. It was an incorrect interpretation of madness 
that suggested the bones to one scholar as a means of incriminating Haveland, and which 
led to confusion, but Appleby uses ‘true’ method when he realises that, although 
Haveland is not the sort of killer who would broadcast the fact with the bones, he is 
nonetheless insane: 
Haveland had that sort of abnormality which never loses at least its tenuous 
connections with reason. Take his motive. He was … a likely candidate for 
the Presidency – and so … was Professor Empson. When Haveland proposed 
to kill Umpleby and let the blame fall on Empson (for that was the original 
plot) he was acting with just that combination of moral imbecility and logical 
sense which characterizes his type. (216) 
Here, the detective takes back command of expert knowledge, realigning the demands of 
science with the dictates of the formula’s own good sense and, of course, conforming to 
fair play. Although the Professor of Psychology disagreed with Haveland as to the 
bringing of the bones, he would not say he was not unbalanced. Along with other clues, 
this intimated that a mental illness would play a role in the dénouement. Fair play is also 
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satisfied by Haveland’s undamaged grasp of logical sense: good detection is still 
possible because the killer is an able opponent and the crime devious enough to tax the 
detective and engage the reader. In regard to narrative, Haveland’s condition is 
invaluable: a killer with the intellect of a scholar and an entirely absent moral sense, who 
will not inconveniently give himself up after musing on Kant’s categorical imperative 
(as another scholar threatens to do). As to the mental illness itself, Innes’s definition is 
clearly not psychoanalytic, but refers to that routinely derided category of moral 
imbecility, in which normal or extraordinary intelligence was supposedly combined with 
a complete lack of moral sense (see the discussion in chapter 3). The assignment of 
biological determinism in these accounts, coupled with their tendency to determine that 
moral imbecility was incurable, was decidedly conservative in tone, and tended to work 
in the interests of those not willing to track back into the past of the criminal and look 
for more contentious environmental or emotional formations of instability. Haveland is 
relatively advantaged, although Appleby’s report defends the determinism and type-
casting which would apply to both eminent and more lowly criminal suspects: 
In searching for a murderer amid any group of people every detective knows 
the importance of a history of mental unbalance. In real-life murderers are 
not, on the whole, found among chief constables and Cabinet Ministers: 
they are found among the less normal portion of humanity. (223) 
Innes’ portrayal of mental illness shows that such definitions, with their confident 
separation of the normal from the hopelessly abnormal, still had credence. 
 
Miles Franklin, Bring the Monkey (1933) 
In Franklin’s satirical take on the crime novel, the nature of madness itself is 
interrogated, leading to the suggestion that it is an unstable category which can be used 
both to silence resistances to power, and to highlight the inherent irrationality, even evil, 
of power itself. The villain of the piece is the dissipated Lord Tattingwood, who is the 
representative of a thankfully declining world order that is patriarchal, patrilineal, and 
colonial in outlook. A feminist as well as an Australian, Franklin’s imitations of the very 
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English genre were, unlike those of her fellow Australasian Ngaio Marsh, chiefly 
satirical rather than affectionate. In Tattingwood she synthesises the financial and 
political hegemony of the lord with his sexual perversion to create a killer whose 
motivation ostensibly conflicts with the rigorous demand for sense inherent to the genre. 
On his deathbed he admits to a string of murders, including that of his cousin for the 
relatively sane (at least within the genre) motive of inheriting his title. It is more than 
this, however, as it is clear that he loves killing for its own sake, something he indulged 
in his celebrated Boer War days: it ‘made big game hunting seem as tame as firin’ at a 
few monkeys … got some of the fire out of me’ (Franklin’s ellipses, 150). Implicated in 
these reminiscences is a demand for sexual domination and frustration when it is not 
achieved, and he admits to trying to kill the heroine because she refused his sexual 
advances: ‘You didn’t want me that night – had the impudence to trifle with me – and 
stuck a pin in me when I touched you. … I’ll stick this dagger in you before we’ve 
finished, if I feel like it’ (149). Murder is for him a conversion of frustrated lust, and he 
compares the pleasure he got from sleeping with ‘Nigger wenches’ (150) in South Africa 
to gazing at the woods in which he murdered his cousin. So too did he kill the attractive 
young male detective ‘to ease the lust that was on me’ (152), a lust he generally found it 
hard to contain: ‘civilians are a mouldy pack of rabbits. … I’ve often had the temptation 
to stick a knife into a few of them. … Sometimes, when the lust was on me, I had a 
rough time holding in’ (151). A more morally abhorrent character can hardly be 
imagined, and Munt is right to determine that ‘[h]is vicious misogyny, handcuffed to 
bloodthirsty militarism’ is used by Franklin to criticise contemporary ‘masculinity and 
dominant forms of sexual exchange’ (12). Tattingwood’s insanity is then, class, colonial, 
and sexual privilege taken to their not unfamiliar extremes. Inherent in Franklin’s 
portrayal of sexual and murderous perversity is the proposition that the reasonable 
foundation of these upper-class values is itself irrational. 
 The uncertain state of Tattingwood’s mind dominates his deathbed scene, and as 
the heroine has been warned that he is likely to be hallucinating during his treatment, she 
is uncertain whether to take his words as those of a mad or sane man. She remarks: ‘If 
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insane, it was not in the form of loss of faculties. He was dreadfully fiendishly true’ 
(151). His physician Sir Philmore stresses that he has lost his grip on reality and has 
made false confessions (158), and thus Philmore becomes the novel’s second villain: the 
figure of the corrupt psychiatrist working in patriarchal self-interest. He is responsible 
for the care of Tattingwood’s wife, who ostensibly lost her mind because of the trauma 
of the murders and is unable to see anyone due to the danger of shock. In fact, she has 
discovered that her husband is the killer, and has been effectively imprisoned by 
Philmore at Tattingwood’s request: ‘She was thoroughly broken and desperately ill – 
neurasthenic – and a husband has a great pull, in spite of the suffragettes’ (154). 
However, as Tattingwood admits, ‘Her mind is not unhinged’ (154), although this is 
never formally recognised and the heroine and her friend must contrive to rescue her 
from the nursing home where the attendants are ready to interpret any outburst of 
emotion or frustration as hysteria (163). Philmore is therefore wrong in both diagnoses, 
but that does not mean that Tattingwood is by consequence sane, at least not in a sense 
that is conducive to any form of social living. His sanity is the centuries-old madness of 
the aristocracy, possessive individualism solidified into acceptable political values 
founded on the primal instincts of sex and self-preservation.  
   
Gladys Mitchell, St Peter’s Finger (1938) 
Mitchell’s murder mystery is set in an isolated convent school and concerns the 
drowning in a bath of Ursula, a young, female pupil. An inquest returns a verdict of 
suicide, but the circumstances of the crime, and the fact that the victim is heiress to a 
considerable fortune, convince the detective, Mrs Bradley, that Ursula was murdered. 
Following the logic of reasonable motivations, the first suspect is therefore her cousin 
and fellow-pupil, Ulrica, who is now next in line for the legacy. The traditional financial 
motive does not, however, make sense in Ulrica’s case, because she is a devoted 
Catholic who intends to enter the convent herself and surrender her worldly wealth as 
soon as she is old enough. With Ulrica above suspicion, inheritors further down the line 
are considered, along with the theory that the murderer is a mentally deranged, thwarted 
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woman, subject to sexual repression and unsublimated, murderous urges. The location 
is, after all, a convent and, as Sayers’ Gaudy Night (1935) attests, Freud’s early writings 
on hysteria could be turned to such a lurid conclusion. In fact, in a way, they are, as the 
murderer turns out to be the highly religious Ulrica after all. Her motivation is the first 
that was suggested, which the reader has already disregarded, the legacy, which she 
intends to give to the convent as dowry as a penance for her sins. 
 The solution is both a surprise and not a surprise because the reader, armed with 
a psychoanalytic vocabulary, might have been able to interpret the signs offered to them 
throughout the novel. It should be no surprise that it is not raving lunacy which inspires 
her behaviour, but a specific delusion which only affects certain aspects of her thought 
and actions. The reader can therefore balance Ulrica’s politeness and excellent school 
record with her more abnormal traits, in particular her desire to suffer. At Lent, she 
starves herself until she becomes unwell (149) and wears upon her arm ‘a sharp-toothed 
band of metal’ as voluntary penance, an object which the anthropologically astute 
Bradley regards ‘with the detached scientific interest which she would have displayed 
for totem worship or a ring worn through the lip or nostril’ (313). These masochistic acts 
are both public and private: in public, she willingly explains how she desires to replicate 
the sufferings of saints (98), as ‘[s]he needed to suffer, she felt, and wished that the 
suffering could be greater so that she could identify herself more closely with the 
solemnity and preparation of the season’ (149); in private, her masochistic conduct is 
more emotional and less devotional in origin: 
“If Mary were out of the way … if Mary died,” she thought, her needle 
pushing carefully into the stiffness of the calico, her finger, where she had 
pushed the needle with it instead of with the covering thimble, springing red, 
“grandfather would not be tempted … he would have to leave me the 
money.” (Mitchell’s ellipses, 150) 
Mitchell’s approach to ecstatic religious worship refers to the writings of Freud and his 
predecessor Charcot on female icons of the church, including the ‘hysterical’ Joan of Arc 
(Showalter, Female Malady 32) thus encapsulating the psychiatric and psychoanalytic 
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project of reassessing ostensibly stable cultural events and signifiers and drawing 
attention to their psychic and pathological origins.  
Ulrica’s other symptoms, nervousness, sleeplessness, as well as sleepwalking, lead 
Bradley’s chauffeur and her lawyer son, respectively, to offer their layman’s diagnoses: 
“Very hysterical subject, I should fancy, madam. Rather like some of Herr 
Hekel’s young ladies, I imagine. Full of imagination, and out for sympathy 
and notice.”  (268) 
“Some form of hysteria, I imagine.” (293)  
As this exchange suggests, these assessments are based upon popular portrayals of 
hysteria in predominantly female, possibly attention-seeking subjects. It is not in this 
‘general’ sense that Ulrica is an hysteric, and she is not an hysteric at all according to the 
definition of hysteria most commonly understood: a psychic conflict caused by the 
repression of a sexual desire and originating from primary infantile sexuality. The 
reader, informed by the same accounts, noting her general instability, would be 
technically right in deducing that Ulrica was the murderer, but they would be unable to 
account reasonably for her motive in committing the crime according to this rather 
reduced understanding of the condition. More, not less, specific understanding of 
psychoanalysis is necessary to solve the mystery of the novel.  
In Sayers’s Gaudy Night, a novel which relies on the false solution of hysteria as 
a consequence of sexual repression, the narrative consistency of such a solution is 
suggested by the fact that the assailant is targeting the college (where women live chaste 
and scholarly lives) as a whole, as well as leaving scattered in public places some highly 
sexually provocative images. Mitchell does not differ from Sayers in her support for all-
female environments and meaningful work as an antidote to traditional female roles, and 
through her portrayal of the nuns makes clear that sexual inactivity does not necessarily 
lead to mental aberration. That Mitchell was not averse to explaining female madness as 
sexual pathology does not necessarily undermine a feminist reading of St Peter’s Finger. 
She created a sexually repressed killer in The Saltmarsh Murders, who suffers from 
‘inverted nymphomania’ (281), who is blamed for driving her frustrated husband to 
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adultery, and whose obsession with celibacy leads her to commit two murders. In 
Mitchell’s 1942 Laurels are Poison, Bradley directs her search towards ‘a person of a 
type familiar to all students of the morbid psychology of sex’ (234), a woman who is 
jealous that her suitor preferred, and went on to have a child with, her younger and more 
attractive half-sister. Unlike these two morbid females, the nuns in St Peter’s Finger are 
endlessly practical, generous, stable and empathetic, having lived full and colourful lives 
prior to taking the veil, and pursing interests in art, literature and science within the 
convent. While Ulrica is described as ethereal and seems ‘not of this world’ (267) the 
nuns are ‘too practical … to be warrantably called ethereal’ (268). Their worship is 
sublimated and calm rather than ecstatic, and they take a pragmatic, modern attitude to 
self-denial, all in all causing Bradley to feel curiously envious of their lives. Sublimation 
is, then, the way to lead autonomous lives at the same time as escaping repression, 
meaning the convent is clearly not the perfect environment for the breeding of sexual 
hysteria.  
 If it is not sexual repression in an all-female environment which pushes Ulrica to 
murder, what then? Sexuality suggests itself in Gaudy Night and The Saltmarsh 
Murders, but the only comparably pathological recurring motif in St Peter’s Finger is 
suicide. When Ursula is found drowned in the bath, the inquest returns the verdict of 
suicide. The case is complicated in that Ursula was a Catholic and would have regarded 
suicide as a terrible sin. A variety of characters offer their opinions on the potential 
suicidal tendencies of the victim: the Mother Superior claims the child was good natured 
and religious and so would be unlikely to commit such a sin, while the hale and hearty 
games teacher assesses her as ‘[n]o good at games or swimming. Timid as a rabbit. Just 
the type for suicide, of course’ (43). The emotional state of the probable suicide, usually 
a woman, is contemplated in many of Mitchell’s novels, with characters differing 
diagnosis demonstrating the limitations of common-sense or intuitive psychologies in 
comparison to the rigours of psychoanalytic training. This is especially true in the 
portrayal of Ursula and Ulrica, who are twinned in their names and their right to the 
legacy, as well as in the novel’s discussions on suicide. The victim, Ursula is described 
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as the ‘Celtic twilight type … Pale and interesting. You know. Keen on poetry’ (44). 
Although she is religious, she does not share Ulrica’s commitment to the faith, and is 
unlikely to have pursued a religious career like her cousin. Although the victim, Ursula, 
is inaccurately framed as suicidal, it is Ulrica who manifests genuine suicidal tendencies, 
despite her devotion to Catholicism. A natural progression from her masochistic 
practices, she is found more than once on the verge of tipping herself down a flight of 
stairs or out an open window, and makes a deep slash on her arm with glass from 
Bradley’s car window. It is in the conflict between these suicidal tendencies and her faith 
that the real motive for murder can be deduced. 
 Early in the novel, a nun explains that Ulrica’s father was an atheist and so did 
not educate her as a Catholic. Now, ‘she is anxious to do all in her power to combat the 
evil that has been done’ (94). Her motivation is to obtain the legacy, which she intends to 
give to the convent she enters as a penance for her sins. This very generous motivation 
only makes sense when Bradley probes into Ulrica’s unconscious conflicts and drives, 
her early education by her atheist father:  
The child, brought up without positive religious beliefs, was always in a 
state of mental conflict, for she could never reconcile her early training with 
her later religious ecstasies. All adolescents are at war within themselves, but 
in this child the fight was terrible enough to overwhelm her. Somehow, she 
had to rehabilitate herself in the eyes of God. Somehow, the family fortune 
had to go to the Church. That was how she saw it. She had to expiate, 
somehow, the terrible sin of her father’s atheism. (348) 
While the psychologically unsophisticated regard her as a classic hysteric, the 
psychoanalytically astute Bradley provides an accurate diagnosis. To Freud, repression is 
fundamentally concerned with keeping ‘the idea which represents an instinct’ 
(“Repression” 166) 
 
away from consciousness. Although this seems contradictory, as all 
instincts, by their nature, are pleasurable and desirable to the individual, Freud addressed 
the problem by asserting that the instinct must be in conflict with another claim or 
intention upon the subject in order to be repressed. As social mores discipline 
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individuals against incestuous desires, this disciplining would make fulfilment of that 
instinct more unpleasurable than its satisfaction. This is equally true of other repressed 
desires which represent an instinct, for example the satisfaction of a non-incestuous 
sexual desire by a person with strong convictions in favour of religious celibacy would 
result in guilt and self-reproach rather than satisfaction proper.  
 Ulrica’s desires are not sexual. She wishes to be ‘rehabilitated’ in the eyes of 
God, but internally she feels the doubt of her atheist upbringing: she is not an ‘innate’ 
Catholic (348), so what is repressed is not sexual desire but irreligious thoughts. Her 
attempt to gain the legacy by killing her cousin is a consequence of the ‘mad’ logic 
inspired by her internal conflict. Her masochism and her frequent attempts to commit 
suicide after the murder are the psychological aftermath of the crime, which she had 
intended to be judged as a case of ‘Accidental Death’. When the inquest ruled that her 
cousin had committed suicide, she experienced psychological trauma:  
To have her innocent cousin – for she never thought of her except as a 
cypher and a pawn – accused of mortal sin, and wrongly accused, worked on 
her mind, and roused in her a dormant suicide complex. (347) 
The dormant suicide complex constitutes, for a large part, the irreligious elements of her 
thoughts, and it is this which is in conflict with her guilty, Catholic super-ego.  
Whatever an innate suicidal tendency may be, what matters is that it is an 
individual, rather than generically gendered condition. Mitchell’s tacit feminist critique 
is conducted within a broadly Freudian framework, yet there is no mention of the aspects 
of Freud’s works which are most troubling to feminists, such as penis-envy, castration 
complexes, self-hatred and the resentment of the mother which could only be only be 
overcome by the acceptance of heteronormative sexual relations. For this reason, it is 
likely that Mitchell is taking issue with both popular and textbook Freud, by suggesting 
and discarding an understanding of Ulrica’s behaviour as sexual pathology. A potential 
solution to the problems she defines in psychoanalysis is a feminist led practice, both 
discernible in the analysis of Ulrica and in the extraordinary characterisation of Bradley 
herself. This disputative relationship with Freud does not undermine Mitchell’s 
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relationship with the method, instead it aligns her with the several other analysts who 
were querying Freud’s account of female psychology during the twenties and thirties, 
including Karen Horney, Alfred Adler, Ernest Jones and, later, Clara Thompson (see 
Miller). As Showalter has contended, the male self-interest in the interpretation of 
Freudian ideas, and Freud’s own explication of female psychology as ‘a defective 
version of masculine psychic development’ (Female Malady 199) meant that female 
practitioners rarely offered alternative accounts or achieved success as psychoanalysts 
during the interwar years. It is Bradley’s position as a feminist practitioner of Freud 
which enables her to resist such patriarchal interpretations,  
 The dénouement of St Peter’s Finger relies upon the ‘reasonableness’ of mental 
illness as a motive for murder. Readers are genuinely encouraged to consolidate their 
intuitive skills with their knowledge of psychoanalysis and employ their understanding 
of mental illness. The novel conforms to the rules of fair play, as clues expand from 
being overheard conversations about financial difficulties or familial grievances to 
unusual reasoning, actions symptomatic of mental illness, nightmares, tics and mood 
swings. The constellation of concepts representing Freud’s ideas to the general reader, 
which Nunn described as akin to the ‘jargon of astrologists,’ (5-6) provides the 
theoretical knowledge necessary to understand Ulrica’s motive and judge the 
consistency of the plot. However, a more informed and critical interaction with Freudian 
thought is also demanded in Mitchell’s feminist reading. Most importantly, the 
individual is presented as such and not reduced to an impossibly broad psychological 
type (woman), for which reason it is necessary to take into account all of Ulrica’s 
utterances, her masochism as well as her atheism, her sleepwalking as well as her 
religious ecstasies, to complete a diagnosis. 
 
Although a range of obfuscating devices are premised as psychology in many golden age 
novels, psychology and psychoanalysis are incorporated into the detective’s solution in 
many texts. Intuition is practiced by golden age detectives, but intuition is not a simple, 
stable, empathetic relation between individuals. Instead it is informed by contemporary 
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psychological theories. One way of accounting for this is through attention to the 
incursion of madness and mental pathologies in crime narratives, derived from a public 
engagement with psychoanalysis and adaptive psychology. Unsettling the form’s generic 
demand for rationality, seemingly irrational actions are accounted for according to 
theories of mind known by and comprehensible to the reader. The rules of fair play are 
obeyed and interwoven with psychological, often psychoanalytic explanations for 
criminal motivations. In Mitchell’s work in particular, these explanations are consistent 
with other analyses of character, which serve to blur distinctions between the normal and 
abnormal. This is just one way in which the golden age use of psychology presents 
opportunities for subversion. As Mitchell’s novel demonstrates, investigations of 
insanity and its origin can be the conduit for feminist critiques of popular 
misconceptions of female psychology, while Brand’s and Franklin’s novels show how 
madness can manifest the destructive essence of sexual, class, and imperial hegemony. 
Innes’ murder mystery is of a more socially conservative persuasion. Informed by 
evolutionary psychologies, it uses the example of madness to toy with the notion of 
reason itself, before finally allowing scientific reason to intermingle with the genre’s 
formulaic demands. In each case, psychology only works if it is internally consistent and 
comprehensible, meaning that homicidal maniacs and raving lunatics rarely grace the 
pages of a golden age text. These conclusions suggest the scope of a new discussion, as 
the use of both psychology and madness has other consequences in the golden age novel. 
Psychology raises a new set of ethical problems as it becomes necessary to question 
whether the detective is merely a diagnostician of motivation, or has, in exercising 









II. Guilty but Insane 
 
In detective fiction, the reassuring effect of the dénouement is achieved through the 
assignment of responsibility. The malevolent agent behind the chain of mysterious 
events is located and the sense of fear and instability they have generated is exorcised. 
The discovery of a moral culprit relieves the sense of guilt the group have all vicariously 
suffered, and the figure of the detective triumphs as the conduit of reason, justice, and 
group solidarity. That, at least, is what is supposed to take place, but what if passing a 
moral judgement upon the criminal is not so clear cut? If the criminal is not a morally 
reprehensible villain, but suffers from a mental illness, what new responsibilities are 
placed upon the figure of the detective? 
Writing of Christie’s novels, Light suggests that ‘the true criminal is never sick 
and always sane’ (103). Insane people may appear alongside those suffering complexes 
but, according to Light, these are false solutions, and the murderer generally ‘knew what 
he was doing, is as sane as the next person, and therefore able to be ostracised and 
punished’ (103). The satisfaction of the desire to ostracise and punish is, according to 
Light, intrinsic to the meaning of the golden age formula, meaning that to pen a criminal 
suffering from a mental illness might elicit unwanted sympathy from the reader and 
make such a satisfying solution impossible. Michael Innes’ Death at the President’s 
Lodging and Miles Franklin’s Bring the Monkey both feature mentally unstable 
murderers, but these figures are beyond the reader’s sympathy. In both cases, the ethical 
difficulty of reprimanding the insane is evaded, as the criminals die before the question 
of punishment is raised: Franklin’s villain dies a smugly comfortable death, while Innes’ 
suicidal murderer, in effect, contains himself by committing suicide. In Innes’s work, the 
reassuring effect of the dénouement remains intact, while Franklin’s work, as a political 
satire, self-consciously inverts the desire for reassurance.  
Of course, sympathy with the killer is not unheard of in crime fiction. Christie’s 
The Murder on the Orient Express (1934) is a classic example of a murder condoned by 
both detective and reader. In that novel, the passengers who slaughter Ratchett are 
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exacting their revenge for a previous unpunished murder. When Poirot connives with the 
group to hide the crime from state justice, he is siding with vigilante group morality 
which, to a great extent, resembles the regular ending of a golden age mystery. Rather 
than ostracising and punishing the killers, he agrees with them that the true crime was 
committed by Ratchett, who has by that time successfully, albeit brutally, been 
ostracised and punished. The criminals are redeemed because the group agrees that the 
crime was both moral and reasonable, and the detective maintains his authority by being 
responsive to the needs of the group.  
 The choice not to reprimand the murderer is, then, relatively unusual in a genre 
which is classically concerned with punishment, partly in a legal sense and as 
importantly in a social-symbolic, group-building sense through their ritual unveiling and 
exclusion. Gladys Mitchell’s The Saltmarsh Murders and St Peter’s Finger, and 
Christianna Brand’s Green for Danger therefore stand out as novels which resist the 
demand for punishment and exclusion by questioning the notion of criminal 
responsibility itself. Proposing mercy and understanding in place of the trope of the 
relentless hunt for the killer, these novels stage an altered interaction between the insane 
criminal and detective which is influenced by contemporary legal debates concerning the 
responsibility of the insane. During the period from the 1920s to the 1940s, jurists and 
psychologists disputed the relevance of contemporary laws. The impact of these 
discussions is felt in these texts’ interrogation of the dénouement as a means of healing 
society and overcoming deviancy. The issue of responsibility is at stake, not only with 
regard to the killer, but to the detective too, who no longer controls and punishes the 
killer’s threatening deviancy, but rather diagnoses and attempts to remedy the mental 
illnesses which have inspired criminal actions. By involving their characters in efforts to 
conceal the offender, or offering them the chance of redemption through psychiatric 
recovery under the detective-analyst’s expert guidance, these texts raise a new set of 





Guilty But Insane 
Since the passing of the Trial of Lunatics Act of 1883, ‘guilty but insane’ has been the 
sentence passed in English criminal trials when the defendant is judged to have been non 
compos mentis at the time of committing a crime. When an insanity plea is successful, it 
means that the defendant is not to be held legally or morally responsible for their 
actions, and in consequence receives care in a criminal lunatic asylum such as the high 
security Broadmoor Hospital, rather than punishment for their offence. Golden age 
crime fiction chiefly involves murder, and insanity pleas in murder trials were the prime 
locus of debate during the interwar period because the penalty for murder was execution 
(until the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act of 1965). At stake was not only 
the life of the prisoner, whose criminal responsibility may be in doubt, but also the 
robustness of social institutions as manifested in the law, and the gravity of capital 
punishment as a deterrent against crime. 
 The criteria that were used to judge the defendant’s state of mind, outlined in the 
M’Naghten Rules, were the subject of debate since their institution in 1843, and came 
under increased scrutiny prior to the First World War and in the interwar years. The 
period after the armistice saw the Rules being tested according to new criteria which 
reflected the broadening of expertise and ideas in psychiatric and psychological theory 
and, to a lesser extent, psychoanalysis. In these debates, medical and legal arguments 
tended to be polarised. Representatives of psychological medicine pushed for the 
standardisation of a modernised definition, while legal thinkers defended the relevance 
and flexibility of existing laws. In both direct and indirect ways, these debates found 
their way into interwar crime novels. In the broadest sense, they contributed to the 
common stock of ideas about crime and criminality held by a mass readership. High 
profile cases fuelled a public debate over the Rules and, more pragmatically, how they 
were implemented. The 1922 trial of Ronald True, which we will consider in a moment, 
threatened to undermine the credibility of legal definitions of insanity and to change the 
place of psychology in court, nearly leading to a significant change in the law.  
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These medical-legal events motivate changes to two central and related aspects 
of the golden age formula in the novels under discussion: the construction of the 
detective as a trustworthy and reassuring figure concerned with enforcing the moral and 
legal values of the group, and the figure of the criminal as destabilising, threatening 
other. Both are modified and tested in ways that reflect contemporary debates and 
change the meaning of the form.  
The figure of the detective occupies a complex and often contradictory position 
with regards to social institutions and formal legal authority in much crime fiction, both 
of the golden age period and beyond. Often detectives operate as private investigators or 
enthusiastic amateurs who deliberately confound police investigations and work in the 
grey areas of the law in order to achieve their objective, the resolution of the mystery 
and the containment of the offender. In Gladys Mitchell’s novels, interrogation of the 
M’Naghten Rules not only pits detectives against the written law, but against the group 
desire to punish, refuting the conservative, affirmative and reassuring functions of the 
detective and giving this figure new authorities over and above the often merciless and 
ill-informed group. In contrast, Christianna Brand’s detective, while remaining loyal to 
the letter of the law, loses the respect of the group and his authority with it.  
  
The M’Naghten Rules 
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, 
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. (M’Naghten’s Case) 
English law first formally recognised that insanity could affect guilt in the 
seventeenth century, when it was established that no crime could be committed without a 
felonious intent or purpose. The legal principle thus established, actus non facit reum 
nisi mens sit rea, confirmed that ‘you cannot have a criminal act without a guilty mind’
 
(“Murder And Insanity” 1049), making cognition and understanding a primary 
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determinant of guilty. If a person was considered non compos mentis – of unsound mind 
– they were  thus irresponsible in law. During the seventeenth century it was determined 
that insane criminals should not be executed, as it would be morally wrong to send them 
to God in an unfit state. At this time, there was no standardised way to test mental states, 
but decisions in trials in the 1720s helped establish that a criminal must be so deprived 
of reason that they resembled a ‘wild beast’ if they were to be considered irresponsible 
(R. v. Edward Arnold 765). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, different degrees 
of insanity began to preoccupy legal thinkers, in particular those delusional cases who 
‘give the appearance of being deluded only in respect of one subject but who appear to 
be sane in all other matters’ (Whitlock 13). As with the wild beast test, it was agreed that 
the delusion a criminal was suffering would have to be extremely disabling in order for 
them to escape punishment, an understanding which persisted into the early nineteenth 
century. 
 Criminals suffering from less severe delusions began to meet with greater 
understanding in law at the turn of the nineteenth century and in the years leading up to 
the institution of the M’Naghten Rules. During the 1800 trial of James Hadfield, who 
tried to kill King George III, the defence attacked the traditional tendency only to excuse 
crimes committed by the profoundly afflicted, those who are in ‘such a state of 
prostrated intellect as not to know his name, nor his condition, nor his relation towards 
others’ (Whitlock 15). Such madness, the defence asserted, was exceedingly rare, and far 
more common were delusions which did not affect behaviour and reason absolutely, but 
which could coincide with ostensibly normal behaviour: 
Their conclusions are just and frequently profound; but the premises from 
which they reason … are uniformly false :- not false from any defect of 
knowledge or judgment; but, because a delusive image, the inseparable 
companion of real insanity, is thrust upon the subjugated understanding.    
(R. v. Hadfield 1314) 
The understanding of insanity as primarily governed by delusions was the basis of the 
decision to acquit Daniel M’Naghten some forty years later. M’Naghten was suffering 
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from a persecution complex and paranoid delusions and, in fear for his life, tried to shoot 
the Prime Minister, Robert Peel, mistakenly killing his secretary Edward Drummond 
instead. After M’Naghten was acquitted, a panel of judges presented the basis of the 
Rules before the House of Lords in an attempt to rationalise the criteria for insanity pleas 
(R. v. M’Naghten). The most regularly excerpted passage from the Rules is the quotation 
above, which states that a defect of reason from disease of mind must be present to make 
a criminal not responsible. The two kinds of madness which qualified under M’Naghten 
were a lack of awareness of the act being committed and a confusion as to whether the 
act was morally wrong. If the accused did not realise they were killing someone, they 
would come within the terms of the act. This was exemplified in the so-called Dresden 
china case, in which a Lord murdered his servant, believing him to be a piece of pottery 
(“Murder And Insanity” 1049). Equally, if a defendant had not known they were doing 
wrong, they would be classed as guilty but insane. M’Naghten had believed he was 
acting in self-defence when he shot Drummond, meaning he fell under the remit of the 
rules.  
 From their creation, the Rules were criticised by medical thinkers. Their 
emphasis upon delusions as the basis of insanity was frequently attacked as irrelevant 
and uncharacteristic of many mental disturbances, as was the notion that knowledge of 
right and wrong had a predictable relationship to mental illness. A particularly 
perplexing issue was that of so-called partial insanity, which was a consequence of 
combining the demand that criminals act morally whilst experiencing delusions. This 
was a feature of M’Naghten’s case. He was not a raving lunatic nor a wild beast, 
detached entirely from reality, but he was convinced that Peel was threatening his life. 
This was, of course, a delusion, but otherwise M’Naghten’s decision to kill Peel in self-
defence was based on sound reasoning. This seemed to suggest that the insane element 
of the mind could be separated from the sane and reasoning element. In cases such as 
M’Naghten’s, the judges concluded that the prisoner should be judged as if their 
delusion was real. If M’Naghten’s life had actually been under threat, it would have been 
justifiable for him to act to defend himself. On the contrary, ‘[i]f his delusion was that 
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the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him 
in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment’ (Whitlock 21). 
The Rules did not take into account the likelihood that a person experiencing a delusion, 
a profound emotional and psychological event, might not be able to reason clearly and 
sanely as a consequence. In his capacity as a Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, Henry 
Maudsley complained in 1874, ‘[h]ere is an unhesitating assumption that a man having 
an insane delusion has the power to think and act in regard to it reasonably ... he is in 
fact bound to be reasonable in his unreason, sane in his insanity’ (qtd. in Whitlock 23). 
To Maudsley, the Rules were psychologically insensitive in their definition of madness 
as a specific defect of reason based on false, delusional premises rather than an 
emotional disturbance which could affect how people reasoned and their relationship to 
right and wrong.  
 In 1883, the judge Sir James Stephen proposed an additional test of criminal 
responsibility which would allow a defence of irresistible impulse to be put forward, if it 
could be proved that the defendant was, at the time they committed the crime, 
‘prevented either by defective mental power or by any disease affecting his mind from 
controlling his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control has been 
produced by his own default’ – by his own default, Stephens meant conditions individual 
choice played a part in, such as insanity due to alcoholism (168). Irrespective of whether 
the criminal had understood the physical nature of the crime or its moral consequences, 
this clause would have led to a more flexible, psychologically aware and case-specific 
means of assessing responsibility. It was not taken up in the nineteenth century because 
of the perceived threat to the consistency of the law: however, Edwardian and interwar 
critics of M’Naghten often referred to the advice of Maudsley and Stephen when they 
complained that rigorous application of the Rules resulted in haphazard judgements in 
individual cases, as the Rules were often misunderstood by juries and misrepresented by 
judges (“Murder And Insanity” 1049). In a murder trial of 1908, for example, a judge 
told the jury: ‘If the prisoner knew he was doing wrong, it does not matter that he knew 
how wrong. If he knew he was doing wrong, it does not matter that he was suffering 
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from delusions or hallucinations’(“The Criminal Responsibility of the Alleged Insane” 
315).  
 Debates over M’Naghten in the pre-war period clarified into a clash of 
professions. Between 1896 and 1913, two medical bodies formulated evidence which 
would come to the fore in the responsibility debates of the 1920s. The British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the Medico-Psychological Association (MPA) both 
recommended changes to the law: the BMA sided with Stephen and suggest adding an 
irresistible impulses clause to the Rules, while the MPA promoted complete practical 
and ideological reform. The MPA would overturn M’Naghten and remove the necessity 
for any strict test of responsibility, leaving the assessment of insanity to the judgement of 
the jury rather than the tenets of the law. Advised by medical witnesses, the jury would 
accept insanity as a defence as long as it could be proved that the crime was related to 




 Allowing psychology such a central position in law worried defenders of the 
Rules, who were concerned that psychologists might come to the conclusion that only a 
mad person would think it reasonable to commit murder at all, thereby rendering all laws 
pertaining to homicide obsolete.
6
 The straw-man nature of this argument is demonstrated 
by its scarce use amongst those actually pushing for legal reform during the period. 
However, it remained a pertinent premise both in the philosophy of law and of 
responsibility, and something that those speaking against the Rules felt the need to 
distance themselves from: ‘We are not concerned to-day with the theorist and faddist 
doctrine that all who commit murder are insane’ (641) Nicolson reassured his audience 




                                                 
5
 As I refer to numerous articles with the same title I have included the publishing date in in-text citations. 
6
 The possibility was mentioned specifically as a potential consequence of reform in House of Lords 
debates concerning possible changes to the law (“Criminal Responsibility (Trials) Bill”). 
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Ronald True’s Case (1922) 
A major theme of the M’Naghten debates was the fear that merely unsettled, or even 
mentally healthy killers, should be let off – that is, sent to Broadmoor rather than be 
executed for their crimes. The trial of Ronald True in 1922 was a sensational apologue 
for the limits of such injustice. When True avoided the gallows he sparked a major 
public debate concerning M’Naghten as well as a confrontation between legal and 
medical practitioners, which nearly resulted in an overthrow of the existing laws on 
criminal responsibility and mental illness. 
 In a letter to the Times which responded to the newspaper’s coverage of True’s 
trial, Maurice Craig observed: ‘The case of True clearly indicates the difference which 
exists between the legal and the medical point of view on matters of mental disorder’ 
(8). Craig was writing days after True had been found guilty of wilful murder and 
sentenced to death for the murder of Gertrude Yates.
7
 Yates had been found brutally 
strangled and beaten in her flat on the morning of the 6
th
 March 1922, while True had 
been seen entering the property on the previous night and leaving in the morning shortly 
before Yates’ body was found. Before he was arrested, he pawned a quantity of her 
jewellery and exchanged his blood-stained garments for a new suit with his tailor; when 
he was arrested, he still had in his pocket items of her jewellery, along with a cocked 
revolver.  
There was little doubt that he was the killer, and there was ample evidence that 
he had attempted to evade detection. He told his tailor a fantastic story about an 
aeroplane crash to account for the blood, he asked his driver to pick him up from a 
different address than Yates’ flat, and he told the police that he had left Yates arguing 
with a mysterious man a while after midnight on the night before her death. In the 
prosecution’s construction of True, all of these details were taken as evidence that he 
was attempting, somewhat haphazardly, but nonetheless rationally, to escape justice, 
knowing as he must have done that he had committed a crime that was morally wrong 
                                                 
7
 “Woman Gagged and Murdered.”; “News from Friday inquest.”; “Ronald True On Trial.”; Coroner and 
Ronald True ‘Murder’ Verdict.” 
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and punishable by law. Sir Edward Muir, summing up the case for the prosecution at the 
first trial, portrayed True as a vain and aggressive man whose motivation was robbery. 
The defence, however, composed a portrait of a highly unstable man who had exhibited 
indications of mental disturbance since childhood. True’s childhood cruelty to his pets, 
his fantastical bragging, episodes during which his mind would go blank (potentially 
caused by epilepsy, insanity and/or a serious morphine addiction) and a delusion in 
which he was being impersonated by another Ronald True were all considered at his trial 
(Crozier 124). A year prior to the killing, True had been admitted to a nursing home on 
two separate courses of care to be cured of morphine addiction, and was described by 
medical staff there as violent, suicidal and delusional (ibid.). True also frequently spoke 
of murder and had described to an acquaintance how his own mother had been beaten to 
death, ostensibly by the other ‘True’, in circumstances very similar to those in which 
Yates was found. True’s mother was, however, still alive. 
 All of this anecdotal evidence of delusional insanity was supported by medical 
testimony from psychologists who had assessed him after the crime. Dr Norwood East, 
along with four other medical witnesses, declared that he would certify True as insane. 
To East, True seemed to be delusional on certain matters and extremely dangerous; Dr 
Young agreed and added that True was ‘deficient in moral sense’ and so ‘incapable of 
controlling a number of acts’; Dr Robert Percy Smith was impressed by True’s delusions 
and thought he had homicidal tendencies which were related to his previous morphine 
addiction; finally, Dr Stoddart agreed with the rest of the medical testimony and added 
that True was a pathological liar on the ‘borderland of insanity,’ although he disagreed 
with the suggestion being voiced in Court (although generally refuted by the medical 
witnesses) that True might be suffering from epilepsy and have committed the crime 
during an attack (all above quotations are from “Ronald True’s Delusions” 7). His blank 
outs indicated epilepsy, although it was agreed that he had shown no other symptoms of 
the condition. The care he had taken over the crime ruled out automatism or an 
unpremeditated attack.  
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  Although all four doctors agreed that they would certify True as insane, whether 
the specific conditions from which he was suffering rendered him irresponsible under 
M’Naghten was fiercely disputed. The judge presiding over the case, Mr Justice 
McCardie, described the Rules as involving a series of enquiries to the jury which would 
conclude with the following questions about the prisoner: 
Whether at the time [of committing the crime] he was aware of the physical 
character of the act he was doing? Whether or not he knew he was doing 
that which was morally wrong according to the code of his normal fellow-
citizens? Whether he knew he was breaking the law? (ibid.) 
This was the conventional interpretation of M’Naghten and consisted of enquiries into 
the defendant’s knowledge of the physical quality of his actions, his knowledge of right 
of wrong, and his awareness of the position of the law on the matter. In their accounts of 
True, the medical witnesses offered different, although not altogether contradictory, 
testimony. One hospital assistant remarked that despite appearing definitely not sane in 
many of his actions, True did appear rational in conversation. Smith declared that ‘the 
prisoner understood the nature of the act, but was incapable of distinguishing between 
right and wrong and was incapable of controlling his actions’ (ibid.). Likewise, Young 
was certain that True appreciated the physical quality of the crime but ‘did not think the 
prisoner appreciated the difference between right and wrong’ (ibid.). Young added that 
‘the tests laid down in M’Naghten’s case were inadequate; the word “wrong” was 
indefinite’ (ibid.). True may have understood right and wrong, but his mental disturbance 
must have had an effect on how he experienced the feeling of ‘wrongness’. Young’s 
critique of ‘wrong’ as indefinite took into consideration the emotional aspects of 
cognisance, and which were missing from the law. As well as this criticism of the Rules, 
Young and Stoddart proposed that True was unable to control certain actions. This 
suggestion was taken up by the judge, and amounted to a move to expand M’Naghten in 
line with the recommendations of Stephens and the BMA regarding irresistible impulses: 
‘Even if the prisoner knew the physical nature of the act and that it was morally wrong  
and punishable by law, yet was by mental disease deprived of the power to control his 
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actions, then the verdict should be “Guilty, but Insane”’ he advised (“Insanity and 
Responsibility for Crime” 892). 
 That True was found guilty and given the death penalty both at his trial and on 
appeal demonstrates how psychiatry and the law were in conflict. Although the defence, 
armed with its team of psychiatrists, had proved that True was insane according to the 
modern, medical definition, the prosecution managed to convince the jury that he was 
outside of the highly limited, legal definition of madness. It was decided that the lies 
True told about his movements on the night of the murder and his deviousness in 
covering his tracks proved he was not intellectually afflicted, and that his homicidal 
tendencies, delusions and blank outs were irrelevant to his crime. Even the proposal of 
an irresistible impulses clause, which had been discussed in law since the late nineteenth 
century did not influence the jury. True knew the nature of the act, and the difference 
between right and wrong. The fact that he was insane was seen to be irrelevant. 
An intriguing addendum to this case was that True was not hanged, the 
punishment for murder at that time. Instead, he was consigned to Broadmoor, because 
contemporary laws forbid the execution of an insane man. The significance of the trial 
lay partly in the result of the case, with the public and press outrage expressed against 
True’s ‘reprieve’ which was attributed to his ‘influence in high circles’ (“Murder and the 
Defence of Insanity” 246). As significant were the debates it raised regarding the 
implementation of M’Naghten and the use of psychiatric evidence in trials, which 
necessitated the establishment of a select committee charged with squaring the 
antiquated laws with modern medical understanding.  
 
The Atkin Committee and Changes to the Law  
In response to the controversy over True, a committee headed by Lord Justice Atkin was 
established in 1922 to consider changes to M’Naghten. The documents previously put 
together by the BMA and MPA constituted their medical evidence, with those aspects of 
both dealing with irresistible impulses and knowledge of right and wrong receiving 
much attention. Of particular relevance was the MPA’s criticism of the M’Naghten Rules 
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as identifying ‘responsibility with knowing and reasoning’ which contradicted the many 
cases of criminals about 
whose insanity (and irresponsibility) there can be no possible doubt, who 
have realized the nature and quality of their act, have known that it was 
contrary to the law, human and divine, and have shown remarkable 
cleverness in carrying out their object. (“Criminal Responsibility” March 
1923: 520) 
The Rules were most mistaken, claimed the MPA, in their assessment of madness as a 
defect of reason, and instead they proposed a modernised definition of madness to 
replace the vague formulation reached by the questions posed in M’Naghten. It ran as 
follows:  
Unsoundness of  mind is no longer regarded as in essence a disorder of the 
intellectual or cognitive faculties. The modern view is that it is something 
much more profoundly related to the whole organism – a morbid change in 
the emotional and instinctive activities, with or without intellectual 
derangement. Long before the patient manifests delusions or other signs of 
obvious insanity he may suffer from purely subjective symptoms, which are 
now recognized to be no less valid and of no less importance in the clinical 
picture of what constitutes unsoundness of mind than the more palpable and 
manifest signs of the fully developed disorder. (“Criminal Responsibility” 
Dec. 1923: 1060) 
In the MPA’s view, mental illness did not always entail intellectual derangement or 
problems with reasoning; rather, choices and reasoning could be partially or profoundly 
affected by emotional and subjective imbalances, or not affected at all. Madness was not 
partial, however, in the sense that the criminal could still think rationally about certain 
things while suffering from unsoundness of mind: the whole organism, that is, the entire 
emotional life and judgement of the patient, should be assumed to be affected.  
 In the MPA’s report, the language used to describe the criminal also changed. 
While the BMA referred to the prisoner, the MPA preferred ‘patient’, showing an 
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inclination towards a therapeutic rather than punitive relationship with the criminal. The 
severity of the conditions necessary to determine irresponsibility was also softened: the 
symptoms need not ever get beyond basic subjective disturbances or develop into full 
disorders in order to be have a consequence on volition and cognition. It is likely that 
such a categorisation of mental illness would have meant more individuals would have 
been considered as having assuaged criminal responsibility due to their mental state.  
 In 1923, however, the Atkin Committee reported that only a minor change to the 
law would be necessary because the M’Naghten Rules were already flexible enough to 
accommodate a wide and expanding understanding of what constituted insanity and 
mental disease. There was a slight change of view with regard to loss of control and 
irresistible impulse in mental illness, and the committee sided with the BMA when they 
agreed that ‘a person charged criminally with an offence is irresponsible for his act when 
the act is committed under an impulse which the prisoner was by mental disease in 
substance deprived of any power to resist,’ in which cases it was accepted that ‘the 
accused knows the nature of the act and that it is wrong; and the M’Naghten formula is 
not logically sufficient’ (ibid. 1061). In other respects the Rules would stand, despite the 
Atkin Committee having decided to accept the modernised view of madness put forth by 
the reformist MPA. In doing so, the Committee noted that the concept of insanity had 
broadened from a specific disease of the intellect to a wider disorder of the sentiments 
and subjective life. Whether they were fully cognisant of the claims made by many 
supporters of change is questionable, as the report goes on to state that 
a person may be of unsound mind and yet be criminally responsible. If a 
person intends to do a criminal act, has the capacity to know what the act is, 
and to know the act is one he ought not to do, he commits a crime. (ibid. 
1060-1) 
The notion that morbid emotional disturbances might influence the way sufferers 
reasoned, their feelings about their actions, especially if their actions were violent, and 
subsequently, their grasp of right and wrong, was barely touched upon in the report.  
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 In spite of the advice of the Atkin Committee, the attempt by Lord Justice 
Darling in 1923 to introduce a Bill to add an irresistible impulses clause to M’Naghten 
failed. Judging from the response of the Law Lords, the attempt to change the law seems 
to have touched a very raw nerve, amounting to a clash of the professions and the 
professional standards of both law and psychiatry. Alone, the idea that an aspect of the 
criminal justice system could do its business without a clear and timeless standard to 
assess mental states appeared highly subversive. This was all the more so when it was 
proposed that psychiatrists and not jurists should define the terms by which insanity was 
explained to the jury. According to Crozier, this:  
necessitated psychiatric opinion [be] given as expert testimony and also 
stressed the legal criteria for responsibility should not be the final authority 
… psychiatry would have the strongest role to play in the determination of 
the treatment of the insane criminal. (130) 
In both the assessment of guilt and the determination of fit punishment, the incursion of 
modern psychiatric knowledge threatened the monopoly on justice maintained by jurists. 
A negative reaction to this can be seen in the response to True’s residency in Broadmoor 
and his construction as a public figure of hate until his death in 1953. Psychiatry’s 
involvement was seen by many as a means of True evading justice, rather than the 
fulfilment of a more suitable, psychiatrically-aware form of justice. In this somewhat 
crude confrontation, legal exactitude represents retaliatory justice, while psychiatric 
case-specificity represents a restorative approach to the criminal. 
 The perceived excesses of psychiatric case-by-case assessments can be seen in 
reactions to the incontrollable impulses clause. In proposing his Bill, Darling did his best 
to limit accusations that the clause would spare criminals whose actions were cruel and 
impulsive, rather than insane. In this spirit, ‘such impulsives as the pyromaniac, the 
anonymous letter-writer, the morbid liar and poison-mixer’ were all excluded  
(“Criminal Responsibility” 1924: 756). In Darling’s public writings, his cynical attitude 
to the potential excesses of an impulses clause, especially when mental illness was 
questionable, is rather more apparent. In a short treatise he penned in 1925, he 
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acknowledged that ‘there are cases of mental disorder where the impulse to commit a 
criminal act recurs with increasing force until it is in fact uncontrollable,’ (Darling 17) 
whilst he mocked the defence of temporary insanity and uncontrollable impulse in minor 
cases. Particularly amusing is the case of the rich woman found ‘with her muff full of 
lace and chocolate’ at Selfridges, who claims that she ‘has lost in the war a dearly-loved 
cousin, or in Bond Street, a favourite dog, and momentarily, her memory’ (18-19). The 
defence, described as such by Darling, sounds ridiculous, but while it may attest to the 
exploitation of insanity defences at this time, so to may it be seen as a conservative 
reaction to the more multifaceted and emotionally-founded psychological conditions and 
their manifestations. Insanity pleas seemed to many to threaten the role of criminal law 
and punishment as a deterrent against anti-social acts, and indeed Lord Hewitt, who was 
critical of uncontrollable impulses as a defence, was reported in 1926 as saying that, 
‘one of the most important functions of the law is to make people control their impulses’ 
(“Insanity and the Law” 714).  
 
The Aftermath of Atkin 
Complaints against the conservative rejection of the Bill came from both the medical 
and legal professions, and many were not satisfied with the persistence of what they saw 
as the irrelevant, unscientific and haphazard basis of M’Naghten. As well as the obvious 
legal difficulties the Rules presented, some psychiatrists felt that the Atkin Committee 
had not sufficiently encouraged the law to accept modern definitions of madness, despite 
demonstrating its willingness to question the categories of mad and sane, normal and 
pathological, and to understand how relatively minor changes or imbalances in 
instinctive and subjective life could result in morally abnormal actions. In 1926, Dr T. B. 
Hyslop made the pressing point that ‘[it] must be recognized that there were conditions 
of irresponsibility not due to certifiable disease’ (“Insanity and the Law”). The Atkin 
Committee and Darling’s Bill had represented a tentative move beyond the standard 
definition of delusions as insanity, but had been conservative in their definitions of 
insanity itself. Psychoneurotic disturbances such as obsessional neurosis, character 
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disorder, psychopathic personality disorder and hysteria did not qualify as limiting 
criminal responsibility because of the continuing ambiguity caused by the wording of 
M’Naghten, in particular its clause not to know the nature and quality of the act. As 
Whitlock complains: 
Unfortunately, such a theory takes no account of the emotional concomitants 
of knowledge; and it is surely the emotional coldness or detachment of the 
schizophrenic, who may kill without any particular feeling of horror or 
apparent awareness of the likely consequences to his victim or himself, 
which makes this interpretation of ‘knowing’ inadequate. (33-4) 
As well as failing to match advances in psychology, the Rules failed in their objective to 
provide a definition of insanity which could be used in trials to test the responsibility of 
prisoners, because even by the late 1930s, judges were still unclear about what insanity 
actually was. In this confusion, they were little aided by psychologists and psychiatrists, 
who were engaged in their own debates over the primacy of competing theories of mind. 
In 1922, one commentator had observed that ‘[i]nsanity has never been legally defined, 
and no even tolerable medical definition has ever been given’ (Smith 11), and in 1938, 
R. v. Phillips demonstrated that schizophrenia was still only partially accepted as 
insanity, due to the general ability of sufferers to judge right from wrong. In this case, a 
student murdered a boy after fantasising about killing, and afterwards was indifferent, 
distracted and unemotional in reminiscing about his crime. That he was judged guilty but 
insane was a rarity, and was even more remarkable given that one medical witness had 
advised that he ‘did not consider Phillips insane, though he was certainly a person of 
abnormal mind’ (“Successful Defence” 1031). That he was not insane was still being 
assessed according to his ability to grasp right and wrong. A conflicting account by the 
second medical witness convinced the jury that the prisoner was insane.  
 While the protocol around M’Naghten was relatively well established, the 
content and focus of medical evidence and its meaning when interpreted by judges and 
juries continued to vary throughout the period. The sense of the ambiguity, dissonance 
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and the contextual mutability of judgements concerning insanity that this variability 
created is often reflected upon in the golden age crime novel. 
 
Psychoanalysis? 
While psychoanalytic perspectives inform much of Gladys Mitchell’s writing, 
psychoanalytic critiques did not feature in many interwar discussions of M’Naghten, nor 
in the discussions of the Atkin Committee. The stance of the Lords, who debated and 
refused to pass Darling’s Criminal Responsibility (Trials) Bill in 1924, is exemplary, and 
is best summarised in the statement that it would be best to avoid admitting to law a 
doctrine which accepted ‘the sinister mysteries of the unconscious mind’ (“Criminal 
Responsibility of the Insane” 923).  
 A rare psychoanalytic attempt to uncover the mental impulses behind crime and 
recognise them in current laws can be found in M. Hamblin Smith’s The Psychology of 
the Criminal (1922). Smith accepts a number of general factors that contribute to crime, 
including heredity, poverty, bad environment and low intelligence, and yet concludes 
that these factors should not be considered generally, but rather in their impact upon the 
individual psychology of criminals. Most significant to Smith are mental conflicts, 
which are capable of causing people from a variety of different backgrounds and 
possessing more or less of the so-called ‘criminal’ traits, to commit crime. Smith defers 
to Bernard Hart for his definition of complexes as ‘a system of connected ideas with a 
strong emotional tone, and a tendency to produce actions of a certain definite character’ 
(qtd. in Smith 69). Psychoanalytic concepts drawn from a relatively orthodox reading of 
Freud including repression, complexes, and the atavistic instinctual drives of the primary 
unconscious, are seen to affect individual action, and hence responsibility. Having 
dismissed the ‘medieval’ conception of volition as an act of ‘free will’ and crime 
therefore as ‘wickedness’ (13) Smith proposes that Freud’s hypothesis of the 
unconscious can explain why certain acts are committed, especially when they seem to 
be irrational. Smith relates how the energy associated with a repressed complex may 
cause a person to act in a certain way, without them knowing that the source of their 
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volition lies in their consciously resisted desires. Instead, they may have rationalised 
their action for themselves and attributed their intentions to a supposedly reasonable 
objective. To Smith, the ‘underlying motive[s]’ (71) behind actions make problematic 
the notion of pure intention, as does the assertion that primitive instincts form the basis 
of the unconscious, and thus make the root of much action pre-social and instinctual at 
core: ‘far more of our psychic life than was once supposed’ claims Smith, ‘and more 
than many persons are even now willing to recognize, results from the action of these 
instincts,’ namely, sex, self-preservation, herding and self-nutrition (75).  
According to A.G. Tansley, the mind’s ‘most fundamental activities are non-
rational and largely unconscious activities. The power of conscious reasoning is a later 
development, playing but a minor part, even in the most highly developed human being’ 
(24). A theory of rational volition is made problematic when sane individuals, or those 
who are merely slightly unstable without being fully insane, can be seen either to be 
acting in conflict with conscious reason, or to be using reason to rationalise action 
inspired by  instinctual drives which were otherwise forbidden full expression by the 
super-ego. The psychiatric establishment’s resistance to such a hypothesis, in Smith’s 
reading, demonstrates an unwillingness to concede to a theory of human consciousness 
based upon non-rational action, an unknowable unconscious self and dynamic instinctual 
drives. Certainly, the consequences of a confrontation between the hypothesis of 
unconscious drives and primal instincts with a criminal law formulated to judge 
responsibility for crime according to mens rae – the guilty mind – are profound. Firstly, 
because the conscious mind resists unconscious conflicts and complexes, knowing one’s 
own mind and motives and reasoning clearly about them are impossible tasks (without 
the help of an analyst, of course). Secondly, the fundamental drive of the primitive 
instincts, coupled with the innumerable resistances they meet in civilised society, make 
complexes, repressions and conflicts the norm rather than the exception (Tansley 15). 
Consequently, it will be difficult to determine who is to blame for the existence of 
conflicts, especially when they result in criminal action.  
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For Smith, this speculation leads on to a more profound point, and one which he 
discusses at length. ‘[O]ur every action,’ Smith asserts,  
is determined by the circumstances which exist at the moment, together with 
the whole mass of former experiences, whether remembered or forgotten … 
Every action which we perform, without exception, as well as every 
precedent mental process, is the only one which could possibly occur under 
the particular circumstances. (76)  
When the psychological, biological, environmental and intellectual aspects of the 
criminal are correlated with the specific circumstances of the crime, little space is left for 
the notion of the criminal as an isolated moral agent acting according to their own free 
will. Every action – including crime, even murder – becomes the only possible solution 
to the complex formula of individual circumstances. 
 The problems for M’Naghten raised by Smith’s treatise are evident. If complexes 
and conflicts constitute an inseparable component of normal mental life, the perimeters 
of insanity become excessively difficult to determine: Smith’s expansive, seemingly 
limitless definitions of insanity (see 11), as well as his dismissal of ‘an entity called the 
“will”’ (9) as unscientific, undermines M’Naghten’s reliance upon behaviour according 
to knowledge of right and wrong, and the role of delusions in defining insanity. More 
threateningly to a legal and psychiatric establishment in varying degrees antagonistic to 
psychoanalysis, Smith’s recommendations for reforming M’Naghten cedes greater 
power to the analyst in determining the severity of the condition the patient suffers, 
something both the MPA and BMA were cautious about in their advice to the Atkin 
Committee. While Smith does accept that medical witnesses should have a merely 
advisory role (12), the intrinsically obscure nature of the insights offered by depth 
psychology, as well as its tendency to pathologise a multitude of social acts and mental 
states, might lead (as those opposed to reform feared) to an explosion of insanity pleas 
involving non-debilitating mental illnesses defined by complexes and conflicts. 
 The most important statement made by Smith from the perspective of M’Naghten 
is the clarification he suggests to the Rules, that ‘[n]o act done by a person in a state of 
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insanity, or suffering from mental defect, to such a degree as to justify his being placed 
under care, treatment, and control, can be punished as an offence’ (12). In comparison 
with the extant phrasing of the Rules, the shift he proposes is significant, both because of 
the miscellany of conditions becoming treatable according to psychoanalytic principles 
(kleptomania included) and because of the ambiguities of the term ‘under care’: clearly 
he is referring to lesser degrees of therapeutic custody than is enforced upon the 
inhabitants of lunatic asylums. Recalling Tansley’s divide between the normal and 
abnormal mind, an interpretive space opens up in which the exact relationship between 
responsibility, moral sense and pathology becomes less of a contentious issue than that 
of what kinds of troubles merit care and treatment – an interpretive space over which 
psychologists undoubtedly would have precedence. A clash of the professions, already 
prevalent in the M’Naghten debates, is anticipated by Smith’s proposal, as well as a 
radical revision of the incentives that underlie punishment. Elsewhere in his study, Smith 
proposes that the retaliatory and deterrent objectives of punishment should be 
superseded by the reformatory principle (4), following which the offender should be 
seen as an object of study, largely a victim of their own complex psychology, and 
potentially reclaimable by analysis. The greater the number of offenders judged to be 




Irresistible impulses, maniacal obsessions, complexes and the irrationality of motivation 
all posed problems to the M’Naghten Rules, representing as they did the psychological 
theories of early Victorian psychiatry. It was at the points of conflict and disagreement 
generated by the proliferation of psychoanalytic and more emotional and subjectively 
sensitive British psychologies that crime writers probed M’Naghten, and from which 
they composed characters who function as case studies of responsible or irresponsible 
insanity. In Mitchell’s The Saltmarsh Murders (1932) and St Peter’s Finger (1938) and 
Brand’s Green for Danger (1945), very modern cases of murderous insanity demonstrate 
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the complexities of responsibility and highlight the shortcomings of contemporary legal 
definitions of madness. In Mitchell’s psychoanalytic detective, who offers murderers the 
chance of redemption through her expert guidance, and in Brand’s portrayal of bereaved 
characters who conspire to conceal the offender from formal legal justice, can be 
discerned the rise of a specialised moral and psychiatric perspective on criminal 
responsibility. The adoption of an ethical stance towards the criminal at the dénouement 
forms an important component of these plots, distinguishing them from the many golden 
age novels in which the murderer is arrested and a just punishment is inferred.  
 
Gladys Mitchell, St Peter’s Finger (1938) 
The psychological expertise employed in the investigation of St Peter’s Finger’s killer, 
Ulrica, has been discussed already in chapter one. Suffering from competing complexes, 
Ulrica is a prime study for investigation in the manner outlined by M. Hamblin Smith. 
According to Bradley’s psychoanalytic understanding, Ulrica can certainly be 
considered insane. However, whether she would be protected from punishment 
according to the M’Naghten Rules is far less clear. This interpretive disparity is a central 
theme of the novel, and informs the juxtaposed trajectory of another mentally 
unbalanced criminal. This is Sister Bridget, in whose portrayal Mitchell highlights the 
problems raised by M’Naghten in the judgement of Ulrica’s case.  
 In her early appearances in the novel, Sister Bridget seems to be suffering from 
an inborn mental and physical disability. She is described as ‘the half-witted lay-sister, 
with her dead-white, puffy face, upon which was a calculating, slightly leering 
expression’; she has a ‘shuffling, lop-sided walk’ and ‘the heavy, ungainly movements of 
the mentally enfeebled’ (125). This is consistent with Edwardian and interwar accounts 
of genetic conditions which were understood as manifestations of degeneracy: she has 
much in common with the suspect of Chesterton’s “The Hammer of God,” the ‘idiot’ 
who most likely was born with what would later be classified as Down’s Syndrome, and 
in the interwar period was referred to as ‘Mongolism’ out of a mistaken association of 
the condition with Mongolian heredity. Contrary to this physical report, she is instead 
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suffering from a mental trauma, the root of which is the experience of being trapped in a 
burning building many years previously. Even without an understanding of Freud, it is 
clear to all that she is mentally unwell and, as the sisters point out, well beyond recovery. 
A Freudian interpretation of her condition is offered nonetheless, and Bradley concludes 
that she never fully recovered from her trauma (the term ‘abreaction’ is not used, but it is 
implied, see Mitchell 351). Her fascination with matches functions as an unconscious 
communicator of this fact despite her senseless state.  
 Sister Bridget’s room is located in close proximity to where the victim, Ursula, 
was found, but from the outset the nuns are careful not to put her forward as a suspect. 
This in itself is striking: the possibility that a raving lunatic could have committed the 
crime seems less ridiculous, after all, in a novel in which a lunatic does happen to live 
within a corridor’s length of the crime scene. Despite the convenience of such a solution, 
psychoanalytic techniques, including word-association and hypnosis, are used by Mrs 
Bradley to test and dismiss Sister Bridget’s possession of even ‘the slightest degree of 
guilty knowledge’ (127). Contrary to Darling’s scepticism (and indeed, Freud’s), 
Bradley’s application of psychoanalysis to the matter of crime is presented as infallible, 
and so Sister Bridget is quickly but decisively acquitted of Ursula’s murder. Instead, she 
has another ‘crime’ to commit: arson.  
 Mitchell gives a close account of the mind-set of Sister Bridget as she 
unconsciously sets the convent’s orphanage on fire whilst looking for a mouse she treats 
as a pet: ‘She was aware of vague cravings, and these crystallised themselves, at about 
half-past eleven, into a violent desire for the companionship of her mouse’ (331). She 
stumbles around igniting matches to light her way, which she then drops carelessly on 
the floor. Her actions are described as both automatic and instinctive, they are a 
‘pilgrimage, which could be taken without thought’ (332). She acts ‘like a baby’ and 
forgets ‘half-way, what it was she was going to do’ (ibid.). Flitting around in a state of 
confusion and forgetfulness, her distinct and reccurring desires for matches and for her 
mouse drive her actions, but only in a state of considerable disorientation. It has 
previously been made clear that Sister Bridget has a limited understanding of her 
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surrounding environment and its dangers – when her bed is set alight by an unknown 
assailant, she dances in the midst of the fire that Bradley is trying to put out (205). This 
obliviousness to physical dangers contributes to her starting the fire and makes it 
impossible to imagine that she was deliberately reckless in dropping the matches, or had 
intended to cause a disaster.  
 Under Mrs Bradley’s guidance, and as a consequence of the reiterated shock of 
being trapped in a fire, Sister Bridget makes a complete recovery. Her culpability for the 
fire is not an issue, and it is made absolutely clear that, although she was in effect guilty 
of the act of starting the fire, the action was not criminal due to her incapacitated mental 
state and her severe disorientation. She had no idea what she was doing and, although 
the lives of a number of children were put at risk, she is not criminally responsible for 
starting the fire. Although it enriches her portrayal, a belief in Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious would not be necessary to return a clear verdict of ‘guilty but insane’; and 
so, if she were brought to trial, she would be well within the limits of M’Naghten.   
 The significance of this incident concerns its juxtaposition with Ulrica’s crime 
and her treatment at the dénouement. After Bradley explains the details of the case 
(outlined in chapter 1) she announces that, rather than handing Ulrica over to the police, 
she has helped her evade legal justice by sending her out of the country. Refusing the 
containment and closure usually associated with the golden age dénouement, Bradley’s 
decision is based upon psychological understanding of Ulrica’s state of mind when 
committing the crime and Bradley’s intimate knowledge of the attitude of the law to 
such forms of insanity. Although Ulrica acted intentionally, even deviously, in murdering 
her cousin, her actions were guided by a mental illness no less real than Sister Bridget’s. 
However, she has a clear sense of right and wrong and she knew full well what she was 
doing when she murdered her cousin. Although she is suffering from a delusion – that 
the money given to the convent would do penance for her family’s atheism – were this 
delusion real, this would be an acquisitive motivation rather than something justifiable 
like self-defence, and her actions would still be a crime. Ulrica would certainly be held 
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responsible for her crime according to the doctrine of partial insanity and the aspect of 
M’Naghten which saw insanity as a defect of reason. 
 The tension of the professions is manifest in Bradley’s decision to trust her own 
assessment of Ulrica’s condition and allow her psychological expertise to pre-empt a 
legal expertise perhaps incapable of understanding the subtleties of Ulrica’s case. 
Further weight is added to this reading by the conversation she has with her son 
Ferdinand, a leading criminal lawyer, who is aghast at his mother’s decision to leave 
Ulrica to her own devices. However, as Bradley prognosticates, Ulrica ‘will never 
commit another crime’ (348) and may very likely one day forget ‘that the death was due 
to her agency’ (347). Bradley’s therapeutic alternative for Ulrica reflects a combative 
approach to the penalizing inclination of M’Naghten and of criminal lunacy case law, 
which divided the responsible from the irresponsible, dehumanised the killer, and made 
stark divides between aspects and states of mind that were complex and often 
misunderstood. 
 It is interesting, given that her decision to acquit Ulrica is based upon the girl’s 
insanity, that Bradley describes Ulrica as ‘perfectly sane,’ and explains that ‘[h]er 
tragedy was that she had a single-track mind, as the vulgar have it. If that mind held two 
very powerful basic ideas, it followed that those ideas must be in conflict’ (348). 
Although Ulrica is clearly not of sound mind – compos mentis – she is to an extent 
reasoning clearly and on relatively sound principles, and it is this fact which puts her in 
conflict with M’Naghten. The two ideas which are in conflict in Ulrica’s mind are her 
underlying atheism and her fervent belief in God, neither of which can be described as 
insane (despite Bradley’s frequent comparison of Christianity to tribal myth, it is not 
portrayed as pathological). Bearing in mind that the two powerful ideas, both secular and 
spiritual, from which Ulrica reasons, are both reasonable, she is not described by 
Bradley as insane, but rather deeply conflicted. That Bradley decides not to pursue 
Ulrica suggests that contemporary legal and punitive practices were unsophisticated in 
relation to the mentally unwell, and certainly not capable of addressing the kind of 
pathologies suffered by Ulrica. The principle that Ursula’s murder should be avenged 
120 
 
and her murderer brought to justice are notably absent from Bradley’s reasoning, 
demonstrating a rejection of both the trope of containment through punishment implicit 
in the classic clue-puzzle dénouement and, in unison with Mitchell’s attitude in other 
novels, a negation of all forms of punishment. This was the kind of attitude lamented by 
Lord Justice Darling, absent from the law and responsible for much justified hype at the 
time of True’s trial. In St Peter’s Finger, it amounts to an attack on the spirit of the 
insanity plea laws and on their psychological foundations.  
 
Gladys Mitchell, The Saltmarsh Murders (1932) 
Bradley certainly airs some unconventional opinions about killers in Mitchell’s other 
novels. As well as claiming that everyone could be a killer in the right circumstances (in 
agreement with Smith’s formula), in The Saltmarsh Murders (125) she suggests that 
murder is really not such a serious crime, or rather, not so abnormal, because it is so 
frequently the consequence of conflicts between primal instincts and social norms, or of 
conflicts between complexes, as in Ulrica’s case. The Saltmarsh Murders (1932) was the 
first of Mitchell’s novels to allow Mrs Bradley centre stage, and it reads very much as a 
launching of the analyst-detective, with copious references to insanity of the hereditary, 
neurotic, homicidal and also purely comical varieties. In the small coastal village of 
Rotherhithe, Meg Tossick, an unmarried and pregnant servant, is strangled. Incestuous 
partnerships, primitive taboos and mental ill-health abound. The prime suspect is Meg’s 
ex-lover and the potential father of the baby, Bob Candy, who is also Meg’s half-brother; 
both were born to separate mothers who were each raped by an escaped lunatic from the 
local asylum (making this one of the few novels to actually feature such a figure). As the 
narrator muses: ‘there was that unfortunate affair of the escaped lunatic in the middle of 
his family tree. I mean, it seems as though this game of strangling young females is a 
proper lunatic’s trick, and Bob Candy’s ancestry told against him somewhat heavily’ 
(100). However, as in many golden age crime novels, the murderer does not come from 
the degenerate working classes, epitomised by Bob, but from the domestic and moral 
locus of the village, the vicarage.  
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Throughout the novel, the vicar’s wife, Mrs Coutts, terrorises the young with her 
crusade against immorality. She prowls around the village after dark in search of 
canoodling couples, she accuses the narrator, a young curate, of behaving improperly 
with her niece, and she sees the unmarried Meg’s fate as a just and convenient end to a 
scandal. To a degree this is a self-interested cruelty, as she is quite explicit in accusing 
her husband, the vicar, of fathering the child, a suspicion which Bradley suggests is ‘a 
sign of subconscious jealousy’ (57). Although Bradley states early in the novel that she 
suspects Mrs Coutts is the murderer, and charts how her ‘nerves and temper had been 
steadily deteriorating since the murder of Meg Tossick’ (108), Bradley’s analysis of 
Coutts is represented as a comical sub-plot, too insignificant to be a red herring. Other 
more rational motivations, including self-protection and jealousy, are considered as more 
likely motives than a sexual complex in a prudish old woman.  
  The representation of Coutts’s mental state as tangential is the fault of the 
narrator, the Watsonian curate Noel Wells, who reproduces popular conservative 
discourses of doubt about, and good humoured resistance to, psychoanalysis. Bound up 
with this there is an embarrassed recoil from issues concerning female sexuality itself, 
especially when mediated by the aged, female and startlingly attired Bradley. The 
purpose of Wells as sidekick and narrator is primarily to misread the evidence, thereby 
constructing the structurally necessary false solution, and in doing so to demonstrate the 
superior expertise of the detective as specialist observer, privy to knowledge that the 
ordinary individual lacks. In Žižek’s words, the naïve companion is necessary ‘precisely 
because he is an ordinary man who embodies what we would call the field of doxa, 
spontaneous common opinion’ (175). This is represented perfectly in Wells’ reactions to 
Bradley’s psychologist’s ‘argot’ (126), which range from the awkward to the scandalised 
and, just occasionally, the somewhat impressed. Reading against the grain of the 
psychological solution that can be expected from Mitchell, Wells’ interpretation of 
events issues at times from nineteenth century and fin de siècle romance tropes found in 
writers like Robert Louis Stevenson and John Buchan. Harking back to a simpler, golden 
era – albeit a disturbingly violent one – Wells laments the passing of an age in which the 
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local smuggler would have been receiving contraband alcohol, rather than pornography 
(122), and when an attractive adulteress would have been murdered by her blackmailed 
lover, rather than an elderly sexual neurotic (267). The discrediting of psychological 
evidence within the novel can be seen as an expression of popular opinion, the doxa, 
which can no longer be relied upon as a means through which to reveal the truth of the 
crime. 
 Wells resists the conclusions of psychology, and in doing so prefigures the 
attitude of the contemporary legal system. Rather than being an irrelevance within a 
novel geared towards symbolic closure, the investigation anticipates the moment in 
which evidence and criminal must be passed over to an executive authority – the police 
– followed by the criminal justice system. Nonetheless, it is the contemporary legal 
system’s investment in a conflicting epistemology that renders the psychoanalytic 
detective powerless. When asked why she cannot tell the police of her suspicions, 
Bradley explains that, although she has proof  –  ‘Plenty, psychological speaking’ – she 
also has, ‘[n]one, speaking in the language of the police’ (177). Likewise, she claims that 
‘up to the present I have no proof except psychological proof (which is incontrovertible 
but not acceptable yet to the lay nor the legal mind)’ (120). Bradley’s complaints issue 
from the assumption that medical evidence of this kind is an invalid basis for arrest or 
conviction. She speaks from experience, for Bradley has herself been a medical witness 
in trials, and in solidarity with doctors qualified in more respected disciplines, notes, ‘I 
never disagree with expert witness upon principle’ (218). This concession of judgement, 
at least in regards to psychology, was not guaranteed in contemporary trials. Such was 
the case in True’s trial, in which the evidence of four psychological witnesses was 
evaded through strict implementation of M’Naghten, and in the subsequent post-Atkin 
legislation, which failed to raise the standing of psychological evidence in court.  
 The resistance of this nexus of institutions to Bradley’s psychoanalytic reasoning 
cannot be overcome with the detective’s standard show of bravado at the dénouement, 
when even the most sceptical characters are supposed to be convinced by the detective’s 
deductive superiority. Indeed, Bradley is so confident that Coutts will be judged unfairly 
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according to legal principles rather than psychological ones that she adopts an extra-
legal policy to help her evade the judiciary altogether. Ironically, Bradley’s extra-legal 
policy relies entirely upon her psychological expertise for its success. Her strategy is 
quite literally to shock Coutts to death; this she achieves at the dénouement through 
outlining the details of the false solution, convincing those assembled that this was the 
real turn of events, while simultaneously working Coutts into a state of acute nervous 
tension. Her heart, as Bradley subsequently relates, was weak, and ‘her nervous system 
has been in a state of attrition for years,’ (274) a physical condition entwined 
inextricably with her neurotic state. By turning on Coutts suddenly, Bradley sends her 
into a faint which is quickly followed by what appears to be a heart attack. Although 
Bradley, in Wells’ words, ‘did all the things that people in the know do do’ (272), Coutts 
is briskly pronounced deceased. As medical authority, Bradley administers first aid and 
signs the death certificate; as legal authority, she both judges Coutts and executes her, 
and it is in this latter function that she pronounces a moral judgement upon the laws that 
she herself breaks in committing the murder.  
 It is already clear that Bradley is willing to break the law. Earlier in the novel she 
has made the extraordinary admission that ‘I actually have a murder to my credit. I was 
tried for it and acquitted, but I did it boys and girls, I did it’ (120). That Bradley is able to 
manipulate the outcome of a trial even when she is guilty of the crime suggests, of 
course, the dangers of ignoring her expertise, psychological or otherwise. It also 
demonstrates the sincerity of her re-evaluative mission, as neither the laws nor the mores 
that accompany and sustain them are outside of her reformative project. She shares a 
number of her controversial opinions within The Saltmarsh Murders, including a defence 
of incest (a taboo inherited from ‘the Jewish code of morals’ 274); illegitimate parentage 
(‘I didn’t know people bothered about such things nowadays’ [281]); adultery (definitely 
not a sin [216]); and murder (‘if it is a crime’ [125]) and inter-racial couplings, which is, 
regrettably, the most controversial of all because of the prevalent racism of the villagers. 
Bradley’s critical moral code permits her to flout the doxa at these most charged points. It 
also justifies her in killing Coutts, and it is in this act that Mitchell encodes an attack 
124 
 
upon M’Naghten. As Bradley explains, ‘I had to choose between killing her through 
shock, or as an alternative. … [l]etting her stand her trial’ (272-3). Whether or not Coutts 
will be judged guilty but insane is uncertain. Bradley describes Coutts’ condition as ‘a 
bad case of sadism plus inverted nymphomania’ (281), a condition unlikely to be covered 
under the present law, despite Bradley’s explicit assertion that ‘poor, woman, she is not 
responsible for her actions’ (283). In her notebooks, Bradley tries to predict the likely 
outcome of the trial: ‘I don’t want the poor woman to be hanged’ she exclaims 
(Mitchell’s italics, 287). ‘If she isn’t hanged she will be sent to Broadmoor’ (ibid.), 
paralleling True’s fate and evoking the controversy of his continued residence at the 
institution. 
Coutt’s trial is of course never held, but a clarification of Mitchell’s position on 
the likelihood of Coutts being sent to Broadmoor can be found in her later novel, Laurels 
are Poison (1942). The murderer in this novel, the teacher Miss Murchan, is sexually 
‘morbid’ (234) like Coutts. The motivation for her crimes lies in punishing her half-sister 
for having a relationship, and subsequently a child, with a man with whom they both 
were in love. Miss Murchan, libidinally, is the inverse of Coutts: she suffers from too 
much attachment to a loved object rather than an introversion. Miss Murchan’s tenacity 
in committing the crime and vengeful motivation combine to put her outside the meaning 
of the act. As much is said explicitly in the novel:  
 “Is she mad?” whispered the Principle. Mrs Bradley shrugged.  
“In your view and in mine, certainly,” she replied. “According to the law, 
poor soul, I  strongly doubt it.” (228)  
It is not necessary for Bradley to intervene, as she does with Coutts, because Miss 
Murchan poisons herself shortly after she is captured. As is frequently the case in golden 
age crime novels, when the detective has scruples about presenting a killer for 
punishment, suicide is a painless and convenient alternative. Justice is still done, in the 
sense that the killer is ‘executed’. They no longer pose a threat to others, and narrative 
closure is achieved through their obliteration. Dorothy L. Sayers, who was unique in 
focusing in depth upon the agonies of the detective responsible for sending a killer to his 
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death in Busman’s Honeymoon (1937), allowed her detective to offer suicide to 
repentant killers in both The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club (1921) and Murder 
Must Advertise (1933). The detective’s role as arbiter of justice, at least in a formal 
sense, is compromised, perhaps, but their personal moral code is unthreatened. It is no 
coincidence that Sayers’ aristocratic detective, Lord Peter Wimsey, offers suicide to the 
killers in the latter two novels specifically because it is the gentlemanly alternative to 
exposing their families to public scrutiny and scandal. In a comparable way, it is 
Bradley’s code of practice as a psychologist that most defines her sense of morality, 
although unlike Wimsey, she poses a threat to the status quo in protecting her insane 
killers from a legal system that to both detective and criminal appears antipathetic.  
 In an extraordinary passage in The Saltmarsh Murders, Bradley outlines a theory 
of law and the criminal, asserting (somewhat in keeping with the reformists Lord 
Darling criticised) that ‘most murderers are insane at the time of committing the murder’ 
(126). To illustrate this she refers to Dr Hawley Harvey Crippen, one of the most famous 
murderers of the long-Edwardian era, who was convicted in 1910 of poisoning and then 
dismembering his wife (see Young). Dr Crippen’s notoriety was the effect of a case 
combining morbid details, an international pursuit, ropey disguises, the use of telegrams, 
the involvement of the strongwoman Vulcana, a love triangle and a positively macabre 
cognomen, and it is somewhat in conflict with contemporary perceptions of Crippen as a 
master villain to describe him, as Bradley does, as ‘the victim of an inferiority complex,’ 
(126). It is also strange that Bradley cites Patrick Mahon, the so-called Crumbles 
murderer, in order to demonstrate that most murderers are insane when committing their 
crime.
8
 Mahon’s victim was his girlfried, the pregnant Emily Kaye, whose corpse had 
been dismembered over the course of two weeks in 1924 and was found in a secluded 
seaside cottage the couple had rented. That the crime was premeditated was proved by 
the fact that, prior to the murder, Mahon had purchased a knife and a saw. He already 
had a criminal background, having committed fraud and been imprisoned previously for 
                                                 
8
 The Crumbles case is also referred to, obliquely, in Mitchell’s When Last I Died (1941): after the 
execution of Mahon, the bungalow was bought by investors who charged interested tourists for guided 
tours of the house and crime scene. Likewise, Bradley’s investigation centres on a house which, following 
a death, has been turned into a tourist attraction.  
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a bank raid and, incredibly, he brought another girlfriend to stay at the cottage for the 
weekend while Kaye’s body was still in situ (see Browne and Tullett). Reading Mahon 
as anything other than a devious and self-interested killer, intent on escaping the 
relationship and the consequences of Kaye’s pregnancy (Mahon was married already and 
was a father), would have been controversial. It is therefore unclear why Mitchell refers 
to this case, which did not involve an insanity plea, when she could as easily have 
mentioned the still highly contested guilty verdict in True’s case. One possible reason is 
that the medical witness in both Crippen’s and Mahon’s trials was the theatrical Home 
Office pathologist Sir Bernard Spilsbury. Spilsbury had become a well-known public 
figure as a consequence of the empathetic performances, rhetorical flourishes and 
gruesome details he provided while discussing autopsies in court. Spilsbury’s 
idiosyncratic interpretation of medical evidence and conservative social views led, it has 
been argued, to a number of miscarriages of justice, (see Rose passim)
 
and by the 1930s, 
when Mitchell published The Saltmarsh Murders, public and legal opinion was turning 
against Spilsbury. His role as pathologist was to advise on forensic evidence, and as such 
he gave no advice upon the mental state of the killer: still, it is possible that Bradley’s 
reinterpretation of the verdict of the Crumbles Murders taps into a wider anxiety about 
verdicts in Spilsbury’s past cases. It certainly would suggest a degree of irony in her 
statement that she never disagrees with medical witnesses upon principle.  
 Alternatively, the suggestion that such infamous villains are victims of 
psychology may draw strength from popular perceptions of their depravity. It may be 
read as a symptom of secularisation, whereby criminality could no longer be accounted 
for according to religious moral codes of temptation and sin. Psychological explanations 
for such shocking transgressions as Mahon’s and Crippen’s crimes were at least 
preferable to confronting the possibility that such criminals were sane and had reasoned 
clearly upon that course of action. The theory that all murderers are insane performs 
something of a reassuring function, and indeed few of Mitchell’s novels feature a 
murderer who is not at least slightly unhinged (even if it is only the petite hysterie of 
Muriel in Mitchell’s 1941 mystery, When Last I Died). Whether they should all come 
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within the protection of the law is questionable. On Mahon, Bradley is clear to 
distinguish between ‘the two acts of the unfortunate man’ (126): the murder itself, and 
the subsequent destruction of the body. Although Bradley ignores the premeditated 
nature of the crime (Mahon’s visit to the ironmonger’s specifically), she draws a clear 
distinction between a murderer’s mental state at the time of the murder and ostensibly 
rational measures they take to conceal the body and crime afterwards. She states:  
If a man laid an entirely false trail for the police, misled them, hoodwinked 
them, drew red herrings across the track and dived and doubled in order to 
escape them, you wouldn’t say that he was any more of a villain than if he 
took no steps to secure himself from arrest, would you? … Well, a man who 
dismembers a body and hides the head is only trying to secure himself 
against arrest. (126-7)  
The distinction Bradley draws here is highly topical, especially as True’s insanity was 
doubted because of the rational steps he took to conceal his presence at Yate’s flat after 
her murder. Bradley’s argument closely relies upon distinctions drawn both at True’s trial 
and subsequent legislation, as she asks whether the relatively reasonable steps a 
murderer might take to secure themselves against arrest afterwards should alter the way 
in which the crime itself, and the state of mind of the criminal while they committed it, 
are judged. While in the extract above Bradley talks of villainy, the argument is applied 
just as readily to insanity. Although the medical voices who supported True made no 
such argument, instead explaining his behaviour after the murder as consistent with his 
insanity, Bradley’s consideration of the fractured nature of individual experience, the 
ways in which states of mind could overlap and engulf one another, and most 
importantly the co-existence of reason and immorality in insanity, provide an important 








Christianna Brand, Green for Danger (1945) 
Brand’s mystery is set in a rural hospital during the Second World War, with many 
patients falling victim to German aerial bombardments. Its cast of six suspects is drawn 
from the medical staff who attended to Joseph Higgins, a man who had been injured in 
an air raid and whose death during a routine operation is treated as suspicious. He dies as 
a result of suffocation – the murderer has painted a gas canister green and supplied it to 
the anaesthetist as oxygen. The murders which follow are as resourceful and devious, 
and it is clear that the murderer would have killed many more of the cast to protect 
herself if the detective had not confronted her in time. However, at the novel’s 
resolution, the murderer Esther, is forgiven for her crimes, not by the detective, but by 
the former suspects and her near-victims. They react to the detective’s unveiling of her 
guilt not with anger or relief, but pity. Because Esther suffers from a mental illness 
brought about by grief, the medically trained cast intuitively and professionally 
acknowledge her reduced responsibility. This creates a schism during the dénouement 
scene, as the detective attempts to enforce legal codes that the medical cast know to be 
flawed. In contrast with the figure of the medically astute forensic detective described by 
Thomas – the ‘master diagnostician, an expert capable of reading the symptoms of 
criminal pathology in the individual body and the social body as well’ (3) – Brand’s 
detective Inspector Cockrill gives only a partial reading of Esther, failing to 
acknowledge the severity of her mental anguish and its relation to her crime. He also 
fails in his diagnosis of the social body, misinterpreting Esther’s crime as an isolated 
instance of criminal pathology. He attempts to cure society by containing and punishing 
her, only to be told forcefully by the group that systemic social problems will not be 
cured by ostracising one troubled individual. Her mental condition has been fostered by 
social disadvantage in an oppressive nexus of familial and gender norms, and is now in 
confrontation with an uncomprehending legal system. Rejecting the resolution of the 
detective, the dénouement diminishes the authority of this figure and offers a critique of 
the conventional social morality he tries to enforce.  
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Sympathy with Esther is encouraged throughout the novel, although her 
portrayed as a gentle and dedicated nurse. In her late twenties and unemployed, Esther 
decides to escape from her home and her demanding, hypochondriac mother to find 
work in the hospital, only to experience insufferable grief and guilt when her mother 
dies in a collapsed building after an air raid. Esther’s mental health deteriorates as a 
consequence of her loss and as a reaction against the sterility of her early life, as she 
realises that her freedom from the oppressive family home has been bought at a 
devastating cost. Brand draws on Freud’s writings on ambivalence and mourning in 
“Mourning and Melancholia” in the construction of Esther’s self-reproach. She also 
portrays Esther as a repressed-virgin and sexual neurotic with a mother-complex which 
could come straight from Freud’s writings on paranoia in sexual neurosis (see “A Case 
of Paranoia”).  
Esther’s mental anguish is converted into deadly vengeance when she realises 
that a hospital patient is the head of the air raid rescue team who, after many days of 
digging, decided to stop searching for her mother. The subsequent murders Esther 
commits are dependent upon her belief that her actions from the start have been a form 
of natural justice. The natural justice delusion has been encountered before in Christie’s 
And Then There Were None, in which the killer, Justice Wargrave, is treated with very 
little sympathy. Yet at the close of Green for Danger, the killer is described as ‘Poor 
Esther’ (248). In the first place it is easier to sympathise with her because her crime is 
related to her grief and guilt over her mother’s death. Her crimes are as subtle and 
technically skilful as Wargrave’s: she kills Higgins by exchanging the oxygen used by 
the anaesthetist with a disguised carbon monoxide canister and hides a key piece of 
evidence on the corpse of a witness she has ruthlessly murdered. She is conscious of 
what she is doing whilst she commits her murders and is clearly wracked by her 
consciousness of right and wrong. In order to be allowed on night duty, Esther 
incapacitates the normal night nurse by nearly gassing her to death, but is conscientious 
enough to save her before she is killed (239). When Esther stockpiles morphine from 
patients’ rations at the hospital, she is considerate enough to give them each a reduced 
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dose so that they are not in terrible pain. All is going well until she realises that she must 
kill William, a patient with whom she has fallen in love, because he was also a member 
of the air raid squad who failed to rescue her mother. She is emotionally conflicted about 
killing him, but still plans to go ahead, a struggle which is dramatically portrayed as she 
becomes anxious and hysterical about his welfare during an operation, whilst knowing 
full well that she has switched the canister that endangers his life.  
 Esther clearly knows the difference between right and wrong, but is suffering 
from a delusion, what one character calls ‘an idée fixe’ (252), that what she is doing is 
just. The diagnosis of partial insanity is repeated throughout the novel: when the 
murderer’s identity is still unknown, Cockrill states that he believes the murderer is sane, 
but obsessed about one detail. Here, the detective is running counter to the modernised 
view proposed by the MPA, that unsoundness of mind is ‘something much more 
profoundly related to the whole organism - a morbid change in the emotional and 
instinctive activities’ (“Criminal Responsibility” Dec. 1923: 1060). The same view of 
madness is expressed by one character after the dénouement, when he explains that 
all murderers are a little mad … I think she was sane enough on every other 
point but just this one. She thought she had to revenge her mother’s death 
and on that subject she was mad. (248)  
Although counter to much psychological evidence to the contrary, this attitude was true 
to the account of madness suggested by M’Naghten and so, if convention is followed 
through, the partial insanity defence must be ruled out because Esther’s motivation is 
revenge, rather than self-defence. This would result in Esther being held responsible for 
her crimes and suffering the full penalty.  
 To the cast, this resolution is unacceptable, a fact that they convey during the 
dénouement scene. Here, the detective presents his evidence and reveals the identity of 
the murderer in a typically triumphant tone. What he does not realise is that throughout 
his victorious monologue, as he recounts the clues and analysis that has led him to the 
solution, the murderess is dying from a self-administered morphine injection. The rest of 
the cast, as medical professionals, all recognise the symptoms, but do not supply her 
131 
 
with an antidote. Instead they draw out the detective’s monologue, asking him probing 
questions and pretending not to understand his clever reasoning, to ensure that he is 
distracted from Esther’s demise. When he realises, the detective plummets from a 
position of absolute authority over truth and judgement to ignorance and powerlessness.  
“All you, doctors and nurses – isn’t there anything you can do? …” As they 
remained unmoving, standing in a silent ring, looking down sadly at the 
body, he flung himself across her and began clumsily to try to revive her 
himself. (243) 
Although he has succeeded as a detective in ensuring that all the novel’s clues, in 
Žižek’s terms, ‘retroactively acquire meaning,’ (58) his position as a reassuring authority 
has been shaken by his inability to empathise with the suffering, mentally unsettled 
Esther or to make an acceptable moral choice about her fate. While Bradley purposefully 
shocks Coutts to death so that she avoids an unjust punishment in The Saltmarsh 
Murders, Cockrill makes a hapless attempt to revive Esther in order that she face such a 
trail. In a symbolic clash of the professions, the medical team conspire with Esther, 
leading a scandalised Cockrill to exclaim: ‘You’ve deliberately connived at her death. 
You’ve assisted a murderer in evading justice … You are accessories after the fact. I 
shall charge you all with it’ (244). If Cockrill’s anger is not enough to convince us that 
Esther will receive the full penalty for the murder, another character’s response, ‘[h]ow 
could we have borne anything else, Inspector?’ (243) shows that the cast also assume 
that her insanity will not be considered as a limit to her responsibility. 
 It is in cases such as Esther’s that applications of M’Naghten would be the most 
fraught, in which the ability to distinguish right and wrong remains mostly unaffected 
while an emotional imbalance alters the sufferers’ sense of how these values apply to 
themselves. Although the concept of insanity had ostensibly broadened to include 
disorders of the sentiments and subjective life following the Atkin Committee, this only 
in part explains Esther’s condition: a more profound psychological understanding of 
madness and a Freudian account of repression and libido is necessary for a full 
diagnosis. Although she suffered terribly after the death of her mother, one character 
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almost scathingly remarks that ‘[t]housands of other people have had to do the same 
thing in this filthy war’ (249). Esther’s madness, and hence irresponsibility, are not only 
the consequence of her grief at her mother’s death, they are consequent upon her entire 
psychic life leading up to the death: her libidinal attachment to her mother in adult life, 
her unwillingness to make alternate libidinal investments, her mourning which develops 
into melancholia. Unless she is viewed according to this psychoanalytic interpretation, 
her madness does not make narrative sense, and the detective, lacking a sense of justice 
in conflict with the M’Naghten Rules, would have her suffer the full penalty for her 
crimes. The characters who sympathise with Esther intuitively are those who offer 
amateur analysis informed by general Freudian principles: so too do they know enough 
about the law to know that Esther’s madness would not qualify under M’Naghten. In the 
moral choice by the characters to allow Esther to commit her final crime, suicide, Brand 
tests the limits of contemporary debates concerning madness, murder and responsibility, 
and imagines an altered relationship between detective and criminal, in which the 
detective’s mastery is appropriated by the social group, the murderer is humanised, and 
moral questions asked about the group’s responsibility to, and relationship with, both the 















III. Born Criminals 
 
Whether it was possible to be born with innate criminal tendencies was a running theme 
of psychiatric discourse from the latter years of the nineteenth century onwards. A 
question of ethical and anthropological significance, it animates psychological debates 
of the interwar years and inflects golden age depictions of criminality. Raising issues of 
autonomy and free will which have points of overlap with those raised by the insane 
killer, the born criminal tests the promise of the clue-puzzle form to offer reassurance 
and containment. As with killers who suffer mental ill health, so-called born criminals – 
who in these years were primarily conceived of as individuals with low intelligence and 
defective moral development – could under interwar laws conceivably claim reduced 
responsibility and the right to care and treatment. However, attitudes to the criminally-
disposed were considerably more conflicted, relating to broader issues raised by the 
science of criminal positivism and the ethics of group responses to crime.  
The educational psychologist Cyril Burt (1883-1971) credits Henry Maudsley with 
first making the link between immorality and inborn mental states in Responsibility in 
Mental Disease (1872), in particular in the section in which Maudsley argues that ‘many, 
perhaps most, young criminals are morally defective,’ (qtd. in Burt 35). Between 1870 
and the 1940s, the cross-fertilisation of  social studies with evolutionary theory meant 
that child offenders were often depicted as primitive and degenerate. Early 
manifestations of vicious behaviour were seen by some as proof positive that children 
could be born with impaired moral sense, and hence predisposed to commit criminal acts 
irrespective of the environment in which they were raised. In other accounts, it was 
hoped that preventive measures, including more individualised education and better 
health services, could divert troubled youths from turning to crime. The following 
quotation from Cyril Burt’s 1925 study of child delinquency demonstrates that the range 
of options in punishment or treatment during this period were as varied and distinct as 
the breadth of opinion on the causes of delinquency itself:  
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Is he to be birched, reprimanded or sent back to his parent’s care? Can we 
operate upon his brain, or dose him with some potent drug? Shall we simply 
mete out to him and to his like, according to some just but mechanical tariff, 
a penalty proportioned to the measure of each offence … Or, finally, can 
nothing redeem him from that downward path he has so early taken, so that, 
indeed, as some have actually contended, it would be best, were it only 
permissible, to end him at once in a lethal chamber? (4) 
In golden age novels which feature born criminals – Gladys Mitchell’s When Last 
I Died (1941) and Agatha Christie’s Crooked House (1949) – the representation of child 
offenders raises the pitch of the discussion, confronting the detective with an ethical 
dilemma which tests the boundaries of the form as a reassuring structure directed 
towards closure, and challenges the figure of the detective as a diagnostician of deviance 
and instrument of justice. While Christie’s novel conforms to beliefs about innate 
criminality which had, by the time of writing, been rejected by many as both inhumane 
and scientifically flawed, Mitchell’s novel asserts that fatalism is founded upon 
ignorance and fear rationalised by pseudo-scientific calculations. Featuring the eccentric 
psychoanalytic detective, Mrs Bradley, When Last I Died raises the problem of 
childhood delinquency in order to explore the environmental and social cause of crime 
rather than its untested biological foundation. As Knight and Rowland have suggested, 
female crime writers of the golden age tended to arm their detectives with forms of 
knowledge and experience constructed as feminine, including empathy and sensitivity to 
emotional states (Knight, Crime Fiction 91; Rowland 19). When Last I Died both 
confirms and supersedes their assertions, as by selecting the stance in the debate which 
relied upon affective relations with the criminal, feminine knowledge is made to 
transcend the bounds of gender and form the basis of wider social rehabilitation.  
 
Measuring the Criminal 
Informed by Mendelian genetics and a social derivative of Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, the notion of a born criminal derived from the theories of the most influential 
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criminal anthropologist of the nineteenth century, Cesare Lombroso. From the 1870s, 
Lombroso postulated that ‘the antisocial tendencies of criminals are the result of their 
physical and psychic organisation, which differs essentially from that of normal 
individuals’ (Ferrero 5). Prominent jaws and canines, a large skull and asymmetric face 
as well as drooping eyelids and protruding lips all, in Lombroso’s system, characterised 
the criminal. Projecting criminal impulses onto pre-social man, imagined as part animal, 
part savage colonial other, Lombroso claimed that psychological features including 
vanity, impulsiveness and an absence of moral sense combined with such physical 
features made the criminal ‘strongly resemble primitive races’ (Ferrero 5). This was as 
much an organic property of atavistic criminal anatomy as an emotional and 
psychological one, as Lombroso compared cerebral cell configurations of criminals with 
those of normal individuals, allegedly to demonstrate that criminality manifested itself in 
the body even at a microscopic level (Ferrero 22). 
Havelock Ellis was an important translator of Lombroso’s ideas to a British 
readership. In his 1890 The Criminal, Ellis compiles extensive criminological research 
from across Europe, juxtaposing physiognomic data, composite photographs (see plates 
XIV and XV) and sketches of criminal body parts with more wide-ranging studies. 
These studies are cited as evidence that the unique physical qualities of the criminal 
would soon be revealed by science, and include enquiries into criminals’ agility (108), 
their insensibility to electric currents (113) and those mental qualities which lead them to 
alter their appearance (tattooing, for example, is linked with vanity, an almost universal 
criminal trait, [107]). Although emotional states are mused upon, environmental 
influences upon behaviour are ignored, while intelligence is not considered as a factor in 
criminality due to lack of data: noting the combined ‘stupidity and cunning’ of many 
criminals, he regrets that although ‘[s]everal attempts have been made to attain accurate 
figures as to the relative intelligence of the criminal … there must be a considerable 
element of guesswork’ in any account (133).  
 The transition from Lombroso’s original theories to the genetic ‘science’ of 
eugenics in vogue from the early 1910s saw increasing emphasis placed upon the mental 
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origins of crime. In 1913, in an attempt to discredit the theory of physical criminal type, 
Charles Goring collected and collated exhaustive statistics on the bodily measurements 
of criminals.
9
 Demonstrating the lack of evidence for physical determinism in 
criminology,
 
his The English Convict proved it was necessary to consider the variables 
of age, class, environment and physical disability when accounting for the causes of 
crime (370). Despite exorcising Lombroso’s ideas, Goring promoted a new positivist 
bias, claiming to have found a different criminal type to replace the heavy-browed 
criminal ament of his rival. He proposed that ‘the one vital mental constitutional factor 
in the etiology of crime was defective mental intelligence’ (263). Environmental factors, 
including poverty, neglect and poor education were, according to his statistics, of minor 
influence compared to inborn intelligence. To eradicate crime, he concluded, it would be 
necessary to segregate the unfit and ‘to regulate the reproduction of those constitutional 
qualities – feeble-mindedness, inebriety, epilepsy, deficient social instinct, etc. – which 
conduce the committing of crime’ (373).  
 In a recent study on fabrications of imbecility in late Victorian and Edwardian 
England, Mark Jackson relates how between 1890 and 1914 the feeble-minded were 
constructed as ‘a discrete, pathological but manageable menace to society’ (3) with class 
and racial prejudices operative in the division. Key figures in the study, classification 
and treatment of mental deficiencies in the early twentieth century – Mary Dendy, John 
Langdon Down and Alfred Tredgold – are discussed by Jackson, who charts how the 
discourse of feeble-mindedness came to occupy the same threatening position in public 
debates about social problems as the chronic poor of late Victorian social thought (also 
see Welshman chapter 3). Isolated as a social residuum responsible for social ills and 
menacing to civilisation, the mentally defective become the focus of many criminal 
studies after Goring, whose work validated the belief that feeble-mindedness was not 
only debilitating to the ‘progress’ of the race, but a decisive feature in the hereditary 
transmission of criminal traits. 
                                                 
9 See Goring’s frontispiece contrasting imaginative criminal portraits with photographic (iv), or any one 
of his 286 Tables based on measurements and other data collected from 3,000 English convicts. 
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 The construction of the feeble-minded as such accounts for why eugenics was 
considered a ‘modern, scientific enterprise’ (Stone 115) during the Edwardian and 
interwar years. The benefits of segregation and sterilisation of the feeble-minded are 
discussed and, with differing degrees of intensity, promoted, in both the crime novels 
under discussion here. Fears about contamination and racial degeneration persisted, and 
during these years the tracing of family pedigrees came to be seen as a powerful tool to 
combat the propagation of feeble-mindedness: the Eugenics Society even produced 
schedules to enable the public to put together their own family history with ease, 
encouraging them to note defects, deaths in infancy and diseases (How to prepare a 
family pedigree). The purpose of these exercises was to attempt to engineer the race 
rather than to eradicate crime per se, although the fact that criminologists took to these 
ideas demonstrates that criminality was seen widely as an inherited trait.   
 Amongst the criminal psychologists who challenged depictions of the feeble-
minded in determinist accounts of crime were W.C. Sullivan, Cyril Burt and Lilian Le 
Mesurier. They noted that Goring’s conclusions, while diverging from Lombroso in 
content, shared its positivist weaknesses, as mental deficiencies replaced the shape of the 
nose or forehead as the locus of criminal stigmata. Sullivan criticised Goring for this 
reason, stating that ‘common to both theories is the assumption that phenomena of social 
conduct can be directly referred to conditions of organic constitution’ (9). What was 
missing was a provision to account for the influence of environment upon personality 
and the augmentation of intelligence through education, resulting in unsophisticated 
portrayals of inbuilt tendencies which would find expression irrespective of 
circumstances. In spite of these criticisms, Goring played an influential role in the 
development of new discourses of mental and intellectual measurement which would 
dominate the study of the criminal, and wider educational and social discourse, for the 
next twenty years.  
During the century’s first decade, increasingly specific tests had been developed 
and used to probe the criminal mind. The foremost of these tests, which would become 
mainstream from the mid-1910s, was a standard intelligence test. The Binet-Simon test – 
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developed between 1908 and 1911 in France and updated by Lewis Terman as the 
Stanford-Binet Test in 1912 and 1916 – used a series of questions of increasing difficulty 
to match the level of an individual’s intelligence according to an age scale of normal 
development. The aged three years test, for example, asked subjects to point to parts of 
the body, to name familiar objects and to count. Progressing to the more sophisticated 
twelve year olds’ test, the subject was asked to provide definitions of abstract words 
such as pity, revenge, justice and charity, to repeat five digit sequences in reverse order 
and to interpret the meaning of images. For anyone over the age of sixteen, to be graded 
below an average fifteen year old in intelligence test was to be considered an ‘inferior 
adult,’ while a score above the ‘aged seventeen years’ test meant one could class oneself 
a ‘superior adult’ (55).  
The link between crime and mental deficiency which these tests were reputed to 
demonstrate when applied to the prison population was supported even by practitioners 
critical of determinist accounts. The peer review journal Studies in Mental Inefficiency, 
launched in 1920, features many articles supporting this connection including the 
following excerpt whose author, while making clear that such criminals should be 
considered as not fully responsible for their crimes precisely because of their unenviable 
inheritance, asserts that they should be considered as products of the prolific stocks of 
‘improvident and feeble-minded’ individuals, and therefore indeed born to criminality 
(Potts 21-22). W.C. Sullivan, in spite of his criticisms of Goring, takes a similar line, 
stating  
that mental defect involves some degree of predisposition to crime has been 
inferred from the universally recognized fact that the proportion of weak-
minded persons is considerably higher amongst convicted criminals than it 
is in the general population. (184) 
Obviously, he does not consider the possibility that more intelligent criminals 
were less likely to get caught. 
 The grounds for the debate over whether or not these persuasive statistics really 
did prove a link between mental deficiency and crime were only partially established 
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when the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 was passed. While not directly referring to the 
Binet-Simon age scale, the Act attempted a technical definition of possible levels of 
mental defect, and ordered that a court trying a person found to be mentally defective 
could ‘postpone passing a sentence or making an order for committal to an industrial 
school’ and instead obtain ‘an order that he be sent to an institution or placed under 
guardianship’ (Leach 19) rather than face a criminal sentence. Within the Act, mental 
deficiency was split into four levels, the first three of which were, in descending 
severity, idiot, imbecile and feeble-minded persons (Leach 5-6). As the link between 
mental defect and criminality was already inferred, the common prerequisite in each 
case that the condition be exhibited from birth seemed only to add legal weight to the 
notion of the born criminal. The wording of the Act then, in particular the description of 
feeble-mindedness with its weakness of judgement and impaired self-control, 
contributes to the construction of individuals of low intelligence as a persistent threat.  
 
Moral Deficiency 
While the application of intelligence tests to convicts demonstrated that the prison 
population contained many individuals of subnormal intelligence, many so-called mental 
defectives could be proved to have never exhibited any criminal tendencies whatsoever: 
some were even found to be extraordinarily honourable. Studies in Mental Inefficiency 
recounts acts of bravery and selflessness by boys from special schools – for example, in 
two articles boys are commended for saving younger children from drowning (“London 
Special School Boys’ Gallantry” and “A Special School Boy’s Brave Act”) –  leading the 
author of the latter article to state that ‘we dwell so much on the sins and failings of 
defectives that we are apt to forget that here and there amongst them … qualities may be 
found which we ourselves do not invariably possess’ (18). Likewise, Sullivan observes 
that ‘a low level of intellectual capacity may be associated with a high degree of moral 
sensibility’ (183). While feeble-mindedness could not be considered as purely criminal, 
another inborn tendency was found to account for the wild lapses in morality which 
were perceived in some criminals.  
140 
 
The 1913 Mental Deficiency Act defined the final of the four categories of mental 
deficiency as follows: 
Moral imbeciles; that is to say, persons who from an early age display some 
permanent mental defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities 
on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect. (Leach 7)
10
 
This concept of moral deficiency found influential supporters in Charles Mercier and the 
physician and writer, Alfred F. Tredgold. To Mercier, moral disorder was ‘an incurable 
kink’ in the mind, which made the sufferer ‘insensible to the obligations of morality’ 
(Crime and Insanity 35). A critic of Freud, Tredgold framed human conduct and 
misconduct as a consequence of instincts in the Darwinian sense. While demonstrating 
an acute sensitivity to moral relativism in noting that ‘moral standards vary with 
different races and at different evolutionary phases of the same race’ (323) he reasoned 
that the psychological basis for moral deficiency must be a reversion to a primitive state 
prior to the development of moral instinct. Just as the body had evolved, so the mind had 
developed in response to social living, and when civilised it would respond near 
instinctively to group prohibitions against the satisfaction of sexual or violent desires. 
Instincts could be partially satisfied, for example sexual desire was gratified in marriage 
rather than rape, while the right to own property was a civilised compromise of the 
instinct to acquire through threat or theft. What changed in the human mind was conduct 
itself, so that behaviour ‘gradually become more and more deliberate and less impulsive’ 
(324). To Tredgold, moral sense comprised of these developed inhibitions and was 
innate rather than acquired, meaning that the normal individual was born with the 
tendency to develop moral sentiments and to take pleasure from social and altruistic 
acts. In the case of the moral deficient, the primitive instincts remained dominant, while 
inhibitory factors failed to develop. Exactly as Lombroso had interpreted criminals as 
atavistic throwbacks, so Tredgold saw moral defectives, or ‘criminal aments’
11
 as 
                                                 
10 In the Mental Deficiency Act 1927, the term was replaced with ‘Moral Defectives’, in order to avoid 
confusion with the more common use of the term ‘imbecile’ to refer to someone of low intelligence 
(Tredgold 338). 
11
 A generic term which refers to any feebleminded criminal, but which often carried the connotation of 
inborn or organic criminality.  
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‘certain individuals in whom the mental faculties concerned in restraining instinctive 
behaviour would appear to be not disordered, or even retarded, but actually absent’ 
(335).  
Another condition easily mistaken for moral defectiveness was, according to 
Tredgold, the mere absence of moral sentiment. He reasoned that individuals who lacked 
morality would suffer no moral qualms committing crimes if the rewards were high 
enough and the chance of detection small. If they confirmed to moral codes, it was 
without any altruistic motivation but simply in order to avoid legal punishment, and it 
was this sense of self-preservation, or wisdom, as Tredgold termed it, which 
distinguished them from the morally deficient (337). It was for this reason that the 1913 
Act defined a moral defective as someone on whom ‘punishment has had little or no 
deterrent effect’ (Leach 7). They were not consciously wicked, or lacking in intelligence 
in the same ways as the other categories specified in the Act: 
The psychological concept of moral deficiency, therefore, is that of an 
individual who differs from the ordinary type of defectives in that he is 
neither illiterate, deficient in his range of general knowledge, nor lacking in 
ordinary understanding; but is defective in adaptiveness or wisdom in the 
moral sense, and at the same time possessed of strongly marked anti-social 
impulses (Tredgold 340). 
Their treatment would be managed in institutions run by local authorities under 
governmental supervision. As they were by definition incurable, they would not be sent 
to regular prisons, and responsibility for any crimes they committed would be judged by 
different standards than that of a normally developed, morally culpable individual. They 
would need to be put into care for life, and no attempt to reform or rehabilitate them 
would make a difference.  
How could such a condition be quantified? Neither the Binet-Simon test nor 
Lombroso’s measurements could rate character traits such as ingratitude, selfishness and 
the inability to feel shame. The study of heredity, as promoted by eugenicists, was no 
help either, as Tredgold noted that moral defectives were generally freak occurrences, 
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‘the only abnormal member of a family characterized by sanity, good mental 
development, and moral behaviour’ of average and above intelligence and possessing no 
unusual physical features whatsoever (343). Proof of persistent acts of cruelty or 
viciousness such as the torture of animals, destruction of property, violence, rudeness 
and theft performed since earliest childhood were equally difficult to collect, as 
Tredgold’s detractors would claim.  
A review at Tredgold’s case studies only complicates the matter, as his confirmed 
moral defectives could, according to other contemporary understandings of delinquency, 
be diagnosed as insane, emotionally unstable, inclined towards crime due to poor 
opportunities or inadequate education. For example, a young woman called F.E.L. is 
firmly certified as a moral imbecile (359-62). A bright but argumentative teenager, she 
left school aged fourteen to take up domestic service, but ran away from that post and a 
succession of others, committing thefts along the way and often ending up in the 
company of older men and soldiers. In a letter to her family which Tredgold quotes in its 
entirety, she expresses her wish to act and to be a ‘Lady’, two desires she is only likely 
to achieve in London: ‘I knew I was never meant to lead such a poor life; I wanted to 
look higher and be a lady, and now I shall be one’ (360) she asserts. Freud might have 
called her an hysteric, Hélène Cixous hailed her as hero, while her rejection of her social 
role and futile attempt to actively shape her own life might be compared to that of 
Shakespeare’s sister as imagined by Virginia Woolf in A Room of One’s Own 
 
(42-4). 
However, the desire of Tredgold as writer, and the prison doctor as disciplinary 
authority, to shape her case to fit a recognised pathological category is abundantly 
obvious: ‘the only section in which she could possibly be included was that of a moral 
imbecile’ (361) Tredgold claims. Noting that she is too intelligent to be classed as an 
imbecile, and is not diagnosable as insane, her obstinacy is taken as a sign of inborn 
immorality, her repeated desire to run away as a lack of wisdom: ‘she had persisted in 
this course when it was manifestly to her disadvantage’ (Tredgold 361). F.E.L. is at no 
point credited as an individual with a right to make choices about her life, neither are her 
complaints about domestic service and her expressions of desire for autonomy 
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appreciated as reasonable or serious utterances. Although the opportunity to recognise 
F.E.L. as an intelligent individual stifled by the material conditions of her life arises, 
Tredgold finds it most appropriate that she is instead certified as a moral imbecile and 
confined to an institution for mental defectives for life (361).  
Tredgold was able to define moral defectives with confidence, undoubtedly in 
sympathy with his class and gender prejudices, but other criminologists found the 
category impossibly vague. William Healy, a child psychologist who carried out 
extensive studies of inmate intelligence, asserts:  
When we began our work there was no point on which we expected more 
positive data than on moral imbecility. But our findings have turned out to be 
negative. We have been constantly on the look-out for a moral imbecile … 
We have not found one … they have always turned out to be somehow 
mentally defective or aberrational; or to be victims of environmental 
conditions or mental conflict, and not at all devoid of moral feeling. (783) 
While Healy found the category of moral defectiveness less true to life than more 
sophisticated accounts of the complex interplay between environmental influences, 
intellectual capacity, and psychological constitution, other writers offered radical 
reconsiderations of the meaning of mental deficiency and its potential treatment. For 
example Terman contended that, although between 18% and 50% of the young criminals 
he tested were feeble-minded in some respect (8-9), this did not prove a link between 
low intelligence and innate criminality. This was because the mental age at which most 
criminals were stuck, around year twelve (classed as borderline cases), was the age at 
which the understanding of abstract concepts, including right and wrong, normally 
developed:  
The formation and use of abstract ideas, of one kind or another, represent, 
par excellence, the “higher thought processes.” It is not without significance 
that delinquents who test near the border-line of mental deficiency show such 
inferior ability in arriving at correct generalizations regarding matters of 
social and moral relationships. We cannot expect a mind of defective 
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generalizing ability to form very definite or correct notions about justice, 
law, fairness, ownership, rights, etc.; and if the ideas themselves are not 
fairly clear, the rules of conduct based upon them cannot make a very 
powerful appeal. (Terman 285) 
Moral sense is not absent; rather, moral ideas are functions of more mature thought 
processes which borderline cases find it harder to acquire. This means that borderline 
cases are less able to scrutinise and judge their actions according to tentatively perceived 
social mores.  
It could be argued that there is something innately criminal in Terman’s account 
of mental deficiency, but such a conclusion is contrary to his intentions in developing 
intelligence tests. While Tredgold’s definition of the moral imbecile, and his somewhat 
haphazard diagnoses, located a depraved, amoral segment in the criminal mind, 
Terman’s account at least allows for the possibility of more suitable care and training to 
help such children function socially. Terman’s emphasis is upon the interplay of 
individual understanding with social activity and socially acquired meaning, both of 
which the borderline child is involuntarily limited from grasping. Education therefore 
has a specific responsibility in helping the borderline child to understand the world, so 
that they can be integrated into, rather than isolated from, society.  
 
Education and Environment 
The influence of Terman’s thoughts on education can be seen in the work of pioneering 
prison reformer Lilian Le Mesurier. In 1922, she was sent to the Boy’s Prison in 
Wandsworth, London, to interview boys on remand and make reports on their 
psychological state. Later she enlisted more female helpers and volunteers to make visits 
to prison and to the homes of boys in order to provide ‘the fullest possible history of the 
lad,’ in order to determine ‘why character and environment have been maladjusted, and 
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by what process can readjustment come’ (Paterson xi).
12
 By 1939, specific legislation 
had been passed thanks to the ‘steady growth of interest and informed opinion,’ amongst 
the general public regarding the care of young offenders, (Le Mesurier xxi), leading to 
the establishment of nine Borstal institutions in the UK to cater for around 4,000 new 
young offenders each year (Paterson xiv). The number of women visitors also grew to 
meet the demand to assess each child individually.  
 The fact that the new corps of visitors were women was of central significance to 
the project, as a sympathetic approach is frequently portrayed by Le Mesurier as a 
uniquely feminine trait, in contrast to the empirical and scientific interest male doctors 
may have had in the young criminals. It is perhaps Le Mesurier’s willingness to see 
herself in this light that encouraged her to question the scientific validity of much 
terminology then in circulation regarding offenders, as well as criminal classifications, 
tests, and statistics-making then in vogue. Even when such research was undertaken with 
the intention of developing teaching and treatment methods appropriate to each 
condition, Le Mesurier contends that the consequent partitioning of child offenders into 
ever smaller categories, including the morally deficient, in effect made people believe 
that rehabilitation was hopeless:  
the tendency in the public mind to-day [is] to assume that most juvenile 
delinquency and adolescent crime are due to a mental defect. People often 
talk of the offender as having a kink, a screw loose, and so on, and shrug 
their shoulders in a pitying way. (50) 
She preferred to consider the boys under her scrutiny as having taken a ‘wrong turning’ 
which could be righted with proper care (ibid.).  
 She knew, however, that her view was not shared by the general public who, 
having only recently become aware of the results of studies of intelligence and 
deficiency in criminals, ‘are now perhaps inclined to swing over to an opposite extreme. 
In a natural reaction from previous ignorance and indifference, they are apt to form an 
                                                 
12 This work was first published in 1931 to describe the establishment in 1922 of a large corps of Women 
Visitors to advise on the appropriate Borstal institution for young offenders. It was re-printed in 1939 
with new introductions and prefaces. 
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exaggerated picture of the number of delinquents who are suffering from mental defect’ 
(39). Ironically perhaps, it was the well-meaning intentions of educators and 
psychologists which she credits as having created this public misconception about 
mental deficiency and other psychological conditions equivalent to moral imbecility in 
young offenders. However, the frightening statistics which were often cited alongside 
unsavoury character descriptions do not fit with Le Mesurier’s descriptions of young 
offenders. Although 15% of groups of remand boys she tested were shown to be 
inefficient, feeble-minded, with low mental age or, in fewer cases, insane, she 
emphasises that ‘85 per cent of these delinquent boys were found to be normal both in 
body and mind’ (Le Mesurier’s italics, 49).  
 Rather than pursue what she framed as the hopeless view of delinquents as 
deficient, Le Mesurier interpreted crime as the outcome of a conflict of individual 
characteristics not in themselves antisocial, with a social setting antipathetic to their 
successful development. She hypothesised about the boy of high-spirits who, if born 
rich, might have set out to climb Mount Everest, but being poor, would terrorise the 
police and commit daring acts of delinquency (35). Le Mesurier refused to interpret the 
offences of the poor boy as anything more sinister than the expression of character traits 
which could be used to better advantage given different opportunities. All of this was 
consistent with her fundamental tenets, that crime concerns people who are in conflict 
with an environment that is failing them, and that children should not simply be given up 
as uneducable because of any deficiencies they might genuinely have.  
In this view Le Mesurier was not alone: a consequence of the 1913 Act was the 
establishment of both clinics for juvenile delinquents and Special Schools for non-
criminal children which pioneered an individual approach. Tests were developed which 
could locate the learning disability afflicting a child, be it visual, phonic or 
psychological, and techniques were used to help the child learn in a targeted and 
personalised way. Lucy Fildes, who was involved in this work, defended the new 
methods as worthwhile both because of their benefits to the welfare of the child and for 
the good of society in general. She contended that excluding children from education 
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because they could not learn in the standard way in effect excluded them from society, 
leading to both low intelligence scores later and potentially to crime, as children turned 
their energies to ‘often less legitimate employments’ (11). As well as constituting 
preventative measures against delinquency, the benefit to children who had committed 
petty crimes was the hope that they could be reconsidered in light of their newly 
articulated, better defined learning disabilities, providing a more manageable framework 
for education and rehabilitation than the unspecific, pessimistic category of ‘feeble-
minded’. 
 In sympathy with the rehabilitative projects with which Le Mesurier was 
involved, preventative institutions aimed to alter the development of troublesome youths 
before they found themselves in serious trouble. The benefit of training in skills such as 
weaving and carpentry was promoted in governmental pamphlets and guides such as 
Child Training Through Occupation authored by Lucy Bone and Marie E. Lane in 1923. 
The Stoke Lyle Institution was opened in 1920 to give seemingly uneducable boys the 
opportunity to learn skills such as music and gardening. Described in Studies in Mental 
Inefficiency as a private house with a ‘good garden,’ a report boasts that pupils took to 
music enthusiastically, and that one misbehaving boy previously sent to a Workhouse by 
his despairing parents was ‘now quiet and obedient’ (“News and Notes” 13-4). In this 
and other similar reports, the institutions do not claim to have made the boys quiescent 
with force and threat, but to have used methods sensitive to individual psychologies to 
normalise their behaviour, having abandoned the notion of an inevitable descent into 
crime and concentrated instead on each pupil’s strengths. Whether abuses of power took 
place within such institutions is an issue for a different study; certainly, differing 
perceptions of the realities of rehabilitative institutions for young offenders are 
considered in Gladys Mitchell’s When Last I Died.  
 
Psychological Rehabilitation 
While few commentators were willing to credit crime as entirely the product of 
environmental influences, the connection between individual psychological constitution 
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and familial and social environment defined the approach of more progressive 
practitioners, foremost of which was educational psychologist Cyril Burt. Burt 
approached the young offender as an individual psychological case to be analysed in 
their entirety. Information concerning the health, physical condition, habits, interests, 
emotions, and temperament of the offender should be collected and considered in the 
context of class, family circumstance and environment. Intelligence is still a major 
consideration to Burt, being part of the child’s personality, but the child’s reason for 
committing crimes cannot be inferred from it alone. Rather, a complete understanding of  
the conditions in which the child was placed in relation to his/her character is essential: 
‘the two together yield a synoptic view of the situation at the moment, with all its inner 
and outer components’ (Burt 8).  
 Burt’s involvement in the British Eugenics Society, as well as the compelling 
claims against him for falsifying data on the inheritability of intelligence (see Joynson; 
Mackintosh passim), have to be matched against his more positive work in helping to 
establish the London Child Guidance Clinic in Islington in 1927 (Hearnshaw 44). While 
he held morally troublesome views on the reproductive rights of mental defectives, when 
a child was diagnosed as such he favoured guidance over incarceration and individual 
study over typecasting. Each crime, Burt asserted, could be understood as the 
consequence of a unique sequence of events, of ‘all the antecedent influences that have 
been making, moulding, perhaps marring the young offender, day by day and year after, 
from the first instant when he was still a single cell within his mother’s womb,’ (Burt 9). 
The 1913 Mental Deficiency Act’s specification that the moral deficient must have 
exhibited their vicious tendencies from an early age is made meaningless when the 
individual is viewed as the product of countless influences since inception. Displaying 
similar tendencies to Hamblin Smith, the onus of responsibility is taken from the 
individual offender and distributed upon society, genetics, mentality and the family, with 
the result that blame is almost entirely dispersed, and Burt’s attention turns to the more 




Healthy, Normal, Vicious 
In attempts to determine a positive science of criminality and to define the individual 
offender as a recognisable subject, what was often neglected was the consideration that it 
was perfectly normal for children to act viciously. Competing explanations were offered 
to account for outbursts of violent emotions, but as Le Mesurier contended, ‘mere 
childish naughtiness, youth’s natural reaction of revolt against authority’ (6) could 
perhaps account for much of what was considered criminal behaviour. Tredgold was not 
alone in treating the movement from childhood to maturity as a microcosm of human 
evolution, with childhood corresponding to the primitive stage of humanity, complete 
with violent instincts and insufficient reason (335). Even Havelock Ellis, writing in the 
mould of Lombroso, allows for such a possibility when he quotes one teacher’s 
reflections on his childhood experience: 
I know that between the ages of eleven and fifteen I was totally devoid of 
affection, passionately revengeful, and capable of acts that I should recoil 
from now with horror ... and – from observations I have since made as a 
teacher, I am inclined to suppose that most boys of that age are. Amongst 
other little fantasies, I broke a cat’s leg with a cricket-bat, and afterwards 
battered its head in; and, when an apprentice in a draper’s shop, I turned on 
all the gas in the warehouse with the idea of blowing up the establishment, by 
way of revenge for an unfair fine. (384) 
The teacher’s misdemeanours are no less shocking (or are even more so) than those 
recounted and diagnosed by Tredgold as cases of moral defectiveness. Ellis goes on to 
assert: ‘Most children have some criminal impulses, and most people can recall from 
their own childhood acts which, however trivial, were still criminal in nature’ (384). 
Ellis concludes that ‘there can be no doubt that such a germinal tendency to “moral 
insanity” and criminality exists in children’ (384). The possibility that it was normal to 
have vicious impulses was, however, not adequately theorised in any of the works listed. 
While Freud’s of theories of ambivalence, the death drive, the fantasy life of neurotics 
and the compelling nature of taboo locate the enigma of criminality in unconscious 
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mental life and its conflict with social laws, Freud is not a central figure in this account. 
Christie’s and Mitchell’s approaches to child delinquency are chiefly influenced by 
debates concerning inborn moral deficiency and domesticated rehabilitation influenced 
by Le Mesurier, respectively.  
 
Agatha Christie, Crooked House (1949) 
Although few commentators publically condoned the execution of incurable offenders, 
the possible extreme that such a position could reach lurks in many accounts. In Agatha 
Christie’s Crooked House (1946) the murderer is a child, Josephine Leonides, who 
poisons her grandfather and her nurse, intentionally incriminates other members of her 
family and plans to attack her parents if she doesn’t get her way. That the random, 
terrifying and prolonged assault upon inhabitants of the Leonides’ rambling mansion is a 
delightful game to Josephine is revealed in her diary, in which she gleefully boasts about 
her ingenuous crimes and plans future strategies against the adults who refuse her 
childish demands. When her aunt discovers the diary, rather than allow her young niece 
to suffer punishment, she writes a note falsely confessing to the murders herself and 
takes Josephine on a car journey, intentionally crashing the car and killing them both. 
She justifies her actions out of love for Josephine, because she did not want her young 
niece to be punished or put into an asylum. The rest of the family are in agreement, and 
express their love for Josephine in spite of her crimes, because they believe her 
immorality is the consequence of an inborn deficiency rather than wickedness: ‘You do 
not like anyone less because they have tuberculosis or some other fatal disease. ... She 
had been born with a kink’ (191). 
 The assertion that delinquent children are born with a kink was specifically 
criticised by Le Mesurier, both because it is based upon the belief that criminality is 
predetermined and organic, and because it implies that the prospect of recovery, reform, 
or future happiness for young offenders is futile. This is indeed the stance that Crooked 
House takes in presenting Josephine as not only a child with a kink, but a veritable moral 
imbecile, the most devious and fantastical category of criminal aments isolated by 
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Tredgold as a social threat. She is described as extraordinarily intelligent for her age, and 
lacking in morality: ‘with her precocious mental development had gone a retarded moral 
sense’ (189). As Le Mesurier predicted, when a child is believed to have a kink, it is 
decided that ‘there is nothing to be done about it than to put them away’ (50). 
Eugenicists and educationists debated the benefits and shortcoming of segregation and 
sterilisation of young criminals, while others suggested drugging and experimentation.
13
 
In the quotation below, the family reflect upon Josephine’s death: 
 “If – she had lived – what would have happened?” 
“I suppose she would have been sent to a reformatory or a special school. Later 
she would have been released – or possibly certified, I don’t know.” 
 Sophia shuddered. 
 “It’s better the way it is.” (191) 
Josephine’s assisted suicide – or it may be called murder – is condoned by her family, 
and in numerous ways it is a problematic solution. Although the detective does not have 
to take responsibility for punishing the killer, the novel’s rejection of the legal and 
governmental care system – to which death is preferable – is both entire and, 
worryingly, not interrogated at the novel’s close. 
Crooked House is both bleak and socially conservative in regards to its 
representation of the child criminal. It is also highly troubling in its assessment of the 
hereditary nature of criminality, as the racial and class prejudices which were often 
operative in assignments of born criminality are emphasised in discussions of 
Josephine’s origins. Her grandfather Aristide is Greek, from a working class family, and 
became extremely wealthy through questionable business practices. Josephine, the 
youngest of five of Aristide’s descendants, is described as his heir proper, having 
inherited his looks – they are both described as ugly and small – as well as his cunning 
and his lack of moral inhibitions. In his lifetime, her grandfather reined in his 
supposedly natural criminal tendencies, instead channelling them into canny, often 
fraudulent and dishonest commercial practice. Josephine, who has inherited both his 
                                                 
13
 See the ripostes to a sequence of letters in the Morning Post on the theme of ‘The Purity of the Race’ in 
“A Question of Sterilisation.” 
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mental capacities and moral indifference, is limited within the domestic spheres of 
femininity and nursery-bound childhood, and so we see her hatching devious plans and 
performing malevolent acts within this circumscribed universe, with none of the 
opportunities for material gain, enterprise or power through trade which motivated her 
grandfather. However, while it may be interesting to suggest that Josephine, like many of 
the juvenile delinquents whose lives were recorded by interwar criminologists, turned to 
crime because of a poverty of more worthwhile goals to pursue, this is not the emphasis 
of the novel. Rather, heredity and its overpowering legacy moulds Josephine’s character 
and makes her fate appear inevitable.  
In its confirmation of inheritance, its hopeless stance towards the child killer, and 
its indifference to social influence, Crooked House is a socially conservative narrative. It  
overlaps uncomfortably with interwar positive criminology, eugenics and, in the post-
Second World War context, with Nazi medical killings in the name of ‘racial hygiene’. 
The fact that the insane, the mentally deficient, and those suffering from brain damage 
were condemned by Nazi doctors versed in the language of genetics and degeneration 
(Lifton 47), could hardly be ignored in the post-war years. However, the representation 
of the charitable, almost heroic, euthanasia of the criminal ament Josephine reveals the 
appeal of this residual ideology in spite of, and in absence of any serious examination of, 
its role in the catastrophic events in Europe of which Christie and her readership should 
have been all too aware.  
 
Gladys Mitchell, When Last I Died  (1941) 
Mitchell’s novel also features child offenders, but unlike the wealthy Josephine, 
Mitchell’s boys are generally poor, abused, and neglected, and are never treated as latent 
master criminals nor as ingenious moral imbeciles. Mitchell’s choice to depict 
institutionalised child offenders therefore marks a shift from the genre’s more 
conventional consideration of complex crimes perpetrated in singularity by motivated 
and well-concealed murderers. Child delinquents constitute, in narrative terms, a 
mundane manifestation of criminal activity, but it is for just this reason that they feature 
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so centrally in the novel. By analysing offenders treated commonly as a social and 
biological other, and in the crime genre as quite different from the plotting criminal 
paradigmatic of the golden age crime novel, Mitchell provides a place from which to 
critique the reduction of supposedly undesirable individuals to type, denying them their 
right to singularity and the dignity of psychological reconstruction reserved for the 
killer/protagonist. In doing so, she demonstrates her sympathy with writers such as Le 
Mesurier and Burt who used affective understanding of the criminal as a practise of 
rehabilitation. 
 A description of the novel’s complex storyline cannot make immediately 
apparent how central to the plot is the question: why do people, especially children, 
commit crimes? It is necessary, however, to outline its main details. Having been called 
in to a boys’ reformatory school to help in the search for two escaped inmates, Bradley 
sets about trying to solve an unresolved mystery: the disappearance of two escaped boys 
– Piggy and Alec – six years previously. Her only evidence is a discarded diary 
supposedly composed by Bella Foxley, the Institution’s cook at the time of the escape. 
Reading the diary, Bradley notices a connection between the boys’ disappearance and a 
mysterious sequence of crimes in Bella’s own life. The details reconstructed from the 
diary and the recollections of a Foxley family servant run as follows: after the suspicious 
death of her elderly Aunt Flora, who died choking on a meal which Bella may have 
prepared, Bella inherited some money and was therefore able to leave her detested job at 
the Institution. Initially, she went to stay with her cousin Tom and his wife Muriel, who 
earned an unconventional income recording ghostly phenomenon in supposedly haunted 
houses and writing up reports for occult periodicals. At the time Bella went to stay with 
them, the couple were residing in a house with unusually high poltergeist activity. This 
was an impressive draw for paying séance visitors, but also a danger: when Tom fell 
from a second floor window, injuring himself, the spirits were blamed. A few days later, 
when Tom fell once again, this time to his death, his hysterical wife Muriel accused 
Bella of murdering him. Although arrested for murder, Bella was acquitted at trial (in no 
small part due to the spite of Muriel’s testimony against her, which to the jury seemed 
154 
 
biased). Bella then retired to live with her depressive sister Tessa in small village, but 
within the year Bella’s body was found floating in a pond, the assumption being that she 
had committed suicide, perhaps because of the guilt she felt for the murders of Tom and 
Aunt Flora.  
 The story, as it is so established, involves Bella, Muriel and Tom, while the 
deaths to be investigated are those of Aunt Flora, Tom and finally Bella. The initial 
impetus for uncovering this mystery – the disappearance of Piggy and Alec from the 
Institution – is treated for much of the novel as a mere bridging device to the Foxley 
mystery. The mystery of the boys is abruptly put aside as individuals who fit the more 
traditional golden age focus – middle class adults in a social group divided by sexual 
tensions and acquisitive financial imperatives – take centre stage. This narrative 
suppression of Piggy’s and Alec’s fate does not last, however, as the detective’s focus 
shifts back to the boys towards the novel’s close. Indeed, their disappearance is not mere 
subplot, but is an unacknowledged key to all the other mysteries considered in the novel. 
Under Bradley’s scrutiny, the supernatural occurrences in the haunted house are firmly 
attributed to human agency, as she proves the very physical spirit manifestations were 
caused by the escaped boys themselves. Bella assisted in their escape and then colluded 
with Muriel and Tom to hide them in the house, a part-refuge, part-job situation which to 
the boys came to feel more and more like imprisonment. Installed in the house’s many 
secret passageways and cavities, the boys became increasingly frustrated with their 
situation, leading them to push Tom from the window at the first opportunity. At this 
point, they were locked up by Bella and Muriel in the house’s cellar, so that when Tom 
fell from the window for the second time, they could not have been responsible. 
Imprisoned, abused, starved and eventually suffocated in the muddy ground of the 
ancient cellar, their murders are the unarticulated crimes which connect and make sense 
of all the novels’ other mysteries. Having discovered their bodies, Bradley is able to 
prove that, while Bella helped Muriel imprison the boys and knew that they had no food, 
it was Muriel who actually smothered them. Muriel is also responsible for the murder of 
Aunt Flora – which she committed to incriminate Bella and make her vulnerable to 
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blackmail – and Tom, whom she killed out of jealousy, hoping that Bella would be 
suspected of the killing (the police knowing nothing of the boys). Muriel emerges as a 
ruthless and unstable character, and Bella herself is discovered still alive and living 
under the assumed identity of her dead sister, Tessa. The assumption that Bella murdered 
Tessa is proved untrue: Tessa indeed committed suicide and Bella assumed Tessa’s 
identity in order to escape the persecutions of Muriel. At the novels’ close, Muriel is 
tempted back into the haunted house and is worked into a state of terror by the ghostly 
phenomena simulated by Bradley, causing her to confess to her attempts to send Bella to 
prison for the murder of the boys, as well as role in Tom’s and Aunt Flora’s deaths.  
  
Bradley’s Approach  
Bradley is brought in to look for the escaped boys because it is thought that, as a 
psychologist, she will be able to ascertain from the other boys where they might be 
hiding.
14
 Thus, from the opening, she is placed in a sympathetic role and trusted to 
interpret the private mental states of young offenders which baffle their official 
guardians. She is also posed at odds with the contemporary government, who 
with one of those grandmotherly inspirations which are the dread and bane 
of progressive educationalists, had decreed, some ten years previously, that 
its theories with regard to the preventive detention of delinquent children 
were a long way out of date, and were to be re-stated in accordance with 
the facts so far gleaned by child-guidance clinics. (8) 
Policy is influenced by current psychological research, but in ways that fail to 
acknowledge the diversity of contemporary discourse, or to tackle the deep-rooted 
problems with the system. Superficially adopting progressive practices without 
subscribing to the ideology which underlies them, the Institution is represented as 
spasmodically implementing reformist policies whilst permitting prejudices inherited 
from previous thought-systems to shape the treatment of the boys, thereby contributing 
to abuses. The changes the Institution has made are merely cynically adopted, 
                                                 
14 The method she uses is word association (Mitchell 13). 
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confirming the doubts of the progressives and failing the inmates, as the narrator 
sardonically notes: 
in spite of humane treatment, fewer punishments, better food and the 
provision of playing fields, bad boys, on the whole, continued to be bad, 
and even attempted, more frequently than could be justified, to escape 
from Elysium – in other words, the Institution – into the wicked and 
troubled world. (9) 
The incorrigible behaviour of the bad boys recalls the 1913 Act’s definition of the moral 
defective, on whom punishment has had little or no deterrent effect, but the novel’s 
intention is to counter such a view. As the renaming of the Institution as Elysium 
suggests, what is being questioned are the merits of institutionalisation itself. If the 
world outside is persistently depicted as troubled and wicked, and life within the 
Institution desirable, is it therefore surprising that juvenile delinquents found themselves 
unable to integrate into society on their release, and frequently re-offended? Bradley’s 
interchange with the Warden suggests as much:  
“ … they’re here for a punishment, you know.” 
 “I am afraid so, yes. A terribly immoral state of affairs.” 
“And for guidance as well; and for the protection of society.” 
“I know. If I were a caged tiger, do you know the people who would have 
to be protected against me if ever I made my escape?” 
“Yes, yes, all very well. I admit these boys have a grievance against society. 
But what can we do?” (15) 
It is the fact of imprisonment, however comfortable the surroundings, that makes the 
boys want to escape, according to Bradley. The institutional context is seen, not as a 
solution, but as another environment likely to have a negative effect on the boys’ 
behaviour and outlook. To remedy the problem, Bradley offers to take small groups of 
boys away from the Institution on a seaside holiday under her instruction (15). This 
experiment, which the Warden treats as eccentric and dangerous, is as much an attempt 
to provide a more attractive location as to give the boys individual guidance and 
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attention. Also, as security in her seaside cottage would be minimal, they would be 
trusted with an unprecedented degree of autonomy. Escape would always be possible, 
but Bradley’s experiment is predicated upon the boys being encouraged to stay and 
improve their behaviour themselves rather than through discipline and the threat of 
punishment. Her suggestion that the inspirational model of athletes might help the boys 
give up their addiction to tobacco follows the same logic. She is so insistently opposed 
to punishment that she would rather cigarettes were offered as a prize for good 
behaviour than the boys be reprimanded for smoking them (12). Making changes of 
behaviour seem sensible and desirable to the boys is at the heart of this approach. As 
crime may be seen as self-defence against difficult circumstances, so the boys will only 
alter their behaviour if they know they will not suffer as a result. The example of the 
cigarettes also necessitates that those set up to judge the boys exercise empathy, a trait 
curiously lacking in many accounts of the treatment of child offenders. When the 
Warden claims that it would be unfair to ask the staff to quit smoking, Bradley notes her 
interest ‘in a system which regarded the powers of self-denial of the staff as being 
inferior to those of the boys’ (12). This view is consistent with an approach which does 
not view young offenders as a category apart from the norm and judge them as 
persistently wicked, but rather as flawed as any other individual.  
 Bradley’s experiment combines an approach which prioritises the influence of 
environment over inborn tendencies. It also contributes to the novel’s positive portrayal 
of domestic care. Imagined as a utopian place of security and nourishing emotional 
attachments, the contrast between the Institution and Bradley’s cottage contributes to the 
novel’s emphasis upon environmental influences upon individual behaviour, and the 
need for rehabilitation sensitive to children’s needs. The cottage provides security and 
responsibility, as well as autonomy, with the sense of attachment and belonging the boys 
feel ensuring they make no attempts to escape, in spite of the lack of safeguards. Treated 
as individuals rather than case-studies in an agglomerated prison population, they are 
also regarded as children, meaning that they cease to act in the ways prescribed to them 
as criminals and delinquents. They are also treated fairly and spared the petty injustices 
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of the Institution, meaning that in turn, they treat their carers with mutual respect. The 
environment is seen to provide a space and a role for the individual, which moulds their 
character and defines their behaviour, making the transformation of subjectivity entirely 
possible.  
 The theme of nourishment is imperative, and is central to the novels’ emphasis 
upon environmental influence over inborn nature in the pursuit of the origins of crime. 
When Bradley first visits the Institution, she witnesses the boys hastily consuming 
starchy, unwholesome foods. Dietary nourishment stands for nurture, and after eating 
this unsatisfactory meal, the boys retain a ‘wolfish aspect’ (7). Their aggressive 
demeanour is contrasted with that of Bradley’s impeccably behaved nephew Derek (16), 
who, rather than being an inherently good boy, is better nourished both physically and 
emotionally. Bella, the Institution’s cook, is also a representative of bad care. She is 
accused of presenting Aunt Flora with the fatal meal of the indigestible grated carrot, 
and in her role in the Institution is suspected by the boys of making dumplings with 
screwed-up pellets of paper – just one of the ever more disgusting objects the boys 
(somewhat unjustly) claim to have found in their dinner, until they are forced to stop 
making complaints through threats of violence (34-5). Bella’s role in the escape of the 
two boys and their eventual starvation makes poor nourishment and the absence of 
domestic care central to the boys’ fates. Burt advised criminologists to attend  
to all the antecedent influences that have been making, moulding, perhaps 
marring the young offender, day by day and year after, from the first instant 
when he was still a single cell within his mother’s womb (9) 
 and it is exactly in the spirit that Mitchell portrays nourishment. Constituting 
another environmental factor detrimental to their development, it is held to be 
responsible for their bad behaviour.  
In contrast, the results of Bradley’s country cottage experiment emphasise that a 
change of environment, individualised treatment and good nourishment can affect the 
change in behaviour which determinists such as Tredgold believed to be impossible. 
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Towards the novel’s close, the elderly housekeeper Eliza, who has been taking care of 
groups of boys on holiday from the institution, relates: 
Tried their hand at jam-making, I declare, they did, with me to tell ‘em what 
to do. Made a fair hand at it, too, and pleased as Punch with it, time they got 
it into pots. Laugh! I thought I should have died to see boys so solemn-like 
over picking the fruit and then picking it over, and stirring the pans and all 
that. (142) 
Following a catalogue of negative opinions and representations of the boys’ inherent 
wickedness, the positive results of Bradley’s domestic cure are charming, even 
intentionally comical. This is light-heartedness, however, and not satire; the therapeutic 
exercise of making jam is presented as a realistically positive image of useful instruction 
and integration into a supportive environment which it is inferred has previously been 
lacking in their upbringing. In a wider sense, a simple but useful task completed under 
minimal supervision has the capacity to momentarily reform the boys, recalling the 
approach of the Stoke Lyle institution, as well as Le Mesurier’s insistence that frequently 
crime is caused by misdirected energies: making jam gives the boys the sense of pride 
and satisfaction for being good at something, a feeling they may have not had before, or 
may have had only after committing a crime successfully. Despite the Warden’s early 
horror at the idea of the boys being under-supervised, the only crime they commit while 
on the holiday is stealing a farmer’s chicken (142). In Tredgold’s account of moral 
defectiveness, acts of meaningless cruelty including the torture of animals is noted as 
common. The boys, instead, cook and eat the chicken: an act of at least constructive 
mischief. 
 Contemporary educationalists expressed comparable views, both in the 
establishment of institutions such as Stoke Lyle and in writing. In “Individual Studies” 
(1920), for example, Fildes expresses the importance of flexible, individualised learning 
and urges schools to ‘try to adapt the methods of teaching to the needs of the child’ (10) 
as a means of averting delinquency. The impoverishment of early education was, in 
Fildes’ view, responsible for alienating children from society and stunting their 
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development. Children who could not learn in a regular way were often dismissed from 
classes and classified as feeble-minded, when alternative teaching methods could have 
induced them to keep up with their peers or develop other skills. Bradley’s affinity for 
more progressive educational approaches resembling Fildes’ is suggested in her earliest 
interactions with the boys: ‘She thought they needed stimulating, and applied 
psychological treatment, to their astonishment and her own amusement. She discovered 
very soon that they were afraid of her’ (Mitchell 13). It is quite typical of Mitchell’s 
humour to describe Bradley as terrifying. Still, it is astonishing that an elderly, badly-
dressed and eccentric woman could instil fear in the Institution’s dangerous characters – 
who, as local legends have it, have almost kicked an instructor to death (27), bit an 
instructor’s hand so severely that it turned septic (29), and collectively, having escaped, 
have ‘robbed hen-roosts, half-murdered an old woman and held up a village post-office’ 
(26). The boys’ new-found reverence appears to support Fildes’ position, as an 
alternative approach astonishes the boys themselves and enables Bradley to 
communicate with them where others have alienated them further. This theme is further 
developed in an interchange between the Warden and two misbehaving boys named 
Dinnie and Canvey. Using interruptions and asides, Bradley mocks and criticises the 
Warden for pretending not to understand the boys’ excuses for their misbehaviour in 
order to make them look like fools (10), and for making personal enquiries about their 
health in public, without considering that this might ‘prove embarrassing and even 
disagreeable’ to them (11). In an attempt to shore up his own power within the 
Institution, the Warden is contributing to the boys’ sense of exclusion and bitterness; he 
fuses all his interactions with them with a ‘combination of bullying and weakness’ (10) 
rather than providing intellectual stimulation and camaraderie, which, as Bradley 
demonstrates, can achieve what meaningless, brute discipline cannot. 
 There is, however, an instance in which Bradley’s feelings are less clear. This is 
when she contends that:  
delinquent children, who, like delinquent adults, can be divided into those 
brands which can be snatched from the burning and those which, 
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unfortunately, cannot, should (literally) be killed or cured. This former 
treatment was to be painless, the latter drastic. (8) 
Even when Mitchell’s frequently flippant and highly ironic paraphrasing of Bradley’s 
speech and actions are taken into account, Bradley’s words seem extraordinary. At worst, 
her statement brings her into alignment with the views of eugenicists, at best, it 
ostensibly supports the pessimistic conclusions of Tredgold and others concerning the 
incarceration of moral imbeciles. 
 Thankfully, no child characters are determined by Bradley to be incurable, 
neither does she judge any other characters fit to be killed, except of course the 
murderer, in the sense that Muriel’s conviction is as good as a death sentence. That being 
cured is offered alongside killing as a final solution for delinquency could, perhaps, be 
seen in a positive light based on this fact alone, and in accordance with an optimistic 
attitude to rehabilitation. Who  is beyond a drastic cure enacted by the ever-competent 
Mrs Bradley? Similarly, her description of killing as painless and curing as drastic is also 
suggestive. Is the simplicity of the first method what makes it attractive to certain 
practitioners, as opposed to the time-consuming, expensive and methodically contested 
process of rehabilitation? The other alternatives to this drastic solution so far discussed 
give a truer sense of Bradley’s and the text’s attitudes to the problem of juvenile 
delinquency.  
  
Analysing the Boys 
By juxtaposing contrasting explanations of the causes of delinquency with accounts of 
the boys which humanise or dehumanise them, the text invites critiques of the validity 
and worth of different accounts of crime. Commentary upon the appearances of two 
boys – Dinnie and Canvay – reference positivist criminology’s reduction of individuals 
to types which determined their behaviour through attention to their physical 
appearance: 
[Dinnie’s] brows slanted in an alarmingly Mephistophelean manner, and 
he had a wide mouth set in a grim jaw. The Americans, with their flair for 
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good-humoured expressiveness, would have dubbed him a tough citizen. 
(8) 
The validity of this response to the criminal is then undermined through 
contradictory commentary upon another boy’s internal emotional states and 
psychological processes: 
Canvey was a rat-faced boy with handsome, wide-open eyes, affording a 
strange impression of cunning and frankness mingled. Call the cunning 
lack of self-confidence, and the frankness an attempt, probably an 
unconscious one, to compensate for this, and you had a different portrait 
of the boy, and not necessarily a less faithful one. (11) 
The former excerpt is a standard, if colloquial, application of Lombroso, relying on a 
subjective impression, popular ideas of criminal types, attention to the line of the jaw, 
and a humorous Gothic touch. The second description also contains assumptions about 
character based upon physical features, but here Bradley reads against first impressions 
to reinterpret the signs otherwise superficially deciphered in the boy’s face and 
expression. The scientific bias of so-called criminal anthropology is parodied and its 
subjective and irrational component exposed, in a manner shared by Le Mesurier, who 
provides an excellent critique of how people fused their ‘natural instinctive feelings, 
with a vague inaccurate knowledge of the doctrines of Lombroso and his school’ when 
making such judgements (Le Mesurier 28). Bradley’s rejection of a subjective 
interpretation of physical features enables her more accurately to interpret Canvey’s 
cunning for diffidence and his frankness as a defence mechanism. Although this does not 
necessarily make him a better boy, it certainly calls for different treatment than the threat 
of violence and thundering voice employed by the Warden against these supposedly 
wicked born criminals. Bradley’s use of psychology, then, does not claim that physical 
signs cannot give insight to character, but suggests that interpreters should be cautious in 
deciphering them, as they may read them incorrectly, or forget that these signs can be 




 Psychiatric practices, far from being promoted as an infallible science, are shown 
to be open to exploitation, misunderstanding and conscious or unconscious bias. The 
ambivalence of psychiatric language as it is employed to describe young offenders is, in 
the same spirit, held up to scrutiny. In this excerpt, Bradley is amused by the 
forthrightness of one distrustful boy: ‘One even went so far as to ask whether she was 
there to pick out the “mentals”. “We are all ‘mentals,’ my poor child,” she remarked’ 
(13). In the sense the boy uses it, the term ‘mentals’ refers both to the mentally deficient 
and to abnormal mental states, perhaps full paralysis or insanity. In her response, 
Bradley refers to both this corrupted, pejorative sense, and to the more neutral meaning 
of individual psychological organisation, or mental processes. She can, of course, state 
that we are all mentals in the latter sense. However, it is precisely because she is a 
Freudian that she sees the former, pathological meaning of the word at work in one and 
all. To Mitchell’s psychoanalytic detective, every individual is a potential object of study 
– people do not become mental cases only when they are mentally ill. Tansley, who has 
been quoted previously, states that ‘the mental factors which produce the characteristic 
behaviour of the neurotic and the lunatic are at work in the ‘normal’ mind and give rise 
to many well-known traits of “normal” behaviour’
 
(Tansley 6). Likewise to Mitchell, 
neurotic conditions are seen as the consequence of failed repression and misdirected 
libidinal energies, and inherited mental ‘kinks’ play less of a role than events in psychic 
development, meaning that pathologies of mental health could be experienced by anyone 
to different degrees of intensity. 
 Perhaps Bradley is proposing that psychoanalysis could better explicate the boys’ 
conditions than the variety of means available to test them for moral and mental 
deficiencies. As no children are analysed in When Last I Died (unlike in Mitchell’s The 
Saltmarsh Murders or St Peter’s Finger) it is impossible to say for certain. The use of 
jam making as a therapy may imply that nothing so drastic as analysis is necessary in 
their cases, that they are mentally sound and responding in a natural way to the 
environment of the Institution. What is clear is that Bradley refutes the division of 
individuals into the categories of normal and mental. This approach, while sympathetic 
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to Le Mesurier’s concern about the morbid assumptions that young offenders are all 
feeble-minded or pathological, is clearly at odds with the imperative for criminal 
categorisation during the 1920s to the early 1940s. The boy’s question to Bradley, seen 
in light of the exhaustive statistics collected from young offenders institutions after 
Goring, is more poignant than audacious. It vicariously expresses the anxiety felt by 
subjects of such studies concerning their isolation as an undesirable mental type and the 
appropriation and institutionalising of their identity by means of specialist knowledge.  
 
Beyond Hope 
Not all of the characters who pass judgement upon the boys are as humane or astute in 
their evaluations as  Bradley. As well as documenting events, Bella’s journal includes 
many reflections upon the boys, which equivocate between condemnation of and 
identification with them. At one point, the journal states: 
What hideous little faces they all have. It is nonsense to say …  that 
criminals are made and not born. These boys were predestined to crime, and 
no psychologist or educationalist is going to persuade me otherwise ... Most 
of them are going to be in prison a year after we let them out of here. (25) 
This excerpt conforms in all respects to a determinist view of criminal predispositions, 
but its placement is a red herring. The journal is a false document, and was not been 
written by Bella at all. Tom authored the journal under Bella’s name and filled it with 
false details and suspicious entries. This was in order to incriminate Bella in the death of 
Aunt Flora – which Tom and Muriel planned together (207) – should anyone find the 
diary during the enquiry. The negative views expressed about the boys by the narrator of 
the journal are attempts to portray Bella as capable of extreme cruelty and bitter owing 
to her unhappy years at the Institution, therefore capable of killing Aunt Flora for her 
legacy. As well as expressing loathing for the boys, ‘Bella’ also writes:  
They are nice boys and I hope they will not be caught. Piggy’s little sister 
was a horrid child, he says … Alec is a merry little boy … There is no harm 
in this boy. Thieves can be as honest as anybody else along their own lines, 
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and it is all nonsense for William to think that boys like these can be 
reformed, or that the world would be a better place if they were. (27-8) 
Tom is attempting to construct her as a criminal, so a sympathy with criminal 
motivations supports the later, oblique, suggestion, that it would be right to kill Aunt 
Flora in order to inherit her money and have a comfortable life after years of hardship. 
The claims that Piggy’s infant sister, whom he pushed out of a window, was horrid, and 
that the world would be no better without criminals, are means to justify criminal acts in 
the context of an unjust and unsavoury world, which Tom is leading the reader to believe 
that ‘Bella’ feels it is. Once again, the question of reformation is raised, and the only 
consistency with this excerpt and the previous, spiteful, account is that in both the boys 
are judged to be beyond cure, a view emphasised in the following gruesome excerpt:  
Denny has a poison bottle in which he places butterflies … And what a good 
thing it would be if this institution were one gigantic bottle into which we 
could drop the boys, one by one. ... A little struggling and choking, a 
fluttering of helpless limbs, and then – a perfect specimen of young criminal 
ready to be preserved, dissected, lectured upon and buried, according to his 
uses as an anatomical, biological or psychological specimen. (25) 
While the exhibition of criminal anatomy, head casts and the use of mug shots in 
criminological writings were commonplace in nineteenth century and turn of the century 
writing, this would have both an anachronistic and a controversial statement to make in 
the early 1940s. Such views of criminal predisposition were still within living memory 
(they were a point of resistance for educationalists) and as this excerpt demonstrates, a 
charged and residual element of contemporary culture (R. Williams, Marxism and 
Literature 122). Written in a private journal, the implication is that, although such values 
and judgements have been outlawed in public, they are deeply felt in private and stolidly 
resistant to more progressive voices. Of course, the diary is disingenuous, Bella has not 
written it at all, but still the text resists the easy dismissal of these views as tactical 
character assassination. Young offenders are treated as specimens with a lesser right to 
life and care, and negative and dehumanising views on them infuse the novel. ‘Bella’s’ 
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fantasy is even played out at the novel’s close, when the discovery of the semi-preserved 
remains of Piggy and Alec in the mud of the house’s basement gruesomely echoes the 
image of the killing jar established early on. In his pastiche of a reactionary view, Tom 
as writer of ‘Bella’ has come close to articulating the true contempt for young offenders 
privately felt by many of the novel’s characters. When she is confronted with the text, 
Bella denies being so explicit in her journal: ‘I never put any of my real opinions in that 
diary,’ she states, but admits, ‘I generally used to say what I thought, to one person and 
another’ (190). Bella is shocked not so much by the opinions that Tom has attributed to 
her, but by their forthright expression in text. Tom’s words are not so much a fabrication 
but potentially a proclamation of Bella’s tacit prejudice.  
 It is her prejudice against the boys that enables Muriel and Tom to manipulate 
her. Bella connives in the couple’s plans, helping the boys escape and establishing them 
in the haunted house, something she would never have done had they been ‘normal’ 
children. Bella is also easily convinced that it was the boys who pushed Tom to his death 
from the window. She believes them capable of anything, being ‘dangerous and 
criminally minded,’ (204) and because ‘one of the little devils had committed murder 
already’ (191).  
At this stage in the novel, Bella has been on trial twice for murders she did not 
commit. She might therefore recognise that in drawing such conclusions, she is denying 
the boys the right to a fair and unprejudiced trial, a right which has so far kept her from 
being convicted. As the text makes explicit, during Bella’s trial for the murder of Piggy 
and Alec, former suspicions against her for the murder of Tom and Aunt Flora, as well as 
her criminal act in assuming Tessa’s identity, are not mentioned in case they prejudice 
the jury. Indeed, in the lengthy section from the trial, events from the past are censored 
and Bella’s previous activities expunged from the court narrative, utterly altering the 
appearance of her actions (174). Without reference to the narrative in its entirety, the 
prosecution cannot prove why Bella might have wanted to kill the boys, or even make 
sense of her role in the crime, and so she is acquitted. While Bella (who is indeed 
guiltless of the boys’ murders) is protected by the tenets of a law that ensures crimes are 
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judged according to facts rather than prejudices, the boys’ guilt is assumed merely on the 
basis of their character and past misdemeanours.  
 When Bradley confronts Bella with details of Piggy’s and Alec’s deaths, Bella is 
surprised, but responds: ‘they’re better out of the world, two kids like that. What chance 
did they ever stand? Who’d give them a chance? Poor little wretches! Thieves and 
murderers before they’d hardly begun their lives at all’ (190). The combination of 
indifference and pity shows the effect of determinist accounts of young offenders, 
which, as Le Mesurier stated, allow people to ‘shrug their shoulders in a pitying way’ 
and assume ‘there is nothing to be done about it than to put them away’ (50). Worse 
even, it permits systemic maltreatment and violence, as assumptions about their 
incorrigible criminality lead Bella to assume that their right to life is of a lesser value 
than other, normal, individuals. This pessimistic prophecy is, however, proved false in 
the character of Larry. A former inmate of the Institution and friend of Piggy and Alex, 
he is called up in court as a witness against Bella. In the intervening years since Piggy 
and Alec’s escape, he has left the Institution and found a career in the Royal Navy. But, 
in spite of the new direction he has taken, and in spite of the ‘unshakeable’ evidence he 
gives in court, his former criminal associations prejudice the jury against him: ‘It was 
enough that he had been an inmate’ (174). This judgement seems especially perverse as 
Larry is one of the novel’s most morally sound and selfless characters. On being hunted 
down by Bradley to give evidence, he is somewhat embarrassed to be reminded of his 
youthful crimes, but this is ‘almost equalled by his desire to assist in tracking down the 
murderer’ (164). Although Larry knows that he will not be believed in court, and that 
public acknowledgement of his youthful crimes may prejudice his present role, he 
quickly agrees to assist, simply because: ‘They was good little chaps’ (164). As an 
embodiment of the potential for reform, he counters the view of Bella and others who 
perceived the boys as beyond hope. He also provides the first believable account of their 
attitudes and motivations, responding to Bradley’s enquiry about whether they intended 
to return to crime after escaping:  ‘I couldn’t say what ideas they got. Racing stables, 
more like, from what they said. I reckon they was the kind to go straight all right, give 
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‘em a chance, as long as it wasn’t too dull’ (165). The idea that such boys would be 
better out of the world, when compared with Larry’s experienced optimism, is revealed 
as both ignorant and open to abuse.  
 This danger is represented through the partial narrative suppression of the boys’ 
deaths. The disappearance of Piggy and Alec is framed at the outset as a corollary of the 
novel’s primary narrative, which concerns the deaths of Aunt Flora, Tom and 
Bella/Tessa. Bradley’s function as detective is to redress this narrative injustice and 
prove the boys’ presence in a mystery that is unsolved as long as they are considered 
absent. Their narrative neglect functions as a metaphor for abuse and is tacitly abusive: 
while the horrors of the haunted house evoke the fear of the unknown that detective 
fiction is founded upon, the discovery of the boys’ bodies in the house’s waterlogged 
cellar substitutes the gothic thrill of spirits with a genuine horror at human cruelty. 
Generic expectations are inverted as the truth is revealed as more horrific than the 
illusion, while the plot moves in a different direction to the standard golden age novel – 
faced with a mystery, it moves towards the discovery of bodies and a crime which would 
otherwise have been suppressed. The choice to depict poor and neglected young 
offenders in a genre typically concerned with more fantastical displays of individualistic 
and bourgeois criminality is unusual, and yet Bradley’s quest as detective is as much 
concerned with solving the Foxley mystery as with proving that the boys’ deaths are 
significant as deaths. In a novel that presents a conflict between fantastical fears and a 
more prosaic, yet humane, sense of reality, this balancing of narrative emphasis 
contributes to a move to re-humanise those individuals subject to dehumanising pseudo-









IV. ‘The Concealed Enemy of the Self’: 
Deviance and Dissociation 
 
Social insecurity, personal unease and anxiety about the identity of others have become 
key concerns in critical discussions of crime writing. The fears that haunt golden age 
crime writing concerning the self, ‘the solitary, perceiving, and interpreting locus of 
anything that can be called experience’ (Robinson 7), have been often remarked upon, 
but have yet to receive close critical focus. At the same time as modernist writers were 
engaged in dismantling the unitary, developmental self of Romantic literature, and 
fragmenting the heroic individualism of pre-War Imperialist British adventure stories, 
crime writers were offering representations of selfhood every bit as unpredictable and 
disobedient.  
 The ways in which crime fiction encouraged, probed and assuaged fears 
concerning selfhood for its readership are of considerable significance for studies in the 
form: they are especially pertinent to this study because crime writers engaged with 
contemporary psychology in order to explore the threat of personal deviance. 
Psychological conditions of insane automatism, dissociative fugue and post-epileptic 
seizure were used as powerful metaphors for self-dissociation, comparable with the 
neurotic characters who conveyed modernist subjectivity. Suspending the ‘solitary, 
perceiving, and interpreting locus’ (Robinson 7) and undermining the autonomy of the 
judging, thinking ‘I’, crime fiction’s unseating of the self-knowing Cartesian self at the 
core of stable identity altered the characteristics of, and the nature of the relationship 
between, the criminal and the detective.  
 While it is certainly true that the rise of psychoanalytic theories can be detected 
in writers’ association of the conscious self with the ego and of the deviant, concealed 
self with the unconscious, it is also true to say that these ideas were not absorbed into 
plots unproblematically. What, their novels ask, was the unconscious actually like? What 
drives and forces does the conscious self or ego master and contain, and what extremes 
of behaviour can be expected when unconsciousness is unleashed in insanity, 
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automatism or fugue? A contemporary fascination with epilepsy helped to complicate 
the question, as Freudian and physiological theorists battled to account for the meaning 
of the seizure, with the issue of responsibility and ‘knowing the nature of one’s acts’ ever 
relevant. These questions, which were drawn from, and fuelled by, popular discourses of 
insanity and press coverage of automatic killings, represent an accessible but critical 
form of engagement with problems of selfhood which were simultaneously 
preoccupying modernist writers.  
 
Deviant Selves and the Reader 
Stephen Knight’s discussion of psychological deviance in the crime novel suggests a 
theoretical point of departure for this chapter. In Form and Ideology in Crime Fiction, 
Knight asserts that crime fictions have been intrinsically concerned with controlling and 
consoling the anxieties of their readership in their particular historical moment of 
emergence. So too have diverse crime narratives worked to shore up ideologies at the 
moment at which they have become uncertain. A distrust of divine intervention in the 
criminal justice system is proposed by Knight as context for the insistence upon Godly 
endorsement of crime solving in the eighteenth century Newgate Calendar, while 
concerns about the limitations of rational and scientific enquiry in the late nineteenth 
century are seen as foundational to the enormous popularity of Conan Doyle’s forensic 
reasoner Sherlock Holmes. Discussing the original structural device of The Murder of 
Roger Ackroyd (1926), in which the first person narrator is revealed to be the murderer, 
Knight asserts that Christie enacts the fear ‘the respectable bourgeois held that disorder 
within society, threats against the self might be caused from within the charmed circle, 
and by someone who seemed most trustworthy’ (Form and Ideology 112). More 
unsettlingly, Knight suggests that the narrator’s use of  ‘I’ and the nearness of the reader 
to the narrator-killer calls upon fears about the concealed content of the mind. In Roger 
Ackroyd, the reader innocently inhabits the consciousness of the killer for the best part of 
the novel. This commitment, according to Knight, awakens ‘an awareness of possible 
deviance within the reader’s self’ (ibid.).  
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A likely source of this culturally specific fear can be located in contemporary 
psychoanalytic thought. As Neil Badmington has suggested, ‘to read Freud is to witness 
the waning of humanism’ because Freud’s thesis of unconscious impulses undermined 
the Cartesian model, in which ‘the critical determinant of being is rational, fully 
conscious thought’ (1). In Roger Ackroyd, the narrator’s voice overcomes the conscious 
defences of the reader, insinuating itself as a reliable, transparent voice and manipulating 
the reader’s perceptions of what takes place within the text. As Knight asserts, the reader 
experiences a sense of danger and personal threat at the novels’ dénouement, for which 
reason contemporary critics felt Christie had gone ‘outrageously far’ (Form and 
Ideology, 112) in her plotting. ‘This level of anxiety’ he states, ‘lurking beneath the more 
overt fear of a concealed enemy of the self, is touched sharply’ (ibid. 113).  
As the title of this chapter indicates, Knight’s term ‘the concealed enemy of the 
self’ is one that will be returned to throughout the ensuing discussion. In its original 
context, Knight uses it to refer to the unconscious, and proposes a dichotomy between 
the archetypal detective and the criminal shaped by the Freudian model of the mind. The 
criminal is seen to correspond to the deviant unconscious and the detective to the 
socialised, inhibiting super-ego. The detective’s task as ‘super-ego’ is the suppression of 
the hostile machinations of the criminal/id, a task which is eventually accomplished in 
Roger Ackroyd, but only after the reader’s dangerous identification with the narrator has 
taken place. Hercule Poirot triumphs as a competent detective of both the criminal and 
the deviant self, but the dénouement – related by the murderer in the form of a letter – 
suggests that the deviant part of the mind has triumphed as a final narrator of the self.   
Roger Ackroyd forms an interesting parallel with Christie’s The ABC Murders, a 
text which will receive closer attention below, because the wresting of authority from the 
detective in Roger Ackroyd’s act of self-narration is something the latter work resists. At 
stake in The ABC  Murders is the issue of whether the detective alone is able to uncover 
the secrets of the self, or whether a psychologist, through analysis, or the individual 
her/himself, through introspection, has more authoritative insight into the mysteries of 
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the mind. This dilemma of authority is at the centre of these texts’ treatments of personal 
deviance. 
   
‘The Concealed Enemy’? 
Freud describes the unconscious as ‘an aboriginal population in the mind’ composed of 
‘inherited mental formations’ (“The Unconscious” 195). Merging ideas of civilisation as 
the teleological evolution of humanity with fears of degeneracy, the unconscious is 
treated by Freud as both the originative site of primitive instincts, including sex and self-
preservation, and the place to which their expressions as desires and fantasies are sent if 
they are rejected by consciousness as too deviant, too socially prohibited. Accordingly, 
Knight’s reading relies upon a negative view of the unconscious, constituted by 
ambivalence, repressed desires and wayward libidinal attachments. The concealed 
enemy of the self, always yearning for representation, is a fearful thing, and its contents 
when they break out are unfamiliar and disturbing, even murderous. It is because of the 
shared conviction that the concealed self is deviant that the act of the detective in 
diagnosing, containing and punishing the criminal is supposed to provide reassurance. 
 As well as in the symbolic sense detailed above, crime novels articulate these 
fears in more corporeal forms, problematising, even challenging, the notion of the 
deviant unconscious itself. As an idea, the deviant self is certainly persistent in many 
texts, but so too do alternative models of the self and ideas about the content of the mind 
emerge. Cases of mental illness and cognitive disorientation help articulate challenges to 
the notion of a core, stable identity and a reliable, self-narrating ‘I’; however, the loss of 
consciousness or a stable sense of self does not necessarily release primitive, 
unconscious violence. Even in those novels in which deviant natures are revealed, the 
distinction between detective and criminal becomes less clear. This is especially the case 
in Christianna Brand’s Heads You Lose, in which an insane automaton performs the role 
of both detective and criminal, rocking between these roles in his state of mental unrest. 
The division of functions within the singular mind suggests a new way of thinking about 
literary externalisations of the super-ego and id in the pairing of detective and criminal. 
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Criminal motivation, no longer necessarily seen as a purely self-interested expression of 
‘evil’, is seen instead as a very mysterious thing, so mysterious that it was not 
necessarily known even to the criminal.  
 
Literary Selves : Self-Division  
The divided and concealed selves which feature in golden age crime writing can be 
situated within a rich literary, theological and intellectual tradition. The division between 
the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’ has been a central concern of Western philosophy, while the 
distinction between the spiritual and the material, the celestial and the pathological, has 
animated medical and philosophical debates between proponents of dualism and 
materialism, theologians and scientists. In folklore and myth, the figure of the double 
has been used as a means of articulating these concerns. The doppelgängers of German 
Märchen probe fears of a loss of authenticity and the dangerous power of the double to 
incriminate. Inspired by these tales, the figure of a concealed enemy within and of the 
self took on robust form in nineteenth century Gothic and Dark Romantic writing. Texts 
like James Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), in 
which a fatal tale of duelling brotherhood overlaps with a quasi-Faustian encounter 
between the desperate Robert and the diabolical Gil-Martin, look back to older Christian 
archetypes of good and evil: but as Dennis Brown suggests in Modernist Self, in many 
nineteenth-century double tales, ‘good and evil have become psychologised’ (4). To 
Brown, the double prefigures modernist notions of selfhood in proposing limitations to 
the unified, rational subject, but does not quite match them: ‘[t]he dramatic division of 
self … or the projection of a contrary self as double, were only familiar variants on the 
model of unitary selfhood – and in a paradoxical way confirmed the normal validity of 
that model’ (4-15). In an alternative reading, Dimitris Vardoulakis has asserted that the 
literary doppelgänger presents ‘a notion of the subject/subjectivity that is defective, 
disjunct, split, threatening, spectral’ (101). Nineteenth century doppelgänger narratives 
posed the question of whether the double represents external temptations, which test the 
unified self, or reveal the ultimately flimsy nature of selfhood itself. In doing so, they 
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prefigure twenty first century neuroscientific accounts of consciousness which, in 
contrast to philosophical accounts which privilege the experiential giveness of selfhood, 
employ evolutionary science to account for the self as projection and trickery (see 
Feinberg).  
 Psychoanalysis is well-tuned to address the self-deceiving and artificial devices 
of subjectivity, and much of Freud’s writing concerns literature which probed the self 
and tested its claims to unity and self-knowledge. In his essay on the uncanny, Freud 
asserts that fantastic occurrences in literature, of which the double is one, are frightening 
and intriguing not because of their absolute novelty, but because of their oblique 
representation of the desires, secrets and undesirable insights of the unconscious. The 
uncanny is not frightening because it is something utterly unfamiliar, but because it is 
‘something which is secretly familiar, which has undergone repression and then returned 
from it’ (“The Uncanny” 249). On one level, the notion of divided selfhood can be seen 
as a repressed thought itself, hence the figure of the double represents the return of the 
individual’s awareness of their subjective discontinuities. Alternatively, the desires that 
the double enacts originate in the unconscious, are repressed, but continue to attract 
cathetic energy in the unconscious. The uncanny effect comes not in the absolute new, 
alien quality of the double, but in its familiarity.  
 While many doppelgänger narratives clearly function as moral allegories, so too 
can they be seen to respond to the experience of mental illness, be it in the dissociation 
of identity, the splitting of personality, or insane delusion. Robert Louis Stevenson’s 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886) can be read as a prototypical narrative of 
divided consciousness, while Hogg’s Confessions can be seen to portray the 
psychological and physical domination of the conscious self by a powerful delusion. In 
the years following the First World War, literary and medical-legal treatments of insane 
automatism reflected an interest in the disabling effects of mental illnesses, as aspects of 
the self appeared autonomous and alien to sufferers. The antisyzgy of these earlier 
literary figures remained a fertile means of understanding selfhood as moral conflict and 
an interplay between free will and determinism, sanity and madness.  
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Golden age crime writers were also writing in the context of experimental 
modernism, which offered radically new models of minds and means of communicating 
the deviance of selfhood. According to Light, modernism, with its ‘obsession with 
unstable identities, the ultimate unknowability of others,’ and concomitant existential 
crises shares an anxiety over the falsity of social masks which can be seen in the crime 
novel (88). The modernist preoccupation with digging deeper to uncover psychological 
conflicts and irrational inconsistencies unapproachable within the confines of nineteenth 
century writing, produced studies of characters who are mysteries to both the reader and 
themselves. Stream of consciousness writing, perfected by Dorothy Richardson, James 
Joyce and Virginia Woolf, foregrounds the surprise, disgust, delight, and confusion of 
characters at their own unconscious effusions. In The Weatherhouse (1930), Nan 
Shepherd plumbed the depths of characters who are shaped piecemeal through their 
peers’ contradictory and shifting perceptions, and in a fearless and uncomfortably 
intimate passage, forces the supposedly superficial Miss Louie Morgan to recount the 
complex, painful, self-deluding, and previously unvoiced motivations which lay behind 
a petty theft. Shepherd exposes the inconsistencies and moral indeterminacy of 
motivation, while André Gide’s arch and iconoclastic Lafcadio’s Adventures (1914) 
features a motiveless crime, whose perpetrator is unable to account for whether an 
unconscious impulse, or the rational testing of a philosophical doctrine, urged him to 
commit the deed: ‘What’s the use of wanting me to explain to you what I can’t explain 
to myself?’ (270) he exclaims. As in other of his works, Gide’s fascination with the 
gratuitous act – carried out disinterestedly, without the individual having taken its 
positive or negative consequences into consideration – reveals that irrational and 
indeterminable feelings of pleasure motivate individual acts. In their fantasies and their 
gratuitous acts, his characters bear little relation to the image of themselves which face 
the world, (see Gide 250) making the premise of conscious dictates and reasonable 
motivations seem merely superficial. In L’Etranger (1942; published in English as The 
Stranger in 1946), Albert Camus returned to the problem of the senseless and 
unmotivated killing, demonstrating how the meaning of such acts was of persistent 
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fascination in early twentieth century intellectual culture. British crime fiction, although 
it pays little heed to the questions of faith and nihilism which motivated French writers, 
shares a preoccupation with the paradoxes of free will and the blithe, even absurdist 
approach to death that in ‘high’ literary texts may confront the reader as shocking, 
although in crime fiction, seems merely a matter of course. Of course, the motivations 
which are lacking in Gide and Camus are by necessity found in crime fiction. What the 
modernist context contributed were explorations of motivation which incorporated the 
premise of the unconscious, of the irrational, and of mysterious and concealed pleasure 
which old dualities were unable to articulate. 
 
War Neurosis  and Literary Fragmentation 
Prior to the Great War, modernist writing introduced a new idiom for approaching the 
self. Representations of the multiplicity of the self, its changes over time and the 
impressionist quality of individual experience informed the aesthetic register of the pre-
War novels of Dorothy Richardson, Henry James and Marcel Proust. While these 
advances were echoed in post-War writings, what also developed was the exacerbated 
fragmentariness of the forms of writing used to communicate the experience of selfhood. 
Abandoning the integral and self-possessed selves of earlier literary canons – the 
transcendent self of the Romantics and the reliable, essentially knowable social types of 
nineteenth century realism – post-War modernists continued the trend begun before the 
First World War, and in their writing expressed interest in drama, social masks, role-
playing, and in textual disintegrations of unitary selfhood. 
 Mental breakdown, as it is understood now, was a new phenomenon at the 
coming of the First World War, as unprecedented mental collapse afflicted thousands of 
soldiers on the front line. Symptoms resembling modern war neurosis have be traced 
back to antiquity – Anthony Babington cites evidence of conversion hysteria in 
chronicles of the Greek-Persian Wars (7) – while the ailment christened ‘nostalgia’ in 
1678 was medically employed to account for the despair, homesickness, apathy, 
paranoia, fever and even paralysis experienced by soldiers well into the nineteenth 
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century (Babington 7-9). Despite the United States Government having issued a major 
report which detailed the high occurrence of ‘nostalgia’ in the American Civil War – 3.3 
cases in every 1000 men (ibid. 15) – as recently as 1888, nonetheless, at the onset of the 
Great War, there was no ready account for why healthy young men in their thousands 
should experience mental collapse. Madness was understood as a consequence of 
nervous disease, hereditary organic weakness or, in more of a literary turn, a collapse of 
reason brought about by intense emotion: ‘the mere insurgence of delirium from the 
fever of hate, or from jealousy, or love, or evil in the blood’ as Fiona Macleod (William 
Sharp) wrote in 1894 (126).  According to Richard Holmes in Firing Line, ‘the process 
of recognising that there was such a thing as a psychiatric breakdown was a painful one’ 
(43).  
 In Modernist Self, Dennis Brown states that ‘it was the 1914-18 War which 
precipitated many less hypersensitive individuals into the existential reality of self-
fragmentation’ (43). The experience of blasts, injury, the daily spectacle of dismembered 
and pulverised bodies, and the loss of individual dignity and particularity in the vast 
machine of modern warfare were matched by real psychological breakdowns, as soldiers 
‘fell apart’ and had their sanity ‘shattered’ on a grand scale. Siegfried Sassoon, the 
officer and poet nicknamed ‘Mad Jack’ for his daring exploits in combat, wrote during 
his stay in Craiglockhart Military Hospital in 1917: ‘No doubt they’ll soon get well; the 
shock and strain / Have caused their stammering, disconnected talk’ (lines 1-2, 
“Survivors”). Physically incapacitated, tormented by horrific dreams and memories of 
death which overwhelm them by their immediacy, Sassoon’s ‘broken and mad’ (l.10) 
fellow patients were at the front line of the crushing mental and physical bombardment 
which would feed into literary representations of both the sane and the troubled mind. 
Neurosis, ‘an experience which combatant writers helped establish as quite central to 
modernist representations of selfhood’ according to Denis Brown (10), became a key 
metaphor for the diverse social and psychological repercussions of the War, attesting to 
its centrality to the modern experience.  
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As much can be seen in Virginia Woolf’s 1925 novel Mrs Dalloway, in which the 
shell-shocked soldier, Septimus Warren Smith, experiences discontinuous and 
spontaneous rushes of thought and feeling, merged with agonising memories and flashes 
of terrible fear and paranoia. Clearly, neurotic experience necessitated, and in turn 
validated, experimental literary techniques of stream of consciousness, shifts in time and 
depth of focus, the merging of literary registers, multiple voices, scraps and collage. At 
the same time, the juxtaposition of Clarissa Dalloway’s discontinuous and floating 
experience of selfhood negates any concrete distinction between the sane and neurotic 
mind. Woolf’s challenge to the autonomous and unitary self is one posed by the modern 
subject irrespective of their personal experiences of war. In this challenge, neurosis, both 
as real illness and as a framework for understanding lived experience as fragmenting, 
decentred, dispersed and heterogeneous, becomes a potent metaphor for modernist 
selfhood. 
 
Psychologies of Dissociation and Deviance 
The theoretical, aesthetic and canonical dislocation between the popular fictions of 
crime writers and the rarefied modernist, experimental novel, is not as wide as it may 
seem. Many critics, including Alison Light, Jon Thompson and Slavoj Žižek have been 
struck by similarities in techniques of narrative disruption, devices of unstable identity, 
and a tone of critical playfulness in both high and low forms of post-War writing. War 
neurosis receives considerable attention in crime writing –Sayers’ detective Peter 
Wimsey is a famous sufferer – however, a comparable psychological condition which 
became emblematic of new forms of subjectivity in the post-War context was 
dissociation. Encompassing nineteenth-century notions of the duality of selfhood, 
dissociation incorporated the experiences of modern warfare, as well as modern 
psychological insights into the nature of the unconscious, in order to account with 
clinical exactitude for the potential deviancy of the self. The conditions portrayed in 
Agatha Christie’s The ABC Murders (1936), Margery Allingham’s Police at the Funeral 
(1931), and Christianna Brand’s Heads You Lose (1941) occupy the following pages. 
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How credible are these narratives of dissociation? How do automata behave? Why does 
the unconscious want to commit crimes, and what is the relationship between the ‘I’ and 
the ‘not I’ when dissociation occurs? Contemporary public discourses concerning 
dissociative insanities and their relation to crime emphasised how potent and widespread 
were fears of deviant selfhood. Crime writers responded by creating detecting figures 
capable of diagnosing deviance and isolating the true self submerged in the confusion, at 
the same time as they posed challenges to the hyperbole of representations of 
unconscious aberration.  
 
Trauma and Automatism 
In the years following the end of the First World War, cases of insane automatism 
brought about by the trauma of conflict began to be reported. Often in tandem with war 
neurosis, in which psychic trauma is relived and physically re-enacted by the body that 
shakes, suffers from phantom wounds, and sees and hears what is no longer there, in 
automatism, repressed memories were enacted in violence towards others. While shell-
shock made heroic masculinity seem both hollow and dangerous, the difficulties of 
returning to civilian life and making self-determined choices after the industrialised, 
dehumanising slaughter of the prolonged conflict helps to account for the appearance of 
automata figures in the immediate wake of the First World War. Towards the end of the 
1930s, the horrors of mass training and mobilisation were being fully realised in the 
fascist states of Continental Europe; it was during these years and into the early 1940s 
that the novels dealing with automata discussed within this chapter were penned. 
In the Chadwick Lecture of 1917, F. W. Mott – one of the earliest British doctors 
to publish research on shell shock – presented his views on amnesia. Many of his 
patients at the 4
th
 London General Hospital had been found after an explosion in a 
‘dazed condition … not unlike a fugue or automatic wanderings of an epileptic’ (Mott 
40). According to Mott, their memories were not lost, but were rather ‘screened off’ and 
were ‘not able to pass the threshold of consciousness’ (ibid.) Memories did, however, 
resurface in dreams or ‘terrifying visual hallucinations’ (ibid.).  In other cases, sleeping 
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soldiers went ‘through the pantomime of fighting with the bomb, with the bayonet, with 
the rifle’ and for their own protection had to be moved to a padded room (ibid.).  
The term ‘dissociation’, which referred to various forms of post-traumatic mental 
illness, gained in usage in the 1920s. Dr W. Brown, who wrote in the Times in 1927 
about his use of hypnotic cures for the still-traumatised victims of the trenches, 
described his patients as men who exhibited a ‘twofold dissociation’ (“Hypnotic Cures”). 
Firstly, they experienced ‘a dissociation of the memory of events immediately following 
upon the shell explosion from memories of earlier and later parts of [their lives]’ (ibid.): 
memories did not connect in a logical, linear way, within their life narratives. Secondly, 
they suffered from ‘a dissociation of these memories as mere intellectual awareness, 
from the accompanying emotional reaction of fear - tremors, sweating, mutism, 
paralysis, which were of a physiological nature’ (ibid.). A memory, for example of 
warfare, could be recalled safely and often, but the physical symptoms of fear sprang up 
unannounced, at which time the sufferer lost control over and intellectual awareness of 
their body. These are the terms in which insane automatism was understood. Not as the 
rising up of an alternate self – the contrary figure of the ‘double’, a Hyde with his fully 
fledged deviant character – but the dissociation of the thinking self from the body. The 
unconscious, a residue of fragments of memory, many of them painful, and intense, 
detached emotions, came to supremacy, blocking out the knowing functions of mind and 
sparking a host of physiological symptoms over which the individual had no control. In 
such an illness, the self is especially fallible and easily unseated.  
 A case which powerfully illustrates the extremes of dissociation came to trial in 
1939. It concerned Dr Lockhart, who was judged guilty but insane after murdering his 
wife during an ‘emotional storm’ linked to First World War trauma. Lockhart injected his 
wife with an anaesthetic and then let gas flood from a fire into their house, both of which 
acts were attributed to previously ‘excluded’ ideas which had flooded his consciousness. 
During his attack, he had behaved like ‘an automaton’ because, according to one medical 
witness, he was ‘suffering from dissociation between the higher and the lower levels of 
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the brain.’ Afterwards, he claimed to remember very little, and what he did remember 
had the quality of a ‘dream’ (“Doctor Guilty, But Insane”).  
 Lockhart’s behaviour was attributed to the dissociation of the ‘higher’ parts of his 
mind from the ‘lower’, which left his unconscious in complete control of his body and 
mind. Fragments of traumatic memories were experienced as if they were happening in 
the present. Strong emotions emerged and Lockhart felt himself detach from his body, so 
that it was as if his actions were observed from without. During this period of 
dissociation, a certain consciousness was, however, revealed by a note he wrote and 
placed in his hall to warn his servants about the gas he had himself released. The 
enactment of this thoughtful, moral, even heroic gesture in the midst of the insane killing 
seemed to suggest that he was to an extent cognisant of the moral implications of 
harming his servants, and in control of his actions. As the criteria outlined in chapter two 
suggests, a judgement under a strict interpretation of M’Naghten might have led to his 
receiving the full penalty, but instead a medical witness convinced the jury that 
Lockhart’s ‘morbidly over-anxious temperament, which moved quickly from anxiety to 
terror, and from terror to imbalance’ (“Medical Man Charged with Wife Murder” 1065) 
accounted for this momentary re-association of the higher with lower functions of the 
brain. Consistent with the more exacerbated fragmentariness of selfhood as rendered by 
modernist writers, the judgement of the Lockhart case suggests that the self is subject 
not only to unseating from its control of mind and body, but to a considerable degree of 
fluidity in the shifts in and out of control. 
 Lockhart’s action in leaving the note suggested the tantalising possibility that his 
moral self was engaged in some kind of struggle with the ‘lower’ functions of mind that 
had taken over, and it is this possibility that is central to Christianna Brand’s 
representation of insane automatism, as shall be seen. However, in spite of his moments 
of re-association, Lockhart’s defence had initially proposed not an insanity plea, but a 
defence of ‘not guilty’. They took the view that his primary self was not involved in the 
attack, and not tinged with insanity. ‘[U]nconscious action, not arising from insanity at 
all’ (“Medical Man Charged with Wife Murder” 1063) was responsible for the attack, 
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therefore it seemed creditable to claim that the doctor was another person entirely: his 
conscious self had been so dissociated from his body while he committed the attack that 
he could be considered as a separate individual in law. Of course, the case of Dr 
Lockhart was not resolved upon a plea of ‘not guilty’. The jury were unable to concede 
that the doctor would not have committed the crime in full sanity, and that it was an 
automaton who murdered his wife, and he was judged guilty but insane. That such a plea 
was even proposed suggests a reluctance to associate the self with the deviant and 
mysterious content of the mind, even in a case in which the existence of the unconscious 
and its repressed emotional content was so readily apparent. Even in the face of such 
ideas, it was desirable to reassert the dignity and impenetrability of the sane, thinking 
and judging self, and to ballast the ‘I’ against attacks from the deviant content of the 
mind.  
 
Unconscious Wish Fulfilment 
The premise that dreams give insight into the unconscious and unconscious motivation 
is a building block of psychoanalytic theory, with the active dream state seen as a 
physical enactment of the symbolic content of the latent dream state. The performance of 
suicidal impulses in a somnambulist state by the murderer, Ulrica, of Gladys Mitchell’s 
St Peter’s Finger (see chapters one and two) conforms to Freud’s work on sleepwalking, 
in particular the assertion that although the conscious mind seems not to be fully in 
control, the walker often acts with ‘certainty’ to enact a repressed, unconscious wish 
(The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 140; 168), meaning that a sleepwalking person 
might commit a crime they unconsciously wanted to commit. Not only the repressed 
trauma of a sufferer like Lockhart, but anti-social wishes and other devious desires could 
be enacted in unconscious states.  
 Like somnambulism, automatism describes the movement of the body, often to 
the purpose of committing controlled and organised actions, without the cognisance or 
activity of the conscious self. In 1922, M. Hamblin Smith proposed that severe 
repression may explain certain crimes, and may be accompanied by ‘fugue states’ in 
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which ‘the subject is confused (“disoriented”) in time and in place’ (72-3). As Smith 
explains, a ‘repressed complex may regain its position in consciousness, replacing an 
antagonistic complex, which latter may, in its turn, become repressed’ (72). In certain 
forms of insanity the unconscious may gain autonomy, meaning a person may be 
physically responsible for having committed a crime, may even have experienced 
committing the crime (that is, be able to remember it) but may not be morally guilty of 
having consciously reasoned, planned and executed the offence. The subsequent 
repression of unpleasant psychological material meant that criminal acts could 
conceivably be forgotten afterwards, creating further problems for the legal system. 
 Some legal thinkers objected to the presentation of automata and amnesia cases 
offered by the likes of Smith. In 1925 Lord Darling attacked the ‘theory that man has 
two minds, the conscious and the sub-conscious’ by noting how convenient it might be  
from the position of a legal defence: ‘witnesses are not hard to find who will explain to 
any jury that it was the sub-conscious one alone which was active when their protégé 
committed crime’ (20). The plea of insanity, when complicated by the theory of the 
unconscious, seemed to Darling a subversive doctrine, as in theory any action can be 
attributed to subconscious volition, with neither law makers nor medical witnesses being 
any the wiser as to which action truly was unconscious. Furthermore, to Darling, 
psychoanalysis’ exclusively negative view of the unconscious was troublesome: ‘But if  
automata may do wrong unconsciously,’ he observed, ‘we may well suppose that they 
may do right, and then none should deserve, or receive, either punishment or reward’ 
(20). The presumption that the unconscious has wholly negative attributes, which 
Darling found so subversive, will likewise be challenged in the crime novels of Christie 
and Allingham.  
 
Epilepsy  
During the period from the 1920s to the 1940s, it is fair to say that a reader might hold 
competing understandings of epilepsy. As it is understood now, epilepsy is not so much a 
specific condition as a range of neurological disorders characterised by seizures during 
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which extreme electromagnetic activity occurs in the brain. On waking after a seizure, 
epileptics are often extremely disoriented, find it difficult to locate themselves and 
recognise others, and experience a loss of memory. Further than this, epilepsy is a highly 
varied and misunderstood condition, which contributes to a number of psychological 
disturbances barely understood in the present day, and even less so in the interwar years. 
During these years, proponents of competing psychological doctrines in the adaptive, 
psychoanalytic and neurological fields advanced alternative explanations of epilepsy. It 
could be understood as an inherited or acquired condition, the consequence of injury or 
disease, or of hereditary defect (see “The Study Of Epilepsy”). Some positivist 
criminologists saw epilepsy as a dangerous, organic defect and perhaps evidence of born 
criminality, while psychoanalysts’ offered the explanation of ‘hysterical epilepsy’: a 
psychosomatic condition which, like automatism as it was understood by Freudians like 
Smith, enacted unconscious wishes under the mask of an attack.  
 The extent to which medieval and early modern occult associations with epilepsy 
survived nineteenth century asylum reform and the rise of rationalist and scientific 
approaches to the insane was no doubt determined by social proximity to centres of 
intellectual development. George Eliot’s 1861 novel, Silas Marner, for example, treats of 
the irrational fears generated in an isolated village by her title character’s catalepsy (a 
nervous condition associated with epilepsy) and his motionless fugues. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, fear of epilepsy had as much to do with what vicissitudes of violence 
might be unleashed in fits and seizures than its possible contribution to social ills. The 
criminal anthropologist, Cesar Lombroso claims in his posthumously published 
Criminal Man (1911) that epilepsy, ‘develops slowly in continuous brain irritation, 
which causes the individual … to reproduce the ferocious egotism natural to primitive 
savages, irresistibly bent on harming others’ (Ferrero 87). The cerebral constitution of 
epileptics, according to Lombroso, provided an explanation of how the destructive 
violence of certain forms of criminality could be organically determined. So too did it 
link the epileptic with the criminal degenerate – hopelessly destined to ‘reproduce the 
ferocious egotism’ of savages. 
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 A twentieth century amalgamation of nineteenth century prejudices, criminal 
narratives and psychological thought can be seen in Freud’s essay, “Dostoevsky and 
Parricide”, which offers a psychoanalytic reading of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 1880 novel, 
The Brothers Karamazov. In Dostoevsky’s work, the murder of Fyodor Karamazov is 
wrongly attributed to one of his three sons, Dmitri. Haunting the investigation is the 
suspicion that Smerdyakov, who is most likely an illegitimate son of Fyodor, is the killer. 
He was in the house at the time of the killing, but has a strong alibi, in that he was 
unconscious after an epileptic seizure. Consistent with the view of epilepsy as a form of 
innate moral deficiency, Smerdyakov has exhibited immoral traits since childhood, and 
indeed, he later confesses to having committed the crime and faked his seizure. In 
Freud’s reading of the novel, Smerdyakov’s symptoms are attributed to a neuroses – 
hysterical epilepsy – which mimics organic epilepsy. According to Freud, repressed 
wishes could be expressed symbolically and masked from consciousness during the 
seizure. In Britain, psychoanalysts were impressed by Freud’s diagnosis. In Epilepsy 
(1928), a contemporary commentator explains how the  
essential epileptic … is a pattern of the oral and anal erotic; he is egocentric, 
emotionally inexpressive and excessively narcissistic. This produces a 
rigidity and inelasticity of the personality incompatible with flexible living, 
hence the explosive fit. (Clarke qtd. in Cobb and Lennox 42-3) 
It is worth noting that the psychoanalyst’ account of the explosive fit following the 
accumulation of emotional energy resembles the more nerve-centric account of the 
condition previously offered by Lombroso.  
 Negative reactions to epilepsy are pervasive in interwar writing and culture. The 
medical witnesses in Ronald True’s trial (see chapter 2) reported that he had a history of 
epilepsy, which served to support his portrayal as a probable criminal rather than to 
question his responsibility for his actions. An offhand comment made in The Devil Rides 
Out (1934), an occult romp by the enormously popular interwar writer Denis Wheatley, 
is a commonplace response to the condition. A group of devil worshippers are observed 
in a Tam O’Shanter-esque debauch by the hero, who remarks, ‘[s]ome of them are 
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probably epileptics, and nearly all must be abnormal’(94). Epilepsy haunted the popular 
imagination, acquiring sinister connotations and acting as both a catalyst for, and a 
determiner of, criminality, degeneracy, and violence. The authors of the 1928 myth-
busting study, Epilepsy, particularly regretted that 
to the average person “epileptic” means the helpless, deteriorated individual, 
commonly seen in institutions, rather than the person who, in spite of 
occasional attacks which are perhaps unknown to others, is carrying on his 
or her work in the world. (Cobb and Lennox 44) 
Of course, to many, the fact that fits could pass unnoticed was one of the most 
threatening aspects of the condition. This was because violent activity was most 
commonly associated not with the grave, debilitating grand mal seizures, but with the 
lighter confusions and blank-outs of the petit mal. A medical witness in a murder trial 
reported in the Times  in 1929 defined the condition according to its attendant dangers: 
‘Petit mal [is] a condition that was sometimes followed by post-epileptic automatism, in 
which condition a patient might carry out certain perfectly rational actions, but might 
know nothing whatever about them’ (“Man’s Throat Cut”). 
 Aside from the immediate symptoms of seizures, the fact that many epileptics 
ended up in mental institutions, borstals and prisons contributed to the condition’s 
sinister connotations. While educational reformers like J. Taylor Fox argued that the 
exclusion of epileptic children from classes by uninformed teachers meant they 
developed the sense of being outsiders and, with time on their hands and little else to 
occupy them, turned to criminality (1-7), less sociologically sophisticated interpretations 
of the statistics proved more influential. A.F. Tredgold shared Lombroso’s view that the 
high rates of epilepsy in prisons and borstals could be taken as evidence of its 
connection with criminal insanity. Criminal impulses were imagined to be the natural 
outcome of a condition whose sufferers could emit sudden torrents of abusive language 
(Tredgold 318), were generally ‘impulsive, undependable and difficult to manage,’ and 
in some cases were subject to destructive outbursts characterised by ‘violence and 
irresponsibility’ (ibid.). Interestingly, Tredgold notes, these outbursts were involuntary, 
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and usually occurred in the light seizure of the petit mal. Actions during this state were 
of such  
a highly co-ordinated and apparently purposive nature that it is difficult for 
the onlookers to believe that the patient is unconscious. They are generally 
followed by severe headache or deep sleep, and on recovery the patient has 
no recollection of the attack. (318)  
Public discourse on the criminality of epileptics was no doubt shaped by press 
coverage of violent cases involving sufferers. Many reports on crimes involving epilepsy 
were published in the Times between 1920 and 1935. What was particularly threatening 
about epilepsy was that crimes committed by its sufferers seemed to manifest wicked 
intentions. As Darling’s criticism of insane automatism defences suggested, many 
doubted whether such crimes could be committed without the individual being cognisant 
of their actions, or without the enactment of will. Should epileptics, like automata, be 
held responsible for the content of their minds? On the other hand,  the figure of the 
epileptic could be seen to embody widespread concerns about the fallibility of selfhood 
and its dependence upon both the unconscious content of the mind and contrary 
constitution of the body. The epileptic could be seen as a grotesque exaggeration of fears 
of individual uncertainty, determined by the matter of the mind and the deviant wishes of 
the unconscious, unable to resist the debilitating seizures, scientifically misunderstood 
and medically incurable.  
 Four murder trials which took place at intervals throughout the period and were 
covered extensively in the Times exemplify attitudes to, and understandings of, epilepsy 
available to a golden age readership. In terms of narrative, a predictable formula 
emerges; also collocating are a series of questions and issues for which the reports 
present comparable, although by no means confident, answers. At the moment of 
seizure, the sufferer shifts from being a normal participant in whatever scenario is taking 
place to both a victim and a witness, as perception is suddenly severed. An unconscious, 
timeless period elapses, then comes the coming-to in a situation which may be quite 
different from the moment at which consciousness was severed. One of the most 
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interesting ontological problems raised by epilepsy was the mystery that occurs during 
the blank out, and sufferers report confusion, anxiety and, if they awake to confront a 
crime scene, horror. A variation upon this formula is played out repeatedly in press 
accounts: however, so too do reports acknowledge that they are participating in the 
construction of a recognisable narrative which may be exploited by criminals. Doubts 
about the credibility of the unconscious killer defence reflect a tension between 
sympathy for the sufferer of epilepsy and a concern over permitting such gross lapses to 
be brushed aside in law. Manifesting contemporary anxieties about the self and probing 
the limits of credulity when it came to the extremes of physical and psychical 
dissociation, these mass-media epilepsy narratives had a significant impact upon the 
narrative strategies adopted by crime writers.  
 In a 1920 case, an epileptic man was sentenced to death for killing a bank 
manager in the midst of a botched raid. His conviction demonstrates that epilepsy 
defences were not always credible to legal authorities, who recognised that they could be 
exploited. At the trial, his girlfriend is quoted as saying that he was ‘liable to fits. She 
had known him have as many as three in a single day’ (“Leeds Bank Murder”). The 
report goes on: ‘When he was recovering he became very violent, and cried out, 
threatening murder, and apparently imagining battles and charges. After the fits he was 
like a man in a trance, and was not responsible’ (ibid.). A pattern of debilitating fits 
followed by linguistic, cognitive and emotional disorder is established. However, 
strategies are also adopted which distance the narrative voice from the report, so that 
even the dry, objective prose of the Times betrays a note of irony. The witness’ evidence 
is made to seem vague and overstated through the accumulation of dramatic details. So 
too does her assertion that he was not responsible seem biased when drily undercut by 
the reporter’s observation: ‘The witness admitted writing letters to the prisoner, one of  
which began, “My very own darling’” (ibid). In general, a subtle derision of the 
defendant’s epilepsy plea imbues the account. That such a defence is attempted implies 
that the pattern attacks took was already well established, and there is a sense that in 
different circumstances, it would be conceivable for crimes to be committed in these 
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states. Although medical witnesses are trusted to make final judgements on the 
defendant’s state of mind, the symptomatic overlap with other states of emotional 
disturbance makes it apparent that classifying and confirming epilepsy was particularly 
difficult.   
 Similar features can be discerned in a report of 1925, concerning a killer who had 
suffered from ‘brain storms’ after a head injury (“Christchurch Murder Charge”). In the 
1920 report noted above, accounts of the defendant’s previous homicidal impulses were 
gently disparaged, but in the 1925 account it is emphasised that seizures release both 
sudden violence and extraordinary strength, by the observation that ‘while in a fit during 
a football match it took four other members of the team to hold [the defendant] down’ 
(ibid.). The report also highlights how the attack brought about, or was catalysed by, 
intense emotion. The defendant relates how he ‘saw red’ in the midst of an argument and 
then ‘hit [the victim] over the head with a bottle. He then went off into a fit, and when he 
came round he had his hands round her neck’ (ibid.). Although it is lucidly recalled, the 
assault with the bottle is treated as part of the fit, and in general the defendant is a 
competent narrator, knowing for certain that he is the killer despite having no memory of  
the subsequent attack. He has approached his fragments of memory – the assault with 
the bottle with the impression received at the moment he awoke – as does the reader of 
crime fiction, and has deduced what took place between from these fragments. This 
subjective reordering is an important addition to the pattern established in the previous 
report. In crime narratives, the detection of what took place during the period of 
unconsciousness from the flotsam of memory will be exploited for its narrative and 
thematic potential.  
 Sudden brutishness was one means of understanding epileptic violence in 
circulation at this time. Different forms of violence were, however, associated with the 
condition. In 1929, an epileptic left a gambling session, had a seizure, pursued a man to 
whom he had lost money down a busy street and cut his throat with a flick knife (“Man’s 
Throat Cut”). The familiar pattern of post seizure trance and amnesia then ensued. 
According to a witness, the prisoner simply ‘walked away’ after the attack and sometime 
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later arrived at a relative’s house looking ‘dazed and worried’ (ibid.). ‘I don’t remember 
anything’ his relative quotes him as saying. It is observed that the man had a fit in police 
custody and at trial it was agreed that he committed the crime in a petit mal. Reporting 
of this case betrays no derision, nor are the circumstances of the crime treated as 
suspicious. The fact that he was carrying a knife and that he chose a victim who had 
offended him very recently do not detract from the credibility of the defence, and it is 
accepted that he committed the crime in an ‘aura of unconsciousness’ and without 
‘premeditation or knowledge’ (ibid.). What the case willingly accepts is that epileptic 
seizure releases urges, attributable to the petty and immoral inclination of a concealed 
self, which the individual is normally able to restrain.  
 In the final case, taking place in 1935, the Times reports how a man shot a girl 
three times and strangled her, afterwards dumping her body in a water tank. He was later 
seen on board ‘an omnibus dripping wet and without boots, jacket or waistcoat’ 
(“Brighton Murder Charge”). The familiar pattern of the attack is followed: the seizure, 
the moment of coming-to, amnesia and confusion. The man remembered having an 
argument and then (in his own words): ‘I got a pain through my head. I started 
swimming for my life’ (ibid.). The murder and his entry to the tank are eliminated, and 
the tails of memory on either side of this blank joined, awkwardly, together. The man 
finds it impossible to deduce what took place in between, and in terms of narrative, his 
account is highly disjunctive. The seizure, described as ‘a state of maniacal excitement 
such as occurred in an ordinary seizure, but without the usual fit’ is something the 
medical witness calls ‘masked epilepsy’ (ibid.). What is fearful is that a person might do 
all these things, but not be obviously suffering from a seizure. Epilepsy as such is 
constructed as an evasive, barely discernible and unpredictable condition, which the 
individual may not know about – perhaps may not even notice – insinuating itself into 
everyday life. The ‘ungovernable fury’ and violence of the sufferer still occur, and it is 
affirmed that the prisoner can ‘perform a number of other acts purely automatically’ 
(ibid.), which overlaps with the evidence that an epileptic ‘might carry out certain 
perfectly rational actions’ (ibid.) during a seizure, but know nothing about them. 
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 Defining the forms epilepsy took and the kinds of violence to be expected from 
epileptics, these accounts demonstrate that narrative disjunction was seen as central to 
the lived experience of epilepsy. To sufferers, life can be reduced to  perceptual 
fragments without warning. These fragments can sometimes be reordered with inference 
and deduction, mimicking the narrative techniques of the detective novel. Reports 
emphasise the points at which narratives stop and where they recommence, and the 
nature of the event taking place at the moment of pause influences whether the epileptic 
is confused, frightened or quickly made aware of what took place in the interim. At 
times, the epileptic is able to detect what has taken place themselves. The result is both 
terrifying and estranging. At other points, the epileptic remains uncertain of what has 
taken place, and other voices – medical and legal authorities or witnesses – complete the 
story for them. Whether these voices are trustworthy depends upon their intention, and 
witnesses are not always reliable sources of information about what has occurred. In all 
reports, an alternate source of agency comes to physical autonomy when the thinking 
self is disabled. 
 
Case Studies 
In the medical and literary context outlined above, core themes in discussions of the 
concealed enemy of the self become apparent. Literature, medical and legal accounts 
overlap in a broad sense when they represent the ‘I’ being submerged by other forces, be 
they mental or physiological, and dislocated from executive control over the body. There 
is, of course, disagreement about what is released when the self loses possession of the 
body. Psychoanalytic accounts insist that what takes place is unconscious wish 
fulfilment, or the re-enactment of repressed, traumatic memories. Physiological accounts 
sidestep the meaning and emotional source of violent actions in order to attribute them 
to the discharges of the nervous system, while the premise of primitive instincts being 
unleashed when the ‘civilised’ self is incapacitated finds representation across the 
divergent thought systems. The core dilemma remains: which is the true self? Is it the ‘I’ 
that is incapacitated, the unconscious or automatic self, or an amalgamation of the two?  
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Three crimes novels featuring unconscious criminals exemplify the influence of  
contemporary accounts of criminal psychology on textual representations of selfhood 
and the mental illnesses which reduce responsibility, overcome the ego and release 
concealed desires. While contemporary science and law recognised the uncertainty of 
fully narrating what took place while the unconscious self was in control, the demands 
of the detective story assure that such mysteries must and will be revealed. Accordingly, 
inseparable issues are: who is given the authority to narrate; can witnesses be trusted; is 
the jargon of medical experts really enlightening; what store should be set by legal 
precedent; and who, ultimately knows the secrets of the self – the individual or the 
detective?   
 
Agatha Christie, The ABC Murders (1936) 
As the narrative techniques of reportage on unconscious killings suggest, the crime 
scene that confronts the epileptic on waking appears as mysterious and unaccountable as 
the crime scene discovered in the crime novel. The sufferer is placed in the same 
position as the reader, the detective, and the innocent person who first stumbles upon the 
horrific scene. The terrifying and alienating experience of separation from one’s physical 
acts, and of the destabilising recognition of possible deviance within the self, is 
exploited by Christie in The ABC Murders. Supposedly a series of crimes committed by 
a homicidal maniac, the investigation follows the death of a woman whose name begins 
with ‘A’ in Andover, to a ‘B’ in Bexhill-on-Sea and finally to a ‘C’. There is a satisfying 
symmetry then, when, in a dramatic faint, a man named Alexander Bonaparte Cust 
hands himself in to a police station as the killer. A diffident salesman who frequently 
experiences headaches, Cust is the first to suspect that he is somehow involved in the 
string of murders when he notices that he has been visiting each of the towns at the time 
of the killings. The reader’s suspicion that Cust is the killer mounts as does his own, and 
both reader and Cust become convinced that he has been murdering people in states of 
post-epileptic automatism:  
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He trotted along the street smiling to himself until he came to the Black Swan 
where he was staying. … 
As he entered the room his smile faded suddenly. There was a stain on his sleeve 
near the cuff. He touched it tentatively – wet and red – blood …  
His hand dipped into his pocket and brought out something – a long slender knife. 
The blade of that, too, was sticky and red … 
Mr Cust sat there a long time.  
Once his eyes shot around the room like those of a hunted animal. 
His tongue passed feverishly over his lips … 
“It isn’t my fault,” said Mr Cust. (Christie’s ellipses, 465-6) 
It is apparent that the coming to consciousness moment resembles that of the epileptic 
who has moved away from the crime scene in a trance, only to find ostensibly 
conclusive evidence upon him later. In keeping with the formula established in 
newspaper accounts, Cust remembers nothing of what took place in the interim. He has 
already considered the possibility that he is a killer, and it is not difficult to take the 
logical steps that confirm this suspicion.  
 In the excerpt, the reader has no access to Cust’s thought processes, but is an 
observer of the sequential reasoning he moves through. His shift from pleasure to 
feverish anxiety implies that he remembers nothing, and by the time that he is excusing 
himself for his unconscious responsibility – ‘It isn’t my fault’ – the reader, like Cust, has 
associated him irretrievably with the killings. Of course, Cust remembers nothing and 
feels nothing because he has done nothing. His guilt is an elaborate red herring, a plot 
constructed by the real killer to preoccupy the police with a hunt for a homicidal 
maniac, and to frighten the retiring, nervous Cust to such a degree that he truly believes 
he has committed the crimes in a petit mal and confesses to the killings. The bloody 
knife he finds in his pocket in the passage above has been hidden there by the murderer 
while poor Cust was asleep. His presence at the various murder locations at the exact 
time of the killings has also been engineered by the killer, who paid Cust’s wages as a 
salesman and ensured that he was sent to the locations where the crimes would take 
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place. A self-interested enemy, not a concealed enemy of the self, are responsible for the 
string of killings.  
 Slavoj Žižek has written of the false solution of the alphabet fixation in The ABC 
Murders in his Lacanian study, Looking Awry. Constructed by the murderer to distract 
from the true motive to kill, ‘the deceitful first impression’ (55) of the false solution 
convinces the ordinary observer – other characters and the reader too – because it 
conforms to intersubjective expectations of crime and human motivation. While the 
detective, with her/his superior, penetrating vision, can discern its constructedness, to 
the ordinary observer, the false solution (generally the crime scene which greets the 
reader as a ‘clue puzzle’, but in The ABC Murders, the Cust plot in its entirety) 
convinces because it is legible: it communicates intelligible meaning. To the detective, 
the artificiality of the false solution will be proven by analysis of what meaning the 
murderer wants the false solution to communicate, and therefore what was the intention 
of the deception. For, as Žižek asserts, the meaning of the false solution ‘consists solely 
in the fact that ‘others’ (doxa, common opinion) will think they have meaning’ (55). It is 
to this mundane, ordinary perspective that the murderer appeals when he/she stages the 
false scene, because the perspective ‘[exhibits] in the clearest possible way the effect 
that the murderer intended to produce by his staging of a false scene’ (fn.175 ). This 
ordinary view, the ‘field of  doxa’ is also the perspective the reader is supposed to 
occupy: the false solution is really designed to baffle the reader. 
 While Žižek is writing of the false solution of the serial killer, The ABC Murders 
in fact entertains two false solutions: Cust as alphabet fixated homicidal killer 
(discussed in chapter one), and Cust as insane automaton. Much of the novel’s drama 
lies in the challenge posed by the celebrated nerve specialist and criminal profiler, Dr 
Thompson, to the reader’s belief that Cust has committed the crimes unconsciously. The 
reader alone has witnessed Cust’s moment of revelation with the knife, and knows as 
well as he does that he has no memory of the killings. His fear that he will commit 
another crime unknowingly leads him to hand himself in at a police station, practically 
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in the state of trance in which the reader supposes he committed the crimes, and it is 
then that Dr Thompson starts to promote his dangerous, jargon heavy theory: 
Cust is saddled – apparently by the whim of his mother (Oedipus complex 
there, I shouldn’t wonder!) with two extremely bombastic Christian names: 
Alexander and Bonaparte. You see the implications? Alexander – the 
popularly supposed undefeatable who sighed for more worlds to conquer. 
Bonaparte – the great Emperor of the French. He wants an adversary – an 
adversary, one might say, in his class. Well – there you are – Hercules the 
strong. (485) 
Exposing the worst of popular Freudian interpretations, the doctor asserts that Cust does 
not lose control, but exercises his agency through a loss of control. Thompson goes on 
to assert that Alexander Bonaparte Cust knew that he committed the murders, and is 
suffering from a hysterical form of epilepsy, rather than the grand or petit mal of the 
true sufferer. ‘Cust knows perfectly well he committed the murders’ Thompson asserts 
(Christie’s italics, 484), so Cust’s position in law changes from guilty but insane to, 
perhaps, just guilty. 
 Thompson’s solution is derided by the supposedly daft Watsonian narrator, who 
is convinced of Cust’s unconsciousness of the crimes: ‘His denials seem to have a ring 
of truth in them’ he says (484). Recognising the falsity of Thompson’s solution, the 
reader goes against their better judgement to align with the narrator who believes in 
Cust’s unconscious innocence. In this outwardly telescoping perspective, all three – 
reader, narrator, and Cust – confront the scenario as observers, coming to the same 
conclusion about the meaning of clues and their restructuring into a logical sequence of 
events. Doxa, public opinion, and the expectations held of epileptic killers are key. As 
the automata defence seems conceivable to Cust himself and to narrator, it is easily 
accepted as truth. The rendition of the scene mimics press accounts of epileptic killings, 
imparting an impression of credibility for the reader, while Cust’s denial of any 
knowledge of the crime impresses the narrator because this is what epileptics seemed to 
do in such situations: ‘I don’t remember anything’ repeated the killer in the 1929 murder 
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case when held in custody (“Man’s Throat Cut”). Putting the narrator and Dr Thompson 
aside for the moment, the relationship between the reader and Cust is at its strongest 
here. Only the reader has witnessed Cust’s private realisation that he is the killer, and 
with Cust the reader has been urged to accept the false solution constructed by the 
murderer. With Cust, the reader is forced into confrontation with the deviance of 
selfhood, and encouraged to champion Cust as a victim of the very uncertainties that 
constitute the reader’s own self-doubt.  
 Ultimately, Cust is found not guilty – in fact, he is found not to have epilepsy at 
all, just bad spectacles. Whether Christie is distrustful of epilepsy as an account for 
crime is not clear, but either way, this is not the main message. What the text proposes is 
that individuals are generally unreliable narrators of themselves, a fact which can be 
easily exploited by anyone with a little medical knowledge and an understanding of 
what kinds of criminal behaviour were credible according to the contemporary press. In 
The Murder of Roger Ackroyd, according to Knight, Hercule Poirot controls the 
deviance of the narrator, thus consoling (or nearly consoling) fears of the concealed 
aspects of the self entertained by the reader. In The ABC Murders, Poirot performs a 
similar function, and both the reader’s and the suspect’s dependence upon the detective 
is assured. While the self is perceived to be unknown, mysterious, and potentially 
deviant, the promise that the detective will shore up uncertainties about selfhood is 
bound up with narrative closure and the detective novel’s capacity to console. As shall 
be seen in Heads You Lose, the alignment of the reader with a character experiencing 
subjective discontinuities only serves to reinforce the necessity of a detective of the self.  
  
Margery Allingham, Police at the Funeral (1931) 
In contrast to The ABC Murders, the prime suspect in Police at the Funeral actually 
suffers from a condition that causes loss of consciousness. The suspect is aware of his 
ailment, but his behaviour during blank-outs is a mystery. The role of the detective in 
these two 1930s fugue-killer whodunits is analogous; in order to solve the crime, it is 
necessary to overcome the illusion of the suspect’s concealed, deviant self. The object of 
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scrutiny is, in keeping with the formula’s classic demands, still motivation, but enquiries 
into conduct during fugue states attest that motivation is something that may not be 
rational in its intentions or recognisable to the suspect. The proficiencies of the 
detective, his capacity to discern the significance of a clue, explain away the mysterious 
and dismiss a false solution, are utilised to deduce the real solution. An accurate portrait 
of the true (conscious) killer, which undermines legal authorities’ enthusiastic accusation 
of the unconscious killer, ultimately solves the crime. 
 The private lives of a dysfunctional family are opened up for inspection when 
Andrew, the most pernicious of the four Faraday siblings, is murdered in the meadows 
outlying the town. In the early stages of the novel, the oppressive atmosphere of the 
Faraday’s rambling Cambridge town house is emphasised: the décor has not been 
modified since the 1900s, the spirit of their autocratic, academic father still prevails, and 
the strange aged-childhood of the siblings – in their late forties and fifties, but as petty 
and insular as infants – all contribute to a poisonous atmosphere. Repression is a key 
concept in these early stages, and the reader is primed to accept that the rules and 
restraints of the household – moral management and the policing of social conduct 
combined with trivial rules against tea in the mornings and the drinking of beer – have 
created such a blockage of unfulfilled desires that pathology and murder have become 
the final means of release. Such are the first thoughts of the detective, Campion:  
The atmosphere of restraint which is so racking in adolescence was here 
applied to age, and Campion experienced a fear of stumbling upon some 
weak spot where, beneath the rigid bond of repression, human nature had 
begun to ferment, to decay, to become vile. (96) 
Freud is very much in residence in the household, with its absent and loathed, 
totalitarian father, its oppressively present, antique and magisterial mother, and its 
infantilised adult-children.  
 The string of ‘lunatic crimes’ (137) completes the picture, and mild mannered 
Uncle William becomes the prime suspect when he admits that he suffers from 
automatism and amnesia caused by an unexplained nervous condition. Ostensibly, this is 
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the ‘weak spot’ predicted by Campion, an outburst of repressed, anti-social sentiment 
supported by medical explanations and legal precedent. William has no means of 
accounting for what he has done while ‘out’, and most damningly, he has always come-
to in a situation strikingly dissimilar to that which he last recalls. On the fatal day, he 
remembers having an argument with Andrew, and then coming-to outside the gate to the 
family home, somewhat late for lunch. In the meantime, Andrew was murdered. 
Resembling very closely the accounts offered by epileptics in court, William explains 
how the attack began:  
I remember standing in the road leading to the Grantchester meadows 
arguing with Andrew about the right way to go home … I remember parting 
with him. I was very rattled, don’t you know, very upset to think that a man 
could be such a fool. And that’s when I lost my memory. (115) 
Evoking a public discourse of the discussion of violent, unconscious crimes, these 
details suggest that the guilt lies with William.  
 This is something that William attempts to reject. He understands his condition as 
a nervous affliction, no more psychological in origin or significance than a ‘gammy leg’ 
(113), and claims that he considers it ‘one of the most natural things in the world’ (113). 
His insouciance is, however, disingenuous, and he betrays his anxiety about his 
behaviour during these episodes through his insistence that he is ‘morally as innocent as 
a new-born babe’ (113), and not legally responsible for ‘any action that I may at these 
times inadvertently commit’ (Allingham’s italics, 113). As the frantic family lawyer 
points out, the law takes a different stance – it ‘is very definite on the subject’ (113). To 
the police, it is obvious that William is guilty, and towards the novels’ close, the police 
inspector admits, ‘I didn’t follow up William’s alibi because I was more than certain he 
hadn’t got one … I knew he’d done it, … If this had been an ordinary case he would 
have done it’ (250). Unquestioning acceptance of the automatic killer plot, supported by 
vague medical understanding, contributes to lazy police work which might have ended 
in William’s imprisonment; even if found guilty but insane, the penalty would be 
Broadmoor rather than acquittal.  
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 Dissociative fugues were already firmly associated with war neurosis, and this 
connection is made when it is discovered that Andrew was shot with the revolver issued 
to William when stationed in France. That his condition did not manifest itself until nine 
months prior to Andrew’s death (the time frame of the novel is the present, so the early 
1930s) does not detract from the likelihood that William’s condition can be traced to war 
trauma: such protracted incubation periods were not unusual and, as the 1939 Lockhart 
case shows, William’s late breakdown would have been by no means extreme. The 
novel, however, comically sidesteps the war neurosis explanation in a move which 
serves as another means of counteracting the automaton solution. William was stationed 
in France, but at Montreuil-sur-Mer, a name which would have familiar to contemporary 
readers as the location of the British Army’s general headquarters on the Western Front. 
Far enough away from the front line to be safe, barring a light attack in 1918, the 
experience of those who held staff jobs in this picturesque, fortified town could not have 
differed more dramatically from that of the soldiers who were wounded and traumatised 
in the trenches. A prognostication of his later life, William’s war was mundane and 
insulated, offering no opportunity for heroism or the emotional turmoil that was likely to 
result in mental breakdown. 
 The explanation for his dissociation will be more prosaic, and it is the detective 
alone who realises this. Campion has the capacity to understand character rather than 
apply psychological principles, to treat the case as unique rather than as a type and, most 
importantly, to understand the significance of clues in order to reconstruct the missing 
facts of William’s lost half hour. These are things the police force, with their vague 
appropriation of psychology and tendency to view the crime as standard, rather than 
singular, are not able to do. Neither is Uncle William, as although the mystery concerns 
none other than himself the content of his own psyche and the actions of his body are a 
mystery to him. Albeit slightly more bumptious in his claims for his innocence than 
Cust, William ultimately relies on the detective to extricate him from conviction through 
re-associating him with his actions, and exorcising the phantasm of the concealed enemy 
of the self.  
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 Primarily, this is achieved through attention to traditional clues. The influence of 
epilepsy narratives in newspapers can be felt in the retelling of William’s experiences of 
previous attacks. In these ostensibly objective, but narratively structured, accounts,  
fragments of memories, the recollection of profound emotions and the state in which 
sufferers found themselves on waking all are treated as clues. Accordingly, William tries 
to piece together the linear order of events through attention to details. In all, he has 
experienced a mere three attacks. The first time, he recounts, 
I was walking down Petty Cury on a damned hot day. My mind went blank, 
and the next thing I knew I was standing outside the Roman Catholic church 
with a glass in my hand. I felt an absolute fool and, naturally, rather alarmed. 
I noticed one or two people looking at me curiously. The glass didn’t tell me 
anything; ordinary tumbler, the sort of thing you’d get in a bar. I put it in my 
pocket finally and threw it into a field as I came out of town. (115) 
His confusion is caused by the heat rather than any extremes of emotion, but the effect is 
the same. In the coming-to moment, the surprise of onlookers and his own feelings of 
embarrassment and alarm are consistent with press accounts. Although he tries to make 
sense of them, the glass and the church have no relationship to one another – they have 
no meaning, in Žižek’s sense of the term. The second account is more bizarre. After 
dinner, he ‘remembers walking down to the gate with Andrew …. I remembered nothing 
more until I found myself shivering in a cold bath’ (115). The glass, the Roman Catholic 
church and the bath are equally mysterious, and William is unable to deduce their 
meaning and understand what motivations he is pursuing in the fugue state. The possible 
explanations for the acts are more frightening than their arbitrariness, given that the 
narrative works to imply that William is the killer, and that anti-social desires were 
widely supposed to be revealed in unconscious states. Had he meant to do himself harm 
in the bath? Are there sexual connotations to this act? Is the church some kind of symbol 
of repression, and if so was he going to throw the glass at it? It is no surprise that 
William was alarmed.  
201 
 
 In an act which recalls Žižek’s retelling of the role of the detective according to 
Freud’s techniques of dream analysis, the detective ignores the supposed symbolic 
meaning of the clues. Instead of trying to integrate them into a coded language of 
pathological wish fulfilment, he concerns himself with their relevance to William alone. 
The church, he reveals, was just a coincidence, and the significance of the glass had 
been obscured by the weighty associations of Catholicism and the assumption that his 
placement there must have a meaning. The presumption that William had found his way 
to the bath alone also added an unnecessarily pathological tone to his condition. His 
submersion in the cold water was most likely a cruel trick of Andrew’s, and once this 
explanation has been hit upon, and the church dismissed, due attention can be paid to the 
glass. Not one of a range of arbitrary and mysterious details, but the one actually 
significant detail, the glass attests to William’s profound and actuating motivation when 
unconscious. He has spoken about his fondness for a drink and his mother’s prohibitions 
before – in the same conversation, in fact, in which he admitted to his attacks. Campion 
alone noticed this, and explains what occurs in William’s blank outs:  
he had walked into a public house, ordered a drink and walked out with the 
glass in his hand. After all, amnesia is a remote form of paralysis, isn’t it? 
The mind rejects memory, often because memory is unpleasant. Memory 
means restraint. Uncle William loses his memory and loses his restraints. He 
satisfies his natural desire. He has his drink. (143) 
Utterly conventional according to appropriations of the Freudian model of mind, the 
only difference with Campion’s account of William’s amnesia is that his natural desires 
do not run into murderous pathologies, but to his innocuous desire for a pint. The 
mechanisms by which he obtains his objectives – the blank out, the disabling of 
restraint, the unconscious action, the satisfaction of desire and its subsequent repression 
through amnesia – are consistent with a psychoanalytic account of automatic action as 
wish fulfilment. William was following the dictates of his unconscious, but the extreme 
austerity of the household, his mother’s prohibitions against alcohol and his generally 
subjugated existence mean that the act is a genuinely deviant one.  
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 Throughout the investigation, the police inspector has bewailed the absence of a 
psychologist to explain the baffling traits of the suspects: ‘I don’t see how their minds 
work’ (81); and ‘[t]his is a job for a psychologist’ (142) he complains. However, and in 
spite of the appropriation of Freud to account for William’s fugues, a general resistance 
to psychology as a discipline is evident in the novel. It is no coincidence that the true 
killer is an avid collector of ‘the more modern psychologists’ (103). As the family 
matriarch, who emerges towards the novel’s close as a particularly intelligent and erudite 
woman, notes: ‘I do not care for the modern psychologists, so I cannot tell you the new 
names for the old disorders’ (243). Alongside her classically inflected understanding of 
human mentality, is a distrust of psychology as an objective science. Campion states: 
The difficulty about psychology is that it hasn’t any rules. I mean, if one 
person can imagine the state of mind in which another might perform 
certain acts, then these acts are sound psychology. In order words, given a 
person’s batty enough, there is nothing he or she may not do. (180) 
That fallible individuals, with their tendency to empathise and to project their 
emotional life onto others, practice psychology is its major weakness. For William, a 
public discourse of insanity replete with narratives of automatic killing make it easy for 
investigators to imagine that he is the killer. Structuring the expectations of characters 
and readers alike, assumptions about unconscious deviance become calcified into a rule, 
but in William’s case, they are not applicable. Psychology may be supposed to have firm 
and fast rules, but the novel suggests that its insights should be used fluidly, without 
trying to tie up all loose ends according to principles which may turn out to be 
speculative, subjective and ungrounded in fact.  
 Far superior is the art of detection. Submitting all facts to interrogation, the 
detective is not concerned with concealed deviance and the complexities of the self, nor 
with the empathy or introspection which might help to reveal the individual’s secrets. 
The true self is revealed through attention to the individual’s acts in the world, not 
through depth analysis or the application of doubtful rules. This is why the detective, 
rather than a psychologist or even the individual concerned, is able to articulate who we 
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are and what, really, we are like. In Police at the Funeral, Campion clears William’s 
name by attention to the glass, but in an interesting dispersion of the detective’s skills, 
William is shown to have a glimmer of the detective’s prowess. Rather than trying to 
clear his name by defending the content of his unconscious mind – praising Andrew and 
boasting of his love for him, or rejecting any concealed deviance on his own part by 
talking of his excellent record of mental health and his lack of repressive pathologies – 
he makes a practical observation:  
I couldn’t have killed Andrew. I didn’t take a chunk of rope to church with 
me. … I wear a very tight overcoat. Very smart. Why, I can’t put a prayer 
book in my pocket without it looking like a hip flask. But a chunk of rope! 
Someone would have noticed it. (120).
15
  
A mode of reasoning that privileges material facts open to public scrutiny, William’s 
emphasis upon the empirically verifiable qualities of the case, rather than upon the 
metaphysical mysteries of his own self, raise him in the detective’s estimation: ‘It was 
evident that a great deal of what Uncle William said was pertinent’ (120), Campion 
reflects.  
 
Christianna Brand, Heads You Lose (1941) 
The title of Brand’s English country house mystery playfully refers to losing one’s head 
– a pun in a novel about madness and decapitation – but also evokes the opposing but 
indivisible two sides of a coin. The title is therefore apt, as the novel, through its 
depiction of the madness of the killer, Pendock (Pen), proposes that duality is a core 
quality of selfhood. Madness itself is seen as a tussle between good and evil, which pits 
the conscious ‘I’ against the truest manifestation of the concealed enemy of the self.  
 There are many similarities between the delineation of Pen’s madness and the 
Lockhart case, and it is worth drawing attention to them as it is highly possible that 
Brand would have been aware of Lockhart’s case. The doctor’s medical career meant 
that the case received wide attention in the medical press and, as Brand herself had 
                                                 
15 Andrew’s hands were bound together with a thick rope when his body was found.  
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worked as a nurse and had married a surgeon, it is possible that the unusual details of the 
case and trial would have attracted her attention. More publicly, a detailed account of the 
trial was published over two days in the Times, and the verdict received front news page 
attention (“Doctor Guilty, But Insane”).  
 Like Lockhart, Pen has experienced a trauma – discovering the body of a dead 
girl in the woods – but has repressed it in a similar manner to a war neurotic, because he 
is a man and an upper class landowner who needs to maintain decorum and control, 
unlike the ‘terrified local’ (13) who was with him at the crime scene. The war is not 
mentioned in Heads You Lose, but the threat of death and madness hangs over the family 
from the novel’s first pages, with the wood that borders the estate functioning as an 
ominous reminder of the horror of the old crime, pushed repeatedly to the depths of 
Pen’s unconscious. Brand’s close delineation of upper class responsibility and the 
figuring of Pen makes him the novel’s pivotal figure of masculine reason and control, 
and he is called upon to inspect the bodies while the women faint. His subsequent 
breakdown overlaps with Elaine Showalter’s account of shell-shock, which she 
describes, after Freud, as the consequence of a conflict with masculine ideals of stoicism 
in the face of extremely disturbing events (The Female Malady 169). Instead of stoicism, 
Pen was deeply scarred by the traumatic encounter. The feelings of shame and guilt he 
experienced because of his ‘emasculated’ response persist while his memory of the 
response itself has been repressed; in trying to locate the source of his great feeling of 
shame, he has erroneously conflated his emotions with the imagined guilt of the maid’s 
killer.  
 Lockhart’s experience was traced back to the massacre of his platoon in 1918. 
Throughout the 1920s he suffered blank outs in surgical theatres and moments of 
dissociation, although it was not until 1939 that he murdered his wife (“Medical Man 
Charged With Wife-Murder” 1064). In contrast, Heads You Lose is set a year after the 
death of the maid. Affirming the psychoanalytic dictate that the unconscious does not 
conform to linear time, for Lockhart and Pen the traumatic memories have disconcerting 
immediacy. Pen turns white when the crime is mentioned, can barely glance at the 
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woods in which the body was found, and must force traumatic images out of his mind. 
Events in his romantic life catalyse the resurgence of traumatic memories, and when he 
realises his love for his adopted niece Fran will be unrequited, conscious checks upon 
his psychic trauma break down. The first victim, a woman who insulted Fran, is 
strangled, just as the maid was. Pen re-enacts the violence he witnessed as the concealed 
enemy of the self – the part of him that did not respond adequately to the death of the 
maid – achieves autonomy.  
 In a narrative device that calls to mind Lockhart’s case, Pen experiences 
mysterious dreams. These dreams, in which he approaches a mysterious woman and 
grips her chin as he tries to turn her face towards him, prefigure the discovery of the 
murders, and the reader later realises they are ‘screens’ to his memories of the attacks. 
His condition, insane automatism, is constructed through the accumulation of his 
symptoms: his headaches; the ‘mist like blood’ which ‘passed before his eyes’ (29) when 
he discovers the corpse; his attempts to repress horror (‘he closed them to shut out the 
horror of it’ 29); and his movement ‘like an automaton’ (32). He is constantly blocking 
out horror, although his conscious personality is highly sympathetic – the ‘kind and 
dependable and safe and strong’ (Brand’s italics, 157) head of the household. 
 Early in the novel, the family suspected that a homicidal maniac was committing 
the murders, however they are soon convinced that the killer must come from within the 
family circle. None consider that the homicidal maniac could be one of them, and so it is 
a shock to all when Pen’s true mental state is revealed at the dénouement at the exact 
moment that another character is being arrested for the murder. Pen realises that he can 
remember a detail about the killings that only the murderer could know, which would be 
impossible unless he himself was the killer: ‘And suddenly he knew the truth, the real 
truth; and the truth was so horrible that something snapped in his brain’ (211). What 
snaps is his repressed memory of the killings, and he is thrown back into the same 
dissociated state in which he committed them. This narrative shift simulates the 
workings of the mind of the insane murderer, a place otherwise suggested, imagined and 
contested in psychological accounts.  
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 In a unique twist upon the dénouement formula, Pen now himself plays detective, 
analyst and murderer. While the supposed detective, Cockrill, has failed to deduce that 
Pen was suffering from his murderous delusion, Pen-as-detective now reconstructs 
events as if an observer, but in his case, repressed memories fill in the details previously 
left blank. He remembers clearly ‘those bleeding stumps of necks, of the swing of the 
hatchet and the sickening scythe of the train’ (212). Rather than the formal detective 
figure, Cockrill, Pen becomes the authoritative detective of the self as he reunites the 
clues of the killings with his own memories, now accessible in the unconscious state.  
 The narration of these events, their cause and symptoms and the phenomenology 
of disassociation can be compared with the account of Lockhart’s crime, and there are 
further similarities in the experience of dissociated personality. Lockhart explained how: 
‘he began to get an image, the image of his wife’s body, and it seemed cold. “There was 
a strong smell of gas … They are images in my mind, just as one recovers bits of a 
dream’” (“Doctor Guilty, But Insane”). During Pen’s dreams, he unknowingly commits 
the crimes, and one character muses near the novel’s end, ‘[s]ometimes there are dreams 
– a recurrent dream, not necessarily anything bad or terrible, but always the same one. I 
wonder if Pen had a dream’ (219). It is a contrary shift of perception when real world 
events have the quality of a dream, and dreams leech into and become constitutive of 
reality. The pre-eminence of the knowing self and its ability to obtain reliable knowledge 
about the concrete world, are shown to be contingent, as the dissociated mind warps or 
masks sense experience unbeknownst to the core subject.  
 There are further similarities between the two cases. Lockhart was acting 
automatically while he committed his crime, and yet he acted decisively and with a 
degree of control and purpose. This is quite distinct from the traditional view of the 
homicidal maniac – originating in the wild beast test of late eighteenth century criminal 
law – which Cockrill espouses:  
The girl had been tied up and then decapitated with the scythe; most 
homicidal maniacs, whatever they may do afterwards, kill their victim with 
their hands or with anything they may happen to have in their hands – they 
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strangle or bludgeon or slash or stab. The lust to kill is strong, and they don’t 
waste time on fancy stuff like tying the victim up first. (55) 
Cockrill is trying to prove that the killer comes from within the family, as clearly there is 
an order to the crimes which suggests motive and intention. However, he does not point 
out that these can be a feature of automatic action in insanity, which suggests that his 
medical knowledge has not kept up with professional opinion. This interchange with a 
medical witness at the Lockhart trial was quoted in the Times: 
If a man is able to get the necessary implements and give a hypodermic 
injection of evipan, does it not indicate he knows what he is doing? - Not 
necessarily. The executive side of the mind may remain intact while the 
knowing part of the mind may be suspended. (“Doctor Accused Of 
Murdering Wife”) 
In comparable fashion, Pen’s actions are reducible to executive functions of mind, as his 
knowing and moral self is suspended. What is left is a shadow of the core identity – an 
estranged pattern of selfhood recognisable because it follows patterns that may seem 
familiar, through habit, through their reiteration in memory or their persistent half 
glimpsed presence in fantasy life.  
 Pen’s crime may have been rooted in the repression of his own feelings of 
inadequacy when confronting the maid’s corpse, but it is manifested in killings which 
demonstrate his excessive anxiety for Fran’s safety. Overlaps, again, are detectable with 
the Lockhart case. The doctor’s obsession with injections was rooted in his fears of 
killing patients. In his evidence at trial, he explains, ‘it was not due to a shrinking from 
responsibility so much as to a great anxiety for the unconscious patient’ (“Medical Man 
Charged with Wife Murder” 1065). So too was he obsessed with his household’s safety 
as the international situation deteriorated before the announcement of the Second World 
War. He lived in an area described as ‘vulnerable’ (1064), was working as an Air Raid 
Precautions warden and, although he ‘was doubtful of his own adequacy’ (1063), he was 
expecting to perform medical duties. He was also concerned about the ‘disintegration of 
social life which they feared might follow if war came’ (1064). As a medical witness 
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said at the trial, in cases such as Lockhart’s, sufferers ‘have been under great emotional 
stress, which they have resisted, and have reached a point at which the emotions 
overcame them’ (1064). As Lockhart’s earlier emotional stress was called back by the 
strong emotion of anxiety experienced at the onset of war, so Pen becomes excessively 
anxious as his beloved Fran seems to be threatened. Pen’s two victims are both women 
who have to some degree insulted Fran: ‘She shouldn’t have sneered at Fran’ Pen 
reflects on one of the victims (213). It is somewhat ironic that Pen’s final attack is on 
Fran herself, but no more so than the fact that Lockhart murdered his wife. In both cases, 
the beloved object that is threatened becomes an object of such anxiety that the 
unconscious wish is to destroy it. As it is related in the reporting of the Lockhart case,   
[i]n the recovery of memory there came a sense of terror lest mutilation 
should happen to his wife, and the night following recovery he had dreams 
of his wife and of war and mutilation’ (“Medical Man Charged with Wife 
Murder” 1065).  
At the same time that Pen feels a deviant urge to destroy Fran, he wants to protect 
her, and this struggle between conflicting desires is manifest in the disrupted syntax of 
the dénouement section. In a novel which is stylistically consistent in its employment of 
omniscient narration and free indirect discourse, the unpunctuated movement to first 
person interior monologue from the conventional third person narrative mode 
throughout the section is a gently modernist touch. Although quite different in content, it 
is reminiscent of Dorothy Richardson’s stylistic ventures in her Pilgrimage sequence 
(1915-38), and here indicative of psychological dissociation:  
His fingers began to curl for the feel of it, for the sweet, warm feel of her 
throat, Fran’s throat, who would never be his. I ought to be destroyed. I’m 
mad, I’m dangerous, and this is Fran. I ought to be dead. (214)  
The bland, informative tone of the last three sentences attempts to quell the more sensual 
tone of the first, reflecting a contest between the excesses of the deviant self and the 
logical, restraining voice of the ego. While, bodily, he is strangling Fran, mentally he is 
in a dissociated state, and it is interesting to note that throughout the section the first 
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person voice is overwhelmingly used as it is above, to explain and to attempt to restrain, 
rather than to revel in the mischief of the body. When Pen has moments of lucidity, he 
narrates his fears and his dawning realisation of his own guilt, but he does not fully 
identify with the murderous mind. He can merely look on as a distinct, dissociated 
observer, terrified by his physical compulsion and helplessness:    
“I’m mad!” he thought. “God forgive me, I’m mad and I’m murdering Fran. I 
did this to Grace Morland and I did it to Pippi Le May and now I’m doing it 
to Fran and I can’t stop myself.” (212) 
Although Pen is, in practical terms, as close in proximity to the concealed enemy of his 
self as possible, they are not one and the same. In contrast to Roger Ackroyd, the reader 
is not tricked into occupying the ‘I’ of the deviant self – with Pen, the reader looks on 
aghast as an observer of an appalling crime, cognisant of the ‘great waves of horror and 
helplessness and despair’ (213) that wash over Pen. The memories of the murders, the 
sensation of the present attack and the lust to kill are accessible to Pen as facts of the 
case, but not as fully lived experience.  
 Of course, Pen’s recognition that he is mad has a touch of bathos, and can be 
criticised in the same way as the M’Naghten rules were by Henry Maudsley, who was 
appalled that the law expected the madman to be ‘reasonable in his unreason, sane in his 
insanity’ (qtd. in Whitlock 23). Heads You Lose sounds a comparable note of 
responsibility, and Pen’s movement from unconscious criminal to detective of himself is 
only achieved when he transforms himself from a rational observer to the controller of 
deviance – a deviance which is, of course, his own. Pen can only overcome his 
murderous self with an act of re-association directed by the will, and that this is treated 
as a battle of good and evil implies that mental illness can awaken concealed irrational 
and malevolent drives which the ‘good’, rational, self-knowing ego has ultimate 
responsibility to overcome. The following excerpt details Pen’s breakthrough moment:  
Good and Evil: heart and mind wrestled together in a few black seconds that 
lasted a hundred years. I, Pendock, I’m mad. I’m dangerous … Why don’t 
they kill me, why don’t they save her from me? And then triumphant, ringing 
210 
 
like a clarion through the wreckage of the splendid brain: “I must save Fran. 
I must save her. I must save her from myself!” (214) 
The division of the self into warring opposites, polarities of good and evil, owes much to 
the nineteenth century writing on duality of Hogg and Stevenson. There is something of 
a retreat from the more complex, modernist entanglement of selves perceptible here, as if 
the old duality presents a more reassuring, because divisible, notion of identity. Pen’s act 
of naming and his repeated use of the word ‘I’ demonstrate that he is experiencing, even 
enforcing, a re-association of his divided self, but one that can only end in destruction. 
His suicide is an act of killing his other self, and as such is treated as a heroic act.  
 In terms of the long detective tradition, the moment at which Pen recognises 
himself as composed of duelling, dual identities, and morally associates with the core 
‘Pen’ reflects the generic reunification of the narrative begun at the dénouement. While 
previously he was not responsible for what he did, now that he is able to perceive his 
concealed self as actor, he becomes responsible. Ultimately, his suicide is the moment of 
justice which completes the dénouement. That Pen, rather than Cockrill, brings about 
this resolution, assures that the detective function has changed hands. Of course, in many 
novels characters commit suicide to escape justice, or are encouraged to commit suicide 
by the detective to spare their family name. That is not quite what occurs here. A 
detective like Cockrill cannot do what is necessary to reconnect the self. Unlike The 
ABC Murders, there are no medical figures in the novel, so there is no suggestion as to 
whether a psychologist could have helped. The concealed enemy of the self is ultimately 
something over which the solitary, perceiving self has responsibility.  
 After his suicide the survivors conclude that Pen was insane, either due to bad 
heredity,  trauma or automatism. Whatever the diagnosis, they agree that he was 
irresponsible for the murders and is, perversely, the saviour of the novel, having 
sacrificed himself to save Fran. He receives some help from Fran’s dog, Aziz, who 
gnaws at his trouser leg throughout the attack and is instrumental in bringing the 
unconscious and dissociated Pen back into full cognisance of his body. However, it is 
suggested that he was only able to overcome the deviance of his self because of the 
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original constitution of his mind. The heroism of his act of will in overcoming his 
deviant lust to kill is emphasised, at the same time as the ‘wreckage of the splendid 
brain’ (214) and ‘ the great, good heart’ which ‘beat like a gong’ (213) throughout his 
attack are credited for enabling his original, moral self to triumph. ‘Pen’ may be a victim 
of the concealed enemy of the self, as well as an observer of the crimes he commits; he 
is not much more authentically himself, however, in his brave overcoming of the deviant 
unconscious and physical impulses that move him to murder. Even in this self-affirming 
act, he is constituted by the original splendour of his brain; not the physiological entity 
that experiences headaches, was probably epileptic, and was inherited from a mother 
who ‘died abroad’ (215), but the matrix of responsibilities and privileges he represents as 
the feudal landowner, rational male and father figure. These are all decisive and 
determining factors which enable him to exercise the power of will to overcome his 
repressed trauma and homicidal urges. The primacy of the ‘I’, the thinking, judging, 
conscious self, is ultimately reinforced, even when it is most utterly obviated. 
 
Nihilistic, even paranoid responses to the modernist focus on the psychological 
complexity beneath the surface of consciousness are exemplified in Christianna Brand’s 
Heads You Lose, Allingham’s Police at the Funeral  and Christie’s The ABC Murders. 
Portrayals of the criminal mind articulated reader’s fears about unconscious deviance, 
and problematised the notion of rational motivation. Like their modernist peers, crime 
authors were drawn to plots which reflected the experience of mental illness and war 
trauma, conditions which threatened to quell the psychological blocks upon repressed 
horrors, ambivalent attitudes and the mind’s uncanny content. These themes spoke to the 
modernist tendency to view the individual as disintegrative and in a fragmented state. To 
the authors of Modernism: A Guide to European Literature, 1890-1930, much of this 
writing responded to contemporary crises, when ‘all realities have become subjective 
fictions’ and when the recognition of complexity and multiplicity within the subject 
occasioned ‘the destruction of traditional notions of the wholeness of individual 
character’ (27). The composite, fractured characters of modern literature, the authors 
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suggest, could not achieve the completion or self-knowledge strived for by characters in 
traditional realist fiction. Personal aberration and miscellaneous, unfamiliar thoughts 
threatened to surface, while consciously calculated rational motivations might prove to 
be psychological screens for darker, unacknowledged desires. The experience of 
selfhood in the modern novel and crime novel alike could be one of alienation, as inward 
experiences of disorder and fractured communication between a character’s several, 
irresolvable aspects perplexes traditional notions of developmental selfhood and 
individual integrity.  
 Of course, an alternate trajectory was also being followed in modernist writing. 
In Modernist Self , Denis Brown explains: 
self-fragmentation can be reassessed as a form of self-diversification and 
self-plenitude … by dismantling integral selfhood, the Modernists also 
deconstruct egoic repression and suggest that self-wholeness consists in the 
acknowledgement and balancing of disparate self-parts. (12) 
Insight into the complex nature of selfhood generated fear, but so too did it enable 
writers to blur boundaries between pathological and normal thought processes, loosening 
the repressive hold of the ego and opening up the possibility of liberation – from social 
norms, guilt at one’s ulterior inclinations and entrapment within static identities. As 
authors recognised the positive, emancipatory consequences of accepting psychological 
complexity, the fragmented modern subject need not be seen as broken, the secrets of the 
self not necessarily purely negative; indeed, the subjective realm could afford a means – 
perhaps the only means – to gain valid knowledge about the world. Was this alternate 








V. Irrational Detection 
 
Crime fiction is at heart a quest for truth, but the way that truth is attained and assessed 
is far from uniform. Golden age crime writers were in general outspoken in their 
demands for methodical, scientific deduction. Their invocations against detection as 
guesswork, intuition and second-sight, were expressed in the copious lists of ‘rules’ 
published during the period, giving a formal structure to the beliefs about truth and 
reality installed in their narratives. There is an objective reality, crime fiction tells us, 
which can be known to rational observers. Although it may be distorted by the beholder, 
knowledge about reality can be ultimately verified. 
In his “Ten Commandments” (1929), the British crime writer Ronald Knox insists 
that the detective must never ‘have an unaccountable intuition which proves to be right’ 
(Knox 195). Even though it is supposed to be beyond the ability of the average 
individual to have come to the solution on their own, the thought process that has led to 
the detective’s solution must be coherent and comprehensible. On election to the British 
Detection Club, crime writers including Dorothy L. Sayers, Agatha Christie and G.K. 
Chesterton took the oath which bound them to write novels in which protagonists  
detect the crimes presented to them using those wits which it may please 
you to bestow upon them and not placing reliance on nor making use of 
Divine Revelation, Feminine Intuition, Mumbo Jumbo, Jiggery-Pokery, 
Coincidence, or Act of God. (“Detection Club Oath” 198) 
North American crime writers also celebrated the application of brilliant reasoning to 
verifiable facts. In “Twenty Rules for Writing Detective Stories” (1928), S.S. Van Dine 
declared: 
a detective is not a detective unless he detects. His function is to gather clues 
that will eventually lead to the person who did the dirty work in the first 
chapter; and if the detective does not reach his conclusions through an 
analysis of those clues he has no more solved his problem than the schoolboy 
who gets his answer out of the back of the arithmetic. (190) 
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Van Dine advised an empirical, ‘rational and scientific’ (191), method of detection, 
disparaging the solutions of ‘pseudo-science and purely imaginative and speculative 
devices’ (191) including séances and word-association tests. Contemporary fads for 
Spiritualism and the psychoanalytic methods of probing the unconscious developed by 
Carl Jung do not meet Van Dine’s rigorous ‘scientific’ criteria. 
 In practice, golden age crime fiction seems to epitomise the rejection of the 
subjective view. Characters are encouraged to think clearheadedly about facts as they 
recount their own, flawed impressions of the crime. Their misapprehensions and partial 
glimpses are analysed, what is useless is eliminated and what is pertinent is fixed upon 
so that an objective reading can be achieved by the detective. Approaching the truth of 
the mystery is treated as a process of removing the subjective view and, through the 
agency of the detective, arriving at a single objective narrative which will supplant those 
of other characters and readers alike.  
Seeming to contradict these outspoken demands for reason, feminine intuition is 
notably reclaimed in Christie’s writing. Intuition, supposed to be a collection of 
irrational hunches, subjective perceptions, scraps of gossip and flimsy guesswork, is 
respected by Poirot as a form of unconscious recording and reordering of facts, where 
the unconscious of the average woman unselfconsciously does the same work as the 
celebrated consciousness of the detective. The unconscious as a rational recorder of 
memories and impressions otherwise lost, is a mysterious counterpart to the conscious 
mind: it performs identical rational functions out of sight of the perceiving subject. For 
this reason, Poirot employs the talking method to elicit details from witnesses where 
direct questioning would fail. However, he still insists upon his own elevated reasoning, 
merely employing women as useful witnesses and sounding boards, emphasising his 
superior capacity to incorporate their unconscious abilities into his fully-realised, self-
conscious method.  
Although Christie’s acknowledgement of the formative functions of the 
unconscious went some way to introducing ideas about mysterious and irrational 
psychological processes into crime writing, logic, problem-solving, and meticulous 
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attention to details triumph in her Poirot novels. This is true even in the case of Miss 
Marple, in whom Christie introduced a detective who is the average woman personified. 
Marple has been cited in support of the argument that golden age novels express 
dissatisfaction with the detective figure as an extraordinarily intelligent, reasoning 
masculine hero. Marple’s intelligence does not, however, resemble the ‘female 
intelligence’ that many writers took a stance on during the interwar period. In Women: 
An Inquiry (1925), for example, Willa Muir asserts that women are stronger in 
unconscious life than men. While ‘[c]onscious life implies rational thinking’ (14), the 
unconscious is concerned with ‘growth rather than form,’ (15) and is ‘essentially 
emotional, spontaneous, and irrational’ (15). These feminine attributes should not be 
disparaged, Muir asserts, but respected as distinct intellectual qualities equal to man’s 
and vital to human success. In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf famously asserts that ‘it is 
in our idleness, in our dreams, that the submerged truth sometimes comes to the top’ 
(28), in a section in which the undirected study (literally, the scribbling) of the untrained 
and excluded woman attains a truth not extractable as a pure nugget from text books by 
means of the methodical scholarship in which male students have been trained. In 
sympathy with Woolf, Dorothy Richardson reflects upon how she ‘groans, gently and 
resignedly’ when critics of her novels accuse her of ‘failure to perceive the value of the 
distinctly masculine intelligence’ (12). As Gillian E. Hanscombe states, the ‘qualities of 
intelligence Richardson most prized were not abstract rationalism and analytic 
empiricism, but the ability to perceive relationships between phenomena and the effort 
to synthesize feeling and reflection’ (6).  
To an extent, this is what Poirot’s unconscious witnesses are doing, but few of 
them are gifted enough to perceive the relationships between the phenomena they record 
in their entirety. What is actually seen in many golden age novels is the privileging of 
feminine areas of expertise – household details, articles of dress, village gossip – which, 
though it can be seen as a subversive validation of alternate spheres of knowledge, does 
not contravene the rational foundations of the form. In The Intelligence of Woman 
(1917), W. L. George notes that a woman, though sometimes illogical when discussing 
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abstract or complex ideas, ‘generally displays pitiless logic when she is dealing with 
things that she knows well. … many women are expert in the investment of money, in 
the administration of detail, in hospital management’ (17), and the same is true of the 
female, or ‘effeminate’, detective. There is nothing unscientific about the methods used 
to analyse household details: the detective still breaks down the evidence of the crime 
into ever smaller units, examines them and draws conclusions about causes based on 
given effects. The female or dandyish sleuth is still ‘the apotheosis of the analytical 
mind in its purest form’ as Ernest Mandel calls the detective (17). 
  
Modernist Parallels 
The trans-Atlantic insistence upon reasonable and analytical approaches to detection 
ostensibly pits crime fiction in opposition to the intensified interest in subjectivity and 
the recording of minute fluctuations in consciousness found in contemporary modernist 
writing. Holquist, as has been seen, asserts that, faced with unsettling modernist fiction, 
readers turned for reassurance to interwar detective fiction because of its ‘flatness of 
character’ and its ‘methodological certainties’ (147). To an extent, this is a false 
dichotomy. The dismissal of psychology as a superfluity also formed a technique in the 
modernist canon. There is very superficial characterisation in Franz Kafka’s plays and 
stories; equally, the symbolic function of characters, communicative of elemental forces 
and universal conflicts rather than subjectively bestowed values, was central to 
Expressionist theatre. Alison Light locates Christie’s modernism, perversely, in her 
fixation upon surfaces and masks: ‘the evacuating of notions of character’ (66) as she 
puts it.  
 More interesting parallels can, however, be drawn between modernist writing and 
crime fiction. Rather than seeing crime fiction as a comforting negation of modernism, 
certain texts display the influence of modernist techniques and modernist concerns. Two 
texts in particular, Dorothy L. Sayers’ Whose Body? (1923) and Margery Allingham’s 
Traitor Purse (1941), published at the opening and the close of the golden age 
respectively, flout the genre’s preoccupation with the exercise of reason and scientific 
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analysis, instead portraying detection as an emotional, subjective, spontaneous and 
irrational activity. The intertextuality of these popular texts is more than a concession to 
high cultural tastes; it alters the traditional authority of the detective in fundamental 
ways, mounting a critique of the rationalism which, ostensibly, had hitherto defined the 
form. Ostensibly, because, in spite of the claims of Van Dine and Knox, detective fiction 
has a long tradition of blurring distinctions between the rational, objective stance and the 
subjective. What follows is an assessment of this tendency in crime fiction, followed by 
a theoretical and historical account of anti-positivist trajectories in early twentieth 
century thought. The significance in the long history of detection of golden age 
appropriations of the irrational, subjective and modernist will be revealed through these 
debates.  
 
Reason and the Long Tradition of Detection 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s detective Sherlock Holmes, reclining in his armchair, swathed in 
a cloud of tobacco smoke, cogitating upon the baffling details of a case, has become an 
iconic image in the genre of detective fiction. It complements the equally memorable 
representation of the detective with scientific implements in hand, collecting material 
evidence, then carefully analysing it before he settles down to deduce its significance. 
He embodies the values of rationality and reason, demonstrating the ability to think 
consistently and to an end, to utilise the information to hand, and to verify facts and 
make judgements based upon the conclusions he has systematically reached. The 
mediation of Holmes through the narrative voice of an admiring Watson ensures that 
what is taking place within his mind is mysterious, but the appearance is that superior 
logic is at work, testing, eliminating and finally locating the solution to the mystery: 
‘connecting ideas consciously, coherently and purposively’ as The Dictionary of 
Philosophy defines the process of reasoning (Greenwood). Possessed of all the mental 
attributes necessary to elucidate the mysterious elements of the plot, the detective figure 
is ultimately reassuring: he stands for the triumph of human reason over the irrational 
and the unknown.  
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However, just as integral to Holmes’ method of deduction are extremes of mood 
which are far from rational: 
All afternoon he sat in the stalls wrapped in the most perfect happiness, 
gently waving his long, thin fingers in time to the music, while his gently 
smiling face and his languid, dreamy eyes were as unlike those of Holmes, 
the sleuth-hound, Holmes the relentless, keen-witted, ready-handed 
criminal agent, as it was possible to conceive. In his singular character the 
dual nature alternately asserted itself, and his extreme exactness and 
astuteness represented, as I have often thought, the reaction against the 
poetic and contemplative mood which occasionally predominated in him. 
The swing of his nature took him from extreme languor to devouring 
energy; and, as I knew well, he was never so truly formidable as when, for 
days on end, he had been lounging in his armchair amid his improvisations 
and his black letter editions. Then it was the lust of the chase would 
suddenly come upon him, and that his brilliant reasoning power would rise 
to the level of intuition, until those who were unacquainted with his 
methods would look askance at him as on a man whose knowledge was not 
that of other mortals. (“The Red-Headed League” 80)  
Watson believes that periods of directionless poetic contemplation, unsystematic musical 
improvisation, and wistful inertia seem to sustain Holmes and prepare him for his more 
active and analytical occupations. As a doctor, he backs up these claims with science. 
According to nineteenth-century neuroscientific understanding, Holmes rests his 
reasoning faculties by indulging his poetic nature, restoring the nerve reserves and 
nourishing the nerve fibres which are employed and expended during his animated and 
relentless investigations. To Watson the surgeon, Holmes’ artistic recreations are 
preferable to his alternative methods of relaxation – morphine and cocaine, as described 
in the opening chapter of “The Sign of the Four” (1890). Artificially stimulating the 
mind, the drugs have a morbid effects, increasing ‘tissue-change’ (40) and leading to the 
physical deterioration of the matter of the mind. Drugs simulate the exercise of reason 
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without supplying the mind with a problem to solve, like an empty stomach going 
through the process of digestion, meaning that Holmes’ mind ‘devours’ its own energy 
and, as Watson fears, may be left with ‘a permanent weakness’ (ibid.). For Holmes, such 
secondary effects are ‘of small moment’ compared to the ‘transcendently stimulating and 
clarifying’ (ibid.) mental experience. Holmes dismisses Watson’s highly reasonable 
medical advice, asserting that he craves ‘mental exaltation’ (ibid.), a feeling only 
achievable through drugs.  
When Watson describes Holmes, he constructs a duality between the detective’s 
poetic and his reasoning faculties drawn from the nineteenth-century trope of the divided 
self. This is a duality Holmes bolsters, describing detection as an ‘exact science’ which 
should be treated in a ‘cold and unemotional manner’ (ibid.). What Holmes ignores is 
that this is obviously not how he experiences detection. The elation he feels when high 
on cocaine comes closer. Holmes displays his exhilarated enthusiasm even when he 
describes detection, which he calls his ‘art’ (ibid.). Although Watson is careful to 
describe Holmes’ astonishing solutions as only seemingly achieved through 
clairvoyance, it is clear that something other than rigorous observation, brilliant 
reasoning capacities and the application of comprehensive knowledge contribute to his 
successes. Holmes is inspired by ‘the lust of the chase’, something which comes upon 
him ‘suddenly’. It is in these heightened states of emotion that his perceptive and 
reasoning abilities reach the astonishing levels for which he is famous.  
 
Problems with Reason 
Dualities of the rational and irrational, emotion and reason, and science and art are each 
in imperfect opposition in the Holmes stories. To the Marxist scholar Ernest Mandel, this 
is a contradiction inherent in the form. Mandel associates the rise of the detective story 
in the nineteenth century with the triumph of modern bourgeois rationalism in social 
organisation, politics and economics: the dominance of instrumental reason; the 
capitalist mode of production; secularisation; and positivism – the subordination of all 
aspects of thought and objects of knowledge into units of data amenable to methods of 
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analysis – measurement, quantification and abstract modelling – used in the natural 
sciences. The detective story, which privileges ‘clue-gathering’ and the accumulation of 
‘formalized proof acceptable in court’ (Mandel 43), seemingly reflects the triumph of 
bourgeois rationality; but so too does detective fiction manifest rationality’s inherent 
contradictions: 
Bourgeois rationality is always a combination of rationality and irrationality, 
and it produces a growing trend toward overall irrationality. That is why the 
detective story, while placing analytical intelligence and scientific clue-
gathering at the heart of crime detection, often resorts to blind passions, crazy 
plots, and references to magic, if not to clinical madness, in order to 
“explain” why criminals commit crimes. (43)  
In its drive to reduce the social field to analysable units of data amenable to the 
assessment of a bourgeois legal system, rationality ignores the interconnectedness of 
social phenomena and the relations of power which underlie them. Rationality is 
myopic, breaking down all social and material relations as things to be measured, 
quantified, computed while excluding much that is ‘beyond’ analysis in the process. To 
Mandel, then, crime fiction manifests the weaknesses of its own rationality when it 
resorts to ‘crazy’ explanations to account for crimes: in order to discover the logical 
chain of occurrences leading to the crime, the more profound and complex explanation 
of both the crime and the individual who perpetrated it remains mysterious.  
In Conan Doyle’s stories, Holmes’ mental attributes enable him to triumph over 
the irrational and the unknown in ways that are reassuring. However, this triumph of 
rationality can also be seen to tend towards domination. Mandel’s study is informed by 
Marxist and Frankfurt School critical theory, so it is appropriate to turn to Theodor 
Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), specifically their 
first essay, “The Concept of Enlightenment”. Here they discuss the rise of experimental 
philosophy and scientific enquiry from the late seventeenth century, and the 
accompanying drive to eliminate superstition and ignorance from thought which 
constituted intellectual Enlightenment. ‘The program of the Enlightenment was the 
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disenchantment of the world; the substitution of knowledge for fancy’ (3) Adorno and 
Horkheimer state, gesturing to the sciences which reveal the functioning of nature and to 
the technological innovations by which nature is harnessed to human ends. Mythic and 
religious modes of apprehension are cast out: the supernatural, spiritual and magical are 
dismissed as projections of human desires and fears onto the natural world. However, in 
spite of its intentions, the authors state Enlightenment does not eliminate fear. Fear of 
the unknown is at the heart of the drives to know and to master natural forces which 
motivate modern science and industry: ‘Man imagines himself free when there is no 
longer anything unknown’ (16).  
In this irrational drive to eliminate the unknowable, exploitation and suffering are 
treated as permissible side-effects: ‘Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles; 
neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance with the world’s rulers … What 
men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other 
men’ (4). Instrumental reason works rationally towards an end, but offers no means of 
assessing the end towards which it works. Neither does it offer the moral groundwork 
for a way out of instrumental thought: ‘[t]he moral teachings of the Enlightenment bear 
witness to a hopeless attempt to replace enfeebled religion with some reason for 
persisting in society’ (85). Self-preservation as a ‘good’ is affirmed by reason in the 
bourgeois order, but emotion is ostensibly withdrawn from rational thought, although it 
resurfaces, perversely, in the fear driven panic of economic and political practice (91). 
Another contradiction the authors highlight is that, although the sole unit of 
Enlightenment law and philosophy is the individual, individualism is turned into a tactic 
of oppression: ‘Enlightenment … excises the incommensurable. Not only are qualities 
dissolved in thought, men are brought into actual conformity’ (12). The dominance of 
scientific positivism – the ‘levelling domination of abstraction’ (13) – which seeks to 
discover the laws according to which all things operate reduces all distinct qualities to 
commensurable units of data. The discovery of these ‘laws’ does not lead to greater 
freedom for the individual, but encourages herd mentality and the conversion of the 
individual into experimental fodder (84). The collective is enthralled by those who can 
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understand and dominate on a grand scale (in Adorno and Horkheimer’s time, the 
leaders of Fascism) and thus Enlightenment reverts to the irrational and to myth.  
The anti-positivist critique of the Frankfurt School, though considerably abridged 
here, helps substantiate Mandel’s criticism of detective fiction’s irrational rationality. So 
too does it suggest a reading of the contradictions of the scientific, rational view in the 
Holmes tales, and in detective fiction thereafter. For Holmes, reason is not only 
refreshed by periods of irrational contemplation, but is always exercised with an 
irrational, emotional element, and it is perhaps the more reasonable for being so.  
Proof of this comes in the figure of Holmes’ nemesis, Moriarty. A professor of 
mathematics with a ‘criminal strain’, Moriarty is described as Holmes’ ‘intellectual 
equal’ (“The Final Problem” 200). He is ‘a genius, a philosopher, an abstract thinker. He 
has a brain of the first order,’ and exercises a ‘deep organizing power’ (ibid.), controlling 
a vast and enigmatic criminal network. While Holmes exercises reason in the pursuit of 
pleasure – the lust of the chase – Moriarty is objectiveless rationality personified. He is 
‘extremely tall and thin … pale and ascetic-looking’ (200) making it unlikely that his 
criminal plots serve a self-gratifying end.  If he takes pleasure in evil, it is never 
mentioned. To an extent, the inborn ‘criminal strain’ by which Conan Doyle explains 
Moriarty’s crimes exemplifies the irrational tendency of detective fiction, unwilling and 
unable to account for crime at a psychosocial level. However, Moriarty’s criminal strain 
is not mere fantasy or, if it is fantasy, it was at the time of writing scientifically endorsed 
in the legally recognised category of the moral imbecile (see chapter 3). In this condition 
extraordinary intelligence combined with a lack of moral sense, and made the moral 
imbecile a perturbing figure in positivist criminology. It expresses the fear that criminal 
madness is, at its limits, a form of excessive rationality, bereft of social, moral or 








As Alison Jagger notes, ‘[w]ithin the Western philosophic tradition, emotions have 
usually been considered potentially or actually subversive of knowledge’ (188). Instead, 
Jagger asserts that ‘outlaw’ emotions such as anger ‘may enable us to perceive the world 
differently from its portrayal in conventional descriptions,’ (Jagger 191) alerting us to 
the fact that something is unjust, cruel, dangerous, wrong and so forming the basis of an 
affective epistemology.  
During the golden age, challenges to traditional rationalism coincided with the 
exploration of diverse theories of feeling in psychology, science, and cultural thought. 
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own, although clearly celebrating disordered and 
subconscious means of acquiring knowledge, ultimately valorises the absence of strong, 
negative emotions in the pursuit of truth. Women’s writing has been unfairly ‘deformed 
and twisted’ (63) by the bitter experience of female oppression, according to Woolf, 
while the supposedly dispassionate, rigorous and rational studies produced by men – she 
refers to the works of the male professors who have written scientific, psychological or 
anthropological tracts about women – far from being written in an objective mood, were 
penned in ‘the red light of emotion’ (30), a fact which reveals their bias and limits their 
worth. Woolf is not necessarily in disagreement with Jagger though, who suggests that 
gut reactions and emotional responses form the basis of subsequent critical thought and 
understanding. Woolf’s moment of revelation in the British Library comes when she 
realises why the image of the Professor she has been drawing makes her so angry (31); 
the Professors, having rationalised their desire for superiority through scientific accounts 
of women’s inferiority, will never be enlightened about the true nature of their emotions 
or the real driving motivation of their anger.  
Psychoanalysis drew attention to the emotional backdrop to rationality, but by the 
start of the 1920s, Carl Jung had broken with his teacher Freud over the issue of whether 
an objective, scientific and analytical approach was sufficient to grasp in its manifold 
complexity the lived experience of the human individual. Freud answered yes, while 
Jung pointed out the widening gap between Freud’s calculations and the subjective 
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realities of his patients’ lives. Jung’s translator describes Freud as acting ‘like a master-
detective tracking down the incriminating complex in the unconscious’ (Baynes i-ii), and 
indeed Freud’s standard method began with experimentation, led to data analysis, and 
ended with the elaboration of a model based upon accumulated facts. On the contrary, 
Jung asserted that psychology should move beyond the principles of empirical science. 
Individuals are intuitive and creative, are guided by transcendent values and moved by 
symbols. They experience the world not rationally, but emotionally and perceptively, and 
understand themselves as a dynamic and vital whole. An analytic system which fails to 
recognise this widely misses its mark, and tends towards error.  
 According to Robert Paul Dunn, during the 1930s ‘it was becoming increasingly 
clear to many that philosophies based on science and strict, rational enquiry were 
insufficient for dealing with the crises of a society that was expecting another major war’ 
(200). Dunn’s statement comes in an essay in which he assesses the lay theology 
Dorothy L. Sayers began to produce in the 1930s, and in which he traces resemblances 
between her spiritual thought and her early Wimsey novels. Inspired by Christian tenets, 
in The Mind of the Maker (1941) Sayers asserts that the creative process of the artist can 
reveal the pattern of universal integration in ways lost to analytic enquiry. The universe 
is ultimately loving and whimsical, but a comprehensive view is impossible except as it 
is expressed in creative work, which itself only reflects the ultimate creative work of 
God. The synthesising process of the artist could illuminate spiritual reality and address 
contemporary ethical and political situations, but it is integral that the artist accepts 
human limitation – indeed, this is central to what Dunn calls Sayers’ ‘comprehensive 
comic view of the universe’ and her ‘whimsical vision’ (202). The notions of humility, 
social interdependence and of creative inspiration as a special ‘gift’ (Dunn 188) are all 
central to Sayers’ vision. 
Although referring solely to Sayers’ narrative techniques in her later Wimsey 
novels, Dunn suggests ways of assessing what takes place as Wimsey detects in Sayers’ 
early work, Whose Body?. Approaching the mystery not as a puzzle to be thought 
through rationally, its clues analysed, and its events logically reordered, detection is 
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instead treated as a creative act over which the detective has limited control. Indeed, in 
both Allingham and Sayers’ novels, excessive rationality is associated with domination, 
while affective forms of knowing and relating to the world are granted a privileged 
ethical status. In her war-time thriller Traitor’s Purse (1941) Allingham consciously 
refashions her detective as dependent, emotional and ethical, in contradistinction to both 
his old independent, logical and authoritative self, and to the egotistic fifth column 
fascists he encounters during the case. In both works, detectives possessing quite 
different attributes are presented as antidotes to destructive and egotistical rationality.  
In Western thought, emotion is stereotypically constructed as the unique province 
of women a definitive quality of femininity: ‘She is emotional, he is not’ as Shields 
summarises (3). This raises an inevitable question: in the work of these female writers, 
does the presentation of affectively-astute male detectives contribute to an attack upon 
the age-old superiority of reasonable-masculinity, and a celebration of a feminine 
epistemology in its stead? While neither novel is nearly so explicit, it is certain that such 
gender binaries do not stand at each novels’ close. The result is not so much a feminised 
masculinity (as Munt says of Sayers’ ‘definitely effeminate’ [9-10] detective Wimsey) 
but an individual identity composed of many qualities which can no longer be safely 
sectioned off as masculine or feminine. Male detectives do not learn from women, but 
find traditionally non-masculine qualities already part of their identity, a revelation 
which makes the supposed opposition of masculine and feminine identity meaningless. 
This is particularly striking in Sayers’ later novels: see, for example, Gaudy Night, in 
which the male Wimsey advises the female Harriet that her detective novels are too 
formulaic and ‘jig-saw’ like (291), lacking psychological realism and emotional depth. 
In her critical writing, Sayers displays impatience with essentialism and a distrust of 
feminisms based upon the elevation of the ‘feminine’. Female knowledge is a 
meaningless simplification, she insists, and when asked for an opinion on detective 
writing from the ‘female point of view,’ she responds: ‘You might as well ask what is the 
female angle on an equilateral triangle’ (Are Women Human? 41). Female experience, as 
Sayers sees it, is heterogeneous, and as such the only valid way to define and divide 
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humanity is individually: ‘it is my experience that both men and women are 
fundamentally human, and that there is very little mystery about either sex, except the 
exasperating mysteriousness of human beings in general’ (ibid. 49). While her later 
Harriet Vane novels foreground female characters with such a diversity of traits and 
talents as to render mythic the traditional category of women, in Whose Body? gender 
dissent is expressed obliquely: that is, through the non-articulation of the feminine 
associations of Wimsey’s method. While in Clouds of Witness (1926), Wimsey’s mother 
dismisses the detective’s skills as ‘mother-wit, and it is so rare for a man to have it that if 
he does you write books about him and call him Sherlock Holmes’ (106), in Whose 
Body? there is no direct comparison of the male detective with the average woman, as is 
found in Christie’s writing. This is no less than an attempt to negate debates about 
gendered experience which, judging from Sayers’ tone and message in Are Women 
Human?, bored and frustrated her.
16
 Instead, by refusing to acknowledge that something 
unusual for a man, or indeed effeminate, is taking place in Wimsey’s mind, Whose 
Body? articulates an individual experience not delimited by gender, and constitutes a 
representation of character where gender binaries do not dominate.  
 
Modernism 
Although, in distinction to the fanatical Moriarty, Holmes’s rationality is tempered by 
his emotional nature, his artistic insights and his humanising vulnerability, for golden 
age writers a new alternative to the hyper-rational detective was not to be found within 
the genre, but in the contemporary modernist novel. Amongst its many innovations, the 
modernist novel revelled in the subjective, recording consciousness in narratives 
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   In her later novels, this tactical non-articulation of gender issues is often abandoned. An important 
incident occurs in Gaudy Night. Wimsey, who is playing a spinet and singing an Elizabethan love song 
to Harriet, is accused of being effeminate by a jealous undergraduate. ‘I have been accused of many 
things … but the charge of effeminacy is new to me,’ (370) he responds. The undergraduate is wrong. 
Wimsey is not effeminate because he is not performing modern masculinity appropriately. In Wimsey 
we see many different, historically varied and at times contradictory masculinities being performed at 
once: courting knight, Oxford gentleman, foppish dandy, brilliant intellectual, retiring scholar, John 




moulded by internal states of mind and processes of thought, rather than by received 
fictional structures. In 1919, Virginia Woolf classed much Victorian and contemporary 
writing as materialist, and criticised it for its focus upon constructing solid, credible 
locations, furnishings and social scenes, as well as characters defined by their material 
wealth and status. To Woolf, what had been ignored and obscured was the lived 
experience of these novels’ corporeal, but spiritless, characters. Absent from such works 
were self-reflection, personal conflicts, minor fixations, fleeting memories and 
convincing impressions: these books are ‘well constructed and solid’ but what, ‘if life 
should refuse to live there?’ she asks (“Modern Fiction” 186)  
Of course, crime fiction is often typified by its staginess and the two-
dimensionality of its characters. This un-literary disregard for psychological depth has 
even been praised as its unique strength: in his rules, Van Dine states that beyond the 
necessity for verisimilitude and credibility, complex characterisation was a distraction in 
what should be a spare and streamlined form (191). However, the modernist novel and 
detective fiction have more in common than the comparison of Van Dine’s statement 
with Woolf’s might suggest. Žižek claims that both modernism and detective fiction 
share ‘the same formal problem - the impossibility of telling a story in a linear, 
consistent way ... bearing witness to the impossibility of locating the individual’s fate in 
a meaningful, “organic” historical totality’ (Žižek’s italics, 48-9). The modernist novel, 
with its heightened interest in the mediation of reality by its characters, responds to the 
crisis noted by the authors of Modernism: A Guide to European Literature, 1890-1930, 
when ‘all realities have become subjective fictions,’ (27). Reality, historical totality, the 
comprehensive view, came to be seen as fantastical and unobtainable concepts as the 
subjective view took hold. Detective fiction follows the same trajectory, offering 
fragmentary and partial versions of the story which respond to the various impressions 
its characters have of events. While modernist novels revel in the subjective as the end 
of art, the detective turns these impressions into facts. Analysis and deduction are the 
processes by which the detective makes the subjective objective. As analysis of Traitor’s 
Purse and Whose Body? will show, the subjective and the impressionistic become part of 
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the method of Sayers’ and Allingham’s detectives in ways that respond to modernist 
developments.  
The modernist novel was not unique in the importance it placed upon the 
plausible and sincere representation of human nature, mental life and motivation – this 
has always been the province of the novel. Likewise, wonder at the mysteries of the 
mind and commitment to the exercise of self-scrutiny are central to the Romantic lyric, 
where records of flights of fancy when the mind is at rest or in idleness contribute to a 
celebration of the enigma of the creative unconscious. The source of divine inspiration, 
strange outpourings, the sudden, destructive rampage that is followed by a mysterious 
revelation in Wordsworth’s “Nutting” (published 1800) or the depths of passions and 
fears described by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in “Kubla Khan” (1816) attest to their 
authors’ attempts to plumb the mind, that ‘chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething’ (line 
17) and articulate its uncharted terrain and sublime potential. To Peter Gay, whose 
account of the shift from Victorian to modern is resoundingly clear, the modernist 
novel’s originality 
lay not so much in its discovery of the mental province as in re-mapping its 
territory; its experimental techniques were designed to dig deeper – far 
deeper – than tradition-bound novelists had ever done … Cautious or bold, 
modern novelists sought to capture minds at work, dreaming, ruminating, 
hesitating, wishing, in conflict. (190) 
Catching the everyday abundance of life, novelists were less concerned with fiction’s 
traditional moments of interest and intrigue – the births, marriages, deaths and love 
affairs which structured the Victorian novel. Emotional complexity, moral uncertainty 
and a more realistic disorder behind the surface realism of appearances are the 
structuring forces of the works of Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf and James Joyce, 
as authors implemented in art the discoveries of psychology. Unconscious mental 
processes and techniques of recording consciousness were integrated into new 
representations of character. Both psychology and modernism, according to Mark 
Micale in The Mind and Modernism, ‘pioneered new techniques of narration to capture 
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the inner workings of the human mind and the moment by moment experience of 
individual consciousness’ (2). The interior life of individuals was given utterance, while 
subjective responses to events which, in the traditional weighting of a novel, would have 
seemed relatively minor, were delved into as matters of bountiful significance and 
interest. 
To Woolf, the modernist novel probed deeper than the novels of the past, and was 
accordingly shaped quite differently from older fictions: ‘the point of interest’ she 
asserts, ‘lies very likely in the dark places of psychology. At once, therefore, the accent 
falls a little differently; the emphasis is upon something hitherto ignored’ (“Modern 
Fiction” 192). The richness and manifold complexity of mental life was the spur for such 
focus, the insights of psychology its structuring principle, but access to and engagement 
with Freud’s ideas were not prerequisites: ‘even novelists who were not reading Freud 
… were asking Freudian questions’ according to Gay (190). Honest and intimate 
recording of conscious experience pre-dates Freud; for example Eduoard Dujardin’s 
novel, The Bays are Sere (Les Lauriers sont coupés, published 1886) introduced the 
monologue intérieur, a ‘relatively orderly form of the free associations let loose in pure 
stream of consciousness, in which links are often resemblances of sounds and sudden 
memories’ (Gay 188). A considerable weapon in the modernist attack on nineteenth-
century literary materialism, the interior monologue was seized upon by Dorothy 
Richardson in her multi-volume work, Pilgrimage (1915-1938) and used to produce a 
more intimate, inward focus upon a character’s development than the novel in English 
had previously permitted. Moments are recorded as they are perceived by her character 
Miriam, their recording shaped by Miriam’s own perception of their magnitude. The 
everyday markers of time and date dissolve. Moments pass too rapidly when Miriam is 
in a state of confusion, or elongate because of her immersion in the moment, while 
divisions between past and present are blurred to reflect the resurgence of memory as 
seen in this extract from Pointed Roofs:  
Miriam’s mind groped … classic – Greece and Rome – Greek knot … 
Grecian key … a Grecian key pattern on the dresses for the sixth form 
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tableau – reading  Ruskin … the strip of glass all along the window space on 
the floor in the large room – edged with mosses and grass – the mirror of 
Venus. …. (Richardson’s ellipses and dashes, 63-4).  
It is useful to dwell on Richardson further, both because of the influence her work 
had on subsequent modernist writers, and because critical responses to her novels which 
closely predate the publication of Whose Body? (1923) are illustrative of contemporary 
discussions of intelligence, subjectivity and consciousness in the modernist novel. 
Firstly, the ‘intelligence’ of Miriam is of the synthetic kind discussed by Hanscombe: 
Miriam’s is a highly absorptive consciousness, passively receiving fragments of reality, 
being drawn to shapes and colours which take on an oblique, almost symbolic 
significance and which are connected in mysterious ways to other impressions, 
memories, and ideas. ‘Anything that goes into her mind she can summon forth again, 
and there it is, complete in every detail’ remarks Katherine Mansfield in a contemporary 
review of Richardson’s novels (309). In 1919, Woolf described how the reader is invited 
‘to follow these impressions as they flicker through Miriam’s mind, waking 
incongruously other thoughts, and plaiting incessantly the many-coloured and 
innumerable threads of life’ (“Dorothy Richardson” 189). Present impressions and 
memory are being constantly plaited and fused, the present is as one with the past. 
Furthermore, when memory is recalled, it is of a highly subjective colour:  
She adds an element to her perception of things which has not been noticed 
before, or if noticed, has been guiltily suppressed. A man might fall dead at 
her feet (it is unlikely), and Miriam may feel that a violet-coloured light was 
an important element in her consciousness of the tragedy. (ibid. 192) 
The idea that an element of perception has either not been noticed or has been 
suppressed is consistent with Woolf’s view of the realist novel as insufficiently realistic: 
preoccupied with recording the material circumstances of characters, the realist novel 
strives for an objective view that is inconsistent with anyone’s actual experience of the 
world. In a 1918 review, May Sinclair concurs. She notes how Richardson’s characters 
‘are presented to us in the same vivid but fragmentary way in which they appeared to 
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Miriam, the fragmentary way in which people appear to most of us’ (“The Novels of 
Dorothy Richardson” 443). A scene is always a scene as remembered by someone, 
details such as the quality of a coloured light are not mere ephemera, and the 
recollection of scenes in a fragmented, highly subjective way is not necessarily 
unreliable. As the ‘truth’ of an event is always mediated by characters, the possibility of 
an objective account is nullified. 
 Trust is what is at stake, and as Sinclair suggests, Richardson’s fragmentary and 
highly subjective prose is not wilfully disruptive: it gets ‘closer to reality than any of our 
other novelists’ (“The Novels of Dorothy Richardson” 444). Woolf saw Richardson’s 
verisimilitude extending further, so that the form of the sentence itself was shaped to 
portray more accurately the ways in which consciousness receives and processes sense 
experience: Richardson ‘has fashioned her sentence consciously,’ Woolf states, ‘in order 
that it may descend to the depths and investigate the crannies of Miriam Henderson’s 
consciousness’ (“Dorothy Richardson” 191). Like her contemporary pioneer of 
interiority, James Joyce, Richardson was an influence on Woolf, who used interior 
monologue and a score of other techniques to achieve the impressionistic prose which 
she believed came closest to the truth of life:  
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind 
receives a myriad impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved 
with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of 
innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they sharpen themselves into the life 
of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old; the moment of 
importance came not here but there … Let us record the atoms as they fall 
upon the mind in the order in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however 
disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident 
scores upon the consciousness. (“Modern Fiction” 189-190) 
The modernist novel as Woolf outlines it celebrates subjective responses to a world 
which – through such a gaze – revealed itself to be anything but objective, consistent 
and rationally verifiable. Of course, experience was seen not as merely the immediate 
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experience of perception, of ‘atoms falling’, but the amalgamation of this ‘incessant 
shower’ with the already constituted identity: the memories, instincts and inclinations 
embedded in the unconscious. This is something Richardson tends towards, but to her 
fellow modernists, she did not dig deep enough. When Woolf criticises Richardson, it is 
for her tendency to treat Miriam’s mind as ‘a very vivid surface’ which impressions 
‘glance off’ (“Dorothy Richardson” 190), rather than as a site of creative synthesis. 
Mansfield calls Richardson’s novels ‘dragonflies’ (310), as a comment upon this flitting 
quality. Not only the place where memory was recorded, the unconscious was seen as 
the place where mysterious connections were made between phenomena, often out of the 
reach of consciousness. More would be generated by Woolf’s characters, less passively 
received, and more interaction between memory and the present would achieve more 
authentic realism and depth as patterns developed in the interaction between the exterior 
world and the modern subject.  
 
Case Studies  
Does detective fiction, a genre preoccupied with probing the impressions of its suspects 
and witnesses and with shaping them into a pattern, exhibit any of the modernist 
preference for recording the minutia of consciousness? The much-used trope of the 
unreliable witness – confusing dates and times, imputing fantastical motivations onto 
other characters and subconsciously connecting impressions to come to a false 
conclusion is common in golden age crime fiction. Familiar too is the character who 
remembers a trivial detail because it has called to mind a distant memory, or for some 
other highly subjective reason made a peculiarly profound impression upon them. These 
devices superficially acknowledge the understandings of consciousness which 
preoccupied modernist writers, without occasioning any particular innovations in the 
form. Dorothy L. Sayers in Whose Body? (1923) and Margery Allingham in Traitor’s 
Purse (1941) went further than their contemporary crime writers; by adopting 
comparable techniques for recording consciousness as Richardson and Woolf, they 
validate impressionistic encounters with the world, and demonstrate how the modernist 
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novel supplied a pattern for crime writers seeking to give new shape to their form. The 
assertion that impressions can form the basis of knowledge and that irrational 
inclinations and emotions are as valid a spur for action as reason, countered the genre-
defining rationalism of the detective story. 
As critical responses to Richardson’s work show, her form of writing was not 
admired merely for its artistic merit,
17
 but also for its unique truthfulness to life. Finding 
an elusive truth is a central concern in detective writing, and one of the most striking 
ways in which these texts learn from modernism is in their location of that truth not in an 
external, objective reality, but in the depths of the detective’s mind. Trusting to emotion 
and intuition, their detectives are dependent upon aspects of mind ungovernable by, and 
possibly unknowable to, the reasoning mind.  
 
Margery Allingham, Traitor’s Purse (1941) 
Traitor’s Purse represents a new brand of detective fiction penned by golden age authors 
during the Second World War in response to the perception that Nazism was penetrating 
the inner sanctums of British public and private life. It is a highly patriotic novel, 
depicting a generation maturing into roles of responsibility as the ideological and 
material defenders of their social order. Humility is central to the novel, and in the case 
of Allingham’s detective Albert Campion, it is achieved through the dismantling of the 
traditional detective figure. Appearing in 1929, Campion is one of the classic golden age 
detectives, defined by piercing intelligence, aristocratic birth and privileged social 
position. In mysteries published up to 1938, he demonstrates his peerless detective 
qualities through his logical method, decisive action, physical prowess and the respect 
he commands from both figures of authority and the criminal underworld. That is why, 
in Traitor’s Purse, Campion has been entrusted with a secret mission to halt a plan 
concocted by the Nazis to release false bank notes, which would undermine the strength 
of Britain’s economy and British self-confidence: ‘At this moment Britain depends 
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 On the contrary, Mansfield and Woolf are critical of aspects of Richardson’s work in their reviews. (see 
Mansfield 310; Woolf, “Dorothy Richardson” 190) 
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practically entirely on her faith in herself and her own internal stability. If that could be 
destroyed suddenly, by a single stroke, there would come confusion, exhaustion, and 
finally decay’ (163). The detective is the antidote to such paranoia, a solitary figure 
buoyed with self-confidence, able to distinguish between truth and falsehood and 
respond with reason and clear-headedness to confusion and panic.  
However, in the opening pages of Traitor’s Purse, Campion wakes up in a 
hospital bed suffering from amnesia. The political situation, the details of the conspiracy 
and his own identity are a mystery to him. He has no immediate access to those 
attributes which constitute him as the detective – the capacity for infallible reasoning, 
intellectual certainty, composite knowledge and decisive action. His ego as Campion is 
lost, and he becomes a consciousness without an identity, a feeling entity rather than a 
knowing and reasoning one. He initially flounders, and the novel charts his increasing 
disenchantment with the role of rational detective and his reliance upon his instincts, 
profound emotional attachments, and sudden flashes of inspiration. Subconscious 
inclinations are shown to be more reliable than reasoned thought, and he must rely upon 
them and his own somewhat mysterious capacity to make connections that are not purely 
logical, in order to avert the conspiracy. The states through which he passes, through 
ignorance and self-disgust, to self-recognition and ultimately to a revitalised and 
integrated selfhood, act as both an accompaniment to, and the real site of, the 
transformation of Britain as becoming-nation. 
 When Campion wakes up, he has no memories. He obtains consciousness, but 
has had his ‘previous life wiped clean off the slate of [his] own mind’ (134). He has 
some sense of stability in the knowledge of the basic structure of reality – what 
hospitals, policemen and cars are – but lacks more involved knowledge of his social role 
and the political situation. Not even knowing his own name, he is mere consciousness, 
acting ‘like a man living in that minute’ (106) only. As he awakes, he overhears a 
policeman describing how the patient (Campion) committed murder before he lost 
consciousness. The world confronts him as sinister and unknowable, and this anxiety is 
revealed in social situations in which the subtle interplay of meaning communicated 
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through glances, tone and suggestive speech is lost to him. More alarmingly, judging the 
reliability of others is dangerous and uncertain business, and a succession of characters 
elicit his trust before being revealed as quite different to how he initially perceived them: 
his realisation that the helpful and sympathetic character Amanda is not his wife makes 
him feel intense loneliness and instability. The sinister Mr Pyne is a source of comfort 
when Campion believes him to be an old friend, but a moment of profound estrangement 
occurs when he finds he has only known him for a couple of days. To Campion, it feels 
like ‘one of those trick films wherein familiar objects are photographed from an 
unfamiliar angle. The strange shadows thus cast made vast secret shapes, forming a 
horror where there is none and, worse still, concealing a horror where horror lies’ (59).  
Campion’s disconcerting experiences throw the anxieties of subjectivity into sharp 
relief, awakening him to the weakness of the individual perspective, something rarely 
experienced by the omniscient detective figure. Unable to find the right angle from 
which to view events, Campion’s uncertainty stylises the misapprehensions of characters 
in the detective novel, as well as those of the reader who, as Holquist suggests, turn 
away from modernist literature confused by its multiple perspectives and to the detective 
novel for its methodological certainties and its guaranteed, final, complete interpretation. 
As such, the facts of the case evade Campion, and his attempts to discover the meaning 
behind events resemble the uncertainties of the reader of the mystery. A clue is pointed 
out to him by another character, but he looks at it with the eyes of a layman, spotting 
nothing out of the ordinary: 
“Interesting?” He murmured to Campion, and there was just a shade more 
than the ordinary casual question in the remark. 
Campion looked at the gate pillar and saw nothing. (46) 
The order underlying the mystery and the secret truths bound up in mundane clues seem 
to be around him at all times, but because they do not connect, the truth is inaccessible: 
‘It was all there in his hand. He held it without knowing what it was. In his blindness he 
had discovered his objective. In his miserable ignorance he could not identify it’ (167). 
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Like the reader, he yearns for the return of the detective, but does not associate this 
figure’s unifying, rationalising functions with himself.  
The detective has an affinity with an objective worldview, but amnesia, as 
Allingham represents it, limits Campion’s capacity to connect knowledge recalled 
emotionally with a reasonable explanation. The impressions he receives and the feelings 
they inspire are recorded in particularly intimate ways for the detective novel:  
it was with relief that he saw a pair of darkened sidelights swaying down the 
road towards him. They turned out to belong to a bus. … The sight jolted him 
and for an instant recollection rushed at him in a great warm sweep of bright 
colours, only to recede again, leaving him desperate. (14) 
In spite of the ‘warm’ feeling, he is unable to fasten his impressions together into any 
coherent shape. Rational explanations are concealed behind the ‘curtain of darkness 
which hung between the front and the back part of his mind’ (28). Slight returns of 
painful memories, habitual actions, strong emotions and sudden flashes of insight are all 
that manage to cross the curtain of darkness. This emphasises the affective and 
instinctual character of the unconscious and the consciousness’s reliance upon the 
emotional and the irrational for a completely integrated identity. Effusive responses are 
welcomed with gratitude, including superstition (65), a sixth sense (113) and ‘primitive 
and disturbing’ anger, each of which guide him in recognising danger and enemies (115). 
‘[R]emembering something not mentally but emotionally’ (115) is put forth as a valid 
foundation for knowledge and judgement, rather than a logical, cognitive process. In 
similar fashion, the impulsive need he feels towards Amanda, ‘unreasonable and 
unanswerable’ (52) is treated as a bedrock upon which to form his moral character and 
motivations in his new, disorientated existence. The detached and logical detective is no 
longer possible. As Campion must rely on Amanda and his profound love for her, so  
must he place his faith in irrational and affective processes he is unable to master or 
control.  
 From the novel’s opening, Campion is guided by automatic action. ‘Moved by 
indignation and an odd singleness of purpose’ (9) he makes a dramatic escape from the 
237 
 
hospital. In the ensuing chase, Campion acts in a state which will be compared with 
hypnosis, automatism and somnambulism – the confused impulsion of ‘that mysterious 
body-mind’ (89) that leads one through a nightmare. His actions are chaotic, his 
occasional capacity for decisive action is sinister to himself. Picking a lock and stealing 
a car seem effortless, while a remarkable skill in physical self-defence and the ability to 
climb ‘like a cat’ (140) force him to ask, what kind of a man would have such abilities? 
The muscle memory of the body and the unconscious mind’s collaboration in 
accomplishing these habitual and instinctive actions are treated as clues to self-identity, 
but highly disconcerting ones. Most alarming is the clear vision which appears, fully 
formed in his mind, when he views the body of a man who may have been murdered: 
Ever since he had first seen the body he had felt less lost and more sure of 
himself, as if the dark curtain across his brain were already practically 
transparent, and now it had come to him up out of the shadows, but with all 
the conviction of certain knowledge, that he knew perfectly well how the 
man had been killed and what the weapon was that had murdered him. He 
did not attempt to argue with himself. He simply knew. (48-9) 
This clear vision, and the more detailed description of the death which follows, grants 
the reader a rare moment of access to the mind and thought process of the detective. As 
shall be seen, it corresponds to Peter Wimsey’s moment of unconscious detection in 
Whose Body? in suggesting that the source of the detective’s powers and insight is not 
exclusively rational, but rather a process of synthesis unconsciously achieved. In its 
immediate context, however, Campion treats the surprising insight as a troubling clue 
into his psyche, which forces him to question whether he has committed the murder 
himself. In a section which calls to mind the dreamlike reminiscences of Pen in Brand’s 
Head You Lose (see chapter 4), Campion considers admitting the disabling state of his 
mind and handing himself to the authorities. However, he is driven on by the burning 
sense that he has a task to accomplish. Self-doubt is tempered, as it is throughout the 
novel, by his inexplicable sense of conviction. While characters like Agatha Christie’s 
Cust in The ABC Murders turn to the detective for personal reassurance, Campion still 
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possesses an iota of self-belief, although it is of the emotional, passionate kind, rather 
than the perfectly rational.  
 Whether or not the new Campion is capable of becoming a self-assured detective, 
and whether in fact such a figure is desirable, is an uncertainty that is kept unresolved 
for the best part of the novel. He continues to doubt whether to trust himself and his own 
instincts and makes bad choices as often as good. He is persistently troubled by the 
mystery of his character and emotional nature, whose shape is left impressed upon his 
friends and colleagues. The inferences he is able to draw are not altogether pleasing. 
When he realises that other characters look to him to avert the plot and ‘save the day’ he 
is disgusted by the dependence that he must have previously encouraged: ‘A fine 
chuckleheaded ass he must have been to surround himself with dear, faithful followers 
incapable of independent thought; fawners, seekers after orders’ (122). The allusion to 
the dependence upon authority encouraged in fascist states is unmistakable, and it is 
therefore significant that separation from his regular identity enables him to recognise 
how the personal authority of the detective shares the character and assumptions of a 
greater political evil. Likewise, his realisation that Amanda is not his wife, but has been 
his fiancé for eight years, and that his procrastination caused her to break the 
engagement, causes him to reflect with grief: ‘If he was a half-wit now, he seemed to 
have been a lunatic for some considerable time’ (31).  
 Estrangement enables him to confront his identity and the detective role in a 
critical way, which in turn enables him to refashion himself. This includes the 
recognition of Amanda’s extraordinary intelligence, insight, and independence. 
Reunification with his ‘true’ self becomes less desirable, and Campion rejects the 
arrogant independence of his past: ‘Pride, manners, custom, the habit of a lifetime, and 
training of an ancient system be damned’ (36), he thinks, as they lead him to fail to 
appreciate Amanda and to resist his ‘helplessness and his need for her’ (206). At these 
moments, he ‘struggled up and out of a whole customary system of living and emerged a 
small naked essence of the basic man’ (36). Values affirmed by subjective experience, 
rather than those imposed upon him from without as an objective good – such as his 
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socially condoned, masculine need not to rely on Amanda – are finally perceived as 
foundational for authentic experience and personal autonomy.  
 Throughout the novel, the lost, original ‘Campion’ has been imagined in many 
guises by the disengaged consciousness of the protagonist. The return of memory and 
identity has been hoped for, but once the new Campion realises that his identity is 
undergoing significant changes, he begins to hope his old self never returns. However, 
when he receives another head injury, he is jolted back. Albert Campion, the assertive 
and clear-headed golden age hero makes his first appearance more than half-way 
through the novel, and the entire adventure so far is sealed off from his memory. To the 
reader, who has accompanied the surrogate Campion on his profound process of re-
fashioning, the original Campion’s return is disappointing, his character appearing 
superficial and arrogant. He seems a much younger man, the ‘fine chuckleheaded ass’ 
that the new Campion came to despise. His cocksure tone and blithe self-assurance jar 
with the more thoughtful, uncertain and vulnerable man to whom the reader has become 
accustomed. The missing details of the plot are mundanely explained (the returned 
Campion remembers them all, except for what has taken place between his concussion 
and his return) and the reader’s emotional investment in the mystery shifts from 
superficial interest in the facts to a concern with whether the two Campions will reunite 
and reconstitute one another.  
 To emphasise the shift from the amnesiac, emotional self to the fully conscious 
rational one, now that Campion has the facts to hand, the emotional insight gained in the 
intervening hours tugs at him from his concealed self in the same way as the plot details 
used to: ‘He might have had some deep emotional experience rather than a bang on the 
head’ (172) he reflects. He attempts to reconstitute events by probing witnesses and 
pondering clues, however it is in a moment of involuntary emotional outpouring – 
brought about by the sight of Amanda – that the breakthrough occurs:  
He was seeing her through some sort of mental curtain. His subconscious 
mind reached out for this infuriating barrier and drew it slowly aside like a 
wet page.  
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The complete picture lay before him.  
He saw it all in a single dreadful moment of revelation. The whole 
kaleidoscope history of the last thirty-six hours, painted with pitiless clarity 
and minute detail, unfolded before him in all its stark gravity; a mad, 
uncomic strip with himself wandering blindfold through it all like a lost soul.  
Then, as his two minds and personalities merged at last, as the new 
Campion’s witless discoveries fitted over the old Campion’s certain 
knowledge, the three-dimensional truth suddenly sprang out in blazing 
colours. He stood petrified. (180) 
The division between the two Campions – the original with his ‘certain knowledge’ and 
the amnesiac with his ‘witless discoveries’ – is overcome. The subconscious mind, 
which ‘reaches out’ and reveals the truth, is both part of, and independent to, the 
conscious witnessing Campion. Their merging permits a composite view inaccessible to 
either alone. In both iterations, ‘Campion’ has been constituted as a subject largely 
inaccessible to himself. His experiences as a lost soul have been recorded with ‘pitiless 
clarity and minute detail’ in the subconscious mind, but it is only through his profound 
emotional attachment to Amanda and all that she embodies that the two minds are 
reunited.  
 In terms of the political content of the novel and its patriotic message, the 
resolution suggests that a degree of overcoming of both individual reason and the self is 
necessary for an ethical and impassioned politics. While absolute intellectual 
dependence, of the kind exhibited by other characters towards the detective figure, is 
portrayed as on a continuum with the mass displays of sycophantic indoctrination 
witnessed on the Continent, individualism is seen to be best tempered by commitment to 
the social body. In his amnesiac state, Campion is forced to accept his dependence on 
Amanda and dismantle the self-assurance and wilful isolation that has characterised his 
practice as a detective: ‘his self-confidence had received a dangerous blow’ (180) he 
realises upon waking, and this is undoubtedly a good thing. Unlike the villain of the 
piece, a ruthlessly rational academic and political fanatic whose ‘mistaken belief in his 
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own superiority cut him off from reality as completely as if he were living in a glass jar’ 
(205), the detective figure is reconstructed on the grounds of a socially responsible and 
integrated humility, recognising his implication in the social body and inspired by an 
emotional creed embedded in communally held values. For this reason Amanda, an 
embodiment of Campion’s newly discovered patriotism, is praised for her practicality, 
common sense, sanity, generosity, and very British ‘pluck’. She is ‘a right thing in a 
ghastly, unrealistic world’ and evokes the familiar: ‘all the lovely machinery for living, 
like manners and introductions and calling-cards and giving up one’s seat on the bus’ 
(125). When Campion becomes resolved to avert the plot, he does so because of a 
passionate yearning to protect his nation and Amanda, rather than the thrill of 
intellectual stimulation that typified him in his earlier incarnation as heroic, problem 
solving detective.  
 
Dorothy L. Sayers, Whose Body? (1923) 
Published two years before Mrs Dalloway, Whose Body? gives expression to the 
disordered consciousness and mental turmoil experienced by her shell-shocked 
detective. Pitted against his own Professor Moriarty, Wimsey justifies his name in his 
carefree, amateurish approach to detection. However, both his mental condition and his 
fanciful patterns of thought are treated as weapons in a confrontation which extends 
beyond the solution to the crime. Unlike Holmes, who shared the reasoning faculties of 
Moriarty but not his amorality, Wimsey and his adversary are epistemologically 
opposed, as each promotes alternative and irreconcilable systems of knowledge from 
which their moral outlooks are derived. In the task of dismantling the irrational 
rationality of the killer and celebrating the idiosyncratic, heterogeneous methods 
advanced by Wimsey, the novel employs an assortment of narrative modes traceable to 
modernist fiction. Experiments with new ways of seeing and recording reality pioneered 
in the modernist novel, and the introduction of the subjective, impressionistic stance is 
integral to the detective work done by Wimsey, and to the novel’s animating debate 
between reason and unreason. The unconscious emerges as an ulterior realm in which an 
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activity resembling detection can take place, while the subjective view, in passages 
which display stylistic resemblances with modernist writing, affords a way – perhaps the 
only way – to gain valid knowledge about the world.  
 
The Murderer 
The eminent neurologist Sir Julian Freke represents the rational point of view. Freke has 
spent his illustrious career enquiring into The Physiological Basis of Consciousness (the 
title of his recent book) and writing virulent ripostes to Freud and his disciples in the 
British psychoanalytic school (131). A chilling item in his Who’s Who entry refers to the 
experiments he carried out on shell-shock victims in 1919 (131) which, in contrast to the 
more emotion-aware talking cures pioneered by W. H. R Rivers, are likely to have 
resembled techniques used by the majority of contemporary physicians: chloroform 
hypnosis (see W. Milligan 242; E.T.C. Milligan 73), the introduction of a spatula to the 
larynx (see Yealland 3) and either the threat of, or the actual administering of, electric 
currents to the brain and neck (Garton 585; Yealland 11). As well as resembling the 
dominant school of neurologists whose response to shell-shock was aggressive and 
disciplinary, Freke is also the country’s most distinguished representative of 
criminological positivism. He believes criminality is an innate trait defined by 
diagnosable pathologies, and that all morals and emotional life – including ‘hysteria, 
crime, religion, fear, shyness, conscience’ – have a material foundation open to 
observation (131). A glaring clue early on in the novel that Freke is the villain is the fact 
that these scientific enquiries have led him to reason away morality as a symptom of a 
mechanical irritation – a development from the Enlightenment premise of faith as 
unscientific superstition. Freke advances his thesis further in print. Knowledge of good 
and evil, he states, ‘is an observable phenomenon, attendant upon certain conditions of 
the brain cells, which is removable’ (129). Conscience is atavistic, an evidence of a less 
sophisticated stage of evolution which is often an obstacle to the individual’s survival. 
As Wimsey realises, Freke’s science is ‘an ideal doctrine for a criminal’ (129).  
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 It is therefore significant that Freke aligns himself with the classic detective by 
comparing the value both place upon observation. Freke says to Inspector Parker, ‘just 
as you observe a theft or a murder and look for the footsteps of the criminal, so I observe 
a fit of hysterics or an outburst of piety and hunt for the little mechanical irritation which 
has produced it’ (108). The detective as Freke conceives him is an observer, and like the 
scientist his elevation above his object of enquiry enables him to view human beings as 
units of data. In his practice of observation and his adoption of the forms of reasoning – 
the same techniques pioneered by Holmes – Freke demonstrates how the detective’s 
reductive, scientific stance transitions into the criminal’s immoral calculations. In Whose 
Body?, Freke is compared to both Holmes and his equally intelligent adversary, 
Professor Moriarty. Mentally, both function in an identical way, but, while the detective 
is preoccupied with upholding the status quo, the criminal has other ideas. Freke’s 
comparison with the two picks up on a concern that is central even to the Holmes stories 
– that there is something dangerous about Holmes’ outlook. Positivism, applied to 
human relations, may solve crimes, but it poses a real threat which is brought to life in 
the figure of Moriarty.  
 The realisation of this concern in Whose Body? will not be clear until Wimsey’s 
role is discussed (more on that later). Firstly though, it is necessary to enquire further 
into the portrayal of Freke, who embodies the tendency, observed by Mandel, for 
rationality to transition into irrationality. As Sayers makes clear, Freke’s system of 
modelling is flawed. Piety, hysteria, crime, shyness, conscience, and religion, which he 
states are all symptoms of nervous pathology traceable to a mechanic irritation, are 
categorically distinct and irreducible facets of human experience. By reducing them into 
equivalents he demonstrates how his scientific modelling rejects all qualities and depth 
as excess. His models as such do not represent life in its intensity, complexity and 
nuance. Religion, the central philosophy of Sayers’ own life,
18
 is a victim of Freke’s 
                                                 
18 Sayers’ writings on a Christian theme include The Mind of the Maker (1941), Catholic Tales and 
Christian Songs (1918) and The Man Born to Be King (1941), while her humanism is evident in the 
public address she gave in 1938, later published as Are Women Human?(2005). 
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gross underestimation: ‘Thinks God’s a secretion of the liver’ (71) mocks Wimsey, in 
one of the novel’s characteristic responses to Freke’s worldview as fatally insufficient. 
 Sayers does not question the legitimacy of science or philosophical logic so 
much as their capacity to explain certain phenomena: religion and morality certainly, but 
also human psychology and the social relations which lead to crime. Finding a footprint 
and linking it with a suspect does not solve the mystery, as any reader of good detective 
stories knows. In relation to psychology, Freke’s reductive worldview is shown as 
inadequate when he attempts a diagnosis of Wimsey. Before Wimsey unmasks him as 
the killer, he visits Freke at his medical practice, ostensibly to ask the eminent 
neurologist’s advice about a resurgence of war trauma that Wimsey has (genuinely) just 
suffered. The balance of power in this scene is complex, not only because of their 
respective roles as detective and criminal, but because of the very recent history of brutal 
psychiatric treatment of shell-shock victims like Wimsey in which Freke is implicated. 
Asking Wimsey to relate his experiences of the episode, the sounds, emotions, and 
visions that overcame him, Freke translates this rich emotional material into the matter-
of-fact language of nerve-sensations and tissue damage, the ‘physical changes which 
you will call by the names you were accustomed to associate with them – dread of 
German mines, responsibility for your men, strained attention’ as well as horror and fear 
(169). His explanation accounts for everything while explaining nothing. Responding to 
the quantity of the sufferer’s symptoms, but not their quality, Freke is insensitive to the 
meaning of psychological events in the lived experience of the patient.  
 Reducing all that rich psychological content into nervous ‘changes we are only 
beginning to be able to detect, even with our most delicate instruments’ (169), Freke’s 
medical practice fails in its objective to cure patients. His eyes ‘were not the cool and 
kindly eyes of the family doctor, they were the brooding eyes of the inspired scientist, 
and they searched one through’ (166). Just as he is indifferent to unquantifiable but 
remedial factors such as a caring bedside manner, Freke excludes much that is 
considered unscientific from his diagnosis of Wimsey, ignoring the fact that meaning 
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and emotional reality are inseparable from Wimsey’s experience and must be factored 
into his cure.  
 In his diagnosis, Freke executes interpretive violence upon Wimsey which he 
attempts to match with physical violence – the injection of a ‘prescription’ to alleviate 
Wimsey’s symptoms, which is actually a poison intended to quiet the detective. His 
objective, scientific diagnosis masks a dangerous subtext, but as in all of his villainous 
acts, Freke is acting purely rationally. Following his means-end rationale, getting rid of 
Wimsey is necessary in order to achieve his ends. Superficial phenomena like 
conscience do not delimit his actions. ‘[H]e thinks conscience is a sort of vermiform 
appendix’ remarks Wimsey. ‘Chop it out and you’ll feel all the better’ (159). Although 
Freke has not physically ‘chopped it out’, he has disregarded morality and so responds 
impassively to any motions of conscience he might experience in experimenting upon 
his victims. However, the text seems to state that the rational, scientific outlook as 
represented by Freke does not achieve its own objectives because it is rarely employed 
objectively. ‘There’s nothing you can’t prove if your outlook is only sufficiently limited’ 
(71) says Wimsey, contributing to the novel’s overall assertion that the scientific view, 
taken to its logical conclusion, ends in fanaticism. Freke is not merely a methodical, 
impassive, objective scientist: as his monographs show, his ‘attacks on his antagonists 
are savage’ (158). When confronted with a problem, his face appears ‘impassioned and 
inhuman’ (166).  
 In a letter Freke writes to Wimsey explaining his crime, the scientist himself 
acknowledges the irrational motivations and antagonistic desires which are at the kernel 
of his rationality:  
my original sensual impulse to kill Sir Reuben Levy had already become 
profoundly modified by my habits of thought. To the animal lust to slay and the 
primitive human desire for revenge, there was added the rational intention of 
substituting my own theories for the satisfaction of myself and the world. (182) 
Freke’s rational intention, he openly admits, is built upon the original sensual impulses, 
meaning the nervous channels, as described by William James, have become calcified 
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through frequent use (107). Despite having undergone modification, as Freke believes 
they have, the sensual foundation of the impulse underlies the rational objective that has 
been built on top, and only the most introspective scientific practitioner, or the most 
remorseless in Freke’s case, will claim to be able to distinguish the emotional-immoral 
from the scientific-objective intention. The theory Freke was testing, that ‘a perfectly 
sane man, not intimidated by religious or other delusions, could always render himself 
perfectly secure from detection’ (182) is both vicious and insane. At the same time, it is 
a perfectly valid problem for scientific enquiry. There is no way out of this dilemma 
from within Freke’s thought system. Because his brand of rationality reduces 
conscience, morality and religion to side-effects of physical processes, they cannot be 




Freke the scientist resembles both Holmes and Moriarty, and for this reason Peter 
Wimsey is proposed as an antidote to both. He is reliant on methods which confront 
Freke’s scientific outlook and his destructive egotism, and contribute to the opposition 
between the rational and the irrational established throughout the novel. Wimsey 
recognises the value of absurdity. He is happy to exploit his harmless, daft, and foppish 
appearance in order to scrutinise suspects without raising suspicion, but absurdity is not 
merely a mask for a brilliant intellect. It is an ingredient in that intellect that is essential 
to Wimsey’s detection. For example, Wimsey interweaves his more perceptive 
‘detective-speeches’ with a range of comical and absurd exclamations, including nursery 
rhymes, jokes and puns, tangential anecdotes and improvised doggerel. He refers to this 
tendency as ‘the sacred duty of flippancy’ (59) and, even though some speeches are 
spoken straight (158-9), his light-hearted tone inflects many conversations that might 
have inspired gravity in other literary detectives. Rather than being a distraction, his 





 but it is in the context of a public reciprocity to ideas about 
different forms of intelligence and patterns of thought that Wimsey’s method is formed. 
Rather than abstract reasoning, he exhibits the form of intelligence which, as 
Hanscombe states, was admired by Dorothy Richardson and expressed in her character 
Miriam – ‘the ability to perceive relationships between phenomena and the effort to 
synthesize feeling and reflection’ (Hanscombe 6). His rapid, charming, and eclectic style 
of conversation, in which diverse scraps of song, stories, and ideas are seized upon and 
blended into the flow, is never purely random. In the associations he so rapidly makes in 
his speech, he reveals the same manner of thinking as he employs in detection.  
 When Wimsey discusses detection, he claims that the ability to synthesise details 
and associate diverse material is vital. ‘[I]t’s only in Sherlock Holmes and stories like 
that that people think things out logically,’ he states. ‘O’nar’ly, if somebody tells you 
somethin’ out of the way, you just say, “By Jove!” or “How sad!” an’ leave it at that, an’ 
half the time you forget about it, ‘nless somethin’ turns up afterwards to drive it home’ 
(118). His thinking, like most people’s, is associative, and when a fact has ‘started an 
association in [the] mind’ (119), most people are able to re-join those details and 
remember a number of details that they would otherwise have forgotten. Wimsey 
demonstrates a similar point in an interview with a witness. A slightly drunk medical 
student is wagered that he can remember what he was doing on one day a week 
previously. Although he claims this is impossible, Wimsey suggests to him multiple 
ways of recalling the details. ‘Do you keep a notebook of the work you do when you 
dissect? … Turn back the pages of your drawing book in your mind’ (150) he suggests. 
Nudging the witness to remember the colour, shape, place on the page, and organisation 
of the drawings, as well as the feel and look of the body he was dissecting and the 
                                                 
19 First published in Switzerland in 1921, the English translation was not published until 1923, the same 
year as Whose Body? Sayers may have encountered Jung’s psychological categories via numerous 
other channels: essays outlining the theory of types were first published in English in 1916 
(Psychological Types). Sayers spoke and read German – in her letters she mentions German coaching 
and examinations (Letter to her parents; Letter to Catherine Godfrey) – so she might have encountered 
Jung’s work in its original language. Either way, discussions of these ideas formed part of her college 
life: in Gaudy Night Harriet Vane comments that the ‘fashion for psychological analysis’ (159) 
dominated her years at Oxford University. 
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sounds of the laboratory, Wimsey encourages the witness to unearth highly detailed 
memories. These facts could never have been recalled if he had been asked specific 
questions about details of the day, but Wimsey’s associative method, attentive to the full 
sensory experience of memory, helps draw the details out. The student, who admits to a 
poor record at examinations because his head is ‘like a sieve,’ is astonished to realise he 
has ‘an extra good memory’ when he is given something ‘to catch hold of’ (154).  
 When Wimsey attempts more logical methods of thinking, it quickly descends 
into absurdity. Using a method of logical thinking which Wimsey claims was developed 
at Oxford University and ‘strongly advocated by my distinguished colleague Professor 
Snupshed’ (77) Wimsey analyses the possible guilt of the suspect, Crimplesham. He 
isolates three possible explanations of Crimplesham’s involvement: ‘we will now 
examine severally the various suggestions afforded by Possibility No.2. This possibility 
may again be sub-divided into two or more Hypotheses’ (77). He goes on in this 
mocking register, translating the details of the case into generic philosophical logic and 
making recommendations for investigation based on his calculations. The hypothetical 
result is not a useful development in solving the mystery, but a stiffening of the 
possibilities of the detective novel. Every line of enquiry Wimsey logically follows leads 
to a formulaic solution. In one scenario, Crimplesham is ‘in the words of the English 
classic, a man-of-infinite-resource-and-sagacity’ (78); he ‘will produce witnesses to 
prove that he left Victoria at 5.45 and emerged from Balham at the scheduled time, and 
sat up all Monday night playing chess with a respectable gentleman’ (78). In none of the 
hypothetical lines of logical enquiry does Wimsey come close to the real explanation for 
Crimplesham’s involvement, which is quickly revealed in an informal interview. Logical 
and abstract thought gets Wimsey no closer to the truth of the mystery; instead, it takes 
him further away from life, a process of ossification which is compared to the stagy, 
conventional formulas of the worst crime novel.  
 Self-referentiality is one of the defining features of golden age crime fiction. In 
moments of collusion with the reader, authors frequently defined their novels against the 
stories of Conan Doyle, or hypothetical, second-rate and formulaic contemporary pot-
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boilers. You are not reading one of those sorts of books, golden age crime novels seem to 
say. Accordingly, Whose Body? is replete with comments, generally voiced by characters 
rather than the narrator, which remind the reader that they are reading about real life, not 
the simplified universe of the detective novel. Characters remind one another that 
extraordinary motivations are actually found in ordinary life, even though they may be 
expunged from crime novels. These motivations are evidence of the complex 
psychologies of real people, which the simplified mystery generally ignores. Through 
these theories, golden age crime writers reformed their genre in a comparable manner to 
that of Woolf, writing in “Modern Fiction” of the need to reflect upon spirit, not matter, 
in the modern novel. In Whose Body? a self-conscious departure from the old 
conventions of the detective story into the more psychologically rich terrain 
simultaneously being explored by the modernist novel can be seen in the episode in 
which Wimsey solves the crime. That this moment also is the accomplishment of the 
movement away from rational detection and the apex of the irrational method, 
demonstrates that something as innovative as modernism in fiction is here being 
accomplished in the mystery form.  
 Wimsey begins the scene ‘extraordinarily wakeful and alert’ with a feeling like 
something ‘was jigging and worrying in his brain’ (125). He settles down, pipe in mouth, 
for a spot of deductive pondering, ‘[tracing] out this line and that line of investigation’ 
(125). Just as he could not explain nor control the feeling of wakefulness, he is 
powerless when his thoughts begin to deviate from the concrete details of the case: 
They ran back from the picture of the grotesque dead man in Mr Thipp’s 
bathroom – they ran over the roof, and were lost – lost in the sand. Rivers 
running into the sand – rivers running underground, very far down -  
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran 
Through caverns measureless to man 
Down to a sunless sea. (127-8) 
Despite his active attempt to pursue linear logic, his lines of enquiry fracture and 
descend into the stream of consciousness. The excerpt from Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” 
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refers to the direction of Wimsey’s thought – into unconscious territory – in its contents 
as the same time as it presents material lifted from the unconscious by Wimsey in a 
moment of free association. By no means a distraction, the inclusion of Romantic verse 
suggests that Wimsey’s mind is at its most limber, as associations and memories buried 
in his unconscious mind are being stirred up. External stimuli – a book and a photograph 
– encourage further ideas, and he begins to feel that there is something important that he 
has forgotten. It does not come at once, however: he tries to pursue an ‘elusive memory 
for some minutes, till it vanished altogether with a mocking flick of the tail’ (128). The 
memory he needs cannot be forced, and he is once again powerless. That is not to say he 
is inactive: what he is trying to achieve is a state of receptive inactivity, where he ceases 
to block subconscious thoughts. Eventually,  
it happened – the thing he had been half-consciously expecting. It happened 
suddenly, surely, as unmistakably as sunrise. He remembered – not one thing, 
not another thing, nor a logical succession of things, but everything – the 
whole thing, perfect, complete, in all its dimensions as it were and 
instantaneously; as if he stood outside and saw it suspended in infinitely 
dimensional space. He no longer needed to reason about it, or even to think 
about it. He knew it. (129) 
The “Kubla Khan” quotation introduces the notion of space that is measureless, and this 
is reiterated above, as Wimsey regards the solution as if it were ‘suspended in infinitely 
dimensional space’. Scientific methods of measurement cannot grapple with the mind or 
products of thought, they are undetectable and immeasurable, despite Freke’s assertion 
that he is ‘beginning to be able to detect’ minute changes in consciousness ‘with our 
most delicate instruments’ (169). No scientific method or logical process could have 
resolved all the case’s baffling details and created something so perfect and whole. The 
‘scattered elements … flung higgledy piggledy’ (130) could not have been arranged into 
a meaningful order through careful analysis. Attempts at analytical thought – the 
breaking down of the case into its details – suggest only a jumbled and inaccurate 
melding of details together, much like the false solution that Wimsey’s rival, Inspector 
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Suggs, comes to by forcing the facts of the case into a logical, but nonsensical, order. 
Sayers compares it to a game in which one must reorder a sequence of jumbled letters to 
find the hidden word. The example given is COSSSSRI. ‘The slow way of solving the 
problem is to try out all the permutations and combinations in turn … as: SSSIRC or 
SCSRSO’ (129). This laborious, experimental method leads to a solution, but a more 
intuitive approach, which utilises faculties over which the observer has limited control, 
is often more suited to the task: ‘Another way is to stare at the inco-ordinate elements 
until, by no logical process that the conscious mind can detect, or under some 
adventitious external stimulus, the combination SCISSORS presents itself with calm 
certainty’ (130). Although Sayers is no devotee of Freud,
20
 the unconscious as it was 
sensed by the Romantic poetics, sounded out by William James and ultimately 
announced by Freud, is the focus here. The synthesis of details, which Wimsey knows to 
be true even before he has accumulated any evidence, takes place unconsciously.  
 In order to emphasise the role of the unconscious, and to suggest how it might 
work, immediately after the moment of discovery Wimsey has a full hysteric attack 
replete with psychoanalytic overtones. A shameful memory of childhood suddenly 
overcomes him and he relives the sounds, sensations. and emotions of the moment. 
Noises from the outside world – a log cracking, a lorry in the street – are absorbed into 
the fantasy and Wimsey’s butler awakes to find his master is now reliving a terrifying 
experience of trench warfare: ‘I can’t hear anything for the noise of the guns. Can’t they 
stop the guns?’ (132). In the cases of Dr Lockhart and Christianna Brand’s killer, Pen 
(see chapter 4), this state of mind was understood as dissociation. Although Wimsey’s 
attack takes place after he has made a grand association, like Lockhart, Wimsey then 
suffers ‘from dissociation between the higher and the lower levels of the brain’ (“Doctor 
Guilty, But Insane”), wherein the conscious mind loses autonomy and the ‘lower’ levels 
of the unconscious and of memory seize control. The metaphor of the unconscious as 
depth has already been evoked – ‘running underground, very far down’ (127) in the 
                                                 
20 As can be seen in Gaudy Night (1931), which contains considerable criticism of Freud’s theory of 
sexuality and its popular adoption.  
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caverns of the Khan. It is clear that the unconscious activity which has enabled Wimsey 
to solve the crime has triggered other unconscious content, and lead to the attack.  
 Sayers’ employment of the unconscious in detection does more than differentiate 
Wimsey from his literary predecessors; it amounts to a more positive way of conceiving 
of the unconscious than that found in contemporary writing and public discourse. As 
cases like Lockhart’s and their treatment in crime novels suggest, the unconscious could 
be seen as a store of negativity, of murderous fantasies, repressed sexual impulses and 
traumatic memories. Although, of course, Wimsey’s dissociation is traumatic, his war 
neurosis is nonetheless explicitly linked to the creativity which enables him to solve the 
mystery. Whether his mental illness catalyses the unconscious processes through which 
he detects, or whether he experiences such vivid attacks because he has always been 
extraordinarily impressionable and associative in his mental functioning, is unclear. 
What is clear is that the unconscious is a dynamic aspect of mind, intrinsic to the holistic 
self, and uniquely fitted for processing and comprehending aspects of reality which 




Throughout the novel, different registers and narrative modes are employed in order to 
communicate the value of multiple perspectives. These perspectives contribute to the 
novel’s argument in favour of idiosyncrasy and the subjective, and demonstrate 
significant overlaps with the innovative forms of representation found in the modernist 
novel. In the crime story, where it is necessary to obscure the truth from readers for 
much of the narrative, techniques such as the unreliable narrator, the long speech 
containing one useful detail surrounded by much detritus, and the revelation of a fact in 
the midst of a frightening or exciting episode, are common. Sayers goes further, and in 
her invocation of other representational registers than traditionally reliable ones – such 
as the court transcript and accurately recorded conversation – she demonstrates the 
validity of more subjective narrative modes.  
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 The scene in which Wimsey uses subterfuge to encourage a student to remember 
intricate details he thought he had forgotten has been discussed. What it demonstrates is 
that life is not a logical succession of details connected together in a linear way, but an 
aggregation of sense impressions which cannot be accessed through meticulous 
questioning, but only through the evocation of the scene in its multi-sensory complexity, 
as it was experienced by the individual at the time. Life is not something the individual 
responds to rationally, something that the mind consciously processes and converts into 
facts but, as Woolf puts it, ‘a myriad impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or 
engraved with the sharpness of steel’ (190). Wimsey nudges these unconsciously 
recorded impressions into life when he questions the student, and his success in doing so 
demonstrates that the individual is not an inferior source of information about reality – 
individual perception is a valid means of acquiring knowledge, and all we have.  
 The importance placed upon individual perspective accounts for the use of the 
rare second person narrative mode in the scene. As Wimsey quizzes the student, the 
transition between the third person ‘he’ and second person ‘you’ happens quite suddenly 
in the midst of a paragraph and lasts only a short time before returning to the standard 
third person at the paragraph’s close (148). A humorous estrangement is achieved, as the 
student tries and fails to make sense of Wimsey’s welcoming attitude, and perceives the 
detective – ‘rather a small man’ (148) – in ways that resist the more affirmative 
depictions of Peter elsewhere. Problematising the neutrality of the narrative voice, the 
use of the second person here foregrounds the multiple, subjective readings to which a 
scene is open. It is also highly unusual. In his study of the second-person modes, Brian 
Richardson notes that it has little history before the modernist era. He traces only a few 
instances in the modern novel, including one instance in the works of both May Sinclair 
and Jean Rhys, but does not mention Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s striking use of the second 
person in a riot scene in “Grey Granite” (1934). It was employed by May Sinclair in her 
1919 novel Mary Olivier: A Life in depictions of her protagonist’s infancy. Influenced by 
Freud, Sinclair allows the ‘you’ and the ‘her’ to shift from passage to passage, merging 
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concrete reality with internal fantasy and displaying the fluidity of her young heroine’s 
ego as she interacts with a world from which she is not yet fully distinct: 
In the dark you could go tip-finger along the slender lashing flourishes of the 
ironwork. … that way you got into the grey lane where the prickly stones 
were and the hedge of little biting trees. When the door in the hedge opened 
you saw the man in the night-shirt. He had only half a face. (3) 
Here a conscious, physical encounter morphs into a nightmare, but elsewhere it is used 
to describe the oceanic bliss of primary narcissism, a comforting and receptive world in 
which colours, sensations and feelings are as one.  
To Brian Richardson, the second person is a uniquely innovative, estranging and 
self-conscious mode: it is ‘assiduous ... in depicting the stream of impressions, thoughts, 
and subverbal speech of the protagonist’ (22) as well as offering ‘new possibilities of 
creative representation, particularly for revealing a mind in flux’ (B. Richardson 35). In 
Whose Body?, it is used to foreground individual perceptions, misapprehensions and 
misunderstandings, implicating the reader in the impressions as they are received by the 
character and attesting to the uncertainty of the individual who is forming them. The 
mode is therefore amusing when it is used to explore the mind of a clueless witness: it is 
quite original when applied to the detective. Based upon the student’s evidence, Wimsey 
advises an exhumation of the corpse of a medical specimen dissected in the hospital. 
This grisly graveyard scene details the moment Wimsey’s suspicions are confirmed, but 
even so, his impressions express uncertainty, emotion, fallibility and imaginative 
responsiveness hardly expected in the detective. He is not an active participant in the 
scene, not even a meticulous observer, but an impressionable perceiver. He is fearful and 
walks indecisively: ‘The vile, raw fog tore your throat and ravaged your eyes. You could 
not see your feet. You stumbled in your walk over poor men’s graves’ (173). The 
narration is terse: ‘A black-bearded spectre at your elbow. Introduced. The Master of the 
Workhouse’ (174). The narrator is balanced between the external world and his own 
internal reality, relating to the world through the unconscious associations that 
impressions jog – the black bearded man who is first perceived as a spectre – an 
255 
 
impression which is modified by a fact (the man is the Master of the Workhouse), but 
does not exactly recede.  
Displaying a resemblance with techniques employed on the grand scale by 
Marcel Proust, initial impressions may be modified by subsequent experience, but they 
continue to colour one’s perceptions. For example, ‘[t]wo Dantesque shapes with 
pitchforks loomed up’ (173), and then later, the ‘lurching departure of the Dante demons 
– good, decent demons in corduroy’ (174). These ‘good, decent’ men are not demons, 
but the association is there, and cannot be detached.
21
 Other details stand out merely 
because they are visually striking, for example: ‘A space cleared at the table. The 
lamplight on the Duchess’s white hair’ (176). Impressionistic details such as these are 
being registered somewhere other than consciousness, and in a language the rational 
mind cannot understand. What will be remembered from the scene is not the facts of 
what took place, but these instants – the corduroy of the departing men, the glow of the 
white hair, the way shapes emerged from the darkness and form themselves into solid 
objects, the creaks, scrapes and clangs which are recorded because they affect the 
perceiver and are part of the same experience as the wavering light of lantern and the 
brilliant circle of the electric lamp. When the exhumation is subsequently related, in the 
dry language of the medical report or in the clear and concise evidence of the courtroom, 
those accounts will be the less authentic distillation of fact from life which is 
experienced, in the words of Woolf, not as ‘a series of gig lamps symmetrically 
arranged’ but ‘a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the 
beginning of consciousness to the end’ (“Modern Fiction” 189). 
As he is the detective, Wimsey’s is the eye that is supposed to unify all the 
divergent strands of the story, whose observations will be proved to be true, accurate and 
reliable. In the graveyard scene, all of these functions of the detective are realised, in 
spite of the use of the impressionistic ‘you’. This is not because Wimsey’s impressions 
are pertinent and reliable – they are often not – but because the novel admits uncertainty 
and idiosyncrasy as part of the subjective perspective which it ultimately celebrates. 
                                                 
21
 Early in the novel Wimsey purchases an old edition of Dante, and this perhaps is placed there to later 
account for his unconscious connection. 
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Compared to the self-assurance of Freke, Wimsey’s uncertainty is both 
epistemologically and morally preferable. Confirmation of this comes in the letter which 
Freke composes at the novel’s close, which supplants the classic detective’s dénouement. 
It offers a meticulously detailed account of the crime, of Freke’s motivation and the 
exact emotions and sensations he experienced whilst committing the crime: ‘I was 
interested to note that I was rather extra hungry at breakfast, showing that my night’s 
work had caused a certain wear-and-tear of tissue’ (194) he records banally. At the 
letter’s close, Freke trusts that ‘I have made clear to you any point which you may have 
found obscure’ and recounts how he has killed himself and donated his body to medical 
science (195). Despite the authoritative assertion of the written ‘I’, neither statement is 
true. Freke is arrested before he can kill himself (actually mid-sentence – the letter trails 
off). Although he has given the reader all the facts, no methodical, scientific account 
truly explains his crime. The rational, explicating and analysing ego is flawed, while 
only Wimsey’s impressionistic uncertainty comes close to grasping the crime, and its 
horror.  
In Whose Body? and Traitor’s Purse, the allusive wilfulness of memory and the 
passive, absorptive quality of consciousness initially raise questions about the reliability 
of the detective, putting the figure on a level with his psychologically fallible suspects 
and with the more contemplative, inward looking subjects of modernist fiction. 
Ultimately, these novels suggest that insights gained by irrational association and ideas 
garnered emotionally, from the mysterious depths of the unconscious, can surpass 
reason. Their detectives’ methods are ethical alternatives to the drive to know and to 
dominate bound up in the rational method. Allowing the atoms to fall rather than taking 
a microscope to them, these detectives act in ways that were profoundly influenced by 









On the pages of golden age crime novels, irrational detectives contradict writers’ self-
imposed formulaic demands for reason-embodying deductive heroes, while pathetically 
deranged criminals resist the genre’s supposed delight in easy closure. In a form 
credited, or rather dismissed, for being reassuring, for probing fears of transgression and 
otherness only to assuage them in the scapegoating and punishment of morally culpable 
offenders, the presence of madness in many plots is an obstacle to the unproblematic 
expulsion of the criminal at the novel’s close. A just resolution is both a narrative and an 
ethical demand in golden age crime novels, but texts such as Mitchell’s When Last I 
Died and The Saltmarsh Murders highlight the weaknesses of contemporary laws and 
legal structures, be they the M’Naghten Rules or state provision for young offenders, 
and reveal their incapacity to provide justice for both the mentally ill and the healthy. 
The detective figure, occasionally no longer an emissary of the written law but its wilful 
transgressor, takes on a new and controversial ethical role. Siding with the criminal as 
victim, in Mitchell’s novels the detective often introduces the group to new ways of 
thinking about crime and motivation which confront their prejudices and lead to 
reappraisals of the golden age form itself. While many golden age novels are 
undoubtedly escapist, conservative and socially detached, by paying close attention to 
the socially engaged, ethically confrontational and highly self-reflective novels which 
were also produced during this period, we can see a more heterogeneous and complex 
picture of the form emerging.  
 Psychology is central to this ulterior history of the golden age form. 
Psychoanalytic understanding is employed in many texts to break down barriers between 
pathological and ‘normal’ thought processes, while a range of conditions are cited in 
order to account for outlandish motivations, meaning that the irrational becomes 
unostentatiously inculcated in the reason of the plot. When not believed to be caused by 
an inborn moral or intellectual deficiency, cases of criminal madness raise questions 
about the impact of environment, social and gender disadvantage, trauma and upbringing 
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on the character and consciousness of individuals. This complicates the easy divisions 
that critics have supposed these novels to make routinely between the group and the 
transgressor. As novels like Christianna Brand’s Green for Danger and Gladys 
Mitchell’s St Peter’s Finger demonstrate, criminal motivation is not a case of isolated 
individual pathology, but is moulded in relation to social realities, necessitating a 
reassessment of that reality and more self-aware, even self-reproachful, responses from 
the group.     
The central place of psychological discourses in the golden age novel both 
incites and responds to specific cultural anxieties about selfhood – the limits of 
autonomy, the threat of unconscious deviance, and doubts about biological versus self-
determination. Depictions of the detective as diagnostician of the self speak to these 
fears, but so too do they draw attention to further-reaching anxieties about conflicts 
between competing institutionalised discourses which claim to explain the individual to 
the community and to themselves. In Miles Franklin’s Bring the Monkey and Agatha 
Christie’s The ABC Murders, the detective assures characters of their sanity against the 
misinterpretations of an archaic and biased medical profession, while Gladys Mitchell’s 
Mrs Bradley frequently defends the fragile subject against an uncomprehending, 
unsubtle and misinformed legal system. For a genre often characterised as escapist and 
detached, these fears evidently respond to the cultural legitimisation of certain forms of 
knowledge and their perceived lacks, making the crime novel an important site for the 
exploration and affirmation of selfhood in the context of developing medical and 
psychological discourses of sanity and insanity.  
Clashes of interpretation mark a number of novels in this study, from the 
progressive stance adopted towards young offenders in Mitchell’s When Last I Died to 
the meticulous focus upon disordered states of mind and their impact upon the reasoning 
of the detective in the two novels discussed in chapter five. In my introduction I 
reconsidered Susan Rowland’s suggestion that the law and the crime novel are 
structured as masculine and feminine respectively in light of the central position of 
madness in many novels; as I suggested, crime fiction is treated as a supplement to the 
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law, including irrational elements that the law cannot express and acknowledging that 
objectivity and reason are often seen as flawed means of understanding and explaining 
crime. Reason and logic, the underlying ordering structures which, as writers repeatedly 
affirm, their terse and unadorned clue-puzzle forms are supposed to reveal, are shown to 
be rather different in nature to what may be expected, or even quite useless, as they 
intersect with psychological understandings. On the one hand, irrational outbursts are 
fitted into logical structures, as in the psychologically sensitive plotting of Brand’s 
Heads You Lose, while the introduction of scientific prejudices and questionable 
psychological knowledge into plots as if they were fact (as in Michael Innes’ Death at 
the President’s Lodging) demonstrates how relatively specialist psychological concepts 
are accepted as a reasonable explanation for criminal motivations within the genre. On 
the other hand, instances of irrational or unconscious detection seen in Sayers’ Whose 
Body? and Allingham’s Traitor’s Purse, depict the rejection of reason outright, as 
psychological understandings inflected by modernist writing encourage a flourishing of 
alternate epistemologies rarely associated with the golden age form. 
 Within crime fiction scholarship, questions about the form’s literary status are 
often raised. While some critics cast golden age writing as an antidote to demanding 
modernist fiction, others have traced the presence of modernist concerns and modernist 
techniques within the form. The similarities between descriptions of the recording and 
perceiving consciousness and the synthesising, irrational unconscious discussed in 
chapter five attest to the need for focused intertextual analysis of crime fiction in relation 
to modernist writing, with implications for academic criticism of both the quality of the 
writing and the themes dealt with in golden age crime novels. In recent years, there has 
been increasing scholarly focus upon middlebrow novels in the context of interwar 
modernism (see Brown and Grover; also Blanch and Sullivan), which has drawn 
attention to the dissemination of high, middle and low traits and tropes across the 
‘brows’ in texts which consciously self-fashion, are unconsciously shaped, or 
mis/identify with the literary aesthetics of the different readerships (see Blanch and 
Sullivan on ambivalence and uncertainty in female-penned writing, 3). In relation to 
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such work, my discussion of crime fiction in relation to modernist writing has not so 
much sought the point of origin of ideas and styles (although this has in some cases been 
apparent, as for example in the discussion of Whose Body? in relation to narrative mode 
in May Sinclair’s writing) but has drawn attention to the influence of psychology and 
popular discourses of insanity – for example, in print media (as discussed in chapter 
four) – in both modernist and crime writing. These readings assert the validity of an 
intertexual approach in the study of narrative and thematic literary cross-fertilisation 
during the interwar years. 
A final conclusion, a dénouement, an account of what takes place in the golden 
crime novel which will bring satisfaction and closure, is an impossibility. Golden age 
novels are far from homogenous, meaning that a final explanation of how psychology 
interacts with the form cannot meaningfully be applied to such a proliferation of texts. 
As many novels demonstrate, the capture of the criminal can mark not the end, but the 
beginning of an uncontainable problem. Attesting to the capacity of narrative fiction to 
generate feeling and meaning through refusing to do what it has asked its readers to 
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